PREFACE

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PREFACE

121 This is one of five monographs prepared by the staff of the China Project at Stanford University in fulfillment of a twelve-month subcontract with the Human Relations Area Files, Incorporated, New Haven, Connecticut.

The main purpose of this monograph is to present insofar as possible a concise account of the social, economic, and political conditions and problems of the Southwest China Region, which is comprised of the provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan. Although primary emphasis is placed on developments since the Chinese Communists assumed the reins of government in the latter part of 1949, whenever necessary the region's past is touched upon.

114 It may be helpful to point out to readers unfamiliar with the Chinese source material used for the preparation of this monograph that, generally, official publications published before 1949 in Nankin or Chungking were of Nationalist origin, whereas those dated from 1949, unless their place of publication is Taipei, Hong Kong, or some other non-Communist area, are Communist sources. Moreove

114 two sources, the Survey of China Mainland Press and Current Background, although prepared by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong, are compilations of translations from Chinese Communist publications; unless the citations contained therein are specifically attributed to American editors, they refer to translation from Communist newspapers and magazines and neither represent nor reflect the views of the United States Government. The critical use of Communist and pro-Communist sources has been the principal means of analyzing developments in Soviet Russia. Scholars of China are now obliged by circumstances to employ similar sources in their study of contemporary China.

000 The regional approach embodied in this monograph represents an attempt to conform with the suggestion of our Prime Contractor. Although certain topics which cannot be properly treated on a regional basis have been discussed in more general terms, the bulk of this monograph is comprised of regional information. Since Communist China is undergoing many rapid changes, the studies contained in this monograph should be brought up to date at frequent intervals.

This monograph is to be regarded as a cooperative project, and no attempt will be made to identify the authors of the studies included. It is enough to mention the members of our staff.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16
~~AF 16~~

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We are also grateful to our consultants who rendered invaluable assistance: Professor T'ung-ho Tung of the Academia Sinica, Dr. Kia-ngau Chang, Loyola University of Los Angeles, Dr. Shun-hsin Chow, now of the College of William and Mary, Dr. Ch'i-yün Chang and Dr. Yün-t'ien Chiang of Formosa, and Dr. Shann Yau Wang of Hong Kong. We are also grateful to Professor Joseph E. Williams executive head of the Department of Geography, Stanford University, for his supervision of our cartographic work. We should like to express our sincere appreciation to the staff of the Hoover Library, Stanford University, for their patient co-operation, and particularly to Dr. Mary C. Wright, curator of Chinese Collections, for her unfailing support.

The views and opinions expressed in this monograph are those of the staff of the China Project and are not necessarily those of Stanford University.

March 26, 1956
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Shau Wing Chan
Director

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
NORTH-EAST
INNER MONGOLIA
NORTH
EAST
CENTRAL-
SOUTH
NORTHWEST
SOUTHWEST
SINKIANG
TIBET
CHINA
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
REGIONAL BOUNDARY

[facing p. 1(a)]


SOUTHWEST CHINA
PRECIPITATION
96
100
104
108
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
IN
MM
114.1 YEARLY 3000
78.7 2000
68.8 1750
59.0 1500
49.2 1250
39.3 1000
29.5 750
19.6 500
9.8 250
3.9 100
PROVINCES
A Szechwan
B Kweichow
C Yunnan
Scale in Miles
0 100 200

[facing p. 1(b)]

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China AF16

132



SOUTHWEST CHINA

MEAN ANNUAL TEMPERATURE

96
100
104
108
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
F
C
75.2 24
71.6 22
68.0 20
64.4 18
57.2 16
53.6 14
50.0 12
46.4 10
42.8 8
39.2 6
35.6 4
32.0 2
PROVINCES
A-Szechwan
B-Kweichow
C-Yunnan
Scale in Miles
0
100
200

[facing p. 1 (c)]

133

100
30
25
95
20
0
10
100

[facing p. 1 (d_1)]

133

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China AF16


SOUTHWEST CHINA
TOPOGRAPHIC
105
110
30
25
0
100
200
105
110

[facing p. 1 (d2)]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1a',
Sociological Background

GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING

131 The Southwest China Region, comprising the provinces of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow, is adjacent to Chinghai, Kansu, and Shensi provinces in the north across the Tanglha, Min, and Tapa mountain ranges. In the east it shares a boundary with Hupeh, Hunan, and Kwangsi provinces. The western limit of this region is an arbitrary line drawn vertically across the Tibetan massif to separate this region from Tibet.[1] This region defines China's southern frontier bordering upon Indochina and Burma. It lies between 21° and 34° North latitude, and 97° and 110° East longitude, covering an area of 1,146,345 square kilometers (442,600 sq. mi.) in which lives a population of 98,195,110, or about 16.9 per cent of China's total population.

I. TOPOGRAPHY

133

A. Mountains and Rivers

The elevation of the Southwest Region is quite high in the northwest, somewhat lower in the south, much lower in the southeast, and at its lowest point in the northeast (the Szechwan Basin). Because of the particular features of these mountains and rivers and their relative positions, it seems best to discuss them together.

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[1] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], April 1955, pp. 15-16. For details of political subdivisions, see chapter on Structure of Government.

The mountains and rivers in this region appear to originate in the same general area in the northwest. The mighty Tanglha Range, with summits over 7,000 meters (22,400 ft.) high, enters this region from northeastern Tibet and spreads south. The even mightier Himalaya and Nyenchentanglha ranges extend into this region just below the Tanglha, bending south to join the jagged tableland of western Yunnan Province. The rivers are sandwiched between these north-south mountain ranges. Between the Himalaya and the Nyenchentanglha ranges run the middle reaches of the Brahmaputra River, locally known as Yalutsangpu, which turns due south and leaves China between 95° and 96° East longitude. Out of the Tanglha Range flows the Nu River (the Angry River, the upper reaches of the Salween) which fills the deep gully between the Poshula Range (also known as Tan-ta, and its southern portion in Yunnan, as Kao-li-kung) and the Nu Range (the Angry Mountain, also known as T'a-nien-t'a-weng). To the east of the Nu Range and parallel to it across another dividing river (the Lan-ts'ang, upper reaches of the Mekong River) lies the Ning-ching Range. Its southern extension in Yunnan Province is called the Yün-ling.

133 The famous Yangtze River washes the eastern foot of the Ning-ching Range, but in this section the river is referred to as the Chin-sha River (Golden Sand River). Between the Golden Sand River and the Ya-lung River (another name for it is the Nya) is the Sha-lu-li Mountain. Flanking the former Sikang-Szechwan provincial border are the Ta-hsüeh and the Ch'iung-lai ranges. The southern finger of the Ta-hsüeh Range is Che-to Mountain, which has the highest peak in this region (Minya Konka, 7,700 m. or 22,400 ft.). The southern extension of the Ch'iung-lai is Ta-liang Mountain, home of the Yi minority. The little appendage protruding west from the middle of the Ch'iung-lai Range forms the celebrated O-mei Mountain which, although only 3,035 meters (9,712 ft.) high, is the most famous sacred mountain in West China and the site of hundreds of temples.

The mountains so far mentioned all run northwest-south. Other mountains of less magnitude violate this general pattern: the Wu-meng in northeastern and the Liu-shao in eastern Yunnan Province, both extensions of the Yün-ling mentioned above, and the Min-shan mass in northwestern Szechwan Province, which with the Ta-pa form the northern wall of this province. The Wu-shan Range guards the northeastern gate of this region through which the Yangtze River flows in a series of gorges (the awe-inspiring gorges of the Yangtze, about 170 km.

133 or 105 mi. in length).[2] In Kweichow Province, Lou-shan Mountain increases the elevation of the land in the north as does Yün-wu Mountain in the land to the southeast. Compared with the mountains to the northwest, these mountains are but minor elevations on the edge of this expanse of tableland.

Framed by high mountains the rivers thus far mentioned are separate systems, each running its own course northwest-south, with the exception of the Golden Sand, which ends its southward course in northwestern Yunnan and curves back and forth before reaching the Pacific Ocean some 3,000 miles east. The Golden Sand (or Yangtze) River system is the most extensive, receiving the Ya-lung in the former Sikang Province and four other sizable rivers (Ta-tu, Min, Fu, and Chia-ling) in Szechwan Province. There are very few tributaries of the Yangtze on its southern bank apart from the Wu River issuing from central Kweichow Province. There is a theory supported by geologic findings that centuries ago the Golden Sand River did not curve back as it entered northwestern Yunnan Province, but continued southeast to the Gulf of Tonkin by way of the Red River. The present course of the Golden Sand River in northwestern

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[2] Huang Yen-p'ei, Shu Tao [Szechwan Roads], Shanghai, K'ai-ming shu-tien, 1936, p. 23.

133 Yunnan remains very close to the source of the Yüan River (upper reaches of the Red River). At one point the two rivers are only a few miles apart and there is no towering division to keep them from flowing into each other.[3] It is also said that after the Golden Sand changed its course to the east and abandoned the Red River, it filled the Szechwan land depression and made a huge lake. The gorges in the Wu-shan Mountain provide an outlet for the river.

The mountain ranges in the western portion of this region are high, rising from intervening elevated valleys up to 4,000 meters (12,000 ft.) above sea level. They are rugged, desolate, and cold, with the snow lines between 4,000 and 6,000 meters (12,800-19,200 ft.), depending on local precipitation.

Lack of reliable surveys has caused geographers to consult travel notes which often contain hearsay information about the names of certain mountains and their systems. In addition, there is the matter of local dialects which makes it extremely difficult to arrive at a commonly acceptable translation of certain names.[4] The name of the Ta-hsüeh Range, for

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[3] Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1954, p. 61.

[4] George B. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934, pp. 37-38, p. 274.

133 example, means "Big Snow." But local people in many communities use the same name when they refer to other mountains. The name Himalaya, incidentally, is Tibetan for "Snow Mountain."[5]

The rivers on the west side of this region are turbulent flows and objects of fear and superstition to the aborigines. Bamboo-cable bridges and buffalo-skin rafts are dangerous and impractical means for crossing these rivers. In this connection, accounts of the construction of the Hui-t'ung Bridge on the "Stilwell Road" in western Yunnan and the Communist epic crossing of the Ta-tu River in eastern Sikang during the 1934-35 Long March should be recalled. Portions of the rivers in Szechwan Province, where wooden junks serve as local transport, are navigable; other rivers in this region are not.

B. Plains and Lakes

133 The Chengtu Plain, heart of the Szechwan
311 Basin, is undoubtedly the largest area of level land in this region -- 6,000-7,000 square kilometers (2,280-2,680 sq. mi.).[6] It is extensively cultivated, and its productivity equals

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[5] Ko Sui-ch'eng, Chung-kuo Ti-li Hsin Chih [New Geography of China], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1950, chap. IX, p. 243.

[6] Chiang Chün-chang, Hsi-nan Ching-chi Ti-li [The Economic Geography of Southwest China], Shanghai, The Commercial Press, 1946, pp. 9-25.

133 the riparian "rice-bowl" section of Hunan
311 Province to the east. The Chung-pa Plain, northeast of Chengtu in the same province, is
133 another extensive flatland. Outside the basin, the plains are scattered and consist of high valleys between towering mountains or "grasslands" on the Tibet-Sikang highland. The expansive valley around Kweiyang, provincial capital of Kweichow, for example, is about 1,000 meters (3,200 ft.) above sea level. Similar in nature is the Kunming plain, except that it rises to a height of 2,000 meters (6,400 ft.). Farther north are the flat stretches around Pa-an (or Pa-t'ang) on the former Ch'ang-tu--Sikang border, which is an open section of the Golden Sand River valley, rising 2,600-3,000 meters (8,360-9,600 ft.).[7] Many small lakes are found in these plains. The Szechwan Basin, with its lattice work of waterways, is without lakes, but Yunnan, Kweichow, and the former Sikang Province have many. Ts'ao-hai Lake in Kweichow and Erh-hai and T'ien-ch'ih lakes in Yunnan, are noted bodies of water. Warm springs also abound in these two provinces.

132 C. Climate

The climatic zones in this region are best

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[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

132 described in terms of relative elevation. This is especially true in western Szechwan, where warmer climatic conditions are noted in the valleys below 1,500 meters (4,800 ft.), and the few rare land depressions about 900 meters (2,880 ft.) show semitropical characteristics. Places averaging 3,000 meters (9,600 ft.) in elevation are cool, and no warm season can be observed at 4,800 meters (15,360 ft.) and above.[8]

On the highland wind and rain come in their own peculiar manner. During the day the wind blows down the valley but reverses its direction at dusk. Hailstorms frequently accompany the wind.[9] Flat grasslands offer no shelter when howling gusts strike with resounding violence. Travelers, who must camp in the open because few villages are within a day's walking distance of each other, find that it is an ordeal to keep their tents from being snatched away. Winds usually start in mid-morning and rapidly gain in velocity after the noon hour, making it most unpleasant for travelers who must fight the wind and breathe the thin air at altitudes of 6,000-7,000 meters (19,200-22,400 ft.).

The heaviest annual rainfall of 1,790 millimeters (70 in.) is recorded in the lower

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[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 30-36.

[9] Fang Te, *Sui-chün Ju Tsang Chi* [*Entering Tibet with the Army*], Peking, Kung-jen ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 41.

Ya-lung River valley, with the greatest amount falling during June-September. North of the Ya-lung River the precipitation decreases; it reaches 300 millimeters (about 12 in.) in the high northwestern grasslands.[10]

In southwestern Yunnan the V-shaped river valleys become more pronounced, and in some places it is over two miles from the top of the mountain to the bottom of the valley. Near the bottoms of these valleys the climate is tropical. Wind rarely visits the surface of the rivers, leaving the air there stagnant and sultry; bacteria and disease carriers thrive.[11] Central and eastern Yunnan areas enjoy moderate weather all year long. The entire province of Kweichow is in the temperate zone; snow is rarely seen in winter except on high mountain peaks, and even the hottest summer days allow the comfort of cool mornings and evenings. Rain in this zone averages between 1,000 and 1,500 millimeters (39-58 in.) a year, the greatest amount falling in summer. The almost perpetuall blue skies of Yunnan are in sharp contrast to the dull skies of Kweichow which are so often hidden under a grey overcast.

The Szechwan Basin is well known for its

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10. Cressey, op. cit., p. 384.
11. Chiang Chün-chang, op. cit., pp. 30-36.

132 fog which blankets the entire area from October through April. As soon as the fog lifts, it is summer. Warm days, with temperatures around 26° C (78° F), continue for five months. Sufficient rainfall (about 1,000-1,800 mm. or 39-70 in.) throughout the year makes the basin well suited for farming.

Table 1. Climate at Selected Localities*

Locality	Average Temperature (F)		Rainfall (inches)	
	January	July	Annual Average	Rainy Season
Kung-ko (on border between Yunnan and former Sikang)	24	64	42	June-July
K'ang-ting (in central-east of former Sikang)	30	69	75	June-July
Sung-p'an (northwestern Szechwan)	27	60	35	July
Chengtu (on Szechwan Plain)	45	78	55	July-August

Table 1. (continued)

Kunming (lake region of Yunnan)	48	73	42	July-August
T'eng-ch'ung (western Yunnan)	27	69	59	June-August
Kweiyang (central Kweichow)	37	72	48	September-October

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* Based on *Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u* [*Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces*], Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Ko Sui-ch'eng, *op. cit.*, chap IV, p. 102, chap. III, p. 241; Cressey, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-79; Mei Hsin-ju, *Hsi-k'ang* [*Sikang*], Nanking, Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1939, p. 10.

II. SOIL AND VEGETATION

134 The soil in the Szechwan plain is mainly a combination of eroded dark red sandstone, yellow shale, and limestone. Underneath is a layer of clay High fertility of this type of soil is attributed to its rich mineral contents that are easily absorbable for plants and not easily washed away by erosion. Red soil of various ages cover most of the land in Yunnan Province. This type of soil shares a number of properties with common clay. In western Szechwan and western Yunnan, where the mountains are, one can find thick layers of dark grey soil, the comparatively high acidity of which is a result of abundant coniferous woods. In the former province of Sikang, the top soil is thin, often deep dark brown or black in color, and of the plateau-grassland type.

137 Vegetation in this region can generally be divided into categories according to the altitude of the land. Along the Yangtze River in Szechwan Province, fruits like the orange and the peach, and trees like the bamboo and the palm, grow easily. On the hills up to 5,000 feet in elevation around the Szechwan plain are found oaks, evergreens, and ferns; sweet potato and maize are also planted. On higher mountains in western Szechwan and some parts of Yunnan, coniferous forests thrive magnificently, with shrubs of the rhododendron family carpeting the foothills. Dwarf juniper and flowering herbs cover the meadows at 11,550 to 15,500 feet. At still higher

137 altitudes, vegetation dwindles, and only cushion herbs survive at places sheltered from freezing winds.

III. IMPORTANT COMMUNICATION LINES AND CENTERS[12]

487 Szechwan Province is the western gate of the region, and the Yangtze River gorges guard the western entrance to Szechwan. Local transportation in Szechwan depended largely on the Yangtze River and its tributaries until the recent highway and railway development increased shipping
504 facilities in the province. Szechwan's largest river ports are Chungking and Wanhsien. Located at the conflux of the Chia-ling and Yangtze rivers, Chungking controls the inland trade of the eastern half of the province. During World War II, Chungking served as a temporary national capital, expanding to accommodate government agencies and industrial plants relocated from East China. About 200 miles downriver from Chungking is Wanhsien, one of the treaty ports open to foreign trade in 1902. Through Wanhsien is exported the bulk of Szechwan's famous tung oil output. Another river port, Lu-chou, is approximately

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[12] Ch'en Yu-ch'in, Ch'uan-yu Man-chi [Random Notes on Travel in Szechwan], Nanking, Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1934, Ch'eng Kuang-yü, Chung-kuo Tu-shih [The Cities of China], Taipei, Chung-hua wen-hua ch'u-pan shih-yeh wei-yüan-hui, 1953.

504 150 miles upstream from Chungking. Two lesser tributaries empty into the Yangtze near Lu-chou and make the city a market for native products of southern Szechwan and northern Kweichow and Yunnan provinces. Further upriver from Lu-chou is I-pin, terminal of steamer shipping on the Yangtze. The proposed Szechwan-Yunnan Railway will pass through I-pin.

361 The Szechwan provincial capital is Chengtu, located on the westernmost of four major tributaries to the Yangtze River in the province. As an old cultural center of West China, this city is well known for its handicraft industries and is reputed to have an atmosphere like that of
499 Peking. The completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway -- an event overpublicized in the Communist press in 1952 -- brings Chengtu into closer contact with a number of important cities in central-south Szechwan, such as Nei-chiang, the only large center for the sugar industry in West China, and Lung-ch'ang. The proposed Szechwan-Yunnan Railway is to start from Nei-chiang, passing southwest through Tzu-kung
[317] Municipality. Salt extraction in the Tzu-kung area dates back to the tenth century. In 1953 there were 330 natural gas wells supplying 4,382 brine boilers in Tzu-kung. A railway linking Chengtu with Kansu Province in the north is under construction. This railway will pass Kuang-yüan, a strategic point on the northern
491 approach to Szechwan. The existing highway

5

491 between Chengtu and Kuang-yüan runs parallel to the new rail line at many places and cuts through a narrow defile just north of Kuang-yüan.

[341] West of Chengtu, the city of O-mei 491 stands on one of the two main overland routes linking Szechwan with the former province of [823] Sikang. The mountain to the southwest of O-mei, after which the city is named, has been the favorite subject of classical Chinese literature because of its scenic beauty and its connection with Buddhism. Another main overland route from Chengtu westward is the much-heralded Sikang-Tibet Highway. Now that the province of Sikang has been abolished, it remains to be seen how the name of this highway is to be changed. An important highway trunk-line in West China, it passes through Ya-an, former capital of Sikang Province. Southward from Ya-an is a road running through the only rich valley area on the huge tableland of western Szechwan and Yunnan provinces.

Two highways connect Szechwan Province with Yunnan Province to the south. The eastern route from Chungking continues through Kweichow Province. The first key city on the highway in Kweichow Province is Tsun-i, which the red Army occupied twice during the Long March in 1934-35. The school playground on which the Red Army staged a huge rally in 1934 is now a national shrine and gives renown to the city

491 of Tsun-i. Farther south, the highway leads to the provincial capital of Kuei-yang in the center of Kweichow Province. On the network of highways converging upon Kuei-yang are Tu-shan on the route to Kwangsi Province, Kuei-ting on the highway to Hunan Province, and An-shun on the road to Yunnan Province. In the mountain area of western Kweichow Province, An-shun, with an estimated population of 50,000, is the largest metropolis.

The western Szechwan-Yunnan route also passes through Kweichow Province. It starts from Lu-chou in Szechwan and enters Kweichow at a point a short distance north of Pi-chieh, then leaves Kweichow at a point south of Wei-ning. The possibility of expansion of Wei-ning is greater than that of Pi-chieh because in addition to the highway, the proposed Szechwan-Yunnan Railway will also pass through the former city. From Wei-ning south, the highway runs parallel to the proposed rail line to Chan-i, the northern terminal of the Yunnan-Indochina Railway.

496 The Yunnan-Indochina Railway links Chan-i with Yunnan's provincial capital of Kunming. During World War II, Kunming was used as the liaison center for U. S. and Chinese armies in South China and as the terminal of the famed Burma Road and the "Over the Hump" airlift. The beauty of nearby Kunming Lake and a healthful climate make this lake region

490 "the jewel of the south." Meng-tzu is the largest city in southern Yunnan. A spur line connecting Meng-tzu with Ko-chiu to the west facilitates the distribution of the latter's tin output by way of the Yunnan-Indochina Railway. For a period tin mining in the Ko-chiu area was interrupted by the destruction of the railway, but vigorous reconstruction after the Communists came has rejuvenated the industry, which, it is reported, supports 150,000 people. The last station on the Yunnan-Indochina Railway in China is Ho-k'ou, China's southern gateway. The only passable route across the border is by way of a bridge on the Nan-ch'i River.

491 Traffic between Yunnan Province and Burma has been shifted to the highway since the abandonment of the old Yunnan-Burma Railway. The highway starts from Kunming and passes through Ta-li and T'eng-ch'ung. The only international road suitable for mechanized vehicles crossing this section of China's boundary, the highway has become known as the Burma Road and is remembered for the important role it played when China was resisting the Japanese.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1b, Sociological Background

HISTORICAL SETTING

I. INTRODUCTION

635 The Southwest China Administrative Region maintained by the Communist Government from 1949 to the abolition of the regional administration system in late 1954 comprises a frontier territory which has never been completely integrated into the Chinese Empire. Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, which make up the bulk of the region, often have been under indirect control of the unified Chinese Empire since its beginning in 221 B.C., but some areas of these provinces have never been completely subject to the central authority up to the present day. The Red Basin surrounding the Chengtu Plain of Szechwan is the only ancient center of Chinese civilization in the three provinces. What was until 1955 the province

635 of Sikang, which rounded out the western part of the Southwest Region, began to be developed as a part of the frontier colonial territory during the last years of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912).

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563 When the Red Army overran the Southwest Region in 1949, the Communists fell heir to the problems the territory has posed to every governing authority in China. As had often happened in the past, the mountainous terrain of the Southwest Region was the last refuge of armed resistance to the new regime. According to the Communists, Kweichow was not completely in their hands until January 1951,[1] and more "bandits" (a common Communist term for its armed enemies) were found in[2] the Southwest Region than in any other region. A more difficult and longer-term problem was that of the tribal people who had never been assimilated into Chinese culture. Constituting about 20 per cent of the region's population, the autochthonous people in many areas of the Southwest were still organized under their own tribal laws and respected the authority only of their own tribal chiefs.

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[1] Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, 205, pp. 12-13. Hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. Unless specifically attributed to the American editors, citations from this source refer to literal translations from Communist magazines and newspapers and should be evaluated accordingly.

[2] Ibid., 212, p. 24.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A. Introduction of Chinese Culture

175 The legendary history of China records close relations between the Pa and Shu tribal states of the Chengtu Plain in Szechwan and the mythical Chinese emperors in the Yellow River area of North China, from which the mainstream of Chinese civilization spread south. In the historical period, the tribal kingdoms participated in the campaign of the founder of the Chou Dynasty (c. 1030-221 B.C.) which overthrew the first unified state in China -- the Shang (c. 1520-c. 1030 B.C.).[3] However, the Chinese culture did not begin to exert real influence in the Southwest Region until just before the establishment of the first Chinese Empire under the Ch'in Dynasty (221-206 B.C.).[4]

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[3] Harold Wiens, *China's March toward the Tropics*, Hamden, Conn., Shoe String Press, 1954, pp. 55-62. On early cultural development in the Southwest Region see *Ibid*., pp. 29-129.

[4] On the development of Chinese civilization from prehistoric times through the founding of the Ch'in Dynasty see Wolfram Eberhard, *A History of China*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950, pp. 3-68; Kenneth S. Latourette, *The Chinese: Their History and Culture*, 2nd ed., rev. (two volumes in one), Vol. I, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1934, pp. 32-84. Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. I, Cambridge, England, The University Press, 1954, pp.73-98, summarizes both foregoing presentations and other [cont'd

In the struggle for hegemony over all China among the petty states of the former Chou domains, the Southwest Region played a key role. During the fourth century B. C., eastern Szechwan became a part of the principality of Ch'u, which dominated the Yangtze River plain from what is now Chungking to the sea. At about the same time, the state of Ch'in expanded from its base in Shensi into the Chengtu Plain. The maneuver cut off a Ch'u military expedition seeking new territories in Kweichow and Yunnan, and it turned back to the Kunming region of Yunnan to establish the kingdom of Tien under the army's leader, Chuang Ch'iao.[5]

More important, the occupation of the forme Pa and Shu territories by Ch'in helped it to vastly expand its economic resources, outflank and defeat Ch'u in the final struggle for power, and become the founder of the first Chinese Empire in 221 B.C. The victory of Ch'in was in large part due to the broadening of its agricultural base through the development of the Chengtu Plain. Large numbers of people from the original domain in Shensi were transported to the more productive Szechwan plain, and its potential began to be realized at the end of the fourth century by the construction of a still functioning irrigation system

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modern scholarship on China's early development.

[5] Wiens, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

175 initiated by the Ch'in governor Li Ping.[6] The longer range results of Ch'in's development of the Chengtu Plain was to make it a continuing center of Chinese agriculture, civilization, and population up to the present day.

The great Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 220) initiated the policy of indirect rule in the frontier areas of the Southwest Region. Tribal territories were formed into political departments and districts. With the exception of those on the Chengtu Plain, they continued to be under the real control of their former tribal chieftains. The local rulers recognized the Han emperor as an overlord, a relationship enforced by imperial military expeditions when not accepted voluntarily by reason of the prestige of the Han Empire and its bestowal of gifts and titles. Among the most powerful local rulers who accepted the vassal relationship voluntarily were the kings of Tien in Yunnan and of Yeh-lang in western Kweichow.[7]

The policy of indirect rule over most of Kweichow, Yunnan, and eastern and western Szechwan was followed by subsequent dynasties until nearly the end of the fourteenth century. During that time, less than 20 per cent of the Yunnan-Kweichow plateau, the area most suitable to Chinese agriculture aside from the Chengtu Plain, was occupied by Han Chinese people.[8]

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[6] Chi Ch'ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1936, p. 96. In late 1954, the Communist press reported that the two-thousand year old irrigation

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175 However, many of the semi-autonomous tribes adopted administrative and cultural elements from the Chinese civilization when it was politically unified and powerful. Whenever the empire showed signs of weakness or was in eclipse,the tribal peoples broke away from Chinese influence.

B. Separatism in the Southwest

The chaos in the Southwest Region following the collapse of the Han Dynasty was resolved by the genius of the prime minister of the Shu Han Dynasty (221-264), recognized by the Chinese as the legitimate dynasty among the Three Kingdoms which ruled a divided empire after A.D. 220. Established on the Chengtu Plain, the Shu Han ruled most of Yunnan and Kweichow. The famous prime minister Chu-ko Liang set up an administrative system whereby central Szechwan and some of the surrounding Sinified areas of the central plateau of Yunnan-Kweichow were organized into districts under the direct rule of the capital at Chengtu. Outlying areas in Yunnan were tied to the kingdom by overlord-vassal

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[continued] system in Szechwan was being expanded: S.C.M.P., 941, p. 39.

7. Wiens, op. cit., pp. 147-8.

8. Ibid., p. 185.

175 arrangements which permitted the chieftains to retain real power in the tribal territories. Chu-ko Liang's firm but fair treatment of the distant tribes gained their respect and admiration. His reputation is still high among the Wa (K'a-wa) tribes of southwestern Yunnan.[9]

A less Sinified and longer lasting independent state was established in the Southwest Region during the middle of the T'ang Dynasty (618-906). The small tribe of Nan-chao in the Ta-li Plain of western Yunnan expanded under the leadership of P'i-lo-ko and the encouragement of the T'ang administration to extend control over most of Yunnan and Sikang. This movement was sanctioned by the T'ang because Nan-chao emulated Chinese administration and culture while performing the vital function of containing the threat of rampant Tibetan nomads on the western borders of the empire.

When a T'ang minister insulted the second ruler of the Nan-chao, Ko-lo-feng, he broke with the dynasty and founded an independent kingdom in 750. In the next century and a half, the Nan-chao threatened the existence of the T'ang, spread into Kweichow, and repeatedly invaded Szechwan and areas outside the Southwest Region to the north and south. During this time, the independent kingdom was absorbing Chinese culture through plunder, captives, and inter-marriage. The assimilation

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[9] Ibid., pp. 148-50.

175 was so thorough that the Min-chia (Pai-man) trbies of the Ta-li Plain show a close affinity to Chinese culture today.[10]

In conquering the Chinese Empire of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), the Mongols outflanked it by striking through the Ta-li kingdom. Central Yunnan was made desolate by the invasion, but remnants of the Ta-li state survived as vassals of the Yüan (Mongol) Dynasty (1279-1368) until the conquest of Yunnan by the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) in 1382. The province was incorporated into the Chinese Empire by the Mongols, who installed as governor a Mohamedan Tartar from Bukhara. Under the adopted Chinese name of Sai Tien-ch'i, he repopulated central and western Yunnan by inviting in Mohamedans from Northwest China. As a result, the province has become a secondary Chinese center of Mohamedanism.[11]

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538 While most of the Southwest continued as an undeveloped and unassimilated frontier area, the thoroughly Sinified Red Basin in Szechwan was contributing to Chinese civilization some of its greatest exponents in the arts, philosophy, and statecraft. No Chinese poet has ever surpassed the work of Li Po (c. 700-762), whose birthplace is disputed but thought to be in Szechwan, and his frequent companion in bacchic revels, Tu Fu 712-770), more certainly a native of the province. Both men were for a time favorites at the T'ang court and were among the "Eight Immortals

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[10] Ibid., pp. 142, 157-62.

[11] Ibid., pp. 162-64, 184.

175 538 of the Wine-cup" -- a small group devoted to serious drinking and metaphysical flights of Taoist and Buddhist fancy.[12] Both men suffered misfortune and privation during their lives, but Li Po sought to escape them by retreat into a romantic world, unlike Tu Fu, whose poetry often expresses suffering in moving terms. Both men are acclaimed by the Communists. Tu Fu's concern with his own and the world's miseries has been interpreted by the Communists as evidence of his anti-feudalistic feeling, and the current regime has lauded him and his poetry while making his home in Chengtu into a national shrine.[13]

Another famous exponent of Chinese culture from Szechwan was Su Tung-p'o (Su Shih, 1036-1101). He has a high place among the great names of Chinese philosophy, literature, and caligraphy. His philosophic writings -- committed to no orthodoxy and searching for the truth in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism -- were long influential in China and Japan as well.[14]

C. Development of Chinese Settlement and Direct Control

167 175 Large-scale settlement of Yunnan and Kweichow by Han Chinese and the extension of Chinese central authority in these provinces and Szechwan became a Chinese policy with the Ming Dynasty. Under its rule, mass migration into western Szechwan and the Yunnan-Kweichow plateau was effected on a planned basis. One of the initial

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[12] Latourette, op. cit., Vol.I, pp.219-220.

[13] S.C.M.P., 840, p. 41.

[14] Latourette, op. cit., Vol. I, pp.264,267.

175 167 acts of the first Ming emperor Hung Wu (Chu Yüan-chang) was to remove most of the population of the Nanking area to Yunnan. Thereafter, armies recruited largely from the Yangtze Valley were settled in agricultural colonies throughout the fertile regions of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan. Fortifications were established at strategic points in the three provinces. Control and colonization in other areas of the Southwest Region were facilitated by commercial and civilian agencies. These acts made possible the establishment of Kweichow as a province under Chinese administrative control.[15]

175 636 The incorporation of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan into the Chinese Empire did not mean the imposition of effective control by the central government throughout these provinces. The Han Dynasty policy of indirect administration of non-Han Chinese areas through local rulers was formalized under the Ming Dynasty by the inauguration of the t'u-ssu system. Under it, local rulers were confirmed or established as hereditary t'u-ssu (local agents of the government) with various ranks in tribal areas. About one-third of these local chieftains were natives of the areas they controlled, another third were tribal leaders not native to the locality under their command, and the remaining third were Han Chinese, most of whom had adopted the customs of the subject tribal people.[16]

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[15] Wiens, op. cit., pp. 180-85,192-200.

[16] On the inauguration of the t'u-ssu system and the extension of Chinese control in the Southwest Region,see ibid., pp. 221-66.

175 636 Some progress in extending direct control over former tribal areas was made by the Ming Dynasty through its program of planned settlement and military action. However, the Ming administration vacillated between a policy of leaving non-Han Chinese areas to their own devices and eliminating t'u-ssu power by military force. The latter policy was most consistently and successfully pursued in Kweichow.

A more persistent attempt to bring the whole Southwest under Chinese administration was pursued by the Ch'ing Dynasty. Under the Republic (1912-1949), the extension of Chinese administration was handicapped by internal revolution, external interference, and warlord rule until the retreat of the Nationalist Government to Chungking in 1938. By the end of the anti-Japanese Resistance War in 1945, some progress in further integrating the Southwest Region into the Chinese political system had been made, but the t'u-ssu and lesser tribal chiefs still exercising real power numbered more than one hundred in Szechwan, more than one hundred and fifty in Yunnan, and over one hundred in Sikang.[17] The continuance since then of local independence in the Southwest is reflected in the announcement that 220 autonomous local governments had been established in the region by the Communist regime up to September 1954.[18]

175 636 563 The extension of central authority in the

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[17] Ibid., pp. 240-41.

[18] People's China, Peking, Sept.1,1954,p.23

175 Southwest was complicated by the lack of respect
636 toward each other of the *Han* Chinese and the
563 tribal people. People who refused to adopt the Chinese culture were habitually regarded as inferior by the Chinese. On the other hand, the frontier area did not attract the best officials or Chinese people. Representatives of the central government tended to be second-raters inclined toward indolence, graft, corruption, and oppressiv tactics toward the tribal people. Petty artisans and merchants made yearly trips to the frontier areas looking for quick profit by any means, while the more permanent Chinese settlers in the non-*Han* Chinese areas were often refugees and displaced persons who lived at a lower level than their non-Han Chinese neighbors. From the tribesmen, who respected strength and straightforwardness, such official and non-official representatives of the Chinese earned only contempt and resentment.[19]

Another factor which made the abolition of local autonomy difficult was that the *t'u-ssu* and lesser chieftains often had the respect of their subjects, entrenched position, and the armed strength to resist anything but a full-scale invasion by the central authority. In many places where *hsien* government was established by the Ch'ing or Republican central authorities, real power remained in the hands of the *t'u-ssu* or village headmen.[20]

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[19] Wiens, *op. cit.*, pp. 251-53.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 248-50.

D. Conflict between Tribesmen and Han Chinese

175 167 563 The mass migration of Han Chinese into the Southwest Region and the attempts of the central government to increase its real control there resulted in heightened and continual conflict between tribesmen on the one hand and the new settlers and the Chinese government on the other. Even if the intrusion of the central authority did not bring with its exploitive and corrupt government, the influx of settlers encroached on the domain of the tribesmen to threaten their livelihood and the power of the local ruler.

175 669 563 Oppression and misgovernment by the Han Chinese bureaucracy, along with appropriation of former tribal lands by Chinese agriculturists drove the Miao people of Kweichow into desperate acts of violence twice in the eighteenth century. A great outbreak in 1735 was put down with much bloodshed by an army under General Chang Kuang-ssu. After enduring another half-century of misgovernment and exploitation, the Miao people retreated to the deeper mountain recesses of the province and again attempted rebellion under the leadership of Wu Pa-yüeh in 1795. In the next two years, the tribesmen sacked Chinese cities and towns in Kweichow, Szechwan, and neighboring Hunan before once more being [167] suppressed by central government force. Thereafter, the Miao people confined themselves to sporadic raids against the Han Chinese, who steadily advanced into the old tribal territories.[21]

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[21] Ibid., pp. 190-191.

175 669 563 798 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, outbreaks of tribal warfare with the Chinese central government occurred further to the south and west. Beginning in 1855, the Moslem population in the Ta-li district of Yunnan staged an uprising against their non-Moslem neighbors that led to almost twenty years of warfare marked by ruthless violence and slaughter on both sides. At least a million people lost their lives in the struggle, and one source estimates the population of the province was reduced from sixteen million to six million.[22]

III. THE MODERN PERIOD

A. The Coming of the West

177 From the middle of the nineteenth century, the Southwest China Region was subject to the intrusion of western military, material, and economic forces. They carried with them new secular and religious ideas incompatible with the traditional cosmological, social, political, and economic views of China. These forces for change coincided with a phenomenon when had been repeated many times over the centuries in China -- the decline of the ruling dynasty with an accompanying abuse of power and growth of disorder.[23]

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[22] Cf. Eberhard, op. cit., p. 313; and H. B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols., London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910, 1918, Vol.II, pp. 288-89.

[23] The course and effect of Imperial China's

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624 The Southwest Region felt the impact of the West later and less profoundly than the regions of China bordering on the Pacicic Ocean. Western military might made an initial impress on the region but was not followed by the broad penetration of new material and ideological forces that changed so much of the environment and thinking in the maritime provinces. The bureaucracy of the Ch'ing Dynasty was succeeded by the warlords of [669] the Republican period. They maintained their power under the Nationalist Government and effectively blocked the wide dissemination of revolutionary doctrine in the Southwestern provinces, while playing along in the power struggle of the twentieth century revolutionary period. Only under the wartime needs and influence of the Nationalist Government in Chungking did the Southwest experience a growth of largely small-scale industrialization, the dissemination of new political and social ideas devoid of revolutionary content, and an advance in direct control by the central political authority.

[Footnote 23 continued]

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interaction with the West are described from different points of view in H. B. Morse, op. cit.; and John K. Fairbank and Ssu-yü Teng, China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1954. Unless otherwise noted, the following pages are taken from these sources.

B. The Western Military and Missionary Impact

636 563 175 The initial effect in the Southwest Region of Western intrusion was the new influence brought to bear on the relation between the tribesmen and Han Chinese authorities by French penetration of Indo-China and British operations in Burma and Tibet. Annam, Tongkin, and Burma were all tributary kingdoms of the Chinese Empire until the last decades of the nineteenth century. Until the coming of the West, their borders with Yunnan were of little consequence to either kingdoms or the empire. The frontier area was rugged terrain inhabited by semi-independent tribes that had no consciousness of political demarcations and that moved freely back and forth across the vague boundary line. With French penetration of Annam and Tongkin and English advances into Upper Burma in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, all these tributary states were wrested away from Chinese suzerainty by force. Their borders and the loyalty of the tribal inhabitants of the frontier region then became matters of prime importance. If China pressed too hard for control or discipline of the tribes commissioned to guard the frontier, they had an alternative to Chinese rule and the means to blackmail the central authorities into more conciliatory treatment.

The Chinese frustration on the frontier was compounded by the inroads of France and England into the Southwestern provinces. Both Western powers in consolidating their position in the former Chinese tributary kingdoms

175 simultaneously enforced demands for the rights
636 of trade, mining development, railroad building,
563 and missionary settlement in Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kweichow. The foreign economic and missionary representatives were a constant source of irritation and fear for the Chinese and tribal inhabitants. Their periodic outbreaks of violence against the Westerners constituted excuses for forcing concessions from the Chinese government, causing it real fear that the provinces might eventually be alienated from its control.

By the twentieth century, Britain in Burma was emulating the old Chinese frontier policy of indirect control over the tribal elements. In controlling upper Burma as a defensive outpost of the English colonial empire in India, England left the t'u-ssu intact, subsidized them, and enlisted their sympathy in every way possible. What could happen when the Chinese government failed to follow a similar program was made evident in 1910. An attempt in that year by the Ch'ing Dynasty bureaucracy in Yunnan to punish the tyranny of a t'u-ssu of the P'ien-ma area led to his defection to the British and their occupation of the northwestern corner of the province.[24]

The Chinese have never been reconciled to the loss, and both the Nationalist Government and the Communist regime claim the upper salient

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[24] Wiens, op. cit., pp. 254-57.

175 of Burma as Chinese territory. Until the out-
636 break of the war of resistance against Japan
563 in 1937, the British t'u-ssu policy in the Burma border area precluded any concerted attempt by the Nationalist Government to exercise real control over the Southwest Region frontier. The same frustration in frontier policy and extension of Chinese authority there still faces the Communist regime, as it has not attempted to enforce by arms its claim to the disputed Burmese area.

175 A chain of circumstances leading to the
635 establishment of Sikang as a separate province
563 within the Chinese administrative system was
669 initiated by the British invasion of Tibet in 1904. The British move was undertaken to offset Russian intrusion into Tibet during the previous decade, which England believed constituted a threat to its position in India. British occupation was soon followed by direct diplomatic negotiations with Tibet, though China was still recognized as nominal sovereign in the kingdom. At this sign of weakness on the part of the Ch'ing Dynasty, tribal leaders in what was then western Szechwan, and later became eastern Sikang, attempted to revolt. The uprising was quickly put down by a Szechwan army under the command of Chao Erh-feng. He attempted to replace the old t'u-ssu system by instituting hsien government on the Chinese model as a preliminary step to the establishment of a new province to be formed from western Szechwan and eastern Tibet.[25]

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[25] Ibid., pp. 237-38.

175 Tibet asserted its independence during
635 the Chinese revolutionary convulsions of 1912,
563 and with British help maintained a disputed
669 sovereignty until the Communists conquered
the territory in 1951. No Chinese government accepted Tibet independence, and intermittent fighting between Tibetan and Szechwan troops continued until 1928. In that year the Nationalist Government was able to assert control over eastern Tibet. That area with western Szechwan was then incorporated into the province of Sikang as part of the Chinese administrative system.[26]

Although the Ch'ing and the Nationalist government policy relieved the t'u-ssu of their legal title to rule, they continued to exercise real command in most of Sikang up to the present time. The last large-scale attempt at revolt by the t'u-ssu occurred in the early nineteen thirties as part of what is known as the Nona Rebellion.[27] The revolt was touched off when Nona, a member of the Commission for the Organization of Sikang Province and high-ranking tribal chieftain, staged an insurrection after the rejection of his recommendation that the t'u-ssu system be restored. His defection led to general unrest among the tribal leaders.

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[26] H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, Far Eastern International Relations, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931, pp. 558-62.

[27] Wiens, op. cit., p. 246.

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The revolt was still in progress when the Communists passed through the Southwest Region on their "Long March." Approaching northwestern Szechwan from Yunnan by way of what was then the border area between Szechwan and Sikang, the Communists claim to have had considerable success in winning the friendship of the Lolo (Yi) people.[28] When the Tibetan Autonomous District of Sikang was organized in November 1950, the Communist press reported that fifteen years earlier in the same area the Communists on the Long March had helped the local leaders establish a Tibetan People's Government or Pu-pa.[29] However, a non-Communist study asserts that the t'u-ssu of Szechwan and Sikang feared the Communists more than the Kuomintang and that many of the local leaders were wiped out in desperately resisting the Red Army. This view agrees with the account of the Communists concerning their bitter experiences among the Mantzu tribes of the Lolo people in the extreme northwest of Szechwan and northeastern Sikang during the second stage of the Long March from the Sungp'an area of Szechwan to Yenan in Shensi.[30]

C. Separatism and Conservatism

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The rugged terrain of the Southwest Region which had kept it isolated and backward during the

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[28] See Communist account as reported by Edgar Snow, Red Star over China, New York, Random House, 1938, pp.182-84.

[29] S.C.M.P., 39, p. 42.

[30] Compare Wiens, op.cit., pp.246-47;and Snow, op. cit., pp. 192-94.

[redacted]

175 imperial era served to perpetuate these conditions during the Republican period that followed. 635 What part the region played in the revolutionary ferment 669 that marked much of China south of the Yangtze River from 1911 to 1928 was characterized by greedy provincialism and military expediency rather than by national aspiration and political idealism.

An immediate and direct cause of the revolution that overthrew the imperial regime was the outbreak in Szechwan during September 1911 of strikes and violence against the central government when it attempted to take over from the province the financing and construction of the Hankow-Szechwan Railway. However, the Chinese do not mark this event as the start of the 1911 Revolution, because the Szechwan outburst was not motivated by anti-dynastic feeling. Rather, the resistance was an outgrowth of jealous provincialism and, apparently, the hope of local investors in the mismanaged and corrupt provincial venture into railway building that the central government could be coerced into replacing their financial losses.[31] When the dynasty showed 175 hesitancy in dealing with the Szechwan outbreak, 669 revolutionary politicians elsewhere in China made another and successful bid, after more than a decade of abortive attempts, to establish republican government in China. The premature explosion of a bomb on October 10, 1911 at the Hankow (Hupeh) headquarters

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[31] On the Szechwan outbreak see Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution; An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic, Chicago, *University of Chicago Press*, 1931, pp. 28-29.

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of one group plotting to overthrow the dynasty is celebrated as the beginning of the republican revolution.

Both the outbreak of open warfare between the die-hard revolutionaries and the dynasty, opportunistic militarists in the Southwest Region as elsewhere in China were ready to take advantage of the situation to promote their own interests. Ts'ai Ao (Ts'ai O), a Ch'ing military commander in Yunnan, was the strong man of the Southwest Region. His troops quickly eliminated the Ch'ing adherents in the province and in neighoring Kweichow and Szechwan. As a reward for his contribution to the success of the revolution, he was made military governor of Yunnan under the new republic. A follower of the reformer Liang Ch'i-ch'ao rather than the revolutionist Sun Yat-sen, Ts'ai stood aside in the struggle for power which soon developed between the parliamentary-minded supporters of Sun Yat-sen and the dictatorial-minded president of the republic, Yüan Shih-k'ai. After Yuan had won the battle by dissolving parliament and crushing its adherents' attempt at resistance, Ts'ai was persuaded to move to Peking and take a nominal part in Yüan's increasingly more personalized government. When in 1915 Yüan attempted to cap his dominance of the central government by making himself emperor, Ts'ai fled the capital by way of Japan and returned to Yunnan in December to institute a rebellion that cost his life but eventually forced Yüan to relinquish his ambition and lose his hold on China south of the Yangtze River before he died in June 1916.[32]

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[32] *Ibid*., pp. 42-44.

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669 After Ts'ai's death, his place of leadership and influence in the region and national affairs was aspired to by T'ang Chi-yao, a native of Yunnan and supporter of Sun Yat-sen. Along with other military strong men, he supported the various ephemeral governments established in Canton with Sun's real or nominal leadership between 1918 and 1924. They claimed varying jurisdictions -- always over Kwangtung and Kwangsi, generally over Yunnan and Kweichow, and sometimes over Szechwan and other provinces south of the Yangtze River. On Sun's death following the revitalization and strengthening of the Kuomintang with Soviet Union guidance and material aid, T'ang made a bid for the dead leader's mantle. The Yunnan militarist adopted the title of vice-generalissimo of the Kuomintang armies, a post which had been offered him before Sun's death. T'ang's amibitious move and his command of a combined Yunnan-Kwangsi army posed a threat to the largely Kwangtung military force and leadership of the Kuomintang. Within six weeks of Sun's death, the Yunnan-Kwangsi army was decimated and T'ang forced into retirement.[33]

Thereafter, the Southwest was splintered into petty domains dominated by a number of minor warlords. The influence of the revolution as of the

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[33] Ibid., pp. 64-68, 95-96.

[redacted]

175 Nationalist Government was scarcely felt in
669 the region. Petty despots forced crop lands to
be diverted to the cultivation of opium poppies,
[661] levied and collected taxes for decades still to come, and enriched themselves in every way possible at the expense of the lives and property of the people.

175 In the 1930's, both Yunnan and Szechwan
635 were brought largely under the control of warlords native to the respective provinces they dominated -- Lung Yün in Yunnan and Liu Hsiang in Szechwan. The foremost native of Kweichow was likewise a military man, Ho Ying-ch'in, who had a major part in running the wartime Chinese army as one of Chiang Kai-shek's most powerful military deputies and still retains some influence in military and civilian affairs on Formosa. Liu Hsiang died as the Nationalist Government removed its capital to Chungking in 1938 and brought new influences to bear in Szechwan. Although there was no love lost between Generalissimo Chiang and Lung Yün, the latter held a major share of his original power in Yunnan throughout the war of resistance against Japan. Two months after V. J-Day, Chiang occupied the warlord's capital of Kunming and incorporated Lung and his army into the national military force. In this capacity, he led his troops into Indo-China to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces there in 1945 and, later, against the Red Army. While pitted against the Communist forces, he fled China to Hong Kong and subsequently returned to the Mainland to serve in the New regime in Southwest China.

000 new regime in Southwest China.[34]

D. New Influences in the War of Resistance against Japan

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177 With the removal of the Chinese national capital to Chungking in 1938, the heyday of central government authority in the Southwest Region was reached. The Kuomintang and its government officials were concentrated in the wartime capital and exerted lesser control in scattered areas throughout the Southwest. Through these party and government officials, such mass organizations as the San-min Chu-i Youth Corps, and a secret police network, the Nationalist Government came closer to ruling the region than had any previous central political authority.

Accompanying the new political influence were the novel effects of the influx of professional and academic people, students, and business men from the more modern cities of the maritime provinces. Industrialization mushroomed, especially in Chungking; and that city with Chengtu and Kunming became the temporary home of displaced universities. Rural co-operative and education movements in scattered areas of the Southwest acquainted thousands of peasants for the first time with some of the new social, economic, and political ideas that had been current in the coastal cities

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[34] On Lung Yan, see Paul M.A.Linebarger, The China of Chiang Kai-shek, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941,p. 101;Herbert Freyne, Free China's New Deal, N.Y., Macmillan Co., 1945, p.169; and T. H. White, Annalee Jacoby, Thunder out of China, N.Y., William Sloane Associates,Inc.,1946.

175 of China for about a quarter of a century.
177 The habits, dress, and ideas of American military and civilian personnel and of the Chinese refugees from industrialized centers constituted another novel experienced for the long-isolated people of the Southwest Region.[35] On the other hand, anthropological studies of ethnic minorities and geological explorations sponsored by the government gave the professionals involved and the government better knowledge of some of the region's hitherto unknown human and natural resources.

The depth of penetration and long-range effect of these new influences is difficult to determine. Had they occurred when the government was not primarily occupied with fighting a war for survival or under a more disciplined or more revolutionary-minded regime, the intensity and lasting quality of the new forces would undoubtedly have been strengthened tremendously. As it was, however, their power was diluted by Kuomintang censorship and control in areas where the new influences were at work, the continued existence of petty warlord rule in other areas, the skyrocketing inflation and heavy taxation incident to the war, and the growth of profiteering, corruption, and demoralization within the ranks of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Government during the last few years of World War II.

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563 From the beginning of the exodus to Chungking, the old inhabitants and the new arrivals from the eastern cities looked on each other with

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[35] On wartime Southwest China cf. White and Jacoby, op. cit., passim; Linebarger, op.cit., pp. 214-34.

[redacted]

175 mutual suspicion and disdain. When many of the
186 new factories and the modern, urbanized immi-
563 grants who largely ran them moved back to the
more convenient locations and amenities of the eastern industrial centers after the war, their departure was mourned by few of the older population of Chungking.
178 Some of the factories remained in operation, however, and the wartime exploration of the mineral resources of the Southwestern provinces contributed not only new knowledge of the potential economic value of the Southwest but also impelling reasons for its further development and for tying it closer to the rest of China by improved communications.

177 The intellectual impact may have made a deeper, longer lasting impression on the people of the Southwest, simply because many of the students and older intellectuals were intensely desirous in their patriotic and socially idealistic zeal of establishing closer contacts with the masses of the people and contributing to their improved welfare and national consciousness. Likewise, most of the intellectuals in the rural education movement were devoted to improving the livelihood and educational level of the peasants. These rural teachers were fully conscious that if they attained their objective it would engender popular demands on the government for improved social conditions and more democratic, responsible political organization.

668 Both the organized rural education movement and the sporadic efforts of inspired students and professional people were handicapped by

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government wartime censorship and control which permitted no criticism of existing conditions or of government policies and personnel. The revolutionary, political, economic, and social elements of the Kuomintang peogram which had won the party a popular following and control of the national government in the mid-1920's had been repudiated under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership and replaced with a reworked Confucian doctrine that sanctioned authoritarian rule.[36] As a result, the spread of Kuomintang influence in the Southwest Region and the recruitment there of members to the Party and its auxiliary San-min Chu-i Youth Corps served to disseminate the principles and influences of authoritarian rule rather than to stir up the social ferment which had accompanied the Kuomintang's rise to power at Nanking a decade earlier. At the same time, the government found it expedient to permit local warlords to maintain their control and oppression of the people without interference as long as assigned quotas for grain payment and army inductees were met.

In the last year of World War II, popular dissatisfaction with Nationalist Government control and policies was plainly manifested in the Southwest Region as elsewhere in China by outbreaks of rebellions and anti-government demonstrations. They

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[36] See Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: the Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," The Far Eastern Quarterly, August 1955.

668 were evidently inspired by economic rather than political factors. Enemy bombings and infantry drives against economic objectives, inflation, heavy taxes, and forced delivery of grain quotas to the government at prices far below the open market rate drove farmers and townspeople into bankruptcy, starvation, and desperate measures. After the war, the Nationalist Government was preoccupied with containing or eliminating the Communists while restoring its position in the agriculturally and industrially wealthier, more developed regions of North, Central-South, East and Northeast China. The Southwest was left more to its own devices and the rule of local warlords than was originally planned by the central authorities.

IV. THE RISE AND VICTORY OF COMMUNISM

A. The Long March

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669 Before the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic, Communism had had a more fleeting existence in Southwest China than in any other region of China. The only period of considerable Communist activity in the Southwest prior to the autumn of 1949 was at the time of the circuitous Long March. The six thousand-mile trek was a Communist retreat from areas of strength in Kiangsi and Fukien to Shensi under constant pressure from Kuomintang air and ground forces.

The first Communist migration occurred in 1933 when Nationalist Government attacks on the

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668 soviets in the Honan-Hupeh-Anhwei border area forced a partial withdrawal of the Communist
669 troops there to Szechwan.[37] They were able to hold on to the naturally defensible northwest corner of the province, and this became the initial goal of the main forces of the Chinese soviets when they were forced to leave their bases in Kiangsi and Fukien under the sledge hammer blows of the Fifth Campaign launched by Chiang Kai-shek in October 1934. The line of retreat for the main body passed through Kweichow, Yunnan, and eastern Sikang.

In these provinces and in Szechwan, the Communists undertook propaganda activities among the Chinese and tribal peoples to gain their good will for the passage of the retreating column of soldiers and civilians. Such acts as the furnishing of arms to the Lolo tribesmen of southwestern Szechwan and eastern Sikang and the distribution of excess captured food supplies to the Chinese peasants all along the route of march helped ease the Communists' way into the Sung-p'an area of Szechwan in July 1935.

While the spent ranks of the new arrivals paused to regain their strength, the Communist leaders argued out future strategy. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai from the Kiangsi-Fukien soviets insisted that the march be resumed with Shensi as the objective. The leaders of the former Hunan-

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[37] On the Communist retreat through the Southwest Region see *Snow*, *op. cit.*, pp.179-194.

668 Hupeh-Anhwei force, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsü
669 Hsiang-ch'ien, favored remaining at the Szechwan base. Evidently the difference was bound up with a continuing power struggle and could not be resolved. In late August, the main force under Mao and Chou struck north into Shensi. Chang and Hsü with their contingent did not follow until a year later, and then only when driven out of Szechwan by Chiang Kai-shek's armies.

From 1936 until the Red Army invaded the Southwest in 1949, no large-scale Communist movement showed itself in the wartime stronghold of the Nationalist Government. However, a small number of official Communist representatives led by Chou En-lai were stationed at Chungking to maintain liaison with the Kuomintang in the uneasy and mutually expedient alliance between the two armed parties of China during the war of resistance against Japan.

B. Personalities with the Communist Regime

Although the Southwest experienced Communism only briefly before 1949, some of the top men in the Communist regime today derived from Szechwan. Three early converts to Communism from Szechwan are military men -- Chu Teh, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Ch'en I.

The best known and most remarkable of the trio is Chu Teh.[38] Born into a wealthy family,

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[38] Ibid., pp. 346-55.

669 he was early trained in Western military science
668 and accustomed to luxury and the opium habit. After distinguishing himself as one of Ts'ai Ao's leading generals in 1911 and 1915-16, Chu fell back into the indolent, corrupt life of a warlord-bureaucrat in Yunnan until his habit of reading stirred him into beginning a new life in his late thirties. Forsaking his family and position in Chungking, he broke himself of opium addiction, came under the influence of young leftists and Communists in Shanghai, and travelled and studied in Germany, France, and Moscow before returning to China in 1925. Caught up in the Nationalist Revolution then rising to flood stage, Chu became a full-fledged Communist in 1927 when the split in the Kuomintang-Communist alliance faced him with choosing one side or the other. From 1928 when he joined his forces with those of Mao Tse-tung on the Kiangsi-Hunan border until the end of the Long March in Shensi some seven years later, Chu Teh became a legendary figure in China and in the annals of defensive-guerrilla tactics. Since 1931 he has been commander of the Communist armies, and is now one of the most honored "old comrades" of the Party.

Both Ch'en I and Liu Po-ch'eng joined the Communist Party before Chu Teh, but they did not begin to distinguish themselves until the war of resistance against Japan. Ch'en led the New Fourth Army in the Yangtze River area, while Liu headed the 129th division of the Eighth Route Army in the North China Region. During

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669 the civil war that followed almost immediately
668 on Japan's surrender, Ch'en I rose to the position of commander of the Third Field Army and Liu Po-ch'eng was promoted to the command of the Second Field Army. The two armies were responsible for the campaigns in the East and Central-South regions, and the Second Army carried the brunt of the attack on the Southwest Region. Ch'en I became a major figure in the East China Region after the Communist victory, and Liu Po-ch'eng assumed various positions of military and civilian leadership in Southwest China.

Another native of Szechwan, Kuo Mo-jo, is one of the leading figures of modern, pre-Communist Chinese literature, journalism, and scholarship. Not a member of the Communist Party as far as is known, Kuo has been heaped with honors by the Communist regime, allowed to travel extensively outside China, and given numerous official positions in the regime's cultural and literary organizations. Originally an advocate of art for art's sake, he became gradually more socially conscious and radical in his literary and journalistic work. Forced to flee to Japan because of his leftist political ideas, he added serious studies in Chinese archeology and ancient history to his long list of writings in poetry, fiction, and political-social polemics.

C. Postwar Victory

By the time the Communist forces entered the Southwest Region in strength, the rest of the Mainland had been overrun and the Communist

669 regime formally established in Peking.[39] It was November before the Second Field Army
668 under Liu Po-ch'eng launched an attack on Kweichow, taking the provincial capital at Kweiyang on November 15. Chungking in Szechwan fell to the Second Field Army on the last day of the month. During the next few weeks, Liu's forces moved westward toward Chengtu while the Fourth Field Army struck into Szechwan from the north. After Chengtu fell December 27, many of the remaining organized Kuomintang forces surrendered to the Communists in Yunnan and Sikang, and the Communists officially claimed the complete "liberation" of the Southwest Region. However, it is clear that large-scale unorganized resistance continued for a good part of 1950, and isolated bands undoubtedly held out much longer in the rugged mountain areas of the Southwest. It is
636 doubtful, too, whether the Communists have any more real control than had former regimes over the semi-independent tribal areas of the Southwest, especially along its borders with Indo-China and Burma.

669 The lack of any prolonged organized resistance in the naturally defensible areas of the Southwest Region was the result of several factors. Little faith in the Kuomintang cause remained

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[39] The names, dates, and campaigns connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts as far as can be determined by checking against other scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, pp. 108-09.

[redacted]

669 among the Nationalist armies and the Chinese
668 people left in the Southwest region. The best Kuomintang troops that could be salvaged from the Communist avalanche had already been withdrawn with the government and its leading officials to Formosa. Other nationalist armed forces retreated into Burma under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan, living off the Burmese countryside and making occasional harrassing raids into Southwest China for several years until withdrawn to Formosa. Many of the troops and their leaders who surrendered wholesale to the Communists in the Southwest provinces were warlord elements which never had had any commitment, let alone loyalty, to the Nationalist Government.

For the tribal people, the advent of the Communists meant only a change in rulers, with no guarantee that the new overlords would be any more upright or considerate in their dealings with the unassimilated peoples than had been the old Nationalist bureaucracy. The Chinese people of the region were thoroughly sick of warlord exploitation and Nationalist Government corruption. Any regime that promised peace and stability would have been welcomed. To the great majority of the Southwest's population, the peasants, the struggle for power was none of their business. They stood aside waiting for the winner to emerge, and accepted the victory of the Red Army as the beginning of a new dynasty which had inherited the "mandate of heaven" from the discredited Kuomintang.


SOUTHWEST CHINA
POPULATION DISTRIBUTION
A
B
C
PROVINCES
96
100
104
108
36
32
28
24
20
Scale in Miles
0
100
200

[facing p. 54]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1c,
Sociological Background

POPULATION

1. DISTRIBUTION, DENSITY, AND GROWTH

A. Distribution

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The 1953 nationwide census yielded a set of population figures by province. At the time the census figures were being compiled, the Southwest China Region comprised the four provinces of Szechwan, Sikang, Yunnan, and Kweichow. Sikang Province in 1953, however, was not the same as Sikang in the 1940's. Before 1953, Sikiang had been divided in two; only the eastern half retained the name of Sikang Province; the western half was renamed Ch'ang-tu District. Thus the population figure announced in the official communique actually reflected only a part of the pre-Communist province of Sikang. When the results were announced, the Bureau of Census grouped the Ch'ang-tu District population with that of Tibet. On July 30, 1955, the First People's Congress in Peking passed a resolution to abolish the province of Sikang and incorporate its territory into Szechwan Province.[1] This latest move does not

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[1] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Aug. 3, 1955, p. 1.

635 161 affect the figure of the total population in the Southwest China Region, because Sikang and Szechwan provinces had been included in the 1953 census figure for this region; nevertheless, it changes the distribution according to the political subdivisions of Southwest China as follows:

161 Table 1. Population Distribution in Southwest China *

Kweichow Province	15,037,310
Szechwan Province	65,685,063
Yunnan Province	17,472,737
Regional Total	98,195,110

*Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1; Sikang population is included in Szechwan.

Among all the regions of China, this region ranks third in population and fourth in size of area.

161 659 The accuracy of the figures in Table 1 is, of course, still open to question. Doubt may easily be cast upon these figures on the basis of one or both of the following facts: (1) The 1953 census-taking was not thorough; in certain areas where direct counting of noses was not possible, undefined "indirect" methods (possibly estimates)

161 659 were employed. (2) Before the results of the census were announced, responsible Communist quarters had already instituted a campaign to "correct the undesirable habit of filing false reports," and even the Bureau of Statistics had begun to criticize the lack of reliability in the statistical work at various government levels.[2] Until 1952, the estimates on China's population cited by Communist officials were all under 500 million. Early in 1953, several months before the census figures were completely tabulated, estimates were stepped up to around 550 million. Thus there is ground for suspicion that the Peking government might have intentionally exaggerated the figures for propaganda purposes.[3]

However, until evidence proving fabrication is discovered, the figures in Table 1 will stand as the result of the first and hereto only direct nationwide census. Relative reliability is further strengthened by the following points: (1) They generally tally with the figures on the electorate,

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[2] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, March 31, 1954, p. 1.

[3] Tsui-chin Ch'i-ko-yüeh Lai Chung-yao Fei-ch'ing Tsung-ho Pao-kao [Comprehensive Report on Important Developments in Communist China in the Last Seven Months], Taipei, the Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1954, pp. 22-23.

161 659 delegates and their representation in the "basic-level election" for which the census was initiated.[4] (2) The fact that scattered reports on the basic-level elections are available, roughly covering all parts of China, should serve to indicate the geographic extent if not the degree of thoroughness with which the census-taking was carried out. (3) The Communists as far back as 1949 had begun their study on population, and it appears correct to say that the Peking regime had exercised considerable discretion in checking the 1953 census against the previously released figures. (4) Only a comparatively small portion of the 1953 population figures (about 8 million) was derived from the so-called "indirect method of census-taking." (5) The above cited commique also reported on the review of these figures by the Bureau of Statistics. After rechecking 9 per cent (or 52,950.000) of the total population in a cross-section of many different localities, the duplicates amounted to only 0.139 per cent and those uncounted in the initial registration only 0.255 per cent.

B. Density

161 From the figures in Table 1 it is apparent that Szechwan Province, the richest and only

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[4] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, pp. 13-22.

16/ extensive plain in Southwest China, is the most populous province in this region and, for that matter, also the most populous among all the provinces of China. The following table, showing density of population, also indicates the unequal distribution among the provinces.

Table 2. Density of Population in Southwest China

	Per Sq. Km.	Per Sq. Mile
Kweichow	88.45	229.08
Szechwan	118.06	305.77
Yunnan	41.60	107.74
Regional Average	85.66	221.85

* 1953 census and Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u [Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces], Shanghai, Ti-t'u ch'u-pan-she, 1953; area figure for Szechwan Province has been adjusted to include Sikang Province but exclude the Ch'ang-tu District

The regional average of 221.85 per square mile ranks fourth among China's regions. Within the region, Szechwan Province tops the list, with 305.77 per square mile. It is necessary to

16 point out that earlier works on China's population have assigned greater density figures to Szechwan, although the total population of Szechwan Province was computed at a smaller figure. This sudden change was caused by the inclusion in Szechwan of what was the former Sikang Province, which according to the 1953 census, had only three and one quarter million people in its approximately 100,000 square mile territory.

The density of population varies greatly within this region. In the agriculturally rich Chengtu Basin and along the Yangtze River in Szechwan Province, there are places where over 1,000 people are crowded in a square mile of land, making it as congested as the Yangtze River Delta in East China. On the other hand, no more than one or two persons may be found in many a square mile in the mountains of westernmost Szechwan.

Another comparison may be made of the Southwest China Region and the region in India comprising Punjab, Rajputana, Hyderabad, Bombay, the Northwestern Frontier, the Central Provinces, and Berar, whose total area approximates that of the Southwest China Region. The topographical and climatic features of the two areas are also comparable. The comparison shows that Southwest China is even more crowded than its corresponding region in India, which has an

/6/ average population density of 172.31 per square mile.[5]

C. Growth

Population figures published before 1953 for this region, as well as for other regions, were estimates and partial census enumerations. The necessary margin of error that acompanies any work of estimation plus the re-demarcation of provincial boundaries tends to reduce the validity of earlier population figures as bases for comparative studies of the population trend in this region. The following table makes use of two sets of earlier figures selected not because of their known accuracy, but because they are the only recent data available.

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[5] K. Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton University Press, 1951.

Table 3. Growth of Population in Southwest China Region*

	1948	1951	1953
Kweichow	10,173,750	13,000,000	15,037,310
Sikang	1,696,600	3,306,738	3,381,064
Szechwan	47,437,387	56,000,000	62,303,999
Yunnan	9,065,921	17,000,000	17,474,737
Regional Total	68,373,658	89,306,738	98,195,110

*The 1948 figures, from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstracts of the Republic of China], Taipei, Executive Yüan, Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts & Statistics, 1955, pp. 20-21. The 1951 figures, from Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u. The 1953 figures, from the 1953 census announced in Kuang-ming Jih-pao. Note here the province of Sikang has not yet been incorporated into Szechwan.

161 If the figures in Table 3 have any accuracy, the net population gain for this region over the five-year period of 1948-53 would be almost 20,000,000, or 30 per cent, a figure far too high to be credible. The Communist government tends to accept this rapid rate of growth and attributes it to increased economic stability and improved social conditions which raise the birth rate and induce people to return to their native towns and villages, but it is far more likely that the figures are an inaccurate reflection of growth in population. The second result, of course, can hardly be established since the increase in population is nationwide and the rate of growth appears to be fairly uniform among all the regions. Perhaps if we examine a few other figures for the province of Szechwan, we will find some pattern:

Table 4. Population of Szechwan

Year	Population
A.D. 221	900,000
263	940,000
1578	3,102,073
1812	21,453,678
1911	50,217,030
1928	54,000,000
1937	49,948,943
1939	46,403,006

*Cheng Li-chien, Ssu-ch'uan Hsin Ti-chih [New Gazeteer of Szechwan], Shanghai, Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1947, pp. 10, 304; Lou Yün-lin, Ssu-ch'uan [Szechwan], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chü, 1940, pp. 36, 47-49; Hu Huan-yung, Ssu-ch'uan Ti-li [The Geography of Szechwan], Chungking, Cheng-chung shu-chü, 1938, pp. 102-10.

Although the population in Szechwan doubled in the nineteenth century, it remained stable from the 1930's until the Communist occupation. Unless the frequent civil wars in Szechwan have had a strong, restrictive effect on the population of the province, it would seem that World War II, which was not fought on the soil of Szechwan, should have added to the population by driving more people into Szechwan from Japanese-occupied

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provinces. The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn is that the estimated census figures in Table 4 are too crude to be relied on for a study of the exact rate of growth of Szechwan's population. One thing, however, should not be overlooked, and that is the fact that previous census-takers failed to include women or children in their population figures.

The New China News Agency reported from Chengtu, Szechwan's provincial capital, on June 14, 1954, that from 1948 to 1953 the population in Szechwan[6] increased by 12,900,000. This apparently is based on a figure for 1948 other than the one cited in Table 3; otherwise the increase would be a great deal higher than the national average rate of increase. However, in the same New China News Agency dispatch, it is said that 7,888,000 babies have been born since "liberation" in 139 of Szechwan's 154 municipalities and hsien. With infant mortality taken into consideration, this would indicate that anywhere from three and four million people of the above-mentioned 12,900,000 population increase for Szechwan during 1948-53 were not born in Szechwan but migrated to that province.

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6. Quoted in Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate-General, No. 834, June 14, 1954, pp. 20-21.

To substantiate official reports, the Census Bureau at Peking released some scattered information on various localities. The growth of population was studied, for example, by taking one hsiang (group of villages) from each of 17 hsien in Szechwan. On July 1, 1953, the total population of the designated village groups stood at 144,981. Sixty days later, the same communities showed[7] an aggregate net gain of 581. The rate of increase in this random sampling of communities thus amounts to approximately 24 per thousand, or about 2.4 per cent per annum.

Or take the population growth at Nan-pu hsien, one of the more populous counties in Szechwan. In the twelve months immediately preceding the census, 29,561 babies were born to Nan-pu's 789,000 people, which would give a birth rate of approximately 3.7 per cent.[8]

From these available samplings, it may be safe to conclude that in default of detailed information on population movements, the natural rate of increase in this region is close to the national average.

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[7] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, March 30, 1954, p. 1.

[8] Loc. cit.

II. COMPOSITION OF POPULATION

A. Age Groups

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The young and middle-aged groups constitute the preponderant section of population in the Southwest Region. The 1953 census showed that of the 747,000 people in Chengtu, Szechwan Province, 380,000 (58 per cent) were 18-45 years of age. And in Nan-pu hsien, youths of 18 and under stood as high as 44 per cent of the total.[9] The situations in many other localities in the Southwest China Region are similar. An earlier study of the population in Yunnan communities arrived at very close percentage figures. The information collected was evaluated and tables were compiled which showed that the 15-44 age group stood at 46.91 per cent in the Kunming Lake region (the central region of Yunnan Province) and 42.71 per cent at Ch'eng-kung.[10] The Chinese study was completed in 1942; a comparable study in the United States was compiled for the year 1930 and gives the national average for the same age group as 47.7 per cent.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Chen Ta, Population in Modern China, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1946, pp. 85-86.

B. Sex Ratio

162 The national average sex ration is 51.82 per cent for males and 48.18 per cent for females, or 107.55 males for every 100 females. Because no regional breakdown on sex ratio has been announced since the completion of the 1953 census, the latest information available is offered for reference:

Table 5. Sex Ratio of Southwest China Population (1948)
(Number of males per hundred females)

Kweichow	100.56
Sikang	100.67
Szechwan	104.73
Yunnan	100.82
Regional Average	103.47

*Statistical Abstracts of the Republic of China, pp. 20-21.

If the 1948 ratio still holds, it means that the Southwest Region has a higher ratio of women than the national average, and this could be the result of several conditions: (1) frequent civil wars in this region, reducing the number of men rather than the number of women. (2) reduction of the practice of female infanticide, because in

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this region women have proved their usefulness by participation in farm work; and (3) the drain of able-bodied males during World War II when China depended almost exclusively on this region for troop replacements. (4) possible under-reporting of figures for males, who were attempting to dodge the draft.

C. Rural and Urban Composition

The result of the 1953 census shows that there has been a rapid increase in urban population, particularly in metropolitan and industrial centers. While in this region there are fewer large industrial capitals comparable to those in the Northeast and Central South regions, cities like Chengtu do bear evidence of this population trend. On the national scene, the increase in urban population is impressive, amounting to 40 per cent in certain cities as compared to their 1950 figures. The total population of the China Mainland is divided into 13.25 per cent for urban and 86.74 per cent for rural.[11] However this percentage is clearly based on dissimilar criteria for "urban" and "rural" than those used in the Nationalist estimates of 1947:

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[11] People's Daily, Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 3.

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Table 6. Rural and Urban Population in Southwest China (1947)

	Rural	Urban
Kweichow	6,182,000	3,911,750
Sikang	1,668,000	28,600
Szechwan	38,957,000	8,481,387
Yunnan	7,169,000	1,896,921
Regional	53,976,000	14,397,658

*Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien [The China Yearbook], Taipei, Chung-hua Min-kuo nien-chien she, 1953, p. 34.

According to Table 6, the percentage of rural population for this region in 1947 was only 75.72 per cent, which is in closer agreement with earlier statistics[12] on scattered localities in this region, such as the province of Yunnan, which had a "rural" population of 70.96 per cent in the early 1930's. As we have noted, there is a difference between the Communist and Nationalist criteria for "urban" and "rural". The Nationalist government have traditionally used the farming population for "rural," while the Communist authorities are apparently drawing

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[12] Yun-nan-sheng Nung-ts'un Tiao-ch'a [Survey of Villages in Yunnan Province], p. 12.

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the line between communities with populations above or below a certain unspecified number.

D. Occupational Composition

The breakdown of the population by profession has not been released by the government on the China Mainland; not even fragmentary information, either national or regional, is available. Earlier studies also fall short of completeness. The following data on the population of Yunnan in the early 1930's, while outdated, may offer some information on the occupations of the people in this region. Yunnan appears to be a medium between the rich Chengtu Basin in Szechwan and the thinly populated mountains of former Sikang Province.

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Table 7. The Occupational Breakdown of Yunnan Population (1935)*

	Percent
Farmers	43.74
Workers	12.73
Merchants	3.04
Students, teachers	0.78
Government, army	1.01
Housewives	29.04
Self-employed†	0.19
Unemployed	6.32
Totally disabled	2.42
Others#	0.72

† Includes artists, physicians, lawyers, etc.

# Includes gambling house operators and members of other professions not socially condoned.

* Yün-nan-sheng Nung-ts'un Tiao-ch'a [Survey of Yunnan Villages], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935, pp. 13-14.

E. Some Earlier Observations

The Bureau of Statistics of the Central Government at Nanking in 1948 released the results of some cross-section surveys of China's population. The data was collected mainly before and during World War II in the Southwest China

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Region. The following excerpts may furnish some additional points for comparison:[13]

1. Population surveys of fifteen municipalities and hsien in the Southwest China Region from 1933-44 showed that on the basis of the age breakdown the population of this region as a whole was of a "stable" nature and only slightly inclined toward the "increasing type."

2. The same surveys also disclosed that while the sex ratio in these representative communities was generally well balanced before World War II began, the picture was quite noticeably altered during the war when the number of able-bodied males decreased sharply. This might have been caused by intensified conscription and by the falsification of reports on age in order to evade conscription.

3. The married population averaged 63-78.23 per cent of the total marriageable population. Out of the total population, those with middle-school education amounted to less than 2 per cent and those with college education, below 1 per cent.

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[13] Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 50-65.

162 4. A separate survey conducted during January-June 1947 in two large cities in this region further indicated that the age of fathers at the birth of first child was 20-35, and for mothers, 20-25. The mortality rate was highest in the 0-5 and 50-60 age groups. Pulmonary and typhoid diseases took the heaviest toll.'

III. INTERNAL MIGRATION

166 The Southwest Region is singular in China's history of internal migration in that it has seen two large-scale migrations into this region within the past five hundred years. The first mass migration took place when the population of Szechwan Province was nearly exterminated during the chaos that marked the end of the Ming Dynasty (circa A.D. 1640). The succeeding authorities decreed migrations from Hunan and Hupeh provinces east of this region and encouraged voluntary migration from any area by promising land to the settlers. Over 1,700,000 settlers were recorded in the period[14] 1667-1707. [722] The second mass migration occurred after the 1937 Japanese invasion of China, when a huge number of people fled the northern and the coastal provinces west of this region. The latter migration is discussed in Chen Ta's Population of Modern China, which includes an analysis of

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[14] Lou Yün-lin, op. cit., p. 36.

166 the influence of more technically advanced easterners on the life of the local population. The first migration restocked the population in the Southwest Region; the second migration was less permanent, with the majority of the migrants returning to their native places upon the conclusion of World War II. However, not a few of these easterners have remained and made their homes in this region.

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171 After 1949, the Communist program of industrialization concentrated upon the Northeast and Central South regions, but this does not mean that the Southwest Region is totally neglected. Many of the industrial establishments temporarily arranged to house the plants evacuated from the north and the east during the Sino-Japanese War have been retained and brought into the master plan for development of this region. Of 156 major industrial units involved in the Chinese Communists' first Five-Year Plan, over 19 per cent are located in this region.[15] The two steel plants in Chungking, the tin mining center in Yunnan Province, and the ordnance plant in Chengtu are undoubtedly attracting many workers and contributing to the rapid increase in population in such centers.

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[15] Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955.

166 Among the large construction projects which have been drawing thousands of people into this region are the Szechwan-Sikang and Sikang-Tibet highways, both reported to have been opened to traffic in the summer of 1954. The railway between Chungking and Chengtu in Szechwan Province has been completed, but another rail line connecting Szechwan Province with the north is still under construction. In addition, the Communists have been organizing people from more crowded places to settle on the grasslands and in mountain valleys in northwestern Szechwan and the western part of former Sikang Province. Reports are available in the Communist press on the progress of new villages where recent settlers are "making the barren mountains bloom ." Although the dimensions of these organized migrations cannot be measured, reports couched in general terms should at least suggest one of the population trends in this region.

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
Miao
Tibetans
Yao
Lisu

THE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

[facing P. 76] [a]

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION

NAME	ORIGIN
Hui (Hui-hui, Hui-tsu)1/	1. Arabian & Iranian soldiers & merchants moved into China from 7th to 13th centuries and intermarried with the Chinese aborigines. 2. Chinese children adopted by Hui families.
Miao (Miao-chia, Miao-tsu)	Tribes migrated from Hunan, eastern Kweichow and western Hupeh.
Yi (I-chia, I-pien, Lolo, Ning)	Probably immigrants from Tibet.
Tibetans (Ku-tsung in Yunnan, Mosshu in the mountains of northwestern Yunnan, Nu-tsu, or Lu-tsu along the Nu River, Kamba in Sikang)	Tribes migrated from Kansu, Ninghsia, and Shensi since the 10th century, probably by way of Chinghai or Tibet.
Pu-yi (T'u-jen, T'u-chia, by the Chinese, Chung-chia near Kweichow, Yu-chia near Anshun, and Shui-chia near Tu-shan)	Probably tribes from area south of the Yangtse in China.
Pai-yi (Shui Pai-yi in southernmost Yunnan, Thai)	Probably tribes from the coastal regions of South China.

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION

(Contd.)

APPEARANCE

Compared with average Han Chinese, the Hui have fairer complexion, and are well built, of moderate height. The Hui have well bridged noses, high cheek-bones, and slightly oblique eyes.

Deep-chested, rosy-cheeked hardy mountain-dwelling people. Men dress like Han Chinese peasants. Women wear costumes of different colors peculiar to their tribes.

Tall for an Oriental race, men and women averaging about 5'7". Their typical costume is a gray felt cloak for both men and women.

Tall and robust in physique. Men wear long garment belted at the waist, felt hat, and felt boots. Women wear different costumes in different localities, but all wear big silver earrings.

Not easily distinguished from the the Chinese. Men dress like Chinese. Among older women their tribal costume consisting of a tight-fitting jacket and a long skirt, is still common.

Short and well-built, with distinct Mongoloid features. Boys are tattooed and girls blacken their teeth at marriageable age.

Facing p. 76 (c)

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION (Contd.)

563 NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION

Tali is the center of the descendants of the Mohammedan soldiers of Kublai Khan.
South of Kunming is the center of Hui immigrants from Shensi.[2]

Approximately 2 million distributed in mountainous areas:

(1) Hua Miao (Flower Miao): widely distributed from Kweiyang westward, through An-sheng, Wei-ning, to eastern Yunnan.
(2) Hei Miao (Black Miao): southeastern Kweichow, centering around Li-p'ing.
(3) Ch'ing Miao (Blue Miao): central Kweichow
(4) Pai Miao (White Miao): central Kweichow
(5) Hung Miao (Red Miao): eastern Kweichow, centering around Tung-jen and related to the Miao of southwestern Hunan.

About 3,200,000 distributed in areas 6,500 ft. above sea level: East Sikang, northwestern Kweichow, northeastern and eastern Yunnan. The stronghold is in Ta-liang-shan in Sikang.

Sikang, northern Yunnan, western Szechwan.[3]

About 1,247,000 distributed in low marshy areas around Kweiyang and in southwestern Kweichow Province.

A little less than a million, distributed in lowland valleys in Yunnan:

(1) Along the Mu R. & Yüan R. (most influenced by Chinese culture.)
(2) Between 23 & 24 degrees N., and between Mu R. & Lan-ts'ang R.
(3) The region along the Yunnan-Burma Highway.
(4) The territory of the Shui Pai-yi in the southernmost Yunnan, historically known as the "Shih Shong Paan Naa" (least influenced by Han Chinese culture).

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THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION

LANGUAGE (Contd.)

Han Chinese with Arabian and Iranian elements of a religious nature.

Many dialects, but no written language. Adopt Chinese for writing when necessary.

No written language. Some have learned Chinese. Recently a Latinized Yi written language was invented and taught to the Yi people by the Chinese Communists.

Dialect not much different from that of Tibet proper. Written language is Tibetan.

Shan-speaking.
Many can read and write Chi[illegible].

Shan-speaking.
Thai written language.

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION (Contd.)

OCCUPATION	RELIGION
Merchants, bakers, money-exchangers, restaurant and inn keepers, horse dealers, carriers, traders. In northwestern Szechwan they control the Tibetan tea trade. In Hui communities they farm.	Islam (Ch'ing-chen chiao)
Most are peasants (the Hei Miao alone are usually owner-cultivators). Women spin, weave, and embroider. Some are boatmen; others, hunters.	Some of the Chinese gods are worshipped in their temples.
Agriculture.	A form of ancestor worship.
Nomadic and agricultural work.	Lamaism
Most are peasants. Those who settle in towns and cities engage in trade.	Buddhism
Agriculture.	Buddhism

THE SIX NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTHWEST REGION (Contd.)

1/ The Hui is an ethnic designation, not necessarily including all the believers in Islam. Many Islamic groups in China have their own ethnic names, i.e., Uigurs, Kazaks, Mongolian Moslems, Tibetan Moslems, etc.

2/ China's 3.6 million Hui people live in large numbers only in Kansu Province. The rest are scattered throughout the country, mainly in Honan, Hopeh, Yunnan, and Northwest China.

3/ According to the census taken by the Chinese Communist government in 1954, there are 2,757,622 Tibetans in China, populating Tibet, Sikang, N. Yunnan, and W. Szechwan.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1d,
Sociological Background

THE ETHNIC GROUPS IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

563 Ethnic minorities are generally defined as groups bound together by common ties of race, nationality, or culture, living together within an alien civilization but remaining culturally distinct. The Chinese Communists, following the practice of the USSR, have termed the ethnic minorities within the Chinese territory "nationalities" or "national minorities" in juxtaposition to the Han nationality. Therefore, the term "nationality," as it is used in China today, is a designation for an ethnic and geographical community; but owing to the fact that the Hui people, who are neither racially homogeneous nor all concentrated in one area, are also regarded as a separate nationality by the Chinese Communists, the latter's main principle governing such a classification seems to be the presence of customary laws and practices particular to a group of common origin which have over a period of time regulated its standard of behavior and given rise to group consciousness and distinctive characteristics. It is on this same broad principle that we base our classification of the ethnic groups in China Accordingly, the Han Chinese, although by far the great majority of the Chinese population (94 per cent), are also considered as one of the many ethnic groups in China.

I. INTRODUCTION

There is probably no area in the world where so many different ethnic groups have collected as

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16

~~[illegible]~~

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in the four provinces in Southwest China. Some of the groups are said to have migrated from Tibet; others, driven from their lands by the Han Chinese, sought refuge in the Southwest. The Han Chinese came later, and are now chiefly found in the plains and more accessible valleys.

These peoples, forming successive migratory waves from different parts of the continent, developed for a long time side by side without much intermingling. Cut off by high mountain ridges and unnavigable rivers, many have preserved their original languages and ancient customs, which are still in use today.

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162 There are more than 35 million people belonging to non-Han ethnic groups in China, constituting 6 per cent of the total national population and occupying more than one-half of the national territory.[1] Of the ten ethnic groups each having more than one million people, the Tibetans, Yi, Miao, Pu-yi, and Hui are represented in the Southwest in large numbers. The Southwest alone has 20 to 21 million people belonging to non-Han ethnic groups, constituting 20 per cent of the total regional population, and more significantly, dwelling along more than 3,000 miles of the national boundary.[2]

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[1] Communique of "Results of Census and Registration of China's Population," Current Background, No. 301, Nov. 1, 1954, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General.

[2] Wang, Wei-chou, "Hsi-nan Min-tsu Kung-tso Ch'ing-hsing" ["The State of the Nationalities Work in the Southwest"] , Min-tsu Cheng-t'se Wen-hsien Hui-pien [Compendium of Writings on Nationalities Policies] , Peking, Jen-min chu-pan-she, 1953, p.124.

II. THE HAN CHINESE IN THE SOUTHWEST

In the Southwest the *Han* Chinese appear to greatly outnumber the non-*Han* Chinese. This is because the *Han* Chinese are mostly settled in cities, towns, and more accessible areas. Moreover, many tribesmen who dress like *Han* Chinese peasants may be mistaken for *Han* Chinese. The *Han* Chinese in this region are generally divided into (*a*) the native *Han* Chinese (*Lao-han-jen* or old Chinese), who have been there for at least 200 years and have intermarried with the aborigines, and (*b*) the immigrant *Han* Chinese (sometimes called K'echia) who came later. 563 162 177

A. Szechwan

In this province, the native *Han* Chinese have spread in the south and west. The more recently arrived *Han* Chinese of Hunan and Hupeh origin are to be found in the western, eastern, and southern parts of the province; those of Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsi origin, in the southern part of the province; and those of Shensi and Kansu origin, in the western and northern parts of the province. Cities like Chengtu and Chungking have other *Han* Chinese from Kwangtung, Fukien, Chekiang, and Kiangsu.[3] The Manchu government in the mid-seventeenth century encouraged immigration into Szechwan with the promise of land, and more than 1,700,000 *Han* Chinese migrated.[4] Many others who settled in Szechwan had been traders or government officials. 563 167

B. Sik'ang

The migration of *Han* Chinese into this province started in the *T'ang* (618-907 A.D.) and *Sung* (960-

175 1280 A.D.) dynasties. In the Ch'ing (1644-1912 A.D.)
167 dynasty more than 200,000 Han Chinese went to
Sikang as refugees, criminals, laborers, and ad-
166 venturers. Shortly after 1910, about 70,000 to 80,000
* Han Chinese went from Szechwan to Sikang as
merchants. Pa-an (Pa-t'ang), at the center of the
province, and K'ang-ting, in the eastern part of the
province, have more Han Chinese than other cities
in Sikang.[5]

C. Yunnan

175 The first Han Chinese invasion into Yunnan took place in 225 A.D. during the period of the Three Kingdoms (221-266 A.D.). The next Han-Chinese attack during the T'ang dynasty was repulsed by a powerful Thai people organized as the Tali Kingdom of Nan Chao. This kingdom, however, was conquered by the army of Kublai Khan in 1253. The most important campaigns undertaken by the Han Chinese in Yunnan occurred in the Ming (1368-1644) and early Ch'ing dynasties. Some large families in Central

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[3] Lou, Yun-lin, Sze-ch'uan [Szechwan], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chu, 1941, pp. 35-36.

[4] It is said that this policy of the Manchu government was pursuant to rebel Chang Hsien-chung's wanton killing in Szechwan at the end of the Ming dynasty which had nearly depleted the population there. See chapter on Historical Background.

[5] Ch'en, Chung-wei Hsi-k'ang Wen-ti [The Sikang Problem], Shanghai, Chung-hua shu-chu, 1930, pp. 85-90.

China were compelled to colonize Yunnan early in the Ming dynasty, and most of the Ming garrison soldiers were from the vicinity of the Yellow River and the Yangtze. Among the Han Chinese immigrants were criminals and refugees.[6]

D. Kweichow

The ancestors of the small number of native Han Chinese in this province were soldiers left behind in the wake of earlier military campaigns. Their descendants, speaking the old dialect (or a modification of it) their forebears brought into the country, now form separate communities. They are sturdy and industrious, and generally own the land they cultivate, but they are regarded by the immigrant Han Chinese in much the same category as the Miao and the Pu-yi. The native Han Chinese, in the course of time, have been absorbed into the non-Han Chinese and the immigrant Han Chinese groups. The immigrant Han Chinese came after Kweichow was made a province of the Manchu Empire. Most of them claimed Kiangsi as their old home. In recent years, however, nearly all the Han Chinese immigrants have come from the provinces of Hunan and Szechwan, particularly Szechwan.[7]

(For cultural characteristics of the Han Chinese in this region, see chapters on Social Structure and Family.)

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[6] Wilhelm Credner, Cultural and Geographical Observations Made in the Tali (Yunnan) Region with Special Regard to the Nan-Chao Problem, Bangkok, The Siam Society, 1935, pp. 12-13.

[7] Samuel R. Clarke, Among the Tribes in Southwest China, London, Morgan & Scott, Ltd., China Inland Mission, 1911, p. 11.

III. THE NON-HAN ETHNIC GROUPS

A. The Hui of Yunnan

563 The Hui intermarry with the Han Chinese. When a Han Chinese bachelor desires to marry a Hui girl, he must embrace the Islam[1] faith; a Han Chinese girl who wishes to marry a Hui man does not have to change her own religion. Therefore, although physical difference sets the Hui apart from the Han Chinese, the lack of racial prejudice on the part of the Hui facilitates the assimilation of other groups into the Hui community and renders the racial composition of the Hui more complex. Hence, Hui cohesiveness is attributable to factors other than mere racial physical difference. Their language, religion, and customs that follow religious practice and observance make them cohesive as an ethnic group against outside forces, despite the fact that in Yunnan the Hui do not have large and contiguous communities.

[669] In the past there was enough antagonism between the Hui and the Han Chinese to cause several rebellions against the Chinese government. The bloody suppression of the Hui rebellion led by Tu Wen-hsiu in the middle of the nineteenth century devastated Hui communities in Yunan to such an extent that they have never recovered from it. The Kuomintang government seemed to take for granted that the Hui were so sufficiently assimilated into Chinese communities that they did not merit recognition as a separate ethnic group. In the 1930's

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[1] [i.e., the Muslim faith -- Analyst]

the *Hui* were treated as "believers in Islam," and their ethnic differences were minimized.[8]

The present Chinese Communist government has reversed the Kuomintang practice. By digging out past grievances between the *Han* and the *Hui*, and by condemning the suppressive policies of the previous governments, the ethnic policy of the People's Government is claimed to be the most enlightened of all times. However, the Peking Government's reversal of the Kuomintang practice seems to have more proganda value among other Moslem peoples in the world, especially the Indonesians, than any actual material benefit for the *Hui* people in Yuman.[9]

According to a report at a meeting held by the *Hui* Cultural Associations at Peking, ten autonomous *hsien* and *chou* have been established for the *Hui* people in China. However, there have been no reports announcing the establishment of any *Hui* autonomous unit in the Southwest, although there are indications that scattered *Hui* in this area have representation in the local governments as well as in the autonomous government units of some other ethnic groups.[10]

B. The *Miao* of Kweichow

The *Miao* tribes, divided by dialects not intelligible to each other, are not united. Many scattered *Miao*, upon closer contact with neighboring peoples, readily lose their identity. Except

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[8] This is evident in several yearbooks of that period; *Hui* people are not separately listed.

[9] Propaganda value can be illustrated by activities of THE *Hui* Cultural Association and its intercourse with Moslem delegations from other parts

[continued next page]

AF16

[redacted]

Miao
Lolo

523 for the Hei Miao, who usually own the land they cultivate and are well-to-do, most of the Miao tribes are poor and backward in their "slash and burn" system of agriculture.

For generations the Miao have been ruled by Yi chieftains called T'u-ssu, or Chinese officials, to whom the Miao pay taxes. In western and northwestern Kweichow, where the Miao are the tenants of the Yi landlords, the Miao not only pay rent in kind, but also render labor and military service to the landlords. The Yi landlords may also impose levies on them on special occasions.[11] In Communist jargon, this is clearly a situation in which one minority group is "exploited" by another. The amelioration of this condition of the Miao tenants would entail the alienation of the Yi people. Consequently, Communist propaganda among the Miao tribes emphasizes the past sufferings of the Miao under the Kuomintang rule, but not their hardships under the Yi landlords. It is interesting to note the way in which the Communists carried out "land reform" in this area; their policy of giving preferential treatment to the Yi is a clear departure from the "land reform" principle practiced in other parts of China.

[No. 9 continued] --of the world.

10. NCNA, April 15, 1955, SCMP, No. 1031, April 20, 1955, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, pp. 32-33.

11. Lin Yueh-hwa, "Social Life of the Aboriginal Groups in and around Yunnan," Journal of the West China Border Research Society, Vol. XV, Series A, 1944, Chengtu, West China Border Research Society, pp. 50-51.

AF16
Miao
Lolo

513 The *Miao* women work in the field together with their men. They do not observe the marriage bond as strictly as the *Han* Chinese. They do not particularly suffer under the marriage system,[12] and the enforcement of the Marriage Law makes no material difference to the status of women in *Miao* communities.

C. The Yi of Sikang

The *Yi* are divided into two classes: the Black and White. The Black are the nobility and landlords, and the White are the slaves. The White *Yi* do all the manual and agricultural work, and their children are born slaves and property of their overlords. Marriage between the two classes is absolutely forbidden. This two-class society is further complicated by the fact that, owing to their own diminishing numbers, the *Yi* along the Kweichow border have brought in the *Miao* as their tenants.[13]

The Chinese Communist press recently has made brief mention of the abolition of the two-class system in *Yi* society, but of how it has been brought about, and, more particularly, of how the organization of the clan and the family has been affected, nothing has been said. It seems that so far this abolition of the class system is only in principle.[14]

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[12] *Clarke*, op. cit., p. 31.

[13] *Ibid*., p. 121.

[14] Chen Han-seng, "The *Yis* of Taliangshan," *China Reconstructs*, No. 2, p. 1.

The Communist press has also emphasized the improved status of women in _Yi_ society. However, the fact is that _Yi_ girls are trained to manage household affairs and traditionally hold a high position in the family, while their brothers are not trained in any occupation.[15] Therefore, that _Yi_ women are now elected to local governments should not be regarded as an unprecedented Communist accomplishment.

D. The Tibetans of Sikang

The Tibetans are divided into two classes: landlords and tenants. Because of the scarcity of labor, those who have been given the right to cultivate the land must work for their masters;this forced labor is known in the Manchu language as _ula_.[16]

The Communists have claimed that the Chinese People's Liberation Army pioneered the battering down of the _ula_ system in Sikang. It is alleged that from the moment of its arrival in Sikang, the People's Liberation Army paid the Tibetans for every service rendered and provided compensation for all animals lost in transport work. This had never been done in Sikang before. Subsequently, one of the first acts of the Sikang Tibetan Autonomous Regional Government was a decree in November 1950 to abolish the _ula_ system.[17] The fact that many _Han_ cadres are encouraged to work and to "grow roots" in Tibetan communities, that soldiers stationed in the area are told to adopt local customs, diets, and languages, and that migration from other parts of China to Sikang is encouraged, seems to indicate that more labor force is needed before the ula system can be abolished in practice.[18] 563

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[15] Lin Yüeh-hwa, _op. cit._, p. 54.

[16] Chen Han-seng, _The Chinese Peasant_, London, New York and Bombay, Oxford Univ.Press, 1945, pp. 16-18.

[17] Chen Han-seng, "Sikiang Serfdom to Freedom," _China Reconstructs_, No.5,1954,pp.28-32.

The Tibetans in Sikang are Lamaists, upon whom Han Chinese culture has made little impression. Instead, they look to Tibet for cultural leadership. Relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans in Sikang have not been cordial, and the attitude of the Tibetans in Sikang toward Pekings seem to be contingent upon Peking's relation with Tibet proper. So far, the Communist government in Peking has had more administrative control over Sikang than over Tibet; this could be the reason behind the recent Communist move to unite the western part of Sikang province with Tibet proper,[19] hoping that, through Sikang, Tibet might be brought closer to Peking administratively and, through Tibet's cultural influence, Sikang's Tibetans might be made to co-operate with the Chinese government more readily. 563 648

E. The Pu-yi of Kweichow

Although called by different names in various parts of Kweichow, the Pu-yi are not divided into tribes like the Miao. Pu-yi dialects differ in individual localities, but not enough to become mutually unintelligible as is the case with the Miao dialects. The Pu-yi are a homogenous group, and there is little divergence between Pu-yi and Han Chinese cultures. The latter fact has made the Pu-yi more 563 readily assimilated into Chinese communities. Many Pu-yi speak, read, and write Chinese, and they are not despised by the Han Chinese as are the Miao.[20] As a minority group the Pu-yi of Kweichow actually do not pose any minority problem for the Chinese administration.

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[18] People's Daily, Peking, Oct. 18, 1952; December 11, 1950.

[19] Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], April 1955, pp. 15-16.

The traditional land ownership patterns of most of the ethnic groups in the Southwest may make them less resistant to collectivism in agriculture, whereas the Pu-yi,[21] who usually own the land they cultivate and are well-to-do, may not accept collectivism as readily.

Pu-yi women do more work in the fields than Han Chinese women, but their social position is lower.[22] No change in status of women in Pu-yi communities has so far been reported in Communist sources.

F. The Pai-yi of Yunnan

Pai-yi society is divided into two classes: the aristocracy, consisting of the native chieftains and their relatives, and the common people. Intermarriage between the aristocracy and the common people is generally forbidden, although the native chieftains sometimes take concubines from the common people.[23]

There are no small landowners or owner-cultivators in Pai-yi villages. Land ownership is nominally vested in the village as a community, but in reality, in the Pai-yi aristocracy as a ruling class.[24] The common people's obligations to their landlords are numerous: rent, household taxes, office provision, and other special tributes. In addition, the common people may be called on at any time to render military service. Land tax is collected for the Chinese government by the Pai-yi chieftains from each family rather than each land unit.[25] The tribal administration lingers on, hindering not only the development of any administration based on taxing the privately owned land, but also imposing the burden of a double government on the Pai-yi people.

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[20] Clarke, op. cit., pp. 96-99.

[21] Ibid., pp. 99-101.

[22] Ibid.; Gabrielle M. Vassal, In and Around Yunnan Fou, London, William Heinnemann, 1922, p. 52.

[23] Lin Yüeh-wa, op. cit., p. 53.

However, the tightly-knit Pai-yi village does not provide fertile ground for the Communists' land reform. In fact, it is reported by Chinese Communist sources that, as late as October 1954, the original Pai-yi tribal land system was still intact. On the other hand, the traditional Pai-yi pattern of land ownership may not offer strong resistance to agricultural collectivism if it is launched.

The Pai-yi are racially related to the Thai people in northern Burma; many of them, especially the Shui Pai-yi, are not much influenced by Han Chinese culture. Part of the Pai-yi territory and their neighboring territory which lies west of the Kao-li-kung-shan [Kao-li-kung Mountains] have been claimed by both the Chinese and Burmese governments.[26] For these reasons, winning the allegiance of the Pai-yi people has been recognized as an urgent task of any Chinese central administration.

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[24] Chen Han-seng, Frontier Land Systems in Southernmost China, New York, Internat'l Secretariat, Inst. of Pacific Relations, 1949, p. 15.

[25] Ibid., p. 22.

[26] In early 1930's, British and Burmese troops occupied Chiang-hsin-p'o. This is the so-called P'ien-ma Incident.

IV. The Chinese Communist Policy and Administration

The Fourth Department of the Nationalities Affairs Commission of the Central People's Government at Peking carries on research and collects data on the ethnic groups in the Southwest. It also advises the Government Council with regard to the formulation and administration of ethnic policy there.[27]

Overcoming the isolation of the ethnic groups is the first goal of the Communist administration in the Southwest. Since the "liberation," three large delegations from Peking have made extended tours of minority areas in the Southwest. They have gone not as mere visitors, but as missionaries to explain the government's policy toward the minorities. They have not only demonstrated the government's good will at the "grass-roots level" by presenting these peoples with gifts and providing them with medical service, but, more importantly, they have collected information pertinent to the development of the Southwest. Highways are now being built which not only link the minority but also join these communities with the outside world. There is now a highway from Yunnan to Szechwan passing through Chao-chüeh, the heart of the once-isolated territory of the independent Lolo (Yi).[28]

The Communists have recognized that, at the present stage, the millions of ethnic minorities

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[27] People's Daily, Peking, August 14, 1952.

[28] Chen Han-seng, op. cit.; People's Daily, March 1, 1954.

[redacted]

513 can achieve cultural, political, and economic progress only in their own accustomed patterns. Their own languages must be used as vehicles for the communication of modern methods. Han Chinese cadres are told to study minority languages.[29] Linguists and philologists have been dispatched to the Southwest to help improve or invent written scripts for the minorities.[30]

"Consultation" is adopted as a method to get desirable representatives from the various ethnic groups when conditions are not favorable for popular election of delegates. This method frequently yields a number of hand-picked representatives not proportionate to the total population of the ethnic groups. When the minorities have more representatives than they are entitled to have, the fact is publicized by the Communists as special consideration for minorities. This subterfuge is cloaked by the democratic-sounding phrase: 'Co-operation with minority leaders having connections with their own people."[31]

To sum up, it could be said that the Chinese Communist government has so far attempted more than any other previous government in China to

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[29] *People's Daily*, November 12, 1953.

[30] In the past several years the government has sponsored the following: (1) invention of a Latinized Sikang *Yi* written language; (2) improvement of the Yunnan *Pai-yi* and Chingpo's Thai language; (3) invention of the Kweichow *Pu-yi* script; (4) collection of Kawa words and phrases; and research in *Miao* dialects and preparation of textbooks in *Miao* languages. *People's Daily*, June 23, 1954.

[31] *Ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1954.

563 to bring the minorities in the Southwest into the national orbit. It increases the intensity of cultural contacts among these groups and between the Han Chinese and these groups. In economic, cultural, political, health, and educational activities, it endeavors to decrease the divergence of the different groups. It tries to curb distrust of the ethnic groups by playing down the irritating chauvinism of the Han Chinese. It has fostered and brought the leaders of the ethnic minorities into closer contract with the central government in Peking. It is training present and future minority leaders in Chinese national universities.

Under the Communist administration, although each ethnic group now seems exalted and its separate identity emphasized, the net effect of the Communist ethnic policy and administration has been easing out the factors which had for centuries caused the minorities in the Southwest to cohere and to defy the central administration. Solidarity of all the ethnic groups, the international prestige resulting from it, and the development of the nation as a whole seem to be the main concern in the government's treatment of the minority ethnic groups in the Southwest. It does not seem feasible for a future Chinese government to concentrate on negating the Communist government's ethnic program in this area if the Southwest is intended to remain as part of the Chinese territory. Rather, better programs can be formulated and carried out by taking advantage of the Communists' experience with the minorities in this area.

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
SINO – TIBETAN FAMILY
CHINESE GROUP
N. MANDARIN
HSIANG DIALECT
S.W. MANDARIN
CANTONESE
KAM – TAI GROUP
KAM, SUI, ETC.
SHAN, LU, ETC.
CHUNGCHIA, CHUANG, ETC.
MIAO – YAO GROUP
MIAO
YAO
TIBETO-BURMAN GROUP
JARUNG
LO-LO, MO-SO, ETC.
TRUNG, NUNG
E. TIBETAN
KIANG
MIN CHIA
KATCHIN
AUSTRO-ASIATIC FAMILY
PALAUNG – WA
SOUTHWEST CHINA
LINGUISTIC
Mary Carmine

[facing p. 92]

Annex "A," Subparagraph le,
Sociological Background

LANGUAGE

I. MAJOR DIALECT GROUPS AND DISTRIBUTION OF SPEAKERS

197 Only two Chinese dialect groups, Southwestern Mandarin and Hakka, are spoken in this region, and the former is by far the most popular. But a good number of non-Chinese dialects are spoken by the people in the Southwestern frontier areas. The distribution of these dialects is as follows:

Southwestern Mandarin -- spoken by approximately 80,000,000 throughout this region.

Hakka -- spoken by several million people in a few scattered districts near Chengtu in Szechwan Province.

Kam-Tai -- about 5,000,000 speakers in southern and southeastern Kweichow and eastern, western, and southern Yunnan.

Miao-Yao -- about 2,500,000 speakers in Kweichow and the mountainous areas in Yunnan.

Tibeto-Burman -- about 3,000,000 speakers in western Szechwan and the mountainous areas in Yunnan.

II. DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE DIALECTS

A. Southwestern Mandarin

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Next to Northern Mandarin, Southwestern Mandarin is the largest dialect group in China in terms of the number of people who speak it and the area which it covers. Like Northern Mandarin, its dialects are fairly homogeneous. The following are some of its characteristics: 197

1. The initials n and l are not distinguished except in some Yunnan dialects. However, there is a tendency to treat these two sounds as conditioned variants or partially conditioned variants of a sound unit. That is to say, l is heard before mid and low vowels while n is heard before high vowels; or, although either n or l may occur as free variants before mid and low vowels, n occurs regularly before high vowels. 197 194

2. There are no retroflex sounds because such sounds are replaced by dental sibilants; thus Northern Mandarin chu (pig) becomes tsu, shan (mountain) becomes san.

3. The guttural nasal ng usually precedes the Northern Mandarin zero-initial when the latter is not a high vowel. Thus, words pronounced like ai (to love), e (forehead), and en (favor) of Northern Mandarin, become ngai, nge, and ngen, respectively.

4. When initial h precedes a syllabic u, it is changed to f; thus, Northern Mandarin hu (tiger) becomes fu.

5. The common Northern Mandarin unrounded back vowel ə̂, found in such words as kə̂, sometimes also written ko. (elder brother), hə̂, or ho (river), is replaced by a rounded o generally.

197 The same back vowel in other Northern Mandarin
194 words such as te (to obtain), se (color), che (this), k'e (guest), etc., is replaced by a front vowel e (which sounds like a in chaotic) in many dialects in this region.

6. Northern Mandarin final uo is replaced by ue in such words as kuo (nation) and huo (or), which become kue and hue respectively in Southwestern Mandarin.

7. Northern Mandarin final üeh is replaced by io in such words as hsüeh (to learn) and chüeh (to become aware), which become hsio and chio respectively in Southwestern Mandarin.

8. There is only one final nasal, n, after the vowels ə, i, u.

9. The four tones of Northern Mandarin are described as high-level, high-rising, low-dipping, and high-falling; most of the Southwestern Mandarin dialects have a tonal pattern consisting of the high-level, low slightly falling, falling, and rising tones.

10. Within this dialect group, the following local variations are observed:

a) Dialects spoken in some areas along the upper reaches of the Yangtze River have preserved the ancient "entering" tone, which is generally associated with a "lax" vowel. Thus these dialects have five, instead of four, tones.

[redacted]

197 b) In certain areas, the common diphthing
199 ie is changed to the simple vowel i; thus Northern Mandarin chieh (elder sister) becomes chi.

c) Some dialects in Yunnan and Kweichow lack the rounded high front vowel ü ; thus Northern Mandarin nü (woman) becomes ni, and chü (to dwell) becomes chi.

B. Hakka

All Hakka people in Szechwan Province are bilingual; they speak Hakka at home and Southwestern Mandarin outside their village. Although they believe that Hakka remains their "ancestors' language," it actually has been very much influenced by Southwestern Mandarin and has lost many of its features except the following:

1. Many aspirated initials are substituted for unaspirated initials; thus Northern Mandarin tu (to cross a river) becomes t'u, and tso (to sit) becomes ts'o.

2. The initial v replaces the zero-initial u in Northern Mandarin; thus Northern Mandarin wu (house) becomes vu, and wan (ten thousand) becomes van.

3. There is no ü sound except in a few words apparently borrowed from Mandarin.

4. In many words, the diphthong oi replaces the Northern Mandarin ai, and the final on replaces an; thus Northern Mandarin kai (should) becomes koi, and an (dark) becomes on.

194 5. There are six to seven tones, two of which
197 are derived from the ancient "entering" tone and associated with final p, t, and k.

C. Kam-Tai

Kam-tai, like the other two major non-Chinese dialect groups spoken in this region, belongs to the extensive Sin-Tibetan family which includes Chinese dialects. The Sino-Tibetan language family, generally speaking, is: (a) monosyllabic -- the ultimate constituents of the language are all monosyllabic; (b) tonal -- when normally stressed, the pattern of pitch of a syllable determines its meaning; (c) uninflectional forms virtually do not exist. The special characteristics of Kam-Tai can be further described as follows:

1. It has eight or more tones. This results from the development into two tones of each of the four tones in ancient Sino-Tibetan languages.

2. There are pre-glottalized voiced consonants, such as b and d. This is especially true of Kam dialects.

3. Consonant clusters are preserved, in Tai, but they do not appear as initials in Kam dialects.

4. Long and short vowels are differentiated.

[193] 5. Word order, in some respects, is different from Chinese dialects. For example, hao jen (good man) in Chinese becomes jen hao in Kam-Tai.

194 197 6. Certain dialects, such as those spoken by the Pai-yi people in southern Yunnan, have preserved aspirated consonants as initials.

7. Examples of Kam-Tai sounds are given below:

	Kam	Tai (as spoken in southern Yunnan)	Tai (as spoken in eastern Yunnan)
palm	fa	p'a	va
eye	da	t'a	ta
fish	mum	pja	pla
egg	tai	kjai	klai

D. Miao-Yao

Earlier scholars have grouped Yao with Tai described above, and Miao with the Mon-Khmer language family. However, further comparative studies have shown that a greater affinity exists between Miao and Yao and that there seems to be more reason to group these two as a separate branch of the Sino-Tibetan family. This group has the following common features:

1. In Miao there is no final consonant except the guttural nasal ng and rarely the dental nasal n. But final consonants m, n, ng, and p, t, k are common in Yao dialects.

2. Initial consonant clusters are common in Miao, especially pre-nasalized ones such as mp, nt, mpl, mpr, etc., but rare in Yao.

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194 3. Gutturals and uvulars in the initial position are differentiated in Miao.

4. Many words in Yao are borrowed from either Chinese or Tai.

5. The following are examples of Miao and Yao words as spoken by different groups of the frontier peoples.

	Miao		Yao	
water	ong	ai	wam	vom
door	tong	tai	keng	keng
house	pla	pra	piau	piau
to die	tu	to	tai	tai

E. Tibetan-Burmese (Tibeto-Burman)

The use of prefixes, syllabic or assyllabic, and the subject-object-verb word order are common features of this group. In comparison with Kam-Tai, this group has a much simpler tonal pattern. Four sub-groups of Tibetan-Burmese are spoken in this region:

1. Tibetan

a) Unlike the Tibetan spoken in Tibet, this sub-group has preserved the prefixes and final consonants of ancient Tibetan.

b) Each word has two forms, "common" and "honorific"; the latter is used when the speaker wishes to be polite. For example:

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	Common	Honorific
eye	mig	spyan
nose	sna	shangs
mouth	kha	zhal

2. Lolo-Moso This sub-group includes a number of aboriginal languages and has a complicated initial system. In addition to the common initials, there are also pre-nasalized voiced stops and affricatives such as mb, nd, ndz, ngg, etc.

3. Kachin The only general characteristic so far ascertained of the people who speak this sub-group is that they tend to pronounce the prefixes as separate syllables.

197 4. Others Small minority nationality groups inhabiting the Yunnan-Burma border zone speak a variety of dialects. Information on these minor dialects has been extremely scanty and it is generally assumed that they belong to the Burmese branch of the Tibetan-Burmese group.

F. Other Non-Chinese Dialect Groups

A number of non-Chinese dialects, which are not sub-groups of the Sino-Tibetan family, are also spoken in this region. The Palaung (with about 5,000 population), Puman (14,000 population), and Wa (about 56,000 population) each has its own dialect. These dialects are related to the Peguan (or Mon) language spoken in Burma and the Cambodian (or Khmer) language spoken in Indo-China. Linguistically they come under the Palaung-Wa group which uses more affixes than dialects of the Sino-Tibetan family.

IV. DEGREE OF AUDITORY INTELLIGIBILITY

197 Although it is rather difficult to point out the exact degree of mutual auditory intelligibility of the languages and dialects spoken in this region, the previous section dealing with their distinguishing features should have made it reasonably clear that non-Chinese languages, although not entirely free from Chinese influences, bear little resemblance to the Chinese dialects. Hence they are not intelligible to the Chinese-speaking people of the region. Furthermore, they are sufficiently different from one another to be mutual unintelligible.

Speakers of Southwestern Mandarin generally have a great deal of difficulty in trying to understand Hakka. However, since speakers of Hakka in this region are able to converse in Southwestern Mandarin also, there is no insurmountable barrier between them and speakers of Southwestern Mandarin.

V. THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE OR KUO-YU

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185 Since there is no standard spoken Chinese, and since the various Chinese dialects in general are sufficiently different to make them mutually unintelligible to various degrees, many difficulties naturally arise. The Chinese themselves have long felt the need for a national language that will help them solve such difficulties. Consequently, as early as 1911, a movement was

197 launched to unify the national language, and a
system of thirty-nine phonetic symbols which
185 were later reduced to thirty-seven was devised
primarily for the purpose of indicating speech
sounds. In the following year the pronunciation
of Northern Mandarin as typified by the dialect
of Peiping was adopted as the standard for the
new national language. With the strong support
of the government and educational leaders, the
movement soon gained momentum and swept the
entire country. Gradually more and more speakers of other dialects began to make an effort to
learn the new national language or kuo-yü.

During the years of China's war of resistance against Japan when people speaking various dialects were squeezed into the hinterland, dialectal barriers were gradually broken down. A situation like that proved to be favorable to the further popularization of the national language. Although it may be exaggeration to say that now the national language has replaced the local dialects in the Southwest Region, it is nevertheless true that kuo-yü is gaining wider acceptance than ever before.

VI. THE WRITTEN LANGUAGES

A. The Chinese Written Language

212 The Chinese written language consists of thousands of uniformly understood logographs or "characters" as they are commonly called. They can be understood only with reference to their ancient forms.

1. Pictographs

212

Chinese characters are traditionally classified into six main categories, the first of which is pictographs. The characters in this category all originated from simple pictures: jih ⊙(now written 日)is the character for "the sun"; yüeh ☽ (now written 月) is the character for "the moon," etc. However, they have long lost their function of picturing things and have become merely conventionalized visual symbols of spoken words.

2. Ideographs

The second category is that of the ideographs, which are characters indicating in a diagrammatic manner simple ideas, as shang 上 for "up, above," hsia 下 for "down, below," i 一 for "one", erh 二 for "two," san 三 for "three,", etc. Pictographs and ideographs, presumably bases of ancient Chinese characters, however, amount to only one-tenth of the entire stock of China's written symbols.

3. Compound Ideographs

The third category is that of the compound ideographs or characters whose meanings are determined by the combined meanings of their component parts, as ming 明, which is a combination of the "sun" and "moon", stands for "bright"; hsin 信, which is a combination of "man" and "word," hence, the "words of a man" stands for "honesty."

4. Phonetic Loan Characters

212 The fourth category is that of phonetic loan characters. These characters were all borrowed from existing words homophonous with the new ones for which written symbols had to be coined. For example, when a written symbol had to be created for the new word lai, meaning "to come," instead of resorting to pictographic or ideographic devices for the coining of such a symbol, the old character 來, meaning "barley," also similarly pronounced, was borrowed for that purpose. Often such a borrowed character displaced the original source. Thus, 來 is now used exclusively to mean "to come" rather than "barley." Simiarly, ch'i 其, the third personal pronoun, is now used invariably as such rather than as a symbol for "basket," the meaning of the original word similarly written and similarly pronounced.

5. Phonetic Compounds

Phonetic compounds constitute the fifth and perhaps the most numerous category of Chinese characters. They consist of two portions, a "signific" or meaning portion, and a "phonetic" or pronunciation portion. The former reveals the general meaning while the latter indicates the pronunciation of the compound. Thus, jan 燃 "to burn" has huo 火 "fire" as its signific, and jan 然 "so, thus" as its phonetic. Similarly, t'ang 糖 "sugar" has mi 米 "rice, cereal" as its signific, and t'ang 唐 "bold talk" as its phonetic. It may be pointed out here that the phonetic element of such compounds may or may not have been a "phonetic loan compound," that the pronunciation of the phonetic may or may not be

212 exactly identical with that of the compound even on the basis of ancient Chinese pronunciation, and that the meaning indicated by the signific is at best categorical rather than minutely accurate.

6. Derivative Characters

The last of the six categories consists of what may be called derivative characters, the origin of which is still uncertain. Some scholars think that the characters of the category resulted from graphic inversion, such as lao 老 "aged, old" and k'ao 考 "aged, old"' others think that they resulted from changes brought about by modifications in sounds accompanied by modifications in meanings, such as heng 亨 "propitious" and hsiang 享 "to enjoy." At any rate, this is the smallest category.

B. Non-Chinese Written Languages

212
563 To varying degrees of completeness and adequacy, some of the non-Chinese languages spoken in this region have their own scripts:

1. The Pai-yi ethnic minority groups, speaking Kam-Tai dialects, use two systems of writing. One is the Shan alphabet derived from the Burmese alphabet and the other is closely related to the Siamese alphabet.

2. Speakers of Miao-Yao have no script of their own, but attempts have been made by some Western missionaries to adapt the Latin alphabet to these dialects for the translation of the Bible.

212
563 3. A writing system derived from a certain ancient Indic alphabet of the seventh century is used by the Tibetan-speaking people in this region in their religious writings.

4. The Lolo people use a phonetic script, mainly for religious writings. The phonetic symbols resemble Chinese characters and can be written either vertically or horizontally.

5. A primitive "hieroglyphic" script is in use among the Moso-speaking people. The system has yet to be standardized and is neither adequate nor effective as a written medium of communication. More recently an effort has been made to adopt a phonetic alphabet to replace the "hieroglyphic" symbols. The new phonetic alphabet resembles that of the Lolo script.

VII. CHINESE SCRIPT AND THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF ILLITERACY

212 It is true that written Chinese is uniformly understood throughout the country and has created no difficulty for literate Chinese in communicating ideas to one another regardless of their dialectal affiliation. But it is also true that although Chinese characters might have been devised for writing the spoken language in ancient times, now the great majority of symbols have become merely conventionalized written equivalents of individual spoken words. Some of the characters for most commonly used words such as 鹽 "salt" and 鐵 "iron," for instance, consist of twenty-four and twenty-one strokes respectively. To say the very least about them, they are time-consuming for the average Chinese

212 to learn and memorize. As there are thousands of characters in everyday use, many of which are comparable in complexity and clumsiness, it should be apparent that it will take an average person many years to become adequately literate. It is entirely possible and highly probable that there is a definite connection between the complicated and clumsy Chinese script and the high incidence of illiteracy in China, although other equally convincing factors, too, must have contributed substantially to that fact.

IX. LANGUAGE REFORMS

212
185 Attempts to introduce language reforms in China began on a nationwide basis with the movement to unify the national language shortly after the establishment of the Chinese Republic in 1911. The movement was followed closely by efforts to reform the written language. Those who advocated such reforms were of the opinion that since the characters were so complicated and time-consuming for the average person to learn, and since literary Chinese was so unrealistic and impractical, something had to be done to make the written language of China more effective, so that it could be within the grasp of the average person to learn, and in a relatively short period of time.

A. Phonetic Symbols

One type of reform advocated the use of phonetic symbols as an aid to the illiterate to learn to read. However, since the sole function of these symbols is phonetic, they are effective

212 185 when they are used as a guide to correct pronunciation in accordance with the standard of the national language for the purpose of leveling down dialectal differences in pronunciation. They are helpful only to those who have not yet acquired such a knowledge. They cannot possibly add anything to the attempt to make the Chinese language system simpler or more readily accessible to the illiterate masses.

B. Alphabetization

Another type of reform advocated was the alphabetization of Chinese in order to get away from ideographic writing. As a matter of fact, the use of the Roman alphabet for the transcription of sounds of the Chinese language is no novel suggestion. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, Matteo Ricci, a Jesuit missionary to China, began to transcribe the then Mandarin sounds with the Roman alphabet on the basis of the speech sounds of his own native Italian language. Later, other systems of romanization were devised by others to meet the needs of those speaking other Western languages The most widely used system among English-speaking peoples is the so-called Wade-Giles system, originally devised by Sir Thomas Wade, a member of the British legation in China, and later revised by the British sinologist, Herbert A. Giles. Another system in current use in this country is devised by the linguists at Yale University.

[redacted]

212
185 In 1928 the Chinese Ministry of Education adopted a system of romanization known as Gwoyeu Romatzyh or National Language Romanization, devised by a group of Chinese linguists and intellectual leaders such as Dr. Yuen Ren Chao, Dr. Lin Yutang, and others. Its distinguishing feature is that instead of indicating Chinese intonation by means of superior figures or diacritical marks, it spells the different tones of Chinese words with different letters: *mai* (second tone, Wade-Giles mai^2) "to bury"; *mae* (third tone, Wade-Giles mai^3) "to buy"; may (fourth tone, Wade-Giles mai^4) "to sell".

Between 1929 and 1931 another system of romanization known as Latinzua was devised mainly by Professor A. A. Dragunov, a linguist of Leningrad, primarily for teaching the Chinese workers in the USSR to read. It has been very popular, for obvious reasons, with the Chinese Communists, who have been doing all they can to promote and popularize it. However, since the system makes no attempt, except in an *ad hoc* manner, to distinguish tones in Chinese, it is not only inadequate and unsatisfactory, but often misleading.

C. Simplified Characters

Yet another type of proposal advocated the simplification of Chinese characters, especially the more complicated ones in common use, by reducing the number of their strokes. Advocates of this proposal believed that a simplified system of writing would make the whole process of

212 learning to read and write Chinese much easier
185 and less time-consuming. For example 纔 ts'ai "then" has been reduced to look like 才, and 鐵 t'ieh "iron", to look like 鉄. If a satisfactory principle of simplication that is philologically sound can be worked out, so that the simplified characters, if necessary, can be identified with the original characters, the adoption of such a system may turn out to be a boon to China's millions of illiterate people in their effort to become literate.

D. Basic Chinese

A fourth type of proposal advocated the reduction of the number of characters to be meant for general use in order to simplify the written language. For example, the series of textbooks for teaching the illiterate compiled by Dr. Yen Yang-ch'u, leader of the Mass Education Movement, who is better known abroad as James Y.C. Yen, represents an effort made in this direction. On the basis of some 1,200 characters chosen by him in terms of their frequency, he compiled texts that he believed would enable China's illiterate people to meet their basic needs in expression. As another effort made more or less in the same direction, we may mention the list of characters chosen by Hung Shen, the famous dramatist. In 1935 he published his Method of Teaching and Using 1,100 Basic Chinese Characters. Instead of basing his choice of characters on frequency and limiting their usefulness and expressiveness to the rudimentary plane, he chose them on the criteria of

212 their flexibility in forming compounds with other
125 characters, and their adequacy for general use in everyday situations.

X. DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE COMMUNISTS

The Chinese Communists have been cautious in their efforts to reform the Chinese language. They frequently quote Stalin as saying that the language of a people cannot be artifically changed and that the evolution of any language has to follow a natural course.[1] However, the Communists also see the immediate need of simplifying the Chinese written language to combat illiteracy. In this regard the government policy is based on Mao Tse-tung's statement that, "under certain conditions, the written language of China must be reformed."[2] Envisaged as an ultimate goal of language reform is the complete Latinization of the Chinese written language. In other words, the characters will be replaced by the Latin alphabet. Communists promoters of Latinization often cite Lenin's pronouncement that "Latinization is the great revolution of the East,"[3] to substantiate their argument.

The Communists are trying to cultivate a politically conscious proletariat in China. China's

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1. See quotation and discussion in Ts'ao Po-han, Yu-wen Wen-t'i P'ing-lun Chi [Critical Essays on the Language Problem], Shanghai, Tung-fang shu-tien, 1954, p. 95.

2. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], Vol. II, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 680.

3. John de Francis, Nationalism and [contd]

2/2 185 spoken language, as reflected in songs, plays, and speeches, is becoming more proletarian and drifting away from the set phrases and expressions traditionally used by the intellectual class. Extensive use of professional jargon and local expressions is the vogue of the day. Political terms and scientific terms, particularly those of Russian origin, are apparently on the lips of every Chinese who has had Communist indoctrination. It must be noted that the Communists, in adopting many new terms heretofore unfamiliar to the average Chinese, are aware of the danger of corrupting the language. The People's Daily of Peking (the Pravda of China), in an editorial on June 6, 1951, urged the use of correct Chinese and stressed the need for the study of grammar so that "the Chinese language will not become corrupt and impure."[4]

In the movement to eradicate illiteracy, the current trend is to promote accelerated methods of language teaching and to standardize and formalize many simplified characters already used in handwriting by the people. One of the most publicized methods to accelerate language learning was introduced in 1948 by Ch'i Chien-hua,

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Language Reform in China, Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 90.

[4] Quoted in Jen-min Chiao-yü [People's Education], Peking, March 1955, p. 28.

212 a cultural cadre attached to the armed forces. 185 Ch'i publicized the use of "National Phonetic Symbols" (not to be confused with the Gwoyeu Romatzyh discussed in foregoing sections of this chapter) as the "walking stick" for new learners. Phonetic symbols are employed as an aid to pronunciation. This method was said to be so successful that the Peking government in May 1952 recognized Ch'i's contribution by awarding him a citation.[5]

Simplification of written characters has received official blessing. When the Committee on the Study of Language Reform under the Ministry of Education compiled 798 such simplified characters and recommended that they be adopted, the recommendation was given immediate attention. On May 1, 1955 the committe announced that 57 of the simplified characters would be adopted by six national periodicals for experimental purposes.[6] By January 1956, the number of simplified characters approved by the committee and already in use by many publications had increased to 260. At the same time the committee also announced the standardized forms of 810 characters, of which many irregular forms had been in use.[7]

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[5] People's Education, May 1952, p. 4.

[6] Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News] , New York, May 2, 1955, p. 1.

[7] Ya-chou Tien-hsün [Asia Foundation News Bulletin] , San Francisco, Jan. 19. 1956, p. 3.

[8] Ni Hai-shu Chung-kuo Yu-wen Ti Hsin-sheng [The Rebirth of the Chinese Language] , Shanghai, Shih-tai shu-pao ch'u-pan-she, 1949, pp. 458-59; also see John de Francis, op. cit. pp. 131-34. [see next page]

[redacted]

The Latinization movement, although without much official promotion, is by no means dead. There are publications printed in this new form of Chinese. One ardent supporter of this movement, Ni Hai-shu, claimed that in 1949 there were over 300 such publications, with a total circulation of about 500,000 on the market.[8] There is evidence that such publications are still available in Southwest China today.

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There are other recent developments in language reform. One is the attempt to standardize the use of punctuation. On October 5, 1951 the Government Administration Council in Peking issued a directive on the correct use of punctuation marks.[9] Since that time the general trend has been moving toward standardization. It has also been advocated that Chinese be written horizontally and from left to right. Such a practice is not new, but the Peking government is the first Chinese regime to sanction it. Following lengthy discussions of this practice, national publications like the Enlightenment Daily and the New China Monthly began printing their texts horizontally in January 1955. The People's Daily and a few other journals followed suit in January 1956.

As to the languages of minority nationality groups, the over-all Communist policy is to help them create or improve their own written scripts. The theory is that these people must first be given their own languages; then it will be easier for them to learn Chinese (Latinized Chinese, most probably). In Southwest China, the Tai

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9. Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1952 [People's Handbook, 1952] , Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1952, p.437.

212 185 script used by the minority nationality groups around Pao-shan in Yunnan Province was standardized in December 1952.[10] Many other non-Chinese languages in this region are receiving equal attention.

XI. SPEAKERS OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

191 Before 1949, the use of foreign languages, mainly English, was found in a few larger cities in Southwest China like Chungking and Chengtu. In Kunming (Yunnan Province) and several towns on the old Yunnan-Indochina Railway where French influence was discernible, French was an understandable language among a small segment of population in commercial and educated circles. Compared with other Western languages English was popular in Southwest China because of the contact with English-speaking visitors and the inclusion of English in school curricula. However, with the exception of a few foreign missionary schools in which English was emphasized and taught by native speakers, instruction in English in other schools did not amount to much. This was true even of the colleges in the region. Although some college students could read a printed item in English with reasonable ease, they could hardly converse in it. On the average it may be safely assumed that no more than one-tenth of the secondary school graduates and no more than one-third of the college graduates could, with some difficulty, read English. The over-all percentages of those who could speak it would be even smaller.

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[10] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, January 29, 1953, p. 3.

The Communist policy is to discourage the use of English or any other Western language except for advanced specialized studies. But as late as 1953, knowledge of simple English was still required for enrollment in college.[11] It appears reasonable to assume that the number of senior middle school (secondary school) and college students able to read or speak English has not changed. Foreign language instruction has been eliminated from the curricula of junior middle schools and primary schools.[12] Although the study of Russian has been encouraged by the Communists, it is doubtful if much has been achieved during the past five years.

There is no statistical information on the number of people able to read or speak English in Southwest China, but if the curricula for senior middle schools and colleges are any indication then there cannot possibly be more than 35,000 with this ability.[13] As to the number of people in this region who can speak or read other Western languages, there is even less information to serve as a basis for conjecture.

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[11] I-chiu-wu-ssu-nien T'ou-k'ao Ta-hsüeh Chih-tao [Guide to Taking College Entrance Examinations in 1954], Hong Kong, Hsüeh-sheng shu-tien, 1954, p. 98-100.

[12] Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü Kung-tso [Communist Education in the Past Five Years], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 16.

[13] Total number of senior middle school graduates in China (1949-53) was 216.000. 17-18 per cent reported in Southwest Region. People's Handbook, 1955, p. 571-73.

[redacted] AF16

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1f,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

563 Owing to the fact that the majority of the population in Southwest China are Han Chinese who have migrated from provinces in East, North, and Central-South China, and that the Southwest has been under Chinese rule for centuries, the social structure of the Han Chinese in Southwest China closely resembles that of other regions of China. However, the presence of a large number of ethnic minorities in this region gives the over-all social structure of the region a unique character. Those minorities who have adopted Han Chinese culture are integrated into the social structure of the Han Chinese; those who remain isolated and unassimilated have their own separate social structures peculiar to their own cultures, which are not yet sufficiently investigated and understood by people outside of these groups.[1] The scope of this chapter is therefore limited to the social structure of the majority people, i.e., the Han Chinese and those ethnic minorities who have adopted the Han Chinese way of life in the Southwest.

I. THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

565 A. Social Classes

The people of traditional China often viewed

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[1] Consult chapter on Ethnic Groups in this handbook.

[redacted]

565 society as being comprised of four occupational groups: the literati, the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. Soldiers had no social status and were not members of any group. Although this classification indicates that all members of society recognized the prestige of the literati and the low status of the merchants, it fails to account for two things: the wide diversity in wealth, standards of living, and cultural and recreational interests within each occupational group; and the free interchange of occupations among the top layers of the farming, merchant, and governing groups.[2]

In reality, social stratification in Chinese society was not entirely based on occupational lines. Rich merchants and wealthy landlords were often linked by marriage; retail merchants and middle peasants were socially compatible; the social distinction between a craftsman and a simple peasant was even more difficult to draw; and bureaucrats were often wealthy landlords as well. Thus, if we employ the term social classes to mean the stratification of society on an economic basis, we will find that class lines cut across the traditionally accepted occupation-status classification.

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2. In some dynasties, sons of merchant families were not allowed to join the governing group. However, as their prosperity increased, it was relatively easy for the third generation to come into the governing group. It was quite common for retired bureaucrats to engage in commerce. Toward the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1912), there emerged in coastal provinces a group of

[continued next page]

[redacted]

However, members of all the occupational groups regarded the possession of land as the true indication of prestige and security. A landless peasant hoped to possess land, a peasant with some land hoped to acquire more, and the wealthiest landlord wished to do likewise. Artisans who had acquired savings would invest them in land. Merchants invariably put excess capital that might have been used for business expansion into land, although often they did not count on income from it as their principal means of support. Bureaucrats were even more preoccupied with owning land concomitant with their rise in officialdom. This is a common phenomenon in any society where other tangible assets for accumulation are lacking.

Although the possession of land was a criterion for determining prestige and, to a large extent, the sign of real power, prestige did not always result from wealth and the land-holding of[3]

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gentry-merchants who purchased the rank of tao-t'ai (circuit judge) and were given positions in the official custom banks. Ssu-yü Teng and John K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West, ADocumentary Survey, 1839-1923, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954, pp. 214-15.

3. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1945, p. 132; Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow, New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1948, p. 4. Hsu's book is a study of a small semi-rural community in Southwest China. It is his conviction, as stated in the preface, that the essential social structure of the community he had studied is typical of China as a whole. See also, Fei Hsiao-tung, China's Gentry, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Particular reference to SWChina in rural-urban relations and life-histories of gentry families.

565 any one family seldom remained constant for more than two or three generations. These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There are definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy.

B. Social Mobility

565 428 596 The family ideal. Large families, especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[4] However, in practice, the ideal was limited by economic means. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions, individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families and particularly when land was the sole source of income.[5] On the

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[4] Consult chapter on Family in this handbook.

[5] "In the matter of inheritance, the general pattern observed for poor agriculturalists holds very well for the merchant group. Just as at the death of a farmer, there is a sharing of the property. In the agricultural situation, however, there seems to be greater fragmentation of the legacy, each son working his share more or less independently and with a minimum of combination. In the merchant situation there is somewhat more cohesion among heirs, who often work the inherited enterprise as partners." Morton H. Fried, Fabric of Chinese Society, New York, Praeger, 1953, p. 52.

565 other hand, because of the existence of extended
596 families and the clan structure, less fortunate
428 members of these groups might be helped by
relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

183 The scholar ideal. Learning was much es-
565 teemed, especially when combined with wealth.
555 The prestige of the wealthy was never complete
until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indicative of the respect all Chinese had for learning was the popular saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them study the Classics."[6] The emphasis

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[6] This stress on learning and cultivation of the Chinese was studied by Max Weber. In his Religion of China, Weber goes so far as to conclude that this emphasis caused the lack of capital accumulation necessary for the development of modern capitalism in China. While this analysis may be oversimple, it indicates that the traditional supremacy of officialdom over the merchant groups may have impeded the rise of a system of negotiable property rights, protected

[continued next page]

183 on learning was buttressed by the imperial ex-
565 amination system, the means by which official
555 positions were obtained, which, in turn, during peace time was the quickest means to the acquisition of wealth and social prestige in China. The saying, "After I have studied I will take a government position," was indicative of the usual goal in education. Wealthy families as a matter of course and poorer families at great sacrifice educated one or more of their sons in the Classics in order to obtain immediate prestige in the eyes of the community and with the hope of the son's eventual success in the examinations, which might lead to an official position and enrichment of the family fortune. Thus, education contributed to the upward movement of the familes, be they of the landed, merchant, or bureaucrat groups. On the other hand, the allocation of family income to the support of one or more unproductive persons through years of study with no assurance of economic return often dissipated the fortune of the family and led to the loss of economic status. Moreover, the belief that those who used their brains were superior to those who used their brawn contributed to the scholars' contempt for manual skills and

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6. [continued] ...by corporation law instead of official favoritism, and capable of supplying the investment capital needed for industrialization. Teng and Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 274-75.

183 commercial activity. Therefore, if a scholar
565 did not pass the examination, or having passed
555 it, failed to obtain official appointment, and if the successive divisions of his family property reduced his own holdings to a small plot, he would find it difficult to improve his economic status. At the same time, his lack of economic means would deprive his children of the opportunity to study. Thus, the scholar ideal also contributed to the downward movement of families in the social hierarchy.

The scholars, therefore, are not to be regarded as a separate class or a separate occupational group, except as they relied for their livelihood on the teaching profession or the use of their literary skills in a clerical capacity, but rather as "leisure" members of families of varying degrees of wealth of the bureaucratic, agricultural, artisan, or commercial groups. When recruited by the government to study at the imperial academies, scholars were protégés of the government, and were regarded as potential bureaucrats even if they were engaged only in the compilation of historical documents of no current import. Certainly the majority of those who devoted their full time to study considered themselves potential bureaucrats. To those who did not cherish the dream of becoming bureaucrats and who had other economic means, education was only a way to added prestige.

The road to status and wealth through edcation and government service was often by-passed

183 in time of chaos; then military skills would enable
565 individuals to obtain high positions in the bureau-
555 cracy. But military men seldom won social esteem until they had become cultivated, and such esteem generally accrued to their children, who were given the opportunity to acquire learning under tutelage of well-known scholars due to their parents' wealth.

C. Social Organizations

575

Social organizations which had no basis in kinship were not recognized as approved parts of the social hierarchy or as approved means for gaining social prominence. However, they helped to supplement relationships otherwise neglected by the social order. Most of the traditional non-kin social organizations had an economic motivation. The success of such organizations, however, served as a disintegrating influence on the existing social system.

In the rural areas, organizations such as the Red Spear Society (Hung-ch'iang Hui) and the Mutual Protection Society (Lien-ya Hui) existed for the protection of its members against roving bandits. These voluntary associations arose in areas where the government failed to maintain order and peace, and their organization cut across class and occupational lines. When landlords were forced to move into towns during periods of disorder, organized peasants and tenants at times became so powerful that they defied the landlords' demand for exorbitant rents.

575 Among the artisans and workers in China there were for generations both craft guilds or "hongs" (hang) and regional guilds or "pongs" (pang). As in Europe, these guilds were not intended to serve the interests of workers as a class, but to promote the crafts and guard their monopolies and trade secrets. Both employers and employees were members, but the employers usually dominated the guilds' activities.[7]

Another kind of association existed to serve travelers, who were usually merchants, in cities outside their home county or province. These associations, t'ung-hsiang hui, were organized on a county or provincial basis. By maintaining buildings and personnel in distant cities, they facilitated the dealings of their constituents who might have language or other difficulties when traveling.

Most significant and disturbing to the social structure were the secret societies. They were, in fact, hierarchical societies within a society. A notable example was the Ko-lao Hui, which was also called Hung-pang. The bulk of the membership of this secret society was drawn from the unemployed in the rural areas and organized under strict and severe discipline. They were instructed to rob the rich, to help the poor, to rescue the oppressed, and to overthrow Manchu rule. Leadership of this society, however, was in the hands of the landlord class. The Ko-lao

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[7] Nym Wales, The Chinese Labor Movement, New York, The John Day Company, 1945, p. 7.

575 *Hui* became such a strong underworld force that Sun Yat-sen had to solicit its co-operation in his endeavor to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. After the fall of the Manchu regime, many warlords of North China obtained power by way of the *Ko-lai Hui* hierarchy and by utilizing its mass following.[8]

While societies like the *Ko-lao Hui* aimed at the overthrow of the existing order, others like the *Ch'ing-pang* were utilized by the Manchu government to prolong its power by extra legal means. The *Ch'ing-pang* was originally organized among the boatmen and the urban unemployed along the Grand Canal and the Yangtze River. It later spread to big cities and gained recruits among the city poor, handicraftsmen, apprentices, industrial workers, policemen, shopkeepers, the self-employed, and even the civil servants. *Ch'ing-pang* organizations dominated the underworld of East China while *Ko-lao Hui* branches dominated other regions of China. The *Ch'ing-pang's* highly organized strength provided a strong bargaining position for the support of politicians and warlords, as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-45 utilized *Ch'ing-pang* organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[9] With the influx

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[8] *Ko-lao Hui and Ch'ing-pang*, Hsi-pei Yen-chiu she, 1941.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

575 of people from East China into Southwest China during the war with Japan, the Ch'ing-pang organization was extended to the Southwest as well.

II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

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Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, so did the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite become contributing factors in the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

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369 The traditional rural village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and
565 landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of whom owned land; the village gentry, that is to say, the local leaders, were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[10]

178 However, the growth of rural population
369 without a comparable increase in arable land to-
166 gether with more opportunity for employment

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[10] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

178 in the cities caused the migration of some peasants
369 to the urban centers. The continued high premium
166 placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to modern city schools which offered new opportunities. Thus, the cities became the centers from which the forces of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breaking up of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people; new professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who would otherwise have been occupied
178 in the study of the Confucian Classics. This
was especially true after Confucian training had
871 been found "impractical" and not in keeping with changing conditions. Education in the secondary schools and colleges, however inadequate and artificial it might seem, was designed for better citizenship.[11] Their curricula opened a new and different world, far more interesting

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[11] Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance (the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933) Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1934. Teng and Fairbank, loc. cit.

[redacted]

178 and intelligible to the younger generation than the
871 classics of old. If modern education had not
always succeeded in giving new skills to the
student, it at least had taught him not to be resigned
to his lot, but to look to the future rather
178 than to the past for betterment. With the increase
871 of schools, there emerged in the cities
565 a considerable professional class and a large
number of students cut off for years from their
original environment. Students and intellectuals,
seeking some common meeting ground, banded
together; and with their newly established organizations
came a semblance of separate class
consciousness. Although frequently dependent
for subsistence on their families, students had
nothing to do with the cultivation or management
178 of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to
565 find a new channel of social advancement, the
intellectuals were confronted with the problems
of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast
with the situation in Europe during a comparable
cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested
with the merchants, industrialists, and
bankers for positions in the ruling elite class,
political power and economic power in modern
China continued to be in the hands of a single
group. When social nobility was made difficult
by the lack of a clear and recognized channel
for upward social movement, social rôles were
less clearly defined; sons of high government
officials became industrialists, bankers' sons
became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages
between the new and the old upper-class
elements were taken for granted. Modern
intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families,
were unable to obtain position and status

178 in the new business or political hierarchy and
565 yet were unwilling to return to their home villages.
They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

178 Influenced by the idea of democracy which
565 they had discovered in the new schools, the intellectuals
668 began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders in China shows that the majority of them came fro the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and had attended modern schools.[12] The labor unions, the peasants' associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectuals began their new career.

178 During this period of social and political
701 disorder, military men began to gain power, obtaining
874 offices by virtue of their military success.
555
565 Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaigns

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[12] Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-21.

[redacted]

178 against the warlords. In the war against Japan
701 the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced.
874 A military career has now become a major
555 attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible
565 channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their prestige to their military skill, suggest the reputation acquired by military men in the modern period.

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565 The Chinese Communists, like Com-
668 munists elsewhere, claim adherence to orthodoz Marxist teachings. They analyze the existing social structure in China in terms of the theory of class struggle and insist on the inevitability of a classless society. In the name of evolving toward this state they justify the liquidation of certain segments of the Chinese population "which stand in the way of the regime." Doing so, they cause changes in the social structure of China.

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People, and those who were to enjoy all the rights of the People. In the first group were included

565 the Kuomintang leader Chiang-Kai-shek, "bureau-
668 cratic capitalists" like H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the "New Democratic Stage" and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved: by bureaucratic capitalism, were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the "New Democratic Stage" formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists to have marked the conclusion of the "New Democratic Stage: and the beginning of a transitional period which will lead China to socialism. Land reform had been completed and the landlords as a class eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists, and merchants, had been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the "ideology of the working class" had been officially established as the ideology for all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

565 668 The Chinese Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those "possessing the ideology of the working class." The Party acknowledges that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists says that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, *viz.*, the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be *from* the working class, the army remains *of* the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most of the Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and have not had time to develop the ideology of the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they profess is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of the Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, rural organizations such as the peasants' associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

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590 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the indvidual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute
668 for the traditional social structure. Since the
555 individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement makes conformity the criteria of success. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the Classics and their

668 commentaries was the prerequisite to success in
555 the imperial examinations.

The Communist regime found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with the traditional social mobility, the new social mobility under the Communist regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

In the development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises, positions conceivably may be offered to absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for the grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in Southwest China the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been mainly limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[13]

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[13] Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

1:Stanford U. S.-4, 5 1956 -AF 16 SW China

~~AF 16~~ Annex "A," Subparagraph 1g, AF16
Sociological Background

THE FAMILY - SOUTHWEST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

596 Until almost the end of the imperial period (221 B.C. to A.D. 1912), the family was a vital and universal aspect of the centralized state in China and most characteristic of the society which sustained it. Since then, the family has been in flux. The direction of change and the major causes and problem involved will be sketched in this section. A more precise picture, as Marion Levy has pointed out, is not feasible with the existing incomplete state of material on Chinese society both before and since the inauguration of the Communist regime.[1]

The traditional family still persists. It proved resistant, but not impregnable, to the influx of modern Western techniques and ideas after 1842 and to the political revolutionary efforts to realize democracy and equality in the present century. The traditional family is still proving tenacious, in the face of the Communist regime's persistent effort to turn Chinese society inside out.

To understand the nature of the Chinese family today, it is necessary first to take account

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[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 273.

596 of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in Southwest China.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

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The term "family" in China has been
596 most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of
565 members related to each other by blood, marriage,
183 or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children, were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small merchant class. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

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[2] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

[3] Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

593 The status of every member of the family was fixed relative to every other member by the criteria of age, sex, and generation. AT the top of the family pyramid stood the head of the house, the oldest living male. In practice, he might consult with other adult members of the family on matters vital to its welfare; theorectically, and often in fact, he exercised complete control over the activities, income, property, training, punishment, and marriage arrangements of the family and its members.[4]

However old his sons, their position in relation to him was one of service, obedience, and dutiful respect. A lesser but similar expression was expected of a man toward his elder brothers and relatives of an older generation.

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606 Females generally were subordinate to males as well as to elders. The wife was subject to the will of her husband, to that of her son when he became head of the house. While a man's parents lived, his wife was expected to be more subservient than he toward his parents. In her mother-in-law, the son's wife more often than not encountered a tyrant. The mother-in-law, rather than her son, governed and judged the actions of the son's wife.

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[4] The material presented in this and the following paragraphs on the traditional and changing family is based largely on the comprehensive works on the family by Levy, op. cit., and Lang, op. cit.

B. Social Role

596 562 769 The principal social function of the family in China was the bearing, rearing, and training of children. Sons were more highly valued than daughters, becuase only the former remained with the family after marriage, contributing to its labor and income, and only sons could perpetuate the family and perform the yearly rites in honor of the father and the family ancestors after the father's death. Implicit in the ceremony was the idea that the ancestors had a life afte death, watched over the family's fortune, and were comforted by the periodic ministrations of the family. For the living, the rites provided an occasion for awe and respect during which the continuity of the family over time was reemphasized and the solidarity and duties of the family unit in the present reasserted.

The veneration of ancestors was so important to Chinese society that the absence of sons to carry on the yearly observances was regarded as a major failing on the responsible male's part and a tremendous catastrope for the family. Concubinage and adoption were socially and legally sanctioned as means of providingsons, if marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide.

554 561 596 Just as sex, age, and generation determined an individual's status within the family, so did

561 554 596 these factors determine his behavior and position in the community and the world at large. An additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society.

562 554 Authority and dominance were the province of the males. Women might, and occasionally did, exervise overt leadership. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however. In modern times, at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed.

561 554 Age was honored relatively and absolutely. Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China, age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis.

555 596 554 Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official careeer was usually dependent on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of financial support, his success in the exams was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and

555 village almost as much as himself. The wealth
554 usually accumulated by an official during his
596 career also materially enhanced the village and
clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

577 To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial
596 system operated by moral suasion with a mini-
642 mum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training ground for loyalty to the state and the virtues prized by it as part of the machinery of government. The root virtue of filial piety was extolled above all others in the Confucian system. It denoted not only the obedience and devotion of the son to his father but of the younger to the elder, and of the subject to the ruler.

618 Two types of organizations built on the foundation of the family were utilized by the state in maintaing peace and uniformity throughout the empire. One was the clan, or tsu. It bound together families with a common ancestor to promote their security and advancement. Relying for strength on the maximizing and formalizing of kinship ties, the tsu reinforced the authority of the family head and the values he imparted to the younger generation. The tsu settled disputes between families, conducted ancestor rites for

618 any member of a family whose line died out, provided help and protection in times of trouble for the lower class members, and safeguarded the social and economic position of the well-to-do. Where the tsu was strong, it governed the village with little interference from the central government, except in matters of high crime and taxes. The advantages to the Confucian state of the tsu were deemed sufficient to compensate for its encroachment on the state's jurisdiction.[5]

In gathering together all the members of the tsu for the yearly rites honoring its ancestors, this social institution served to bring the poor and uncultured into contact with, and under the influence of, the well-off and educated gentry. Its more accomplished members headed the clan and represented the closest approximation to the ideal of the "superior man" (chün-tsu). Meetings with such men, whose behavior was patterned by leisure and education beyond the means of the great majority of society, provided the lower classes with living models for emulation and opportunities to impress the young men and women with the proper attitude of respect toward their social superiors.

631 Another institution based on the family utilized by the state was the pao-chia system.

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[5] On the clan, see Hu Hsien-chin, The Descent Group in China and Its Functions (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 10), New York, The Viking Fund, Inc., 1948.

631 As it was constituted under the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912) and again in the 1930's by the National Government, ten adjacent families were grouped as a *p'ai*, ten *p'ai* as a *chia*, and ten *chia*, or one thousand households, as a *pao*. The head of each unit was responsible for the conduct and defense of those households under him, and the head of the *pao* had to answer to the government for the conduct and protection of the thousand households.

D. Economic Role

596 421 As the definition of the term "family" infers, it was the basic economic unit of the society. Real property such as land, houses, and workshops were owned by the family rather than by individuals. When disharmony caused the breakup of a joint family, its real property was divided among the constituent conjugal families, each as a new family claiming title to the portion of property which fell to its share.

596 The peasant, artisan, and small-merchant families were units of both production and consumption. Male family members worked together in the fields, workshop, or store to produce the goods on which the family mainly relied for a living. Sons nearly always followed their father's [462] occupation and seldom left home. Women worked in the home, taking care of the children and turning out the family's clothes and shoes. Where sericulture was practiced, women managed the entire industry from the cultivation of mulberry trees to the weaving of cloth. Food and clothing

596 were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

Some variation from this pattern occurred among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

The family and its extensions in China also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or desrving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business systems in the twentieth century.

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

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178 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately

596 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is
178 traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those cities. The same influences also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

596 491 178 361 Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China.

178 For one thing, it organized economic activity on
361 a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas
471 attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn
596 an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subject to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficiency operation of modern production and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possesion of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprise in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

871 In many places where the Chinese popula-
178 tion was sheltered from direct contact with
596 modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteeth and twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and

871 offered to a broader segment of the population in
178 the decade before World War II. New social,
596 political, and economic ideas thus disseminated
were supplemented by the outpourings of the press.
489 Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or
596 more away from the nearest great city were
178 brought only hours away by modern methods of
transportation, particularly the railroad and
the steamship. All these media brought the
people and especially the young into contact with
ideas and way of life alien to their own. Awareness
of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures
to be had in the modern city planted a seed of
dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

668 An even more disturbing influence on the
178 old way of life was the increasing spread of revolutionary
596 social and political doctrines after
1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had
brought the traditional family under attack as
early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated
with it as either non-existent or harmful to
society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread
currency in China until the rise of the New
Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese
thought and expression. It emphasized individualism,
the equality of the sexes, and the duty
of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of
this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement
of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of
the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in
the mid-twenties, by the student of anti-Japanese
agitation of the thirties, and in the socially concious
writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

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178 In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was undermined. He was still needed at home to carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

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562 The family in the rural areas adjacent to industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship

369 continued to give a greater primacy to males in
596 the family, but the ability of daughters to earn
178 a wage enhanced their value to the family and
562 made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, however, that women of farming and laboring families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children. Having a higher education, the younger members of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right to individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

596 178 While modern education gave youth increased stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in high school were willing to answer the question as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal,: acting "against the trend of the time"; as "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium and frequenting brotherls Mothers were more gently and less often criticized but they were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society

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[6] Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

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has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by foreign firms or government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successsively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911.

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[7] Ibid., pp. 186-89.

178 No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in
596 youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as
a common guide in the new society. Attempts by
the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the
National Government to restore filial piety along
with a revised Confucian code to the service of an
increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with
failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

596 In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist
671 regime has undertaken to change the nature and
function of the family. The first step in this direc-
582 tion was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May
1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the
state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and
the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later
date but put into effect within a much shorter time
and with greater immediate success.[9]

Eassentially, the outward provisions of the Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

(1)...The abolition of arbitrary and compulsory marriage and the putting into effect of freedom of marriage for men and women.

(2)...The abolition of the feudal system

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[8] Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, Aug.1955, pp.515-32.

[9. and 10. next page]

596 671 582 of marriage...based on the superiority of man over woman, and the putting into effect...of monogamy, and equal rights for both sexes.

(3)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

In propagandizing and implementing the Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriage, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

596 668 To help traditionally-minded families

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[9] See comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as C.B.: Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist magazines and newspapers, and should be evaluated accordingly.

[10] See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, p. 3.

[11] "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

596 attain the new Communist-established goal of
668 "democracy" and "harmony," family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure, condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in their children's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage." [12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese society with two utilitarian purposes in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed. For instance, an article in the Peking Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphasis on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices from them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and...the interests of the people

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12. [see next page]

596 668 should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13]

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15]

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

671 596 As the Nationalist government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to this great majority of the Chinese people. They were still bound to the traditional family and had not

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[12] See especially C.B., 273, pp.1-3; pp.4-14 and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong American Consulate, 932, iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 8.'

[13] SCMP, 973, p. 31.

[14] Ibid., 106, p. 15.

[15] See, for instance, C.B., p. 4; and SCMP, 104 pp. 30-31.

596 671 encountered the economic experience and education which had pushed the family in Western-influenced cities toward new types of social organization from the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, the new law offered no immediate or apparent economic benefits as had the Land Reform Law.

The result was apathy, when not open resistance, toward the reorientation of marriage and family practices among the farming population. These attitudes were as typical of most of the village cadres as of the rural people generally.[16] However, Liu Ching-fan's criticism in 1953 of the use of force by village cadres to achieve acceptance of the new Marriage Law's provisions indicates that up to that time violence accompanied this measure as it had other measures in Communist China.[17]

The regime became aware only slowly of the failure of the Marriage Law to take automatic effect. A preliminary investigation gave such cause for concern that a thorough investigation was made at the end of 1952.[18] The results impelled the Communists to launch a drive

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[16] See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

[17] C.B., 273, p. 4.

[18] See comment of American editors of C.B., 136, pp. 3-4.

596 671 for the thorough implementation of the Marriage Law and intensive indoctrination of the people in its principles. The movement was restricted to Han Chinese areas where land reform had been completed.[19]

Summing up the result of the campaign before the Government Administrative Council on November 11, 1953, Liu Ching-fan reported satisfactory indoctrination of 80 to 90 per cent of the adults in 15 per cent of the nation's hsien and municipalities where land reform had been completed and, to a somewhat lesser degree, 60 to 70 per cent of the people in 60 per cent of similar local areas. Almost no progress was indicated in the remaining 25 per cent of the localities.[20] Assuming the population in these areas to be roughly equal, these figures would mean that on an over-all basis even partial success was claimed for only 48 to 55.5 per cent of the population subjected to the indoctrination process.

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C. The Communists' Vague Picture of Success

Unfortunately, we cannot precisely judge how successful the regime has been in implementing the Marriage Law nationally or regionally. Communist evaluations are too generalized to reveal a definite picture, and statistics released by the regime are sketchy and, when available, rarely provide a basis for significant comparison. Reports on the results of the 1952

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[19] C.B., 273, p. 1.

[20] Ibid., p..3.

596 investigations of Marriage Law implementation
671 were evidently intended to illustrate the extremes
582 of backwardness and progress in family practices rather than to give a comprehensive picture of them. A spate of press accounts in January 1952 referred to conditions from good to bad found in political units of varying size throughout the country, but none of the accounts contained references to the Southwest Region. Evidently, the regime encountered more difficulties here than elsewhere. Last of the regions to fall to the Communists and to complete land reform, the Southwest was still reporting difficulties in expanding the Party organization in the region and complaining of the lack of education and soundness in existing cadres as late as January 1954.[21]

The Communist press announced in October 1951 that all areas in the Southwest Region had begun a check-up on Marriage Law implementation, but noted that one of the duties of the work teams involved in the task was to educate local cadres. The report also referred to a meeting of government organs in Sikang to correct the "erroneous ideas" of some cadres that to publish the Marriage Law "would cause confusion" in the central work of the Party.[22]

Some light was shed on the situation in the Southwest Region by a Communist article written in the fall of 1953. Referring to "the

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[21] SCMP, 858, Supplement, vii-xii; 970, pp. 29-32.

[22] Ibid., 198.

596 stubborn remnants of the old marriage system...
671 still damaging the prosperity, security, and
582 happiness of the people of New China," the article cited the example of the subdistrict of Chen-yu in Szechwan. According to the article, there had been no strong "progressive" influence in the area before "liberation," and the Marriage Law team found family relations little changed from the traditional pattern. To propagandaize and implement the new Marriage Law in the subdistrict, the team undertook the training of new cadres made up of village administrators, leaders of peasant women's associations, and members of the Communist Party and New Democratic Youth Corps. It soon turned out that "at least half [the new cadres] were themselves influenced by feudal ideas." Further troubles were encountered when an attempt at a panel discussion to illustrate the need for reform by soliciting personal experiences ended in failure. In carrying the movement to the people, the method of assembling individual families and encouraging wives to reveal abusive treatment by husbands and mothers-in-law had to be called off because[23] the sessions only succeeded in developing quarrels. This revelation of the resistance to family reorientation in the Southwest Region has no parallel insofar as is known, although similar problems were undoubtedly encountered outside the Southwest Region.

The latest report on the reorganization of family life in China was given in March 1955 by the Marriage Law Implementing Committee.

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[23] Fang Yen, "Making the Marriage Law Work," China Reconstructs, Peking, Sept.-Oct. 1953, pp. 32-33.

596 671 582 Couched in general terms, the announcement gave no clear indication of the true situation in the country or any one of its regions. For example, the committee reported on the prevalence of free marriages during the first quarter of 1954, stating that of the 402,025 applications for marriage registration in 562 hsien and municipalities of 15 provinces only 1.07 per cent were denied because the contemplated marriages had been arranged without the consent of the couples concerned.[24] No figures were released on the remaining, roughly three-quarters of the country's hsien and municipalities, nor was any indication given to show whether the figures cited were typical of the whole country, the only figures available, or figures selected for propaganda or other purposes. If the figures can be given credence, they indicate a remarkable advance over the situation existing two years earlier. After an investigation of Marriage Law implementation in 1952, a woman minister of justice, Shih Liang, reported that in only three of the country's 2,086 counties were families reformed "up to perfect Communist standards," and that in the East and Central-South regions freely contracted marriages and other reforms had gained no acceptance with the people.[25]

The Marriage Law Implementing Committee's report in March 1955 also included a summary of conditions "in certain advanced areas in Shansi and elsewhere." It is unlikely that any of the "advanced areas elsewhere" were

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[24] SCMP, 1002, p..3.

[25] China News Analysis, Hong Kong, No. 5, p. 2.

596 671 582 in the Southwest Region. Far more likely, the region would have been mentioned in reports on the areas "least progressive" in family reform, had the Communists cared to publicize such conditions in 1955. But the report on the "advanced areas" gives some indication of the best the Communists have been able to do in places where they have been long estabished. According to the commitee, family relationships were improved or improving in 90 to 95 per cent of the homes and "bad" in only 5 to 10 per cent. Of the larger group, 10 to 15 per cent were described as the "advanced modern type...with a definite degree of socialist consciousness, where democracy and harmony obtain and members are united for production." The commitee announcement added that in 80 per cent of these homes women were no longer oppressed, beaten, or scolded, but "remnants of the patriarchal system and the conception of the rights of the husband" still existed to varying degrees.[26]

C. Reorientation of Family Reform

596 185 No rapid change in traditional family attitudes and practices in the Southwest Region is likely to have occurred to date. The all-out effort to revolutionize the Chinese family in the spring of 1953 has not been repeated. Soon after the 1953 campaign, decreasing emphasis was given by the regime to quick implementation of the new Marriage Law. Family reform was made a continuing part of the everyday work of the various

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[26] SCMP, 1002, p. 3.

Party and state organizations. The complaint of the Party since then has been that the cadres are not taking the work seriously.[27]

There are indications that by 1953 the regime's emphasis on new freedom for women and the prominent publicity given statistics on divorce had led to the Marriage Law being popularly termed the "Divorce Law."[28] At the same time, resistance in the rural areas to sudden changes in the old institutions of marriage and family relations are becoming evident to Party leaders as the results of the late 1952 investigations are tabulated.

A shift in pace and in the propaganda emphasis on marriage and family reform was evident in Liu Ching-fan's report to the Government Administration Council at the end of 1953. Although the better treatment and greater freedom given to women were not to be neglected, greater emphasis was placed on the establishment of "harmonious" and "democratic" relationships within the family, whether originally of the old or new type, and to the positive benefits that would accrue to all members of the family as a consequence of reform.[29]

Analyzing the then current situation, Liu noted that the people still maintained a feudal ideology and consciousness in regard to many social problems, and that this attitude in respect to marriage problems was a "more universal

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[27] Ibid., p. 4.

[28] China News Analysis, No. 5, p.2.

[29] C.B., 273, pp. 5-6.

596 185 and serious one." Liu admitted that the abolition of the feudal marriage system and the establishment of the new system was "a long term and difficult process in the ideological and social reform of the people." To accomplish this reform, he added, the regime would have to co-ordinate its efforts with the people's personal interests and levels of attainment, persuade the people patiently, and raise their level steadily. The process of implementing the Marriage Law, Liu concluded, would have to be made part of the regular tasks of the government and people's organizations at all levels and co-ordinated with the central tasks of production, construction and elections.[30] These recommendations have become the principles by which the government still seems to be guided in marriage and family reform.

596 185 369 In the cities where modern influence had prepared the people for acceptance of new marriage and family principles, the regime encountered a different kind of problem. Just before International Women's Day, March 8, 1955, an authoritative statement in the Communist press added a new note to the usual reference to lingering remnants of feudal obstruction and the long-term nature of family reform. The statement charged that bourgeois ideology had reached into marriage and family relationships. The bourgeois influences detected were love of luxury and disparagement of labor, "carelessness" in choosing marriage partners or the desire for new partners after marriage

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[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

596 and devotion to self- interest. They had re-
185 spectively given rise to the sins of marriage
369 based on money, "the belittlement of sexual relationships," and maltreatment, desertion, and irresponsibility toward parents and children.[31]

The nation's young people were evidently the most prone to this subversive influence. A campaign to guard youth against "bourgeois concepts" was launched in the large cities during the spring of 1955. In connection with the drive, the Communist press evidenced concern regarding romantic love, heart-break, unsolved marriage problems of workers in sparsely populated areas, and the attractions and diversions of a carefree social life in the cities. These things, the press warned, were subverting many young people from their primary duty of devoting their whole effort and attention to study and work in the national interest. The advice of the Communist editors, "to place love in a secondary position in one's life," is hardly likely to solve the problem.[32]

A different sort of problem confronted youth in the countryside. Apparently the possibility was not present there for youth to develop love and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts... the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking.

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31. SCMP, 1022, p. 4.

32. Ibid., pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.

[redacted]

596 As a result, "most marriages are still being
185 contracted after both parties were first intro-
369 duced to each other by third parties." The report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[33]

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic and Political Role

596 A second step taken by the Communist
575 regime to change radically the nature and function
467 of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social, political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform. Until it was completed in any area, no alternate organization to the family existed to assume its
[582] socio-economic role. This fact seem to explain why the Communists during the spring of 1953 limited their Marriage Law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished.

596 Special organizations were set up to train
575 and absorb the energies of women and children
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[33] Ibid., 1002, p. 3.

596 who might otherwise be free of the constant
575 direct influence of the government. These two
562 groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Democratic Women's Federation and into the Young Pioneers, the Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

596 Aside from its primary role as a unit
861 for procreation and for child-care until the young reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state training process. An editorial in the People's Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solicitude" of the government toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that the trade unions were to help office employees and workers to learn how to educate their children: Teachers and directors of the Young Pioneers were to assume the "important responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[34]

596 With the Communist regime's emphases
593 on youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents need clarification. An

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[34] Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

596 article on the subject in the January 1955 issue
593 of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution.' If the parents are counterrevolutionaries, they should not be respected but treated as enemies; if they are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to reform-through-labor, and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burden will fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[35]

563 Except for the Chengtu Plain, an ancient
596 center of Chinese civilization and population in Szechwan, the Southwest Region is occupied largely by Chinese who immigrated since the fourteen century. About twenty per cent of the region's population consists of various indigenous tribes scattered throughout the more mountainous areas and following different social and family customs

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[35] Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.

[redacted]

563 too various to describe in this chapter.[36] Under
596 the Communists, the tribal peoples have been given special treatment, and the uniqueness of their social systems has been largely preserved.[37] No attempt was made to implement the new Marriage Law in the ethnic minority autonomous areas established by the new regime.

178 In the twentieth century, family patterns among the Chinese people of the Southwest Region have largely followed the forms of traditional China before the beginning of industrialization and the resulting outgrowth of revolutionary social and political forces.[38] The customs and practices of the Chinese people long established on the Cheng-tu Plain and of immigrants, mostly from the Yangtze River provinces of the Central-South and East China regions, were little disturbed by modern trends until the capital of the Nationalist Government was moved to Chungking during the war with Japan. Previously, Western-style commerce and industry had made little progress in the region, the intrusion of modern trends from other parts of China had been barred by the lack of railway and highway links with the outside world, and war-lord rule had perpetuated traditional values and
178 practices. One significant modern influence that
873 had made its way into the region was modern education at the universities, especially in the

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[36] The chapter on Ethnic Groups describes some of the major social characteristics of the principal indigenous tribes.

[37] See Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "Minority Groups in Kweichow Province," C.B., 150, pp.8-15.

[38] On the family in the Southwest Region, see Fancis L.K. Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow: Chinese Culture and Personality, New York, Columbia U. Press, 1948; and Fei Hsiao-t'ung, China's [cont'd]

178 provincial capital of Chengtu and its vicinity.
873

Just before the war, transportation sys-
178 tems began to bring the Southwest Region into contact with the rest of China. The wartime needs of the Nationalist Government led to the beginning of modern industrial and commercial development within the region and the exploration and development of its mineral resources. Refugee students and professors from other parts of China were scattered in makeshift unversities throughout the Southwest Region. Many of the educated group made determined efforts to filter to the people some of the new political and social ideas derived from Chinese contact with the West through the mesh of the Kuomintang wartime censorship. Some refugee intellectuals were enlisted in the rural reconstruction program, headed by James Yen, who attempted in scattered rural areas to improve literacy, agricultural methods, and living habits and to spread new social and political ideas. Although stripped of their former revolutionary content, they contained within them the seeds of change in family and other areas of life.[39]

563 The results of these innovations in the
178 Southwest Region appear to have been minor and ephemeral, but it is still too early to assay their long-range and lasting effects. The influences of the intellectuals and of the personnel of the rural

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[39] On the rural reconstruction program see Paul M. A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic.] : A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, pp. 218-22.

reconstruction program probably cut deepest because of the patriotic eagerness and sincerity with which many of the educated group sought communication with the peasants, understanding of their problems, and the elevation of their social and political life and outlook. Industrial influences seem to have been less penetrating. Manufacturing plants were generally small, decentralized operations most centered in the wartime capital. Refugees from the modern cities stayed close to Chungking and viewed the permanent residents with contempt. The factories, the immigrants who supervised them, and the modern habits of the recent arrivals from the western cities were in turn looked on with suspicion and dislike by the older inhabitants. As soon as the war was over, many of the war-born industries were discontinued and the urban immigrants moved back to the industrialized centers of the East with their ammeniti for modern living. However, some of the new factories remained open after the war, the mining possibilities of the region had begun to be explored and developed, and permanent changes with closer links to the rest of China were underway before the Communists entered the Southwest Region.[40]

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[40] On the Southwest in wartime see Linebarger, op. cit., pp 218-34; and Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, New York, William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1946 pp. 3-19, 54-72, and *passim*.

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178 The Communist government, with its penchant for regimentation and passion for industrialization, is exerting a more intense and pervasive influence on the region. If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. The youth of the region will probably prove less resistant and more in favor of the "new order," as has been true elsewhere in China. But as the young people are emancipated from the old family restriction, they are likely to manifest the tendencies, already evident in the youth of the eastern cities, toward individualism and romanticism in love and marriage which pose a problem of equal calibre for the new rulers of China.

[redacted]

Annex "A," Aubparagraph lh,
Sociological Background

SOCIAL VALUES AND PATTERNS OF LIVING

I. CUSTOMS AND CHARACTERISTIC WAYS OF LIFE

177 The Chinese imperial system was strikingly successful in fostering common basic attitudes among the peoples which it absorbed within its ever-widening sphere, but local and regional sub-cultures, brought into the imperial order at different times throughout more than two millenia, did not lose all of their characteristic traits. 101 In Southwest China, the Red basin is the oldest center of "Chinese" civilization. Yunnan and Kweichow remained in the status of colonies for many centuries after Chinese culture had taken root in Szechwan. Thus one might say that there are in the Southwest two distinctive types of sub-cultures: one is the older culture of the area surrounding Chengtu, and the other encompasses the remainder of Szechwan, Yunnan, and Kweichow and has been forged out of the interactions -- over the last few centuries -- between indigenous cultures and the culture of the invading Chinese. There is then as high a cultural diversity in this region as in any other major region of China.

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177 There are other factors which give to
311 much of the area we are now considering
563 important uniformities in culture. The
expansion of "Chinese culture" from Honan
and Shantung into the whole of south and south-
west China was essentially the steady outward
push of an efficient agricultural technique
which displaced the more primitive aboriginal
food-gatherers and primitive slash-burn
agriculturists, absorbed most of these people
into its operation, and drove the remnants
higher and higher into the hills. This process
is still going on in upland areas of the South-
241 west. The characteristically Chinese agri-
621 culture is intensive, that is, it uses large
quantities of human labor in irrigating,
fertilizing, and cultivating land for maximum
yields. Its unit of socio-economic organization
is the village, composed of those families
which cultivate the surrounding fields within
621 easy walking distance. It was in the villages
of rural China, spread over a vast area to
exploit the land through a common technology,
that the characteristic way of life developed.
It is his family's village which is "home" to
any Chinese, no matter what his class, how
far he may wander, or how Westernized his
life may have become. There are perpetuated
the ties with his own family's past, symbolized
by the ancestral temple and the family or clan
burial ground. There are the other families

62 with which his own has built an enduring pattern of reciprocal favors and obligations. It is in the farming villages that the Communists are seeking to bring about fundamental changes in the way of life and to break up the old complex of family and local loyalties.

What are the patterns of village life common to the old settled Szechwan plain and the more recently colonized areas of the Southwest? We shall sketch these before discussing the variations represented by urban life.

A. The Pattern of Village Life

423
241 First of all, life in the farming village is meager. In Szechwan in 1946 the average farm was 3.9 acres, and the average square mile provided food for 650 people. In Kweichow the average farm was 3.2 acres,
241 in Yunnan 3.1. [1] Farm families save everything; fecal matter and refuse go into a pit

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161 [1] George B. Cressey, Land of the 500 Million: A Geography of China, New York, 1955, pp. 105, 178. The richest part of Szechwan, the Chengtu plain, has a population density of 2,300 people per square mile. Ibid.,
241 p. 178. As we consider the pattern of agricultural life in the Southwest, the following data on the nature and distribution of farming throughout the area should be kept

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241 in mind. The table is from Shina Mondai Jiten [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, p. 435.

Province	Under cultivation (per cent)	Cultivated land in paddy fields (per cent)	Cultivated land, dry farming (per cent)
Szechwan	15	44	56
Yunnan	4	44	56
Kweichow	8	41	59

241 near which a pig is kept, and at the time of
spring fertilizing the material from the pit
is mixed with topsoil or water and spread on
the fields. Grass and grainstalks are care-
fully husbanded to be used as fodder for the
farm animal, if the family is fortunate enough
to have one, and as fuel for cooking, and,
291 rarely, for heating the house. Cloth is scarce,
and clothing is worn until it falls apart; after
that the rags are used to make the soles of
342 cloth shoes. Wood for all purposes, is
more abundant in Yunnan and Szechwan than
elsewhere in China, but farm buildings are
made of pounded earth, mud bricks, or,
in the rice region, of bamboo lathe and mud
plaster. Floors are of earth, and only
the dwellings of the wealthiest farmers have
735 glass windows. The dominant fact of life
in the Chinese countryside is poverty. This has
grown steadily worse during the last hundred
years as factory-made goods destroyed
village handicrafts, usury and tenancy
increased, wars and ineffectual governments
brought disruption and oppression, and over-
population became steadily worse. "The most
bankrupt countryside in Asia is the Chinese.
The worst crisis of over-population China has
yet had to face has been accompanied by a
breakdown of traditional ideas and traditional

235 authority so complete as to lead to a state of near anarchy."[2]

178 311 The characteristic way of life of the peasants has been slowly disintegrating under manifold pressures. During prosperous periods in the past a delicate balance of human and economic factors fostered a crowded, conformist, but on the whole harmonious village life. Recent decades have seen the old harmony replaced by tension and a predatory struggle for survival. And, despite the isolation of most villages, ideas and ideals from the West have slowly undermined the authority of the older mores and customary laws.

178 Despite all the fissures that have developed, it is well to remember that peasant life everywhere has a tremendous inertia, that it is incredibly resistant to all the forces of

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[2] Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West, London 1951, p. 111. H.L. Richardson, commenting in 1942 on Szechwan -- usually regarded as a fertile and prosperous province -- says: "The condition of the individual farmers is less happy than the prosperity of the Province as a whole would suggest; and the pressure of the whole population on the supplies of food and other agricultural products, such as cotton, is very intense." Cressey, op. cit., pp. 178-79.

178 change. Thus much of the sweeping change that occurred in city life under comparable pressures did not occur in the peasant villages.

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527 The main economic and social unit of the village is the family, and a special study is devoted to that subject. Here we should sketch the rhythm of village life and something of its annual cycle of activity.

The New Year holiday, for the people of China the first fifteen days of the year, is the main period of leisure for the villagers. Food is prepared in advance, and even the women may rest from their cooking during the first days of the holiday. The village is decorated with nien-hua (New Year's pictures) and ch'un-lien (paired New Year's Day mottoes). Visiting friends, and relatives, gambling, eating the best food of the year, wearing the best clothes, and indulging the children make this the most festive period in the year. For many families it is the only time in the year when they can afford to eat meat dishes. The special dishes of the season vary from province to province. In the northern provinces chiao-tzu (meat dumplings) and other wheat-based elaborate dishes are particular favorites; as one moves south, rice-based delicacies such as nien-kao (year cakes) figure more prominently in the New Year's feasts. Besides being a time of celebration, the New Year is also the time for settling accounts; for many

527/ farmers there will be little left for celebration
221/ when the creditors have been dealt with.

241 In the rice lands of the Southwest the most intensive work of the agricultural year begins immediately after the New Year. At that time the farmer harvests his winter crops -- usually rape and wheat sometimes supplemented with winter beans and peas.
243 Right after the New Year, often before the winter harvest, the farmer sets out his rice plants in nursery beds near the farmhouse. Then he removes his winter crop stubble and plows and prepares the fields for the young rice plants. He spreads fertilizer over the land and then breaches the dike and allows the irrigation water to flow in. After the desired water level is reached the field is harrowed again and again; then begins the back-breaking work of transplanting the rice shoots from the nursery beds to the flooded fields. The farmer has an easier life during the ripening of the grain. As the grain ripens, the fields dry, and at last it is harvest time. The harvesting and threshing are done with primitive implements, and many hands are required; straw is carefully

243 saved in bundles for thatch and for fuel.[3]

[422] Once the harvest is in, the farmer, if he is a tenant, has to pay a share -- often
241 40 per cent of the crop -- to the landlord.[4] He must also deal with the tax collector who relieves him of yet another substantial share of his crop. If the year has gone well, the rice borers have not destroyed too much of his crop, and the tax collector has not been unduly rapacious, the farmer may retain enough grain to see his family through to the next harvest and have some to sell in the nearest market town. After he has prepared his fields for the crops of winter wheat and rape, the farmer and his household turn to a variety of winter chores: repairing farm implements and buildings, weaving thatch, spinning and weaving rough cloth, making shoes, and doing other household chores. With the approach of the New Year the farmer looks forward to some festivity, perhaps calling for a feast and the slaughtering of the family pig; if debt looms large, the pig may have to be sold to help pay the bills.[5]

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[3] *Cf.* the description in Gerald Winfield, *China, The Land the The People*, New York, 1948, pp. 49-52. For the slightly different work cycle in the terraced upland ricefields, *cf.* *ibid.*, pp. 53-58.

[4] *Cf.* Morton Fried, *The Fabric of Chinese Society*, New York, 1953, pp. 186-200. On (continued next page)

527
796 The farm year, toilsome everywhere in China, is punctuated by other activities and festivals which relieve some of the monotony of the long seasons of work. The first of the annual festivals after the New Year is that of Ch'ing-ming, which corresponds in time to the Western Easter. Like Easter, the Ch'ing-ming observance was once a spring fertility festival. At this time, the ties of the living and dead members of the family and clan are celebrated; the family or clan graveyard is swept and food offerings are made to the dead. The performance of these duties is often the occasion for a family picnic at the graveyard. All relatives make special efforts to join in this annual celebration of family solidarity, and the outing is a pleasant relief from winter and indoor work.[6]

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4. (continued) landlord-tenant relations in the Southwest which involve the ethnic minorities, see chapter on Ethnic Minorities.

5. J.L. Buck's study of 16,786 farms showed that 39 per cent of these were in debt in the period 1929-32. Cited in Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, 1946, p. 69.

6. Wolfram Eberhard, Chinese Festivals, New York, 1942, pp. 113-127. Cf. the full description of this festival observance in Yunnan in 1942 by Francis Hsü in Under the Ancestors' Shadow, New York, 1948, pp. 178-82.

527 196 On the fifth day of the fifth lunar month is the Dragon Boat Festival. This is of southern origin and is traced by Eberhard to the human sacrificial rites of the *Tai* aborigines of south China.[7] In modern times it has been somewhat less popular in the north than in the south. It is in the south that the dragon boat races were held on rivers and lakes. For most rural families the festival meant somewhat better food than usual and particularly the steamed rice dumplings known as *tsung-tzu*, symbolic of the rice sacrifices made on this occasion to the shade of *Ch'Ü Yüan* -- ancient statesman and poet of the feudal state of *Ch'u*.

On the fifteenth day of the seventh moon, usually in late August, is the feast of souls, the primitive origin of which has been transmuted by Buddhist belief and symbolism. It is at once a festival for the souls of one's ancestors and a community salute to the dead. Ancestral graves are cleared, sacrifices of food are made, and paper replicas of desirable objects are burned. As a further salute to the dead, lantern-lit boats are floated on some

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[7] Eberhard, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-96.

527 796 body of water, to symbolize the community's concern that all the dead may be guided to the "other shore" -- a Buddhist metaphor for salvation. Many persons pay visits to nearby temples and pay for masses for the souls of the dead, particularly for the souls of the people in the community who died without descendants to commemorate their passing. At this festival, too, special food is prepared for the dead and for the living, and the farmers and their families enjoy leisure and conviviality.[8]

The mid-autumn festival is primarily a moon festival, and the ceremonies in honor of the moon carried out at moon-rise on this autumn night are full of the symbols of fertility and longevity. In modern times it has been mainly a festival of women, and the Old Man in the Moon is sacrificed to as the one who arranges all marriages on earth. The moon cakes, in the shape of the full moon, are one of the special delicacies of this season. This too was perhaps originally a fertility festival, and in some areas it is a popular time to make pilgrimages to nearby mountains.[9]

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8. Eberhard, _op. cit._, pp. 129-33.
9. _Ibid._, pp. 97-112.

527 796 These are the festivals that have retained the most significance for the Chinese farmer into modern times. Many of them have changed drastically through time, and we shall shortly see that the Chinese Communists are greatly altering the meaning and symbolism of those few which have been allowed to survive.

585 In addition to the annual festivals, the farmer's life of toil may be relieved by ceremonial family events. For a family with resources or the ability to borrow them, a wedding meant a great feast and ample wine; even the poorest families often went heavily into debt to make a marriage ceremony festive. Practical jokes were played on the bridegroom, traditional songs were sung, and the guests, particularly the men, thoroughly enjoyed themselves.[10] The births of male children were often celebrated as were the betrothals and other milestones of family and individual life.

527 In modern times the government of the Republic of China decreed certain national holidays, but these were little observed by the farm villages.

536 In addition to these occasions for

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[10] For a description of wedding celebrations in Yunnan in the 1940's cf. Hsü, op. cit., pp. 93-98.

536 relaxation, special events added interest and variety to the routine of village life. Itinerant dramatic troupes occasionally performed, and until very recently the storyteller frequently appeared on the village streets to spin his 622 tales to an impromptu audience. The election of a village headman often involved political maneuvering and a town meeting. Pilgrimages 796 to famous mountains or shrines were often undertaken in the slack agricultural season for religious reasons or purely for relaxation. 521 Perhaps the most universal recreation was, as in all illiterate communities, gossip and desultory conversation. Francis Hsü describes the recreation pattern in a small Yunnan town:

> In the evening, many shop doors may be found open to welcome neighbors and friends who care to come into the brightly lighted interior for a chat, and little clusters of men stand or squat near some street corner, often near a food stand.... The topics discussed at these gatherings range from rumors about national affairs and market prices to local rights and wrongs.[11]

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[11] Hsü, op. cit., p. 25.

181 Despite the grim struggle for survival, the average villager tended to be cheerful, self-respecting, and possessed of a robust sense of humor. He went through life with a continuous concern for his own "face" or prestige among his fellows and with the strong determination and unceasing faith that, despite all, the fortunes of his family would steadily improve.

B. The Pattern of Urban Life

369 Urban life, although it meant a different pattern of work, was closely akin to life in the villages. Town and city dwellers -- perhaps 20 per cent of China's population -- kept their ties with their native villages, returned there whenever possible and many saw commercial activity in the town only as a means to the acquisition of sufficient wealth to buy farming land and return to the village.[12] The town population, then, was mostly made up of artisans and peasants, plus a small number of landlords, retired officials, county functionaries, and established merchant families.
632
369 The county seats (hsien capitals) were the centers for tax collection and administration of

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[12] Cressey, Land of the 500 Million, pp. 18-19. The 1953 Communist census credits cities and towns (undefined) with 13.26 per cent of the Mainland population.

369 the surrounding farm-villages and also served
632 as market towns where the peasant might sell his crop and purchase the manufactured goods he could not produce.

511 Town life for the average artisan was as meager as for his relatives in the village. Long hours, hard work, low pay, few holidays wer the lot of most, and living conditions were generally poorer and more crowded than those in the villages. Proprietors of many shops required their employees to live on the premises, so that they seldom visited their families. The diet of the town dweller was as poor as that of the poor farmer -- mostly cereals, vegetables, and some condiments, and meat
527 and fruit on holidays only. Brief holidays were allowed at the New Year, the Ch'ing-ming Festival, the mid-Autumn festival, and the Dragon Boat festival. On these occasions, townspeople usually tried to return to their villages; if this was impossible they enjoyed such delicacies as they could afford and strolled the streets, perhaps visiting friends and attending seasonal fairs and theaters.

369 Life in the towns was, then, closely
361 linked with village life. But in the cities and provincial capitals, such as Kunming, Chungking, Chengtu, life in some respects has been greatly altered by the modernization that spread slowly from the

361 coastal to the inland cities. The streets are
369 sometimes paved, and schools, newspapers,
motion pictures, and radio make the people
more aware of the outside world than are their
cousins in the towns and villages. In Shanghai
and other modern cities, major industries
built large dormitories for workers, labor
unions and political clubs developed as new
foci for society activity. World War II brought
a measure of industrial life to the Southwest.
Yet the living conditions grew worse as workers
161 moved into the cities. Crowding reached unbelievable
361 proportions. The figures for
Chengtu suggest the dimensions of this problem
in all urban centers. Chengtu, with predominately
one-storied buildings, had a
population density of 50,000 per square mile
as compared 22,500 per square mile in New
[44] York City.[13] One survey suggests that
workers in the newer industries were somewhat
better off than workers in the traditional trades,[14]
but their traditional holidays were shortened
without, in most cases, the introduction of a
364 six-day week. In the crowded cities the festivals
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[13] Winfield, op. cit., p. 88. These figures would seem to be for the period 1945-47.

[14] Lang, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

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521 of the agricultural year continued to determine
the holidays (although national holidays were
increasingly observed), and, like the town
dwellers, city workers tried to return to
their family villages for at least one of the
575 holidays. Another link to one's native place was
the system of clubs composed of those city-dwellers who had a common provincial origin; the clubs operated hostels and sometimes made arrangements for mutual-aid. Secret societies provided another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals, passports, and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through-association and a refuge against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society.

369 It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong, extending even into the large modern cities and the farm towns. The urban and rural ways of life tended increasingly to diverge, yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which, even when change has been accounted for, held together all Chinese of village and town and city.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNISM

114 668 In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the cities.

241 668 First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected. No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: (1) he must be made to produce more; (2) he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime, and (3) his attitudes and values must be radically changed.

668 The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages, is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears, and the mouths of authority.[15] "They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods, distributing new seed, performing grain requisitioning, helping in planting, building and repairing dikes, etc."[16] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders, "foreigners," but the Party has recently been recruiting youths from specific localities as well as from among the ethnic minorities and training them to return to their native places as cadres. The cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulated its meetings and its officers. It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in

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[15] Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

[16] Ibid., p. 28.

the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new. It is the cadre in the Southwest who brings to each locality the new policies for the various ethnic minorities.

The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulities.[17] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives inthe countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[18]

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17. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

18. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, April 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 1036, April 28, 1955.

668 The cadre carries on the continuing effort to destroy traditional mores, which are prime resistants in what the Communist call the long and difficult process of ideological and social reform. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and, sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[19]

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668 The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed,

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[19] People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

556 668 and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[20]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work has not been completely successful:

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[21]

668 Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take more of his leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or

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[20] Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 13, 1954.

[21] Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

668 involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

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527 Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[22] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional activities, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[23] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist
[525] standards.[24] The government may allow some additional food for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can no longer be restricted to family and friends.
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536 The peasants have been urged to organize their

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[22] SCMP 979, F b. 2, 1955, p. 30.

[23] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

[24] Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan T'ung-shu [South China Almanac], Canton, 1953, p. 32.

668 own dramatic troupes to play the approved
536 repertoire, now brought to villages by
traveling troupes. Special mobile teams
668 trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"
208 or to show films dramatizing the "New Order"
have been moving through the countryside.
The old exchange of visits with relatives in
nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart:
interchange of visits between urban and
rural workers' groups to observe one another's
"progress in Communist reconstruction."[25]

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company, to some famous shrine also has its Communist counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[26] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[27]

796 Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved
668 festival, presumably because of its function

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[25] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid. Also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21. We have no data on this for the Southwest.

776 as a celebration of kinship ties and family
668 continuity. Although we have no data, it is safe to assume that the elaborate festival calendar of "West Town," Hunan, described by Hsü, has been severely reduced by "anti-superstition" campaigns and other work of
527 the cadres.[28] The next approved traditional
668 holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "people's hero, martyred in portest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[29] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be the occasion for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern consists of elements too deeply ingrained to be abruptly condemned without precipitating a crisis, useful to the Communists in the interest of morale, or adaptable in the promotion of their rural program of change and indoctrinatic

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[28] Cf. Hsü, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

[29] SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING

668 In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[30]

632 City and town dwellers are also organized
668 into street and ward units, which serve further to mold urban life into the new pattern.[31] The

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[30] Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[31] *Cf.*, "*Regulations of Urban Organizations*," *Current Background*, 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

632 townsman, more than the peasant, is open to
668 an "around the clock" propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy and the chance to be at ease with family or friends are rare.

668 The New Year's holiday has some of its
527 old gaiety, although subject to the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, they appear to do at the mid-autumn and Dragon Boat festivals, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a minority of the urban population.[32] New Year's activities in 1955 suggest the way in which

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[32] Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2. In preparation for the New Year exodus from the cities in 1955, the Ministry of Railways estimated that "over three and half million more people will travel than on normal days, mostly to join in united family celebrations of the holiday." NCNA dispatch, Jan. 19, 1955; SCMP, 972, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 21.

668 527 all public celebrations of the festival are made to serve the Communist purpose. It was reported that, in the coastal area, traditional merrymaking was combined "with strict vigilance and celebration of the Yikiangshan (I-chiang-shan) Island liberation." In Foochow, special exhibitions on the theme "Taiwan Must be Liberated" drew large crowds. In the Amoy area and along the Chekiang coast, people called on units of the armed forces in their neighborhood "to bring them gifts and thank them for their efforts in national defense." In Shanghai, 40,000 spectators watched military teams play football, and Red Army song and danc troupes performed at thirty factories.[33]

668 [653] 369 The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, large sections of old city walls such as those of Chengtu have been destroyed, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[34]

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33. NCNA dispatch, Jan. 27, 1955, 976, Jan. 28, 1955, p. 15. In all such activities one should remember that the cadre is instigator and manager. We do not have details on activities in the Southwest. We would expect them to be similar in outline, less elaborate in form.

34. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

[511] 618 369 Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[35] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he was once in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a daily calendar of meetings, a full briefcase, and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families somewhat easier

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35. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

668 life than that granted the rest of the urban
369 population, but they are constantly disciplined, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas, and forced to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[36]

The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communists plan, the new mores and patterns of living for society as a whole.

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[36] Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

[redacted]

II. BASIC ATTITUDES

184 One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its social homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statesmen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than government coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior.

This characteristic of the old order is one of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful, than was the imperial government of the past.

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which affect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

181 178 There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

181 668 These two factors are closely inter-related. Thus, the Communists have been making a sympathetic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has
> organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly
> mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friendship and love.[29]

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[29] *Fu-nü San-tzu Ching* [*Three-character Classic for Women*], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p.21. Three-character rhymed verses [cont'd next page]

181 In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the
668 Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from the traditional culture. For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).[30] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that means in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[31]

[29. from previous page] were widely used in traditional China for the indoctrination of the young.

[30] Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953) pp. 31-44.

[31] Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship, 3rd. ed., Peking Foreign Languages Press, 1950, pp. 16-17. For Mao, of course, this term means ultimate world-wide Communist utopia.

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In discussing certain attitudes and values we 181
should bear in mind that the power of the old and 668
the appeal of the new vary not according to regions 369
but according to social groups. It was among the 565
population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[32] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

A. Good and Bad

In traditional China the prevailing belief was that man was inherently good and that social harmful behavior occurred only when men lacked guidance or were placed in adverse circumstances. For example, if the ruler of the state or his officials or the father of the family failed to provide for the basic physical needs of individuals, their dependents were likely to rebel. Or if those in authority failed to provide instruction, particularly if they failed to set an example in conduct, then those subordinate to them would have no guideposts to the good and would fall into evil ways. 183

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32. For example, as late as 1941-43, one anthropologist found in rural Yunan that the traditional value of hsiao (filial submission) was still,

183 Bad conduct was not, as in the West, violation of the laws of God but deviation from the age-old norms of acceptable social behavior. Specifically, behavior was categorized as "bad" if it went against such prescribed norms as the following: (1) hsiao, filial submission to fathers and elders; (2) chung, loyal and submissive devotion to superiors; (3) hsin, good faith among friends and associates; (4) jen, benevolence or fellow-feeling which should inform all social relationships; (5) i, righteousness in one's dealings with others; (6) li [good form], accepted procedures in human relations; (7) lien, integrity; and (8) ch'ih, sense of shame.

The laws of imperial China provided heavy punishments for violations of these norms; the most heinous crimes were those against hsiao, filial submission. Yet the ideal in the application of law was not blindfold justice but punishment administered with due regard for "human feelings [jen-ch'ing] and for the specific circumstances surrounding the crime. This attitude is illustrated in the old proverb: "There is one thing worse than a dishonest official and that is an honest official," which

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[32. continued] as it had been for centuries, "the foundation stone...of social organization, ...the measuring stick of all behavior and of the worth of the individual.

expressed disapproval of a rigorous enforcement of rules and regulations, of an enforcement that fails to take into account "human feelings." [33] The criteria for judging behavior as good or bad were therefore neither religious nor legalistic, but were the prevailing norms in the community, the customary practices sanctioned by tradition and ratified by a high degree of community consensus. 183

In traditional Chinese goodness could be cultivated through practice, study, and contemplation. Confucianism held that the path to goodness was open to all, that those who attained a high order of goodness should be a moral elite, a group of exemplars for others. This moral elite was also, in Confucian theory, the group which should hold and exercise political power and enjoy the rewards of status and wealth. This nation sanctioned the long political dominance of the scholar-official.

The Chinese Communists have laid out new standards of good and bad. In the words of their leading theoretician, their aim is". . .to reform mankind into the completely selfless citizenry of a Communist society." [34] In setting the new standards the Communists have consciously and unconsciously selected concepts from traditional moral 183 668

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[33] Ruth Bunzel and John Weakland, "An Anthropological Approach to Chinese Communism," Columbia Univ. Research in Contemporary Cultures, New York, 1952, pp. 80-81. Hereafter cited as Bunzel-Weakland.

[34] Liu Shao-ch'i, "The Training of the Communist Party Member," first presented as a speech in 1939; cf. trans. in Boyd Compton, Mao's China, Seattle, 1952, p. 146.

183 ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger
118 between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[35] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[36]

The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage" of the society into which he is born, has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create a favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling

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[35] J.M.H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20, (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

[36] Liu Shao-chi, quoted in David S. Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford University, 1954, p. 15. Nivison's study will appear in symposium, Thought and Officialdom in China, Univ. of Chicago Press, early 1956.

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of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality..."[37]

This is the basic principle: utter subordination of the individual to the Party. But when we examine some of the personal qualities which the Communists want, we find them linked in many ways to Chinese tradition. The good Communist is "able to love others and hate others" (A phrase from the Analects of Confucius); that is, he never injures his comrades for his own benefit but vigorously fights the enemies of the revolution. Towards his comrades his attitude is one of "genuineness and sympathy." (Analects) He does "nothing to others that he would not have done to himself." (Analects) He "grieves before all the rest of the world grieves and is happy only after all the rest of the world is happy." (Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva-savior, adapted by an eleventh century Confucian thinker.) He "has no individual apprehensions or private desires to obscure and pervert his investigation of things and understanding of true principles," (a restatement of the late Confucian view of purity of mind as being necessary for true knowledge.)[38]

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[37] Liu Shao-ch'i "On the Training of the Communist Party Member" in Compton, *op. cit.*, p. 110. Nivison, *op. cit.*, p. 18, points out that this prescription is close to the classic descriptions of the traditional virtue of *chung* -- absolute loyalty to superiors.

[38] These characterizations are all from authoritative treatise by Liu Shao-ch'i , *ibid.*, translated in Compton, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-55. Traditional sources are identified in Nivison, *op.cit.*, p. 19-20.

183 668 To attain these and other "good" qualities, the Communist, like his Confucian ancestors, is to pattern his character after approved models and to subject himself to intensive self-cultivation. In traditional China, the models of character and behavior found in the classics and histories were to be studied and followed by individuals who sought to improve themselves. Books on filial piety were required reading. Now the Communists set up Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao as personal models; everyone is capable of attaining the great qualities of these revolutionary geniuses if he tries.[39] Even selected heroes from China's "feudal past" are recommended as models.[40] Such models are presented in fiction, in textbooks, in newspapers, and young and old are urged to emulate these heroes. In addition, "model" workers, farmers, soldiers are feted and publicized, and their pictures and idealized biographies appear in all propaganda media.

Self-cultivation consists of being unremittingly conscious of one's faults and of Communist ideals, of being ever alert, in study and action, to the recrudescence of "bad" attitudes which are the residue of one's pre-Communist education. Liu Shao-ch'i stresses the development of consciousness in the individual; through consciousness one is free from the determining forces of

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[39] Liu Shao-ch'i, op.cit., quoted in Nivison, p. 16.

[40] Ch'en Sang, "Tang-hsing Yu Ssu Cheng-huo" [Party Nature and Private Life] in Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen [On the Party and the Individual] by Ch'en Po-ta and others, Hong Kong reprint, 1948, p. 3, cited in Nivison, op.cit., p. 76, note 16.

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183 history and environment and becomes capable of working creatively for the aims of the new society. 668 This emphasis on consciousness is connected with both traditional ethics and Soviet psychology. On the one hand, it has "an obvious affinity to the Neo-Confucian notion of cultivation as freeing the individual from the tyranny of blind habit and unconscious selfish motivations."[41] On the other, it reflects the recent development of Soviet psychology; from an earlier denunciation of consciousness as "smacking of bourgeois idealism" the Russians have come to the view that "consciousness is a central process in making man capable of forging his own destinies."[42]

The list of bad qualities denounced by Communists is long; liberalism, formalism, bureaucratism, opportunism, and a dozen others are being continually denounced. How does one rid onself of these vices? The following formula, here used against the vice of individualism, is typical:

> "The methods transmitted by the ancients for raising oneself out of the vulgar state and entering sagehood, becoming a Buddha or a Taoist spirit, all required one to go through a long period of discipline. If we want to shed the early form of individualism and acquire a spiritual form of collectivism, we must cultivate and discipline ourselves over and over; ...we should continually ask ourselves this question: 'Am I or am I not still guilty of individualism?' If we have a thought, utter a sentence, walk a step or do a thing, we should listen for the response

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[41] Cf. Nivison, op.cit., p. 15.

[42] [next page]

183 of others [the group] : this is -- or is not --
668 individualism."[43]

The last sentence quoted above introduces the notion of group criticism and group pressure, which is the universal Communist device for fostering approved behavior and eliminating the disapproved. Members of Party organizations, professions, government bureaus, and all other groups meet continually for criticism and self-criticism, and this whole process reaches the population through the publication of confessions and criticism in the mass media. The study meetings, popularly called "struggle meetings," are characterized by an atmosphere of tension and fear. Confessions of deviation or defect are made by individuals and analyzed or "exposed by the group; criticisms are leveled at individuals and promises of reform are exacted.[44] This appears to be a device of deadly effectiveness for making individuals conform to the new Communist standards for thought and behavior.

B. Time, Change, and Causation

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668 In traditional China, time and change were

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181 42. Cf. Raymond Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, Cambridge, *Harvard University Press*, 1952, p. 164 and *passim*. The quotations are from Jerome Bruner's forword to this volume, xxii.

43. *Lun Tang Yü Ko-jen* [*On the Party and the Individual*], cited in Nivison, *op.cit.*, pp.45-46, and note 66.

44. Cf. Anon., "The 'Struggle Meeting' in Communist China," *Far Eastern Notes*, No. 1. April 21, 1952.

178 regarded as cyclical. Out of their careful adjustment to the seasonal and recurrent rhythms of 181 Nature, Chinese-farmer-thinkers developed a notion 668 of time and change which they applied to the course of individual lives, to changes in political life, to history as a whole. In the life of man, old age was not seen a the end of the line but as a return to childhood -- not in the sense of "second childhood" but as having come full round from the freedom of childhood to the freedom of old age. In political thinking at all levels a notion of the cycle is present. Dynasties, like men and animals, were regarded as having a natural life, from birth, through growth, to maturity, senescence, and death; these phases differed in length but the cycle was never broken. Integration and disintegration followed one another as day followed night. The opening line of the most widely read Chinese classic novel states this prevailing belief: "When empire has long been unified it will invariably be divided."[45]

The Communists seek to extirpate this age-old attitude and substitute for it the modern western idea of straight-line progress. For them the future is not to be a return to the past but the attainment, through protracted struggle, of a Communist world utopia. Textbook Party handbooks, and all other media insist on this new and revolutionary idea of time and change. This dynamic straight-line change

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[45] San-kuo Chih Yen-i, [The Romance of the Three Kingdoms], translated by Prewitt-Taylor.

178 is typically and authoritatively expressed by Liu
181 Shao-ch'i:
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> "It is in the course of the long struggle of men as social beings against nature, that men's physical forms..., their social relations, their forms of social organization as well as their brains, ideology, etc., are all continuously being changed and improved...."[46]

The traditional Chinese view of causation was related to their views of time and change. Sequences of events were seen to have a certain regularity, not that of cause and effect. Night follows day, but day is not the cause of night.[47] Through education one learned how to identify situations and to know the sorts of things that might happen. One learned to place oneself advantageously in a sequence of situations. The Communists seek to replace this older view with the Marxist idea of causation. A student is to learn the Marxist laws of social development, that certain causes always bring certain effects, and that when one has mastered the laws of causation, one can actively participate in bringing about the desired and inevitable results.

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[46] Liu Shao-ch'i, "On the Training of the Communist Party Member." For this passage, cf. Current Background, No. 159, Jan. 31, 1952, p. 18.

[47] Bunzel-Weakland, p. 31.

178 668 181 The Communist effort to replace the old attitudes toward time, change, and causation with new ones has tremendous implications. It seeks to destroy any tinge of fatalism, any inclination toward resignation, and to foster in the individual a restless search for the goals set by the Party.

C. Work and Leisure

461 668 In traditional China, leisure was seen as a time for replenishment of bodily and psychic energy; leisure was necessary if one were not to suffer depletion of vital forces.[48] Abundant leisure was also important evidence of membership in the favored social class. In Communist China, work and vigorous activity are given a high value; hard work and ceaseless struggle are characteristi of all the "models" held up before the people in all the propaganda media. The ceaseless activity of the top leaders is meant to set a pattern for those who follow them. Leisure as contemplative bodily replenishment is devaluated, and active sports which develop competitive spirit are being promoted. Leisure as a mark of high status has disappeared.

D. Authority and the Individual

577 The father's relation to his sons was the model for the exercise of authority in traditional China. Ideally, the father was to be firm and aloof, seeing to it rather impersonally that his children were well cared for and given proper instruction.

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[48] Ibid., pp. 37-40.

577 The son was to submit unquestioningly to his father's will at all times. He had no independence of judgment or action until after his father's death. The son's loyalty and devotion were also to show themselves in providing for the father's comfort in old age, in arranging a proper funeral and burial and in periodic offerings to his father's tablet in the ancestral hall of the family.

573 643 In the political sphere the emperor was the "father" of his people, and the key local magistrate of the imperial bureaucracy were often referred to as the "Fathers and Mothers of the People." To reciprocate the care and concern of those in authority, the people were to provide material support through taxes and labor; they were to serve their masters loyally and submissively; they were to obey the rules which custom (personalized as the wise rulers of the past) and the laws laid down for them. And in those laws the heaviest punishments were decreed for those who showed unfilial behavior in the family, or, in its political counterpart, rebellion against the state.[49]

576 577 These were the patterns of authority to which the individual was subject. His personality was

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[49] The Classic of Filial Piety says: "Of the 3,000 crimes punishable by the five punishments, none is greater than unfiliality." (i.e., failure to submit to authority.) For a discussion, cf. Etienne Balazs, Le Traite Juridique du Souei-chou, Paris, 1954, p. 144.

596 formed within the family; his status in society 579 was determined by his family's status. To understand the individual of traditional China, we must see him within this setting; to understand the changes being wrought by the Communists, we must take into account some of the tensions and dissatisfactions which the family system -- particularly in its period of decay -- set up in the individual.

596 The role of the individual was determined by his position in the family, and he was taught to fill that particular role. For example, an older brother was held responsible for his younger brother, and was taught to be nice in play to those younger in years. The younger sons were expected to be less sober and responsible; their mothers often spoiled them. Throughout all the complex relations of the family, roles were assigned and the individual's life and character were formed by the role he played. Freedom of choice and freedom to develop individuality were thus rigidly limited.[50]

The well-being of the family group was the individual's prime concern. He was committed to work which would assure the family's prosperity; he was obliged to protect the family's reputation, for example, by paying off the gambling debts of a family member rather than have the family disgraced; to continue to live in a tense and unhappy household rather than to break away and thereby weaken the family's solidarity.

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[50] Bunzel-Weakland, pp. 47-64.

596 In exchange for his submission to authority and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bride, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

572 The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

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596 The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

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178 When the old social order began to break up under the impact of modern forces, the family

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[51] Ibid., pp. 137-47.

system was undermined and began slowly to dis- 181
integrate. Chinese critics held that the old family 178
stifled individuality, prevented the development of individual initiative vital to modern China, and that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism, hindering the development of democratic citizenship. They also felt that a new kind of individual was needed, and that the family system prevented its birth.[52]

The Communists are developing a new image 181
of the individual and a new relationship between 668
the individual and authority; in doing this they are using certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they are releasing the individual from his bonds and pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular atten- 181
tion to the groups which suffered most under the 668
old family: women, particularly younger women, 596
such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter denunciations of the tyranny of the old family system by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to the family -- all these are being resorted to in order to create new individuals suited to the needs of a Communist society. In Communist literature this new type of individual, free of the family and its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having boundless opportunities for self-development. Stories

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52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

596 of young "heroes" who have broken away -- some-
181 times denouncing their "reactionary" fathers --
668 and gone on to make striking contributions to state and society are glorified in almost every publication.

572 "Comradeship," the brother-friend type of
relationship, is strongly emphasized in Party and
668 other organizations. During the long years of their suppression, the Communist leadership was bound together by "comradeship," which is continually romanticized and extolled in textbooks and other writings. This pattern of human relationships is built on an age-old Chinese ideal and is most attractive to those who suffered most under the old family system. It is used to encourage co-operation between individuals in a common task. In the textbooks it is fostered by moral tales -- a pail of water is too heavy for Little Brother and too heavy for Big Brother, but it is easily carried by the two; a lone tree is easily shaken by the wind, but many trees standing together can withstand a heavy wind.[53]

576 The brotherhood-friendship pattern among
668 top Communist leadership has subtly shifted, and
Mao and the Party have begun to exercise paternal
643 authority over subordinates and the people as a whole. Mao has taken on many of the attributes of the supreme patriarchal emperors of old; his paternal guidance is praised in these lines from an officially published song:

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[53] Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p.325.

572 The great leader is like a father,
643 Mao Tse-tung educates us....[54]

668 Another praises his paternal care for his people

In loving care for the people
He surpasses that of their own
fathers and mothers.[55]

And, in a children's song, his paternal care and affection are invoked while he is likened to the pole star -- one of the old symbols of the emperor's supremacy:

The northern pole star in the sky --
In China, Mao Tse-tung --
Saving Mankind,
Loving little children.
He'll destroy Chiang's dirty rats.[56]

668 As Mao takes on more and more attributes
181 of the father, the Party and the state take over both the functions and the emotional focus once supplied
596 by the family. A labor heroine is described as

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[54] From a song in Chieh-fang Ko-sheng [Liberation songs], No. 2, 1949, p. 9.

[55] From a song in K'ang-mei Yüan-ch'ao Hsiao-t'iao chi [A Collection of Resist-America-Aid-Korea Songs] , Wu-han t'ung-su ch'u-pan-she, Wuhan, 1951, p. 60.

[56] From a song in Nung-ts'un Ko-yao Hsüan-chi [A Song Collection of Rural Themes] , Hsin-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 24.

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"a good daughter of the Party."[57] A song says:

> Our great fatherland–
> We should pay it the same filial
> reverence,
> As we would show to our mothers.[58]

These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

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[57] Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial] Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

[58] In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yantze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

[59] Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

[60] The poem "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has the baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

181 one looks to state and Party health agencies, but
668 responsibility for the care of the aged devolves
596 upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizens of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

It would appear, then, that the Communist government tries to adapt both patterns of individual-group relationship to its purposes. On the one hand it encourages the equal co-operation pattern

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[61. and 62. on following page]

181 668 596 associated with the old image of brotherhood and friendship. On the other hand it increasingly subjects each individual to a type of authority that is reminiscent of the old all-powerful father of the family. For certain types of work, for example, team projects carried on by Party cadres, the former may be encouraged as the efficient pattern. But for the masses of the population, submission to absolute paternalistic authority and the subordination of the individual to the group is the ordained pattern.

E. Face

577 668 In traditional China, "face" meant one's moral reputation (lien) and one's accumulated moral and material prestige in the eyes of the community (mien-tzu). One's lien, or moral reputation, was solidified by adherence to the ethical norms of society in all human dealings. One's mien-tzu could be increased by making important contacts, by acts of conspicuous generosity; but this could be done only within the rôle which society

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61. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are 'counterrevolutionaries', the child should treat them as enemies.

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, op.cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.

63. Cf. Hsien-chin Hu, "The Chinese Concepts of Face," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46 (1944), pp. 45-64. The word lien is more current in North China than in the Yangtze Valley and the south. In the lower Yangtze Valley, according to Miss Hu (p. 46, note 5), mien-k'ung is used for lien.

577 668 assigned to the individual. To "get above oneself" in a play for prestige was actually "to lose face" (tiu mien-tzu). The widespread use of go-betweens in business, marriages, and political negotiations was a device for insuring that, in the event of failure, neither principal would "lose face." Consideration for the "face" of others was highly regarded, and, in actual behavior, care for one's own and others' "face," particularly of one's family, was conducive to the surface harmony of Chinese social relations.

Modern Chinese critics have argued that this harmony was too dearly bought, that individual concern for "face," intensified by community pressure, stifled individual initiative and made creative people into timid conformists who sacrificed all for the preservation of superficial prestige in the community. This, they held, worked against China's successful adjustment to the modern world.

The Communists have built on this sort of criticism and dissatisfaction and, in seeking to release individual energies for the purposes of the Communist state, have made a frontal attack on the notion of "face." Mao sarcastically describes the attitude they seek to destroy: "Failing to start an argument in principle with a person, even when you know he is in the wrong, letting things slide for the sake of peace and cordiality, all because he is an old friend, a fellow villager, a fellow student, a close friend, someone beloved, an old colleague, or an old subordinate. Or failing to make any clear

577 decision, speaking about [the error] in allusions
668 in order to preserve harmony and unity...."64

577 The Communists single out for public recog-
668 nition individuals who have ruthlessly battered
554 their way toward one of the Communist goals with utter disregard for "face," their own or others'. They praise children who have denounced their father, which, in older China, would have been condemned as utter destruction of the family's "face." Communist writings indicate that the older attitudes have been hard to overcome. Liu Shao-ch'i is fulminating against them when he says "Any idea of trying to avoid inner-Party struggle, or of refraining from criticizing others' mistakes so that they will not criticize one's own errors, is utterly wrong." 65 Obviously the universal "struggle meetings" for personal criticism and self-criticism in the presence of the group are destructive of the old feeling for "face." Indeed the leadership may regard them as one of the principal devices for the complete elimination of this traditional attitude.

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64. Mao Tse-tung, "In Opposition to Liberalism," written in 1937, translation in Compton, op.cit., pp. 184-85.

65. Liu Shao-ch'i, "On Inner-Party Struggle Current Background, No. 105, Aug. 5, 1951, p. 5.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph li, Sociological Background

INTELLECTUAL AND ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

538 184 Intellectual and artistic expression is interpreted in this chapter to mean the communication of ideals and ideas through creative and academic writing, painting, the plastic arts, dancing, and music.

The Chinese written language is the vehicle for official business and creative expression in all parts of China. Therefore the bulk of the creative and academic writing of the Southwest Region of China does not differ from that produced in China as a whole. In the past cultural activities originating in Peking and Shanghai stirred up cities like Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming in the Southwest as well; and the support from these cities gave cultural movements originating in coastal [722] cities a national appearance. During the war with Japan, these Southwestern cities became wartime Chinese cultural centers, as the sites of the wartime campuses of the best Chinese universities. The identification of the bulk of the creative and academic writings of the Southwest with that of the Chinese nation is particularly true today when the nation is ruled by a centralized government and when all cultural innovations emanate from Peking.

538 The Chinese, especially the Chinese Communists often speak of literature and the arts as one. In the Communists' policy statements, what pertains

538 to literature also pertains to the other arts. Therefore, as far as the theory and policy of the arts are concerned, no separate treatment is necessary.

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563 Only in the less sophisticated folk literature and folk art does the Southwest retain its unique regional characteristics. However, even in this respect, the Southwest is by no means a separate entity. Parts of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, being largely populated by the *Han* Chinese from the provinces east of them, are more closely related to the Central China tradition; other parts of these provinces are populated by a variety of ethnic minorities, each having its own unique cultural pattern. The cultural policies toward these minorities are part of the national policies and are decided in Peking.

No attempt is made in this chapter to describe the propaganda and information machine of the Chinese Communists in which literature and art are made to play their part. For this, consult the chapters on propaganda and information in this handbook.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LITERARY ACTIVITIES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

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668 The reform of literature and art (*wen-i cheng-feng*) at Yenan in 1942[1] made the practice of literature and art in the Liberated Areas overt political activities; the application of the same line to the entire country in 1949 subjugated all

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[1] [See following page.]

[redacted]

538 writers and artists in the nation to the service of
668 the state. Control and regimentation of thought in literature and art became more systematic as the Communistsconsolidated their power, the victor being the arbiter of artistic "truth." In

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1. Mao Tse-tung's speeches at the Party School in Yenan in February and at the Yenan Literary and Art Circles' meeting in May 1942 established the "line" of literature and art which had been endorsed by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and which has since been upheld as the creed of writers and artists in Communist China. The general tnor of the speeches was that literary and art workers at Yenan, being undeniably "revolutionaries by choice," should stop the hitherto blind imitation of alien and imported prototypes and the singing of abstract, contentless tunes which had nothing to do with the revolution and, as such, would not be understood by the peasant-worker-soldier masses. In their place, fresh and lively revolutionary themes in the Chinese style would be appreciated. Although in principle Mao believed that Chinese literature and art should benefit from masterpieces of other cultures, especially those produced in the Soviet Union, in no instance would he allow the separation of Chinese literature and art from immediate revolutionary tasks; and on this basis he puts the popularization of literature and art ahead of sophistication. See Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking, Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she, 1953, Vol. 3, pp. 833-900.

general, the control over writers, artists, and their work takes three forms, as was true in the Liberated Areas after the 1942 reform: (1) the organization of writers and artists under government auspices; (2) the identification of the duties of the writers and artists with the implementation of government policy; and (3) the intentional and unceasing use of literary and art criticism to keep writers and artists in line. Now, however, the scope is national.

A. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles

In July 1949, before the establishment of the Central People's Government, writers and artists from various parts of China were "invited" to Peking where the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was organized to co-ordinate the activities of a number of the nationwide organizations in specific cultural fields, such as literature, art, music, and the cinema; it was to follow the line laid down by Mao Tse-tung in 1942. Theoretically, the federation is not a government body, but it sent delegates to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in September 1949, as did Communist-sponsored political factions and mass organizations. The chairman and vice-chairman of the federation were given posts in the Communist government.

At the organizational meeting in July, Chou En-lai told the gathered writers and artists that they were the representatives of 70,000 literary and art workers in China, of which 30,000 were in the People's Liberation Army, another 30,000 scattered in the old Liberated Areas, and

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538 668 the remaining 10,000 in areas recently liberated from the Kuomintang. From Chou's statement it becomes obvious that he identified as writers and artists Party propaganda personnel and those workers engaged in raising the standard of literacy.[2] It is doubtful that the majority of these 70,000 so-called writers and artists had achieved high competence in intellectual and artistic expression. Two years later, the Communists' leading woman author, Ting Ling, was still complaining that as editor she had difficulty in finding acceptable manuscripts for her magazine.[3]

It is certain that the organization of these writers and artists put the politically dubious under the guidance and supervision of the politically reliable; and the organized state rendered the writers and artists collectively responsible for their part in the Communist cause. Furthermore, dominated as it was by veteran Communists, the organization embracing all China's well-known writers and artists served as a good Communist-style "democratic front."

B. The Task of the Writer

The literary subdivision of the federation was the All-China Association of Literary Workers, which, like the federation's other subdivisions, has its own professional magazine, People's Literature. In the first issue, published in October 1949, the sixfold task of the magazine was stated in part as follows:

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[2] Chou En-lai, "Political Report at the Conference of the All-China Literary and Art Workers," (July 6, 1949), People's Literature, Peking, I,3, Jan.1,1950,p.17.

[3] [see next page]

538 668 1. To participate in the People's Liberation War and in the construction of the "New Democratic nation: through literary forms that are treasured by the people, with ideological content reflecting the growth of the new nation and praising the contribution of the masses in revolutionary struggles and productive activities;

2. to rid literature of imperialist influence and to reform traditional literature; to accept what is "good" in foreign literary and artistic endeavor;

3. to guide the masses in factories, villages, and in the ranks in their literary study, and to help increase their "literary strength";

4. to develop literatures of the ethnic minorities;

5. to study revolutionary theory and to organize groups for the study and discussion of the new literary productions and the formulation of a "scientific" theory of literary criticism;

6. to promote interflow of literature and

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3. Ting Miao, A General Analysis of Chinese Communist Literature and Art, Hong Kon Ya-chou ch'u-pan she, 1954, pp. 149-50.

4. People's Literature, I, 1, Oct.25,1959, p. 13. The content of this declaration reads very much like the constitution of the Union of Soviet Writers in the USSR. [see next page]

538 part among nations; to develop patriotism and
668 internationalism; and to participate in "struggle
for peace" as led by the USSR. [4]

Before the writers of the association had time to demonstrate their ability to implement these policies by fulfilling pledges to turn out so many pieces of work in a stipulated period of time, the conflict in Korea began.

The war was utilized by the Party as a schooling ground for class education and was depicted as a panorama of international class struggle. On this pretext writers were sent to the front to learn about "reality" in order to delineate the struggle of the heroes of the day and to draw the moral of the times. They were expected to make the most out of their experience not only by reporting immediate events but also by recording their impressions in notes which would later serve as material for more lengthy literary works. With the exception of Pa Chin's Living Among the Heroes, Wei Wei's Who Are the Most Lovable People?, Lu Chu-kuo's Shang-kan Mountain, Yang Shuo's Three Thousand-Li Territory, and a few others which are readable and maintain certain literary standards, other writings based upon the authors' experiences at the Korean front do not show maturity even in the handling of the Chinese language. However, the Chinese Communists claimed that these second-rate writings adequately express the Chinese Volunteers' patriotism and Communist internationalism.

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In sending professional writers to Korea the Communists departed from one of their most boasted practices. Throughout the war against Japan and the "war of liberation" against the Kuomintang, Chinese soldiers were encouraged to write, and writings from the ranks were hailed and widely publicized. But professional writers were chosen for Korea, probably in the hope that they would effect a more skillful literary dramatization of the Communist cause.

However, the Korean front was not the only place where writers were to learn about "reality" and to dramatize the "cause of the people." While the war was going on, Ai Wu, Ts'ao Yü, the noted playwright, and other writers, were sent to factories; Ho Ching-tzu, author of The White-Haired Girl, was sent to study life in the villages; Ting Hsi-lin, Liu Ch'ing, Li Tzu-hua, Mu Yen, and a host of other veteran motion picture producers and directors were sent to Shanghai to participate in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.[5]

But these writers were not to record life as they observed it. Before they left for their "life schools," they had to undergo some "training." One can imagine the situation: writers of the calibre of Pa Chin and Ts'ao Yü learning from the speeches of Lu Ting-i and Ch'en Po-ta, the two propaganda chiefs of the regime, "how to describe people, how to abstract living reality and exercise care in collecting material, how to portray and praise, and above all, how to avoid making mistakes." It would appear that the Communists were so eager to prove the righteous-

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[5] See chapter on Subversive Potentialities in handbook for impact of Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns.

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538 ness of their actions that they carefully arranged
668 that "history" should be recorded exactly in
the way they wished it to seem.

Judging from the extent to which the land reform turned the rural, social and political order upside-down, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns destroyed the bourgeois stronghold in the national economy, and the way in which the war in Korea affected the national life, one might expect that those writers who had been given the opportunity to witness these momentous events would accomplish literary feats of equal magnitude. On the contrary, one finds, with only rare exceptions, "formula" stories which have all the correct political ingredients demanded of them but which lack originality and any attempt at characterization. One story of land reform reads much like another, the only differences being the names given the heroes and some few idiosyncracies of the writers in the use of colloquial expressions and political jargon. Adherence to a prescribed political formula blights all creativeness.

C. Literary Criticism

What has contributed most to this fear of originality in literature is the influence of officially organized and directed literary criticism, which uses Communist literary theories to coerce and browbeat the writers. The disparity in the respect given critical and creative forces has stunted the young Communist literature and precluded a normal growth.

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668 Outstanding instances of the enervating effect of Communist criticism are the reviews of the play, "The Song of the Red Flags," and the story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan." The play, concerning shock-teams in a production drive, was initially praised by the Communists themselves; later, it was criticized because "it did not give a strong portrayal of the trade union and the Party." According to the critics, the author should have used the play to strengthen the prestige of the trade union among the worker-audiences as well as to emphasize the "heroic" qualities of the leading protagonist, a Communist cadre. The portrayal of the Party cadre P'eng Kang in the play was deemed incorrect, "for the Party's leadership is invariably collective, but in the play P'eng seems to be quite alone." The play was thus rated "of low educational value." The author of the story, "Old Worker Ku Fu-shan," was reprimanded because he "not only distorts the image of a model Party member but also completely ignores the function of Party training and leadership."

The classic example of Communist literary and artistic criticsm involves the 1951 Shanghai-produced film, "Wu Hsün Chuan," based on the life of an advocate of free education from Shantung Province. Wu Hsün was born into a poor family and had no formal education. In order to help children attend school, he dedicated himself to hard work and frugal living; and by shrewd investment of his savings, he succeeded in accumulating funds for the education of the poor. Wu Hsün's contribution to Chinese education was never questioned until the Communist critics attacked

538 668 the film. Wu's effort for the kind of education prevalent at his time, according to the Communist critics, only strengthened the feudal order and arrested the forces of progress; rather than serving as an "accomplice" of the Manchu ruling order, the critics said, Wu should have joined the revolutionary force, i.e., the Taiping revolutionaries. Furthermore, they said, Wu Hsün's means of accumulating wealth was indicative of his subservience to the rich and of his exploitation of the poor.[6]

The evolution of criticism of the film "Wu Hsün Chuan" is illustrative of the nature of Communist literary and artistic criticism. Adverse opinions of the film were not initiated by literary and art circles, but by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In fact, the film had been very enthusiastically received, even by many eminent Communists. On May 20, 1951, the Peking People's Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Party, published an editorial alluding to this state of affairs. "Some comrades say that they have already mastered Marxism, but....confronted with concrete issues, they completely lose their critical sense." The "Party life" column of the same issue ordered all Communists to join in criticism of "Wu Hsün Chuan." On June 4, a directive of the Ministry of Education of the People's Government,

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[6] The most representative voice of this kind is Ai Ch'ing's article "Oppose the Slave Ideology of Wu Hsün in People's Literature, June 1, 1951, pp. 9-10.

538 published in the People's Daily, instructed all 668 personnel in education throughout the nation to carry out discussions of the film. On August 4, the final and definitive verdict on the film was delivered by Chou Yang, the vice-minister of Cultural Affairs of the Communist Government. He labeled the film as unrealistic art and a product of anti-historical and anti-popular ideology.[7] Party organs in all parts of China where "Wu Hsün Chuan" had been shown used the film as a target for ideological propaganda. The ideology of the film was also discussed at the third session of the first National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which met from October 23 to November 1, 1951. Members of the All-China Federation of the Literary and Art Circles began to echo the view of the Central Committee of the Party and confessed that, while they had made definite progress in the past two years, nevertheless they always fell behind the development of Chinese society. This confession led the writers to "plunge" into study in an effort to "remold their ideology and to sharpen their critical sense."

The conflict between critical and creative forces also manifests itself in the bulk of incongruous writings of the literary critics in Communist China. The critics have ready an abundance of clichés, jargon, and theories of socialist realism which are clearly ill-digested and are

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[7] Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate General, No. 113, September 1, 1951.

538 used with little discrimination or literary skill. 668 Quotations from Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Gorky, Zhadanov are frequent but are not integrated into the theme of the text. Even Communist critics have noted that many quotations for orthodox Marxist texts are either irrelevant or superfluous.[8] This excessive verbalism at the expense of content makes literary criticism irreconcilable with the alleged theory of its essentially didactic function. Much criticism is lukewarm and stereotyped, written by writers who are called upon by the Communists to undertake the task of attacking their fellow writers. In this case, what is criticized is invariably the "petty bourgeois standpoint." The exception to the rule is Mao Tse-tung himself, who, from his position of absolute authority, can write criticism which is non-imaginative, forceful, and pointed, even by the standards of the free world. Top Communists, like, Liu Shao-ch'i, for example, who seem to be more confident in translating Marxism into practice, do not quote from orthodox texts as often or use as many clichés as the lesser Communists.

Since 1949, Chinese Communist literature appears to have concentrated on a number of well-defined themes. It has been most concerned with the individual under the Communist system and the problems confronting him. These have included the social confusion of the New Democratic period, the doubts of the intellectuals, the "criminal activities of the bourgeois merchants, the struggle against the "enemy of the people," and the appearance of human types based on the newly created Communist "tradition." Even the "return to history" is oriented for the solution of certain present-day problems.[9] Patriotism, aetheticism, and naturalism are all good literary themes, provided they are imbued with the spirit of "socialist 538 668

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[8] Shen Ch-chung, "The Popularization of Theoretical Criticism of Literature and Art," People's Literature, No. 9, July 1, 1950, pp. 27-28.

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[9] Writers are told to find evidence in history of the excellent qualities of the Chinese people, and to appreciate and to learn the beautiful styles in Chinese literary heritage. For instance, the poet Li Po (A. D. 701-762) who was an incorrigible individualist, can now be safely described as a "great patriot," for Li Po "could not have written such beautiful verses about the magnificent rivers and mountains of his fatherland had he not been very patriotic." His many lyric poems which sang praises of the bright moon are now interpreted to mean his longing for a "cleaner" world, and therefore indicate his personal integrity; his mild protests against the conditions of his time are now interpreted to mean his progressive spirit. (Wang Yao, Li Po, Shanghai, Jen-min ch'u-pan she, 1955.) Ch'ü Yuan, the poet-statesman of the Kingdom of Ch'u in the Chan-kuo period (481-221 B.C.), is praised for his "patriotism and sympathy for the common people." (Kuo Mo-jo, "A Brief Account on Ch'ü Yuan," People's Literature, No. 44, 1953.) Emperors like Han Kao-tsu and T'ang T'ai-tsung, who increased the national territory and the prestige of the Chinese people, are now praised as heroic. This salvaging of national characters and literature for Communist posterity could be a sign of a felt need. There are reports that since the

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538 realism," which is belief in the inevitability
668 of the development of socialism.

Since 1949, China's best writers have not produced any first-rate work. If there happen to be interesting writings that suit the taste of the reader, they do not fit into the theoretical scheme of the Party. Hsiao Yeh-mu's short story, "Between Us, Husband and Wife," for instance, was criticized as "employing the intellectual's viewpoint and taste to distort the image of the working masses and to vulgarize things political."

Some writers are unable to find publishers for their work, not because the work is counterrevolutionary but because its theme is considered untimely. In 1952, Miao Yen-hsiu was advised not to publish his Maio-chia Feng-kuang, a long poem about freedom of love and marriage in Miao communities, because the Communists did not think a celebration of the equality of the sexes useful to the Communist revolution at that time.

[No. 9 continued]
Party came to the cities it has neglected to supply enough reading material for the people in the old Liberated Areas, and that the people have gone back to the old novels. In order that they may not be "poisoned" by the "feudalistic ideas" in the old novels, the reinterpretation of the characters in old novels according to dialectical materialism seems far more necessary than the writing of novels of comparable stature.

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16
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668 Romantic novels of love and sophisticated novels of human relationships are not published. When love does come into the scene, it is shown as subsidiary to other, more "worthy" and "unselfish" problems (i.e., problems social and political).

Although the writer may desire to let human relationships play a decisive part in the development of his material, there is a tendency to utilize abstract characters rather than vivid personalities. Most of the writers who choose to deal with the exposure of corruption and the excesses and tyranny of established institutions are more adept at portraying "negative" personalities than creating "positive" personalities in keeping with the Communists' view of the "heroes" of the new regime. This is true, despite the fact that Communist leaders have repeatedly told the writers "to give the most important position in the plot to the affirmative man," and that "in no case should evil be vividly presented, lest virtue remain an abstraction," for it is now the writers' task to describe the bright possibilities of life under the Communist leadership.

The recent development of literature and art in China seems to parallel that in Soviet Russia. In China, the emphasis to praise industrial and agricultural heroes follows the pattern of Soviet literature. The influence of the war in Korea upon literature in China is comparable to the influence of World War II upon Russian

538 literature. Now that we hear about the "thaw"
668 in Russian literature,[10] can we anticipate a similar development in China? Hu Feng's attempt in early 1955[11] to liberate literature from the shackle of politics, although it ended in failure and personal disgrace, indicates, nevertheless, conscious recognition by a group of writers of the freedom necessary for the creation of works of art.[12] Only general discussion of minor ways to improve literature has been undertaken by leading authors like Mao Tun and Ai Ch'ing, and all discussions are prefaced by fervent dedications to the Marxist-Leninist world outlook. While the parallel we draw of the developmentof literature in the two countries may aid in the understanding of certain similarities, the parallel is not complete. If we compare the contents of the first six issues of People's Literature (October 1949 to April 1950) with six issues published in the first six months of 1955, we find a noticeable change; the percentage of creative writing by Chinese has increased, and the percentage of works translated from the Russian has decreased. Among the translated works, the percentage from Soviet Russia is smaller than it was; and there is now a sampling of literature from non-Communist sources, including, surprisingly enough, the tales of Hans Christian Andersen.

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[10] Walter Z. Laqueur, "Russia in Flux, I. The 'Thaw' and After," Encounter, London, October 1955, p. 35.

[11] Hu Feng is a well-known Communist writer, and was the protégé of the Communists' "literary saint" Lu Hsün.

[12] Laqueur, op. cit., p. 35.

II. THE GENRES OF LITERATURE

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A. Translations from Russian Literature

Translations from Russian literature are included in this section because of the influence they have had on Chinese intellectuals.

According to a survey made in 1937 in twenty-one Chinese universities and eight high schools, foreign literature, particularly Russian, English, and American, had an important place in the intellectual life of contemporary youth in China. Gorky was mentioned oftener than any other foreign author. Other favored Russian authors included Tolstoy and Turgeniev.[13] This popularity of Russian literature seems remarkable in view of the fact that between 1927 and 1949 there were no Russian schools in China and almost no Russian was taught. Of course, many works of Russian literature were translated into Chinese.

The success of Russian literature in China stems from the appreciation of the problems confronting Russian and Chinese society: the conflict of generations, new sexual ethics, the struggle for sexual equality, the struggle between the doctrine of "non-resistance" and a revolutionary attitude toward life. Sympathy with the Russian revolution has also played a part.[14]

Translations of post-1917 Russian writings

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[13] Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, pp. 276, 363-64.

[14] Ibid., p. 276. O. Briere, Les tendances dominantes de la litterature chinoise contemporaine, Bul. Univ. Aurore, Ser. III, Vol. 9, #35, 7/1948, p. 251.

538 such as Krymov's Tanker Derbent (1939),
8/14 Ostrovsky's How Steel Was Tempered (1937), Simonov's Days and Nights, a novel of Stalingrad, Scholokhov's And Quiet Flows the Don, and Virgin Soil Upturned, a novel about collective farming, and Fadeyev's The Young Guard (1945) were read by secondary school and college students. These novels encouraged young intellectuals with a yearning for a "positive" life of action no less heroic, revolutionary, and romantic than that experienced by the heroes about which they read. These novels had an obvious influence on the radical movement among the students who defied the Kuomintang regime.

Today, Bassov, hero of Krymov's Tanker Derbent, and Korchagin, hero of Ostrovsky's How Steel was Tempered, are more familiar to the students than many of the characters in novels written by Chinese authors, most probably because the Chinese novels are poor imitations of Russian originals. Mayakovsky's poem "Lenin" is acclaimed by the Chinese Communists as a model of socialist realism, and Michael Prishvin' s nature petry is popular. Chinese translations of Ehrenburg's Storm and Nikolayava's Harvest are best-sellers.[15]

Since the establishment of the Central People's Government, delegations of Russian authors have visited Peking and other important cities of China. Russian is now taught in Chinese schools as the foreign language. Under the Communist regime, the Sino-Soviet Friendship

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15. [see next page]

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538 Association, which has branches throughout
814 China, has contributed much in the promotion of popular appreciation of Russian culture.

B. Academic Writings

814 Academic writing under the direction of the Chinese Communists seems to be concentrated upon the history of peasant rebellion during the last one hundred years, anthropological studies of the ethnic minorities in China, commentaries, political and philosophical, on texts by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i, and archeology and pre-historic Chinese society.

In the field of modern Chinese history, the Chinese Historical Society[16] is most comprehensive in its program of research. It has sponsored the compilation of a series of documents on modern Chinese history. To date, the published volumes of the series include Nien Chün, concerning the peasant rebellions in Kiangsu, Anhwei, Honan, and Shantung in the latter half of the nineteenth century; and the Hui Revolt, the

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15. "'Liberating' the Creative Impulse in China," The Times Literary Supplement, August 5, 1955, xlii. For the Chinese Communists' own estimation of influence of Soviet literature on Chinese writing, see Pa Jen, Look at the Soviet People Through Soviet Literature, Peking, Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien ch'u-pan-she, 1955.

[16] Society is now called the Institute of Chinese History, a division of the Academy of the Sciences at Peking.

814 revolt of the Hui people in the Northwest and in the province of Yunnan in the Southwest in the nineteenth century; The Opium War (1839-42); and The Hundred-Day Reform (1898). This series will include twelve collections of source materials including works on the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the May Fourth Movement (1919).

The published volumes contain a wealth of source materials. In addition to assembling records kept by previous governments, the works bring together the memoirs of individuals concerned and documents which have lain undisturbed in county archives. However, one cannot find in these volumes any interpretation of or commentaries on the material gathered. In the prefaces to these published volumes it is stated that:

> "Counterrevolutionary forces always try their best to distort fact. Because they often suppress and destroy revolutionary literature, the latter is seldom preserved for posterity. New research in past revolutionary events can only proceed from the records kept by the counterrevolutionaries. Therefore those who are going to use the material here assembled must be reminded that they should approach the matter with a viewpoint opposite to that advocated by the authors of the material."

So far no major historical treatises based on this material have been written. The first volume of Part I of Fan Wen-lan's Modern

814 *History of China* (Harbin, Tung-pei shu-tien, 1948), which deals with the period 1840-1905, is *the* text on modern Chinese history; Fan's book was published before the Communists achieved national power. Other historians such as Ku Chieh-kang, who at the beginning of the Communist rule in China expressed his gratitude to the Chinese Communist regime for enabling him to continue his research, have so far produced nothing.[17] Historians in China now prefer to annotate published works rather than write their own views of history, probably for fear that the whims of some Communist critics may some day put them in peril. As a result of the lack of new historical texts, history books written before 1949 are now being reprinted.

Of the academic people who have transferred their allegiance to the Communist regime, the anthropologists seem to be faring better than others. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, author of *Peasant Life in China* (London, 1939) and *China's Gentry* (Chicago, 1953), published his *Revamping the Universities* (Shanghai, Shanghai ch'u-pan kung-ssu 1950), in which he anticipated the change of college curricula under the Communist government. Fei has since led several government delegations to visit the ethnic minorities in the South and Southwest and has made some first-hand studies of these peoples. In the field of anthropology much basic study is possible without running afoul of the Communist line. Despite the

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[17] The re-writing of history textbooks with a dialectic materialist viewpoint for primary and secondary school students is not considered in this section. See the chapter on Education in this handbook.

814 omnipresent praise for Communist policies, the articles written by the anthropologists do indicate that new facts are being discovered; and the fact that these discoveries are financed by the government and are used in the administration of the minority peoples may suggest the favored position held by anthropologists in China today. On the other hand, anthropologists so busily employed by the government are prevented from doing the work they might do in a free society.

829 In the field of philosophy, especially in political philosophy, Mao Tse-tung's books are accepted as of unquestioned authority. His Selected Works has gone through several editions since 1949, each new edition being more beautifully and elegantly printed than the one before. But Mao has not written any new books since 1949. Political theorists who wrote on socialism before 1949 now limit their writings to short articles published in such journals as The New Reconstruction (Hsin Chien-she), explaining Communist terms and government policies. Fung Yu-lan, the philosopher, has only published one article, "Mao Tse-tung's On Practice and Chinese Philosophy," since he made his confession. His article is an attempt to establish some continuity in Chinese philosophy in the past centuries, especially as it is concerned with the problem of knowledge and action, and to place the various revolutions in the same context. The article attempts to make Mao Tse-tung's ideology seem respectable, but it adds nothing to the development of philosophy. This state of affairs is necessarily

829 the case since "truth" was declared in Marxist writings before 1949, and there is no room for new ideas except in commentaries on "orthodox views." Cadres and students must study Party and government documents in the light of Marxian texts. By attacking "wrong" views, "correct" dialectic materialist views are vindicated. The recent mass attack on Hu Shih's "bourgeois" philosophy illustrates this point.[18]

C. Fiction

538 The larger part of Southwest China came under Communist control after all the other regions of China. Southwest China, therefore, is not among the first to face problems such as the recovery of industries, the increase of agricultural and industrial productions, the land reform, and the liquidation of the anti-Communist forces. Since Communist literature is largely intended to describe the solution of these problems, stories and novels which deal with these aspects in Southwest China are stereotyped and lacking in originality, imitations of the prototypes written in other regions and earlier. As a result, stories and novels produced in other regions of China are more popular in Southwest China than that produced locally.

People in Southwest China, like those in other parts of China, read Yüan Ching and K'ung Chüeh's best-seller *Hsin Erh-nü Ying-hsiung Chuan* (The Biography of a New Hero and Heroine) a 200,000-word account of the repulse of the Japanese invaders in North China,written in the

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[18] *Criticism on Hu Shih's Ideology* (4 vols.),Peking, San-lien shu-tien, 1955.

[illegible]
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538 style of the old-fashioned Chinese novels,[19] and Ting Ling's The Sun Shines on the Sang-ch'ien [Sang-kan] River, a novel about the struggle of the people in North China during the 1946-48 land reform, which was awarded the Stalin prize. Liu Pai-yu's Lights Ahead, which describes the crossing of the Yangtze River by General Liu Po-ch'eng's Army during the "liberation" war against the Kuomintang, is also well-known in Southwest China.

D. Poetry

Although Mao Tse-tung himself composes poems in the classical style, the "new poetry" which is written in pai-hua (vernacular) is in vogue in Southwest China today as in other parts of China.

Wen I-to, Kuo Mo-jo, and Hsü Chih-mo, who wrote pai-hua poetry, are still talked of. The publication of Wen's collected poems, Still Water, was an important literary event in 1929. Hsü experimented with new forms, including those found in Western poetry. He was less concerned with the theory and art of versification than was Wen. Wen's book, The Forms and Rules of Poetry (1926) which lists musical, artistic, and architectural skills as the necessary elements of good poetry, is a unique contribution to pai-hua poetry.

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[19] First edition (10,000 copies) sold out in twenty days, 80 per cent in North China. Although pleased

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538 Kuo Mo-jo's poetry had energy and imagination, but no discipline and restraint; and has been likened to water escaping from a broken dam, rushing everywhere. In the 1920's, when Kuo was the leader of the Creative Society, he advocated "art for art's sake." He was the first to introduce untranslated Western words and phrases into pai-hua poetry to enhance the beauty of the metrical patterns of the stanzas. Although Kuo is not productive nowadays, and his poems are not popular today, his present prestige as a "literary personage" is based on his past achievement; and his present political position as a cultural leader in the Communist regime in turn encourages the sale of his peoms. He is the only one of the three still living. Being now wholly dedicated to the Communist cause, although not a Party member, he is comparable to Simonov of Russia, for Kuo, like Simonov, spends a good deal of his time heading Chinese cultural delegations to other countries and entertaining foreign cultural delegations to China.

Ai Ch'ing and T'ien Chien are established as Communist poets. Ai writes prose poems and T'ien writes extremely short verse. The average Chinese reader is apt to appreciate Ai more

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[19 continued] with its success, the Communists have lamented the fact that the Chinese people are still so fond of the traditional "feudalistic" novels that a novel of new ideas and new people could be successful only when dressed in the traditional forms.

than T'ien, especially when Ai writes of everyday things familiar to the reader and T'ien draws his inspiration from a vision of the new world which is less comprehensible to the average reader. 538

Ma Fan-t'o and Li Chi are often spoken of together. Ma's poems are modeled upon popular rhymes. Li Chi's poems are modeled after Shun-t'ien-yu, a folk-song pattern popular in Shansi and Suiyuan during the war against Japan.

All the poets mentioned above are known nationally. Their styles are imitated by lesser known poets. Kuo Mo-jo may be better appreciated by the Southwesterns because he was born and grew up in Szechwan.

E. Literature of the Ethnic Minorities

The so-called literature of the ethnic minorities in Communist China, the development of which was mentioned in the first issues of the People's Literature in October 1949 as one of the six tasks of the literary workers in China, is so far not the product of the minority peoples; the writing is done in the Chinese language, mostly by the Han Chinese, or by people of minority origins who have mastered the use of the Chinese language.[20] 538 563

So far, the effort of fostering minority literature takes four forms:

1. tracing and recording customs of the minority groups;
2. interpreting the institutions of the minority groups from a dialectic materialistic viewpoint; and

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20. [see next page]

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563 3. The exchange of literatures of the *Han* Chinese and the ethnic minorities.[21]

Although history in the Southwest is often interpreted by the Chinese Communists as antagonism between groups or suppression of one group by another, the literatures of the minorities that are to be developed are not allowed to take anti-administration forms.

F. *Drama*

536 Stage plays in China can be roughly divided into four kinds: (1) folk plays native to small dialectal districts, (2) *ching-hsi*, or *p'i-huang* (Peking opera) which is appreciated in all parts of China proper, but particularly in Peking, Tientsin,

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[20] Most of the literature of the minority groups take the form of poetry. The following are representative: Yung Ying, "We Are a Group of *Miao-chia*," *People's Literature*, January 1, 1952, pp. 61-62; Fan Jung-k'ang, "Sang of the Mao-chia" *ibid*. pp. 63-64; Chu Yeh, "The *Yi* and the *Ni-su* of the Highlands," *ibid*., pp. 53-60; Miao Yen-hsiu, *Ta-miao-shan Symphony*, Shanghai, Hsin wen-i ch'u-pa she, 1954; and "Ah-shih-ma," a long poem transmitted orally by a Southwest minority group and now rendered into *Han* Chinese language by Huang Ti, *People's Literature*, May 7, 1954.

[21] This, before minorities have their own written language, amounts to sinicization of minorit people with Chinese literature in ways which do not seem "imperialistic" to minority peoples. On the other hand, cultural heritages of the Chinese people may be enriched by the assimilation of cultures of minority groups through literature.

[redacted]

536 and Shanghai, and in the big cities of the Southwest, (3) the new opera, a genre created by the Chinese Communists, and (4) the modern plays. These, together with motion pictures, are now utilized by the Communists to disseminate ideological and political messages

1. *The folk plays*. The best-known folk play in the Southwest is *Ch'uan-hsi*. The difference between *Ch'uan-hsi* and other Southwestern folk plays is mostly due to the difference in the dialects employed. All the folk plays borrow stories from each other, and therefore the same folk stories in the Southwest are presented in different versions in different folk plays.

Ch'uan-hsi resembles *ching-hsi* in stage-setting and costuming. But *Ch'uan-hsi* uses percussion more extensively than *ching-hsi*; at the end of each verse the percussion helps to heighten the mood, and the musicians themselves also chant the sound of the last syllable of the sung verse of the actor on the stage. This practice is called *pang-ch'iang*. Also, in *Ch'uan-hsi* there are choral arrangements which are absent in *ching-hsi*.

With the large influx of people from other parts of China into the Southwest during the war against Japan, *ching-hsi* has become more popular than *Ch'uan-hsi* in the larger Southwestern cities. But in the small towns and in rural areas *Ch'uan-hsi* and other types of folk plays are still the common means of entertainment.

536 2. Ching-hsi. A composite of many regional plays, ching-hsi is popular in all parts of China. The best actors and actresses of ching-hsi, however, have been those associated with the Peking theaters. Because of their wealth, some of the larger Southwestern cities have been able to invite to their theaters the best actors and actresses from North China. The musical accompaniment is carried by the hu-ch'in, a string instrument, assisted by other strings and by wood-winds. Percussion is used to accentuate rhythms of body movements and to dramatize heightened moments.

At its present state, ching-hsi is a polished form of art. It no longer depends for audience appeal on plotting but rather on a display of skill by the actors or actresses. It emphasizes costuming rather than scenery. Actors may play the female roles and actresses may play the male roles. The music pattern is not very flexible, but permits the well-known actors and actresses to vary the style of production. The spoken dialogue and the spoken patter songs, consisting of clichés in colloquial language, help the movement of the play, make the literary language of the sung verses more intelligible to the audience, and aid in the variation of rhythm. However, most of the spectators know the play, have memorized the verses, and can sing some of them. They came to the theatre to watch and enjoy the art of a stylized performance.

In comparison with the folk plays, the ching-hsi is a much more integrated art. Therefore, it is more difficult to bring innovations to the ching-hsi without damaging its accepted form; in contrast, 536 the folk plays may easily incorporate new elements. This fact accounts for the Communists' effort to revamp the folk plays and to bring them up to the same level of popular and artistic recognition as the *ching-hsi*. However, in the Communists' effort to reinterpret history, the *ching-hsi* is now rendering unique service. The Communists have not only revised many of the old scripts to conform to their ideology, but have also encouraged the writing of new scripts. In this attempt, well-known actors like Mei Lan-fang and Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu are asked to lend a helping hand.

Playwrights in Communist China are now told to study *ching-hsi*, because this form can be used to dramatize personalities. In the Communists' efforts to glorify the image of the "new heroes," this art is considered extremely important.

545 3. *The new opera*. The new opera in China is modeled after the operatic forms of the West but the content conveys revolutionary themes. The first experiment in this form was *The White-Haired Girl* (1944), a collective creation of the writers and artists of the Lu Hsün Institute of Literature and Art. In the arias sung by the heroine, the musical pattern of the Hopei *pang-tzu* is borrowed to convey her changing moods. This is considered a very successful adaptation by the Communists. But the melodies of the other sung parts, which appear to be of *yang-ko* origin, are close to folk songs and lack dramatic effect. *The White-haired Girl* has been characterized as "drama-plus-songs," a term which indicates that the operatic form is not well enough developed to enable the music to carry the theme.

545 This inadequacy was remedied in the second major opera commissioned by the Communists. The opera *Liu Hu-lan* gives the heroine Liu Hu-lan opportunities "to delineate her heroic personality" in longer and more frequent arias. The musical pattern of the Shansi *pang-tzu* is used in the areas, and the whole opera has a Shansi color.

The composers were alarmed when they discovered that the melodies which describe the corrupt life of the landlord in the opera *The White-haired Girl* were hummed by the audience rather than the arias of the heroine and the chorus of the 8th Route Army. They resolved not to give the "negative" personality strong musical treatment. As a result, the opera *Liu Han-lan* incorporates disjointed melodies for the villainous roles. The villains are shallowly caricatured. Thus, for ideological reasons, the Communists now limit "true music" to the expression of "lofty passions" for the "right cause."

The new operas are intended for national consumption irrespective of regional differences, although local airs are incorporated into the scores according to the locality of the stories. Both *The White-haired Girl* and *Liu Hu-lan* are based on incidents which occurred in North China, although they have been transformed by grossly "dramatic exaggeration. They are performed by opera troupes all over China, and their influence is therefore national. Other well-known operas include the *Long March*, in which for the first time Mao Tse-tung is impersonated.

536 4. Modern plays (hua-chü). The modern play, like the motion picture, has no regional character. Any acceptable play will be staged in all parts of China, and kuo-yü (the national language) is used rather than the various dialects. Ch'en Ch'i-t'ung's Thousands of Rivers and Mountains proves that the Communists' Long March in the thirties is always "correct" material for dramatization. The Song of the Red Flags, concerned with production drives in a textile factory in North China, was the joint creation of three playwrights, written after they had agreed on the ideological significance of this type of play and had sketched out the plot under the guidance of Chou Yang, the vice-minister of Cultural Affairs. The Song of the Red Flags was performed in Chungking as well as in other cities like Shanghai, Nanking, Peking, and Lan-chou. In Shanghai alone, it was given 159 performances, and some 125,000 people attended it.[22] If we take into account the fact that theater-going is now an organized activity of the various mass organizations such as the labor unions, the Women's Federation, the New Democratic Youth Corps, the Young Pioneers, and the study circles, the length of the run and the size of the audience do not accurately reflect the enthusiasm of the people but rather the effectiveness of the Communist organization of mass participation in the field of recreation.

546 5. Motion Pictures. Although Peking decides the policy, Shanghai and Mukden are now the centers of China's motion picture industry. The White-haired Girl, based on the same incident

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[22] Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Peking, July 1950.

546 as the opera of the same name, won first prize among the thirty-eight entries at the Communist International Motion-Picture Festival in Czechoslovakia in 1951. The Concentration Camp at Shang jao, produced in 1951, describes the life of the "patriotic people" in the Kuomintang concentration camp, and, according to the Communist reviewers, successfully demonstrates the "collective heroism" of the Communists under duress. When the rural production drive was about to begin in 1954, the movie Good Harvest was timed to be shown to the peasants during the festivities of the lunar New Year in order to emphasize the importance of increasing the output of the land. The People on the Grassland is a movie about the Mongols in Inner Mongolia. Sound tracks in the Mongol and Uigur languages have been made so that this picture may be circulated among the ethnic minorities. Similar movies about the ethnic minorities in the Southwest are likely to be made in the future.

III. ARTISTIC EXPRESSION

A. Painting and the Plastic Arts

532 Painting and the plastic arts are largely utilitarian in China today. The utilitarian spirit puts them either in the realm of propaganda or craftsmanship. As propaganda, they become extremely derivative and stereotyped; as craftsmanship, they utilize local characteristics and traditional skills, although they sometimes appear to be unrestrainedly florid and pretentious. Chinese brush paintings, woodcuts, oil paintings, cartoons

chalk drawings, and posters are entries in most of the art exhibitions. Among these categories, ceramic figures and wood-carvings represent local craftsmanship and are little influenced by Communist ideology. Other art forms have used Communist policies and slogans as themes for depiction. Woodcuts, sculptures, and water colors seemed to have been more easily adapted to the new themes than oil paintings and the traditional Chinese brush paintings. The oil paintings done by Chinese artists usually lack imagination in composition; at their best, they are only near-photographic depictions of political activities. Traditional brush-painting technique is at its best in landscape paintings and in depicting rural life and is ill-adapted to the illustration of modern people and their activities. No prominent artists in oil or water color have emerged under the Communist regime.

Under the general principle, "Accept the heritage of the world," artists like Rembrandt and Leonardo da Vinci are commemorated and reproductions like that of the Mona Lisa are used in literary and art journals.

B. Woodcuts

The woodcut, a traditional art in China, is used to adorn story books. Lu Hsün was the first to renew popular interest in this art. Woodcuts became popular in Yenan during the war against Japan because their creation does not require eleaborate equipment. Many people remember the lively wood cuts of the Liberated Areas, which showed the influence of Western woodscuts. Woodcuts are popular in Communist China; there is a tendency to incorporate the traditional Chinese woodcut style in the illustration of Communist themes, and there are elaborate woodcuts in multiple colors, a technique which antedates the Yenan period. In recent woodcuts, rural life is more effectively presented than blast furnaces or anti-U.S. activities.

C. New Year's Pictures (Nien-hua)

In those Chinese households which have not been influenced by the West, a new picture is hung or pasted on the wall on every New Year's Eve to assure a prosperous and peaceful year ahead. The pictures are called nien-hua. New Year's pictures are exploited by the Communists as a means to secure people's consent and support for their regime. The traditional themes of superstitious propitiation to gods has been transmogrified to praise of Mao Tse-tung for bringing happiness and prosperity to the people, to celebration of the Long March of the Red Army, the distribution of the land certificates after the land reform, the woman train-conductor, or the "great meeting of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung."[23]

The Communists have boasted of a tremendous sale of the "new" nien-hua in the last few years. The production and printing of the nien-hua are now done entirely by Communist publishing houses, and the Chinese people have no way of buying their traditional nien-hua. The aesthetic value of the nien-hua is practically nil, but it utilizes so well the traditional customs, beliefs, and sayings of the people that its messages are immediately understandable and are apt to be accepted.

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[23] People's Pictorial, February 1951.

D. Comic Strips (Lien-huna t'u-hua)

532 The Chinese comic strip is neither literature nor art, but it borrows a little from both to enable the barely literate to entertain themselves with stories. The Communists, knowing the popularity of the comic strip among children, women, and the uneducated, have used it to teach "patriotism," sanitation, and health. They regard earlier comic strips as "feudalistic" and superstitious, and have replaced them with those which are "new, healthy, and educational." The new comic strips, created by artists recruited and guided by the Communists, are seen at street corners, and in factories, villages, armies, and schools.

The Communists claim that the sale of comic strips is increasing daily. The Lien-ho Bookstore in Shanghai, which handles the new comic strips, reports the sale of more than 600,000 volumes in January 1951, and more than one million volumes in the following April. The comic strip periodical Lien-huan Hua-pao is reported to have a circulation of 400,000 copies.

The most representative and most publicized new comic strip is The Letter with a Chicken Feather,[24] which uses 243 pictures to "give the Chinese children a patriotic education." The story concerns a young boy who, after receiving a Communist education, successfully fulfilled the "heroic" task of delivering an important message to anti-Japanese guerrilla force. It is claimed

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[24] It was a traditional practice to include a chicken feather with an urgent message, signifying the letter's importanceand need for its safekeeping

532 that more than 58,000 copies of The Letter with a Chicken Feather have been sold.

E. Dance

535 China proper does not have any distinctive form of dancing, although yang-ko is sometimes considered native to China. Yang-ko is a combination of signing and dancing, derived from the song pattern of peasants who sing in groups antiphonically when working in the rice-fields. The dance steps revolve around a basic pattern, that is, two steps forward and one step back, which resembles the movements of the peasants as they work in the fields. In village festivals, yang-ko is sometimes performed, but it became truly popular only after the reform of literature and art in 1942, when the Communists used the dance to propagate new ideas in Shensi, and later in North China. It was brought to different parts of China in time to greet the advancing People's Liberation Army. The opera The White-haired Girl was based on singing and dancing forms of the yang-ko; and at the first stage of land reform this opera was utilized by the Communist cadres in many different parts of China to stir up class struggles in villages. The vogue of yang-ko in East China now seems to be over. The sophisticated cadres seem to prefer the new opera to yang-ko, and Western forms of social dancing to yang-ko steps.

The Chinese Communists have always fostered any art form that would assist their revolution. In 1950, Hsien Hsing-hai's Production

535 Cantata (Sheng-ch'an Ta-ho-ch'ang) was transformed into an operatic spectacle. The new song-and-dance version is divided into four scenes, celebrating the times of spring cultivation, seeding, harvest, and prosperity, to portray the rural working people's enthusiasm for production and their prosperity as a result of the Communist "liberation."[25]

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563 The minority groups in the Southwest have many forms of folk dances. During the war with Japan and in the postwar years, folk dances such as the Drinking Party of the Chia-jung (Chia-jung Chiu-hui) became popular among student groups in all parts of China. The Cultural Corps (Wen-kung t'uan) of the Central Institute of Nationalities at Peking has been visiting the minority communities in Southwest China and has adapted some of the dances of the minority peoples for performance in Peking, in other Chinese cities, and abroad. Among those performed are the "Flute Dance" (a courtship dance) and "Wedding Dance" of the Miao people, "Happy Sun" (a tap dance) and "Good Harvest" (a traditional dance around a family cooking stove) of the Tibetans in Western Szechwan and Northern Yunnan, "Please Stay, You Guests from Afar" of the Yi people, and "Peacock Dance" of the Tai (Thai) people.[26]

535 The Central Dance Corps at Peking, sponsored by the government, recently gave a "Lion

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[25] People's Pictorial, August 1950.

[26] Ibid., July 1954.

535 Dance," which is an adaptation of a traditional festival stunt performed in North China during the lunar New Year season.[27] Another dance, "Tea and Butterflies," has also been widely publicized; it is concerned with tea-gathering maidens in Western Fukien.[28] The purpose of these dances is "to beautify the working spirit" and to set a pattern to be developed by dance corps elsewhere in China.

The Central Experimental Opera Institute at Peking has also given instruction in ballet, and there are many aspiring ballerinas. Interest in ballet is unprecedented in China and is clearly the result of the popularity of ballet in Russia.[29]

The activities associated with dance are organized and directed by the government. There is the All-China Association of Dancers, a subdivision of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers,[30] with headquarters in Peking. Tai Ai-lien, a well-known professional dancer, heads the association. She has dedicated herself to the incorporation of folk life, especially that of the minority peoples, into her dances. Her training, however, is Western.

F. Music

533 Appreciation of Western classical music has been revived in accordance with the principle of "accepting the culture of the world." The

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[27] Ibid., March 1954.

[28] Ibid., April 1954.

[29] Ibid., May 1954.

[30] The All-China Federation of Literary and Art Circles was changed to the Federation of Literary and Art Workers in September 1953.

533 municipal symphony orchestra in Peking performs Beethoven as well as Tschaikowsky and such a performance is intended to set an example for musical activities elsewhere in the nation. The quality of the symphony's performance is unknown. No major composer has emerged under the Communist regime. Most of the musicians seem to be absorbed in collecting and re-arranging folk music, in composing scores for new operas, or in turning out at short notice musical accompaniment for propaganda films.

Marching bands have been very popular under the Communist regime; nearly every school has a band. This is in keeping with the Communists' deliberate effort to foster some kind of martial spirit in the youth of the country.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1j,
Sociological Background

EDUCATION

I. BACKGROUND

871 In order to understand the changes brought about by the Communists in the educational system of China, it is necessary to review the background of educational development under the Nationalist regime.

Chapter II, Article 11, of the Nationalist Constitution promulgated in 1946 states that the "people have freedom of speech, [freedom for the] pursuit of knowledge, and [freedom of] publication." Article 21 of the same chapter further spells out the principle of education by stating that the "people have the right as well as the duty to receive a basic education." Interpretations of these broad principles are found in Chapter XIII, which specifies, among other things, that the purpose of education includes the development of the spirit of nationalism, and that both public and private educational institutions are subject to government supervision according to law.[1]

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[1] Chung-kuo Chiao-yü Nien-chien 1948 [Educational Yearbook of China 1948], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1948, pp. 23-24.

871 Nationalist officials singled out two of the most controversial points for further elaboration. One is the so-called "spirit of nationalism" which the Ministry of Education at Nanking defined as the spirit based on San-min Chu-i, the Three Principles of the People expounded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Thus a mild social reform was adopted as the central theme of the Nationalist philosophy of education. The other controversial point is the extent of government supervision over educational institutions. Officials explanations stressed the supervisory function of the government in the system of education and denied that this implied any authoritarian control.[2]

Under the Nationalist Government, efforts were exerted to promote adult education and combat illiteracy. Outstanding records were [873] made by such people as James Yen (an internationally known promoter of mass education), who organized drives to eradicate illiteracy, and Huang Yen-p'ei, now a member of the Communist Central People's Government, who did much for the development of vocational education in China.

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[2] Ibid., p. 24. For other influential theories on education expounded during World War II in China see Chan-shih Chiao-yü Lun-chi [Discussions on Wartime Education], Shanghai, Sheng-huo chiao-yü she, 1938.

It is enough to say here that had it not been for 871 a decade of war, general education in China would have been far more developed than it was in 1949 on the eve of the Communist seizure of power.

The application of the broad principles of education under the Nationalist government resulted in a system of regular and specialized schooling as pictured in the chart which follows.

CHART 1. SYSTEM OF EDUCATION UNDER THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT*


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*Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien, 1953 [The Yearbook of the Republic of China], Taipei, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1953, p. 491.

87/ As shown in Chart 1, the primary school consists of six grades divided into two levels. For students at rural schools, the first four years of primary school education may constitute an integral unit and may be sufficient, for all general purposes, if the students must devote themselves to manual labor upon the completion of this unit. This feature was later attacked by the Communists as a mark of discrimination against the peasants and workers. But it is to be remembered that at one time the Nationalist Ministry of Education did attempt to revise the primary school system by making it a five-year, one-level system.

Another feature of the Nationalist system of education attacked by the Communists was its failure to establish vocational schools with college standing, thus forcing vocational school graduates to terminate their education at the high school level. While most of the vocational school graduates did not continue their formal education, the system under the Nationalists did not preclude this possibility. The doors of the colleges were open to such graduates as were qualified for enrollment. The only restrictive factor was that most of the vocational school graduates because of their specialization had to take additional courses in order to fulfill general requirements before they could pass the entrance examination to the regular college.

By 1946, it was announced by the Nationalist Ministry of Education, 54.52 per cent of the nation's population above the age of six either had attended or were attending schools.[3] In 1947, there were 207 institutes of higher learning throughout the country. But this number was unsatisfactory to the government; the Ministry of Education announced that the Central Government devoted only 4.3 per cent[4] of its 1946 budget to education, which is not quite one-third of the amount designated for this purpose by the Constitution.

In the Southwest China Region, 30 schools for advanced education were in operation in 1947. Of these, 16 were general, 8 were technical, and 6 were for teacher-training.[5] Other pre-Communist statistics on education in Southwest China, cited in Table I, will offer comparison with developments under the Communist regime, to be discussed.

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[3] The Education Yearbook of China, 1948, pp. 1,397-483.

[4] Chung-hua Nien-chien, 1948 [The China Yearbook, 1948], Nanking, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1948, p. 1,623.

[5] Chung-hua Nien-chien, 1948 [The China Yearbook, 1948], Nanking, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1948, pp. 1,591-594.

Table I. Education in Southwest China (1945-46)*
(Figures in parentheses are 1946 statistics)

Province	Primary Schools		Middle Schools (Secondary Schools)		Institutions of Adult Education	
	No. of Schools	No. of. Students	No. of Schools	No. of Students	No. of Schools	No. of Students
Szechwan	47,931	3,696,712	825	283,205	(4,635)	(64,828)
Yunnan	11,150	724,833	173	38,844	(2,014)	(169,572)
Kweichow	7,901	623,983	155	38,961	(9,394)	(149,091)

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* The Education Yearbook of China, 1948, pp. 1,397-1,483. The institutions for adult education include libraries, museums, night schools, etc. It is obvious that not all the people participating in such activities are counted in the figures for "students" of adult education institutions. The figures for Sikang Province have been included in those for Szechwan Province.

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722 It is to be noted that Southwest China, unlike other regions, had an opportunity to expand educational facilities during World War II when many schools in North and East China were forced to move to the interior.

II. MAJOR CHANGES BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE COMMUNISTS

A. Basic Policy

871 Mao Tse-tung stated in his work On New Democracy, that, "A specific culture is the ideological reflection of the political and economic activities of a specific society."[6] In molding a culture for the "New China," Mao believed that the education program in China would be successful if it contained "scientific substances, oriented toward the masses, and adapted to suit China's nationalism."[7] This principle of education was incorporated into the Common Program of 1949 which constituted the basis of the Communist Constitution promulgated in

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[6] Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung Hsüan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung], Vol. II, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, p. 666.

[7] Hsia Feng, Hsiao-hsüeh Chiao-shih Shou-ts'e [Handbook for Primary School Teachers], Shanghai, Wen-hua ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 8.

87/ 1954. Article 41 of the Common Program states that the purpose of education is "to elevate the level of the people's culture, to prepare personnel for national reconstruction, to eradicate the thoughts of feudalism, compradorism,[8] and Fascism, and to develop the spirit of service to the people." To apply this basic policy to education, Article 47 of the same document further specifies that "education must be systematically popularized; secondary and advanced education must be strengthened; technical education must be emphasized; spare-time education for laborers and cadres must be stressed; and revolutionary political education must be given to both young and old intellectuals."[9]

These pronouncements became the guiding light for the Communists in their effort to revamp the educational system of China until the promulgation of the Constitution in 1954. In reality, the new Constitution has nothing to add to or subtract from the principles already in practice. Article 94 of the Constitution

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[8] Comprador - a native agent employed by a foreign establishment (commercial houses, etc.) in China, to have charge of its native employees.

[9] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1950 [People's Handbook, 1950], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1950, Section B, p. 9.

871 says that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to education. To guarantee enjoyment of this right, the state establishes and gradually extends the various types of educational institutions. The state pays special attention to the physical and mental development of young people." The next article in the Constitution "safeguards the freedom of citizens to engage in scientific research, literary and artistic creation and other cultural activity." These are innocuous statements of commonly accepted principles. Reiteration of these principles in the Constitution, however, provides the Communists once more with the opportunity to clarify their educational aims which are "to develop a socialist China."

Attention must be given to the gradual shift of emphasis from 1949 to the present in the Communist basic policy for education. At the beginning of the Communist regime, the central theme was to bring to reality a "New Democracy" in education. By this the Communists meant that petit bourgeois and national capitalist classes would still be tolerated on a level with the proletariat. Soon afterwards the Communists made it amply clear that a constant effort was to be made to root out every trace of thought and action in education that did not conform to strict proletarian socialism, Russian-style. There have been numerous articles arguing whether there is any difference between the principles of the New Democracy and the socialist principles

871 of education.[10] Apparently the final word on this question was pronounced by an article in People's Education, an official organ of the Ministry of Education since May 1, 1951, which said: "The present stage is no longer the same as the New Democracy stage. We have to not only establish a socialist system of thought for the educators and students (which was the central mission under the New Democracy principle), but to put into practice the principle of 'eliminating step by step the exploitation system and establishing a socialist society' as stipulated in the new Constitution."[11]

In short, the Communist basic policy of education has been to remove gradually all influences other than those of stemming from socialism. In practice, the Communists have attempted to train all levels of personnel required for a complete socialist remolding of China.

B. Changes in Curricula

873 Curricular "reform" was among the first actions undertaken by the Communists in the field of education. Even before their consolidation of power (at a time when a thorough renovation

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[10] See articles on this subject in Jen-min Chiao-yü [People's Education], Peking, June 1953, April 1954, and June 1954 issues.

[11] People's Education, Oct. 1954, p. 13.

873 of the educational system was administratively impossible), the Communist instituted changes in the curricula wher~~e~~ever their troops had seized control. As early as September 1949, Communist authorities announced the "Temporary Regulations of Curricular Reform in the Departments of the Colleges of Arts and of Law in the Institutions of Higher Learning in North China." The principal features of this "reform" were (1) the substitution of Marxism and Leninism for the Three People's Principles, (2) abolishment of the course on traditional law and, before new laws were promulgated, the addition of studies on socialist theories of jurisprudence. This action was aimed at institutions of higher learning; reform of curricular for lower level schools was not much publicized.

The same subject was the central theme for the All-China Higher Education Conference of June 1-9, 1950. By that time the movement to reform curricula had reached its second stage. Out of this conference emerged "Decisions Concerning the Enforcement of Curricula-reform in the Institutions of Higher Learning." The main point of this directive was that, "Institutions of higher learning must... abolish the politically reactionary courses, install revolutionary political courses of the New Democracy.... The curriculum of all departments must practice the principle of proper specialization ... must install and

873 strengthen necessary and important courses and omit those overlapping and unimportant courses and materials, in accordance with the principle of intensification and simplification."[12]

Following this conference, major changes in college curricula were carried out. Similar measures were also adopted for secondary and primary schools by modifying the courses and altering the subject-content. In January 1951, the Communist Ministry of Education moved to check on the results of curricula "reform" by holding a "Conference on Inspection of Teaching Plans for the Academic Year 1950 of All Institutions of Higher Learning." Again, similar actions were taken for schools on the lower level. After September 1951, official efforts were mainly devoted to "thought reform" and the inspection of course material and teaching methods to ensure that the reform measures were truly carried out in the Communist spirit. These efforts have not lessened in the past five years.

Besides changing the materials for courses on political and economic theory, the curricula

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12. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol. II, No. 5, Sept. 1950, p. 1,134.

873 "reform" also has the mission of dovetailing the schools on different levels and seeing that their doors are open to Party and other professional cadres who have not had the opportunity of a formal education.

One important development closely related to curricula "reform" is the thorough re-examination of all textual materials. The central authorities responsible for education, through their subordinate agencies on provincial and municipal levels, supervised the revision of all textbooks, particularly those in the field of the social sciences, before releasing them to the schools. That the revised books are politically slanted is obvious, but their technical quality can not be judged without a detailed comparative study of many such books against the original versions and against similar books accepted as standard works in non-Communist countries.[13]

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[13] For more information on revision and publication of textbooks in Communist China, see the chapters on Public Information and Propaganda and Artistic and Intellectual Expression. Also see Chu Po-ch'i, Chung-kung Ti Hsüeh-hsiao Chiao-yü [Formal Education in Communist China], Hong Kong, Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 218-27.

C. Changes in Organization

871 Before 1949, as the Communist Army assumed control of a city or a town, a military delegate was assigned to each school to supervise its administration. The changes the Communists brought to the schools at that time were imposed unsystematically and arbitrarily. Even after the establishment of the Peking regime, the measures designed to revise the educational system and school organization remained haphazard. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, the main activity of the Communist Ministry of Education, as far as reorganization of the schools was concerned, appeared to be the seizure of private schools and other schools sponsored by religious groups and foreign missions.[14] The first systematic reorganization was occasioned by the issuance of a Goverment Administration Council directive, "Decisions Concerning the Reform of the Educational System," on October

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[14] Wu-nien-lai Ti Kung-fei Chiao-yü [Communist Education in the Last Five Years], Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, Vol. II, pp. 14-15. A total of 6,360 schools were said to have been seized by the Communists.

87/ 1, 1951. The *People's Daily of Peking*, central organ of the Communist Party, and People's Education both expounded the theory behind the organizational reform:[15] (1) the reorganization will ascertain the position of vocational schools, special training programs for cadres, and adult educational classes in the regular school system; in other words those cadres, soldiers, peasants, and workers who have had no opportunity for formal education may attend special training schools and achieve the same standing as regular school graduates; (2) changing the six-year and the two-level primary school system into a five-year and one-level system will enable children of poor peasants to receive a much more complete basic education; (3) the new system will place emphasis on technical education to serve the purpose of the "socialist reconstruction of China"; and (4) the kindergarten will have its definite place in the reorganized system.

Thus the reorganization was launched as the central task for education in China for 1952. By September 1952, it was reported, the major

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[15] People's Education, Oct. 1951, pp. 5-6; Hsia Feng, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

871 reorganization of schools was completed.[16] However, the Communist Vice-Minister of Education, Liu Shih, reported in January 1954 that "systematic reorganization of the schools was not completed until late 1953."[17] Liu, in reporting on the completion of the reorganizatio possibly had in mind the decision of the Government Administration Council in November 1953 to "restore the old primary school system of six-years and two-levels." According to Premier Chou En-lai, this last action was necessary because of "inadequate preparation" for the new five-year, one-level system.[18]

The main changes brought about in the reorganization were the regrouping of departments in large universities and specialization in the colleges. The purpose was to

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[16] Kao Chien-hsing, Chung-kung Ti Nu-i Chiao-yü [Slave Education of the Chinese Communists], Hong Kong, Tzu-yu ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 36; Walter Crosby Eells, Communism in Education, Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1954, p. 201.

[17] People's Education, Jan. 1954, p. 24.

[18] Ibid., p. 8.

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87/ achieve a balanced distribution of educational facilities as prescribed in the program of national economic reconstruction.[19] The system of education after reorganization can best be shown in the chart which follows.

Chart 2. System of Education under the Chinese Communist Regime*


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Research Institutes
Universities and Specialized Colleges
Specialized Institutes
Senior Middle Schools
Secondary Specialized Schools
Junior Middle Schools
Primary Schools
(Senior)
(Junior)
Kindergartens
Proletarian Accelerated Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Senior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Spare-time Junior Middle Schools (3-4 yrs.)
Proletarian Accelerated Primary Schools (2-3 yrs.)
Spare-time Primary Schools

*Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 8-9; Chi Tung-wei, Education for the Proletariat in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 16. The Chinese term for "middle school" implies "secondary school."

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[19] For a detailed description of the reorganization, see People's Education, Jan. 1954, p. 65; Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. II, pp. 14-15; Chung Shih, Higher Education in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1953, pp. 41-47.

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Chart 3. Communist Government Control of Education*/


State Council
Physical Education Commission
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Higher Education
Ministry of Culture
Provincial (or Municipal) People's Council
Physical Education Commission
Department of Public Health
Department of Education
Department of Culture
County People's Council
Municipal People's Council
Public Health Bureau
Cultural & Educational Bureau
Physical Education Committee
Public Health Bureau
Educational Bureau
Cultural Bureau
Hsiang (or Minority National Hsiang, or Chen) People's Council
Ch'ü People's Council
Commission on Cultural and Educational Work
Public Health Section
Cultural & Educational Section

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*/ Communist Education in the Past Five Years, pp. 12-13. The term "Physical Education" used here can also be translated as "Physical Culture and Sports."

(Chart 3 faces p. 285.)

Following the reorganization of the school system, government control over the system was further defined by the promulgation of the 1954 Constitution. As shown in Chart 3, the formal chain of control is not much different from that of the Nationalist system. The following new features, of course, are to be noted: The Ministry of Higher Education is in charge of the education of higher and secondary levels of technical and administrative personnel to be used in the national reconstruction program; the Ministry of Education is responsible for the administration of teacher's training schools, regular middle (secondary) and primary schools, and adult education schools.[20] Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution, education was under the jurisdiction of a Cultural and Educational Administration of the Government Administration Council. Now, under the State Council, culture and education are separated. The Ministry of Culture continues to supervise all "cultural activities" other than education, such as the press, publications, art, drama, and so forth. That physical education is worthy of an independent commission under the State Council indicates the important position it occupies in the Communist program of youth training.

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[20] Communist Education in the Past Five Years, Vol. I, p. 11.

871 665 One significant development in the control of education by the Communist government is the role played by the Party. Although the official chain of control as shown in Chart 3 seems to have no place for the Communist Party, Party branches on all levels are actually the authorities for interpretation of official policy and have the final decision on how a school should be run. Evidence shows that some schools report every important question to the local Party secretary before taking any action.[21] Close-range Party supervision, together with the assignment of well trained veteran cadres to key positions on the administrative staff of the school, serve to maintain the Communists' control over the educational system.

III. MAJOR MOVEMENTS LAUNCHED BY COMMUNIST IN EDUCATION

A. "Thought Reform"

871 668 To effect an ideological revolution among the educators and students is an essential step in the Communist plan to "Sovietize" the educational system in China. Since 1949, every major measure adopted by the Peking regime

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[21] People's Education, Dec. 1954, p. 30.

871 in the cultural and educational fields involves,
668 either implicitly or explicitly, an effort to remold the thought of the people concerned. However, an organized drive to change the way of thinking of the educators and students did not begin until Premier Chou En-lai delivered his speech on September 29, 1951. He urged the educators to abandon their attitude of "study for study's sake" or "art for art's sake" and to step down from their professorial pedestals to serve the masses. He exhorted the students to forget about personal profit and to identify their ambitions with the national interest.

This movement spread rapidly. Criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. "Petit bourgeois sentimentalism," "capitalistic romanticism," "feudalistic individualism," and a host of other "undesirable" attitudes were subject to relentless attack. During subsequent months the Communist press was crowded with signed confessions of past ideological erros. This is the mainstay of the Communist program to revamp education, but it is admittedly a most trying task which requires a long-range plan and sustained effort for its achievement.

Although practically every college professor in China has published his self-criticism (some of them have done so several times) and every student has been through at least one "thought struggle," the movement continues unabated. The Ministry of Education in announcing the tasks for 1954 again pointed out the need for continued vigilance against the "remnant of feudalistic thought."[22] The State Council in directing secondary schools to improve their courses stressed the importance of strengthening socialist thought.[23] The latest revival of this issue occurred when the philosophy and works of Hu Shih, Yü P'ing-po, and Hu Feng became the subject of a purge.[24] (See chapter on Artistic and Intellectual Expression.)

B. Labor-education Movement

The labor-education movement is designed to inculcate a respect for labor in the minds of intellectuals and youth. (This is not to be confused with "Reform-through-labor" discussed in the chapter on Forced Labor.) Instruction begins in kindergarten, where the Communists teach pupils to respect the "fruits of labor," to care for school property, and to aid their parents in the work at home and in the fields. Grade school children are given manual work, partly as physical exercise and

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[22] People's Education, March 1954, p. 22.
[23] Ibid., July 1954, p. 16.
[24] People's Education, May 1955, p. 5.

871 partly as a means to cultivate respect for labor. 668 Older students are urged to prepare themselves for work on the farm or in the factory. Such a preparation, the Communists say, is the "most glorious" assignment which can be given "New China's" youth. Students in advanced schools are reminded of their duty to accept government assignments regardless of the working conditions involved or the separation from familiar places it may entail. The main purpose of the labor-education movement is to prepare students for work upon the completion of any of the several levels of education.

"Study is the only task worth undertaking, and all other professions are beneath it" is a traditional Chinese expression which upholds the high social status of the educated. This has become a target of Communist attack, and the fight to change the minds of the people is still surging.[25]

C. Physical Education Movement

Although a specific commission has been established to promote physical education (see Chart 3),[1] the State Council and the two

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[25] See Communist official directives on "labor-education," *ibid.*, June 1954, p. 7; May 1954, p. 7.

[1] [facing p. 285--Analyst]

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668 ministries of education have been seriously
87/ concerned with the health of students. This concern originates from Mao Tse-tung's instructions to promote "good health, good study, and good work." In April 1951, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, called the attention of the nation's educators to the importance of guarding the health of students. Tung's declaration was affirmed by other officials in responsible positions during subsequent years, but apparently the situation was not much improved. The students remained in financial straits while the pressure of intensified courses was increased. The Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry of Health, and the Commission on Physical Education issued a joint directive in July 1954 reiterating an earlier announcement by the Government Administration Council on "Decisions for Improving the Health of Students in Schools at All Levels."[26] However, it is obvious that stress on physical exercise alone cannot take the place of an adequte diet.

Other movements launched simultaneously with the above-mentioned drives have been revived from time to time. They are indicative of the ills plaguing the educational system under

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[26] People's Education, Aug. 1954, p. 65.

668 the Communists in China. Language reform,
871 important to primary education and in efforts to combat illiteracy, is associated with "thought reform." The program to establish winter schools, summer schools, and other special training classes for peasants, workers, and soldiers is actually a part of school reorganization. Some of the most important characteristics of these movements will be discussed.

IV. SCHOOLS ON VARIOUS LEVELS

The Communist policy for education and the movements in education are nationwide, and are subject to only minor regional variations. However, a survey of the schools in Southwest China may reveal the extent to which the Communist policy has been carried out and the response of the people in this region.

A. Kindergartens and Primary Schools

872 The development of kindergartens in the Southwest China Region followed the basic policies laid down by the Communists: to consolidate the existing schools and improve their efficiency before building new schools. The program was tied in with the child welfare program and there has been no specific discussion on the progress made in Southwest China. According to Ch'u T'u-nan, Chairman

872 of the Cultural and Educational Commission for Southwest China, the emphasis in educational development in that region immediately after the Communist seizure of power in 1949 was to "build and strengthen a few institutions of higher learning and middle schools."[27] Obviously the expansion of kindergartens in Southwest China was to come later.

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668 The development of primary schools received prompter attention than did the development of the kindergarten system. The policy has been to strengthen the primary schools in cities and important villages and to encourage the villagers in outlying districts to establish their own primary schools under local government supervision.[28] To consolidate Party control over these numerous primary schools scattered over wide areas, the Government Administration Council in Peking ordered the assignment of experienced political cadres to supervise the educational agencies in county governments.

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[27] *Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien, 1950* [*Compendium of Government Reports 1950*], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 1,000.

[28] *Jen-min Shou-ts'e 1955* [*People's Handbook, 1955*], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 575-76.

872 668 In addition, primary school principals and other administrators were indoctrinated. By September 1952, over 16,000 primary school teachers had gone through the "thought reform" process in Southwest China. Refresher courses were arranged during summer and winter vacations and other off-duty hours to improve the qualifications of primary school teachers; over 18,000 teachers were reported to have attended these courses before the end of 1952.[29]

872 In 1950, there were 76,000 primary schools in Southwest China with a total registration of 5,000,000 students. By September 1952, the total enrollment of primary schools in this region had increased to 7,167,000, or about half of the number of school-age children in Southwest China. Of these students, nearly 90 per cent were from peasant and worker families.[30] The Communists pointed out the high percentage of "proletarian" students in primary schools as a proof of the improved educational opportunity for the working class.

One of the most difficult problems in improving the primary school system was the fact the teachers were dissatisfied because they

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[29] Pei Kuan-chin T'ieh-mu hou Ti Hsi-nan [Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1954, pp. 17-19.

[30] Ibid.

872 were not paid as much as industrial workers and their political status was lower than the often-untutored government "cadres". Much of this discontent was bared during a lengthy discussion in the Primary School Teacher, a monthly published by the Ministry of Education. From September 1953 through May 1954, the magazine received over 20,000 letters and articles arguing the pros and cons of this issue. Many of the letters were from teachers in Southwest China.[31] On the other hand, Chou Hui-wen, a young woman teacher at a primary school in Chengtu,[32] recounted in detail how she reformed badly behaved students for the glory of the "New China." There seem to be similarly dedicated teachers, thoroughly indoctrinted in Communism and devoted to the responsibility of "being the People's teacher," in all parts of Southwest China.

The emphasis in primary school education has been to imbue the students with respect for labor and love for country. Thus, students in a history course were told that Confucius was not concerned with the "proletariat" and that

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[31] Hsiao-hsüeh Chiao-shih [Primary School Teacher], Sept. 1953 through May 1954 issues.

[32] Ibid., Nov. 1953, p. 6.

872 he offered advice to the kings in order to perpetuate the feudalistic system.[33] Schools which succeeded in teaching the students to enjoy manual work, to help their parents at home, and to prepare for farm or factory work upon graduation were cited as "model" institutions. In April 1955, the schools at Kuang-yüan (Yunnan Province) reported with pride that out of 204 students graduating in the last class, 80 took up jobs with mutual-aid teams and agricultural co-operatives.[34] To achieve this result, school teachers had to persuade the students' parents that it was as noble and as desirable to have their children participate in productive labor upon graduation as to send them to schools of higher education. However, in spite of the fact that the government has made "labor education" the primary point of emphasis in political indoctrination, lack of success was revealed by Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, Mayor of Chungking, who reported on January 13, 1955 that "the idea of looking down on physical labor and the laboring class still prevails among students."[35]

873 B. Secondary Schools

In 1950, the secondary schools in

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[33] People's Education, Jan. 1952, p. 52.

[34] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1012, April 26, 1955, pp. 12-13.

[35] Ibid., Supplement, pp. 4-5.

873 Southwest China went through the initial stages of consolidation and reorganization according to the Communist policy for education. Incomplete statistics from a Communist source indicate that in that year there were 1,200 schools with 150,000 students in this region.[36] Suspension and merging of many private schools in the subsequent years reduced the total number of middle schools in Southwest China to 674 in 1951. However, student enrollment apparently suffered little from the reorganization of schools; in the spring of 1952, there were 216,000 students attending middle schools. Of this number, about 50 per cent were from "proletarian" families.[37] In Szechwan, the largest and richest province in this region, the policy has been to establish a middle school in every "old revolutionary base" (area occupied by the Communists in the 1930's). Although there is no up-to-date information on the accomplishment of this program, the government in Szechwan was prepared to do everything possible to develop education in the northern parts of that province, including the

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36. Compendium of Government Reports, p. 1,000.

37. Southwest China behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 17-19.

873 organization of "substitute tiller" teams to help those families which, after sending their older children to school, would not have sufficient manpower to work on the land.[38] Concrete results of middle school expansion were reported in Chungking Municipality; in 1954, 18 junior middle schools were either newly built or expanded.[39]

Aside from giving technical instruction commensurate with the level of the school, secondary education in Mainland China stressed the same things as the primary schools. To make the teacher conform to the government policy of education, a rotating system of indoctrination was inaugurated for secondary school principals and other administrators, with the commissioners of education of each provincial government responsible for the supervision of indoctrination. The program got underway in Southwest China in 1951; by September 1952, over 11,000 teachers and administrators had completed their "training."[40]

Some important changes were made in the curricula for secondary schools. To the natural science courses was added a subject

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[38] Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia Ti Ssu-ch'uan [Szechwan Under the Communists], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 21.

[39] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1012, pp. 4-5.

[40] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

873 called Elementary Darwinism. To the social sciences courses was added a study of the Common Program, later replaced by a study of the new Constitution of 1954 after its promulgation. During the past five years there have been times when a scheduled course was suspended at the last minute because the official textbook for the course was not ready.[41] Many textbooks were revised several times to measure up to the changing Party line as interpreted by Peking.

C. Institutions of Higher Learning

873 668 In principle, the control of institutions of higher learning is centralized under the Ministry of Higher Education, except for the teacher's training program which falls under the Ministry of Education (see Chart 3).[1] In practice, the Government Administration Council has instructed the various central government ministries in charge of various industries to "supervise and co-ordinate" the programs for advanced technical schools. These central government ministries in turn can appoint local government personnel to take charge of the schools in order to maintain close supervision.

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[41] People's Education, Aug. 1954, pp. 63-64.

[1] [facing. p. 285 --Analyst]

873 In this connection, local governments, mainly
668 provincial, are given the responsibility of providing the schools with political guidance.[42] With this system of control, the political conversion of the universities and colleges was carried out with very little delay. In September 1950, the regional authorities of Southwest China called a conference on higher education. Immediately after the conference, the 43 existing institutions of higher learning were put through the initial "reform." As a part of the "thought reform," 808 college teachers and 5,212 students were enlisted to serve in the Land Reform Movement. In the summer of 1951, 191 teachers and 1,640 students were sent to farms and factories to practice what they had been learning in school.[43]

873 Among the more acute difficulties

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[42] "Decisions Concerning the Revision of Relations of Leadership for Institutions of Higher Learning," announced by the Government Administration Council on Oct. 6, 1953; People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 558-59.

[43] New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

873 experienced during the conversion and reorganization of universities were:[44] (1) the "thought reform" of college professors, who were subject to public criticism by their students, and (2) the transfer of certain departments from one university to another, which disrupted the administration of those institutions. By the end of 1952, nine of the schools of higher education in Southwest China had been revamped to include 39 more departments, of which 25 were directly controlled by government agencies in charge of industrial affairs. Seventeen "new type" technical schools were established, of which 11 were engineering[45] schools. Not all of these schools were on the college level.

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[44] Accounts of thought reform for college professors are presented (possibly with some exaggeration) in such works as Ts'ui Shu-ch'in, *Ta-lu Hsüeh-jen Ti Pei-chü* [*Tragedy of Scholars on the Mainland*], Taipei, Chung-yang wen-wu kung-ying she, 1953; and *Kung-fei Ti Nu-i Wen-hua Yü Chiao-yü* [*The Slave Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists*], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952.

[45] *New China Daily*, Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

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Table II. Institutions of Higher Learning in Southwest China (1954)*

Name	Location	Departments	Special Courses	Specialization
Szechwan University	Chengtu	7	none	General
Yunnan University	Kunming	8	none	General
Chungking University	Chungking	6	2	Mining, engineering
Chengtu Engineering College	Chengtu	3	1	Engineering
Chungking College of Civil Engineering	Chungking	1	1	Civil engineering
Kunming Engineering College	Kunming	2	1	Engineering
#Szechwan College of Chemical Engineering	Lu-chou	4	none	Industrial chemistry
Hsi-nan Agricultural College	Chungking	6	none	Agriculture
Kweichow Agricultural College	Kweiyang	1	none	Agriculture
Agricultural College, Szechwan University	Chengtu	4	none	Agriculture
Agricultural College, Yunnan University	Kunming	2	none	Agriculture
Szechwan College of Finance and Economics	Chengtu	4	none	Finance, Economics
Hsi-nan College of Political Science and Law	Chungking	none	1	Pol. science, law
Szechwan Medical College	Chengtu	3	none	Medicine
Kweiyang Medical College	Kweiyang	1	none	Medicine
Hsi-nan Russian Institute	Chungking	none	1	Russian
Hsi-nan College of Physical Education	Chengtu	1	none	Physical ed.
Hsi-nan Normal College	Chungking	11	4	General
Szechwan Normal College	Nan-ch'ung	5	5	General
Kweiyang Normal College	Kweiyang	7	6	General
Kunming Normal College	Kunming	4	5	General
Chungking Special School for Teacher Training	Chungking	none	4	General
Szechwan Special School for Teacher Training	Lu-chou	none	3	General
Hsi-nan Special School of Music	Chengtu	none	3	Music
Hsi-nan Special School of Fine Arts	Chengtu	none	3	Fine arts

*Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1955 [People's Handbook, 1955], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 569-71.

#Szechwan College of Chemical Engineering specializes in training students in the process of pulp-making and tanning.

[PP. 301, 302 are blank]

873 In 1950, there were 43 schools of higher education with 15,000 students in Southwest China[46] -- some 13 schools added to the number existing in 1947. However, subsequent reorganization and merging of the schools left only 25 in operation in 1954 (see Table II). Of these, nine were technical schools, two specialized in medicine, and two were full-fledged "general" universities. Some of these schools simultaneously conducted two- and three-year special courses. The establishment of the short-term special course is in accordance with the over-all government policy of preparing sufficient technical personnel to meet the needs of the national reconstruction program.

Problems were created by the "planned distribution" of college graduates and other students to the places where they would be needed. Throughout their years in school, the students were told that "to think of salary is mercenary and to dodge government assignment is political desertion."[47] The 9,190 college students graduating in 1950-52 in Southwest

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[46] *Compendium of Government Reports,* p. 1,000.

[47] *Kao-teng Hsüeh-hsiao Pi-yeh-sheng Ti Kuang-yung Jen-wu* [*The Glorious Mission of College Graduates*], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, pp. 12-13.

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873 China were assigned jobs.[48] Supporters of this program said that this would bring to an end the complaint that "graduation means unemployment." But placing so many graduates properly so that everyone of them would make use of what he had studied was not a simple undertaking, and there were undoubtedly many misassignments resulting in dissatisfaction on the part of the students.

D. The Teachers' Training Program

874 As shown in Chart 2, colleges and secondary schools for teacher training have equal standing with general schools on the same levels. The urgent need for trained teachers for schools on different levels was first announced in October 1950 by Ma Hsü-lun, then Minister of Education. Ma told the first All-China Conference on Primary Education and Teacher's Training that, before 1957, according to the planned expansion of schools, China would need 1,000,000 new teachers. Of these, 200,000 would be for "spare-time"schools for peasants and workers, 130,000 for regular

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[48] New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

middle schools, 10,000 for colleges, and the remainder for kindergartens.[49] Measures adopted to expedite the training of teachers included the condensation of courses and the establishment of special short-term courses for training primary school teachers who, upon completion of training, would be promoted to teach in junior middle schools. To improve the qualifications of teachers, refreshers courses were organized during vacations and in evenings. In 1953, there were 1,280 such refresher courses throughout China. For teachers in outlying districts correspondence courses were designed in addition to reference materials brought to them by mobile libraries. The Communists claim that 407 counties in China were serviced by mobile libraries in 1953. In the same year, the teachers in 220 counties formed correspondence clubs and exchanged their teaching experiences, thus helping one another to improve teaching techniques.[50] Another measure adopted was the hiring of some high school graduates after a period of apprenticeship to serve as teachers in the schools from which they graduated.

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[49] The Slave Culture and Education of the Chinese Communists, p. 23.

[50] People's Education, Jan. 1953, p. 23.

874 These stopgap measures, however, were unable to meet the shortage of teachers pointed out by Ma Hsü-lun in 1950. In 1954, Tung Ch'un-ts'ai, Vice-Minister of Education, still mentioned the possible shortage of 100,000 secondary school teachers in the next five years.[51] Nine months later, a report from the Ministry of Education stated that, according to plan, the expansion of secondary schools in 1954 would need about 28,000 additional teachers. Yet all the teachers' colleges in China would graduate only 9,600 students in 1954. At the same time the teachers' colleges also had to be expanded, thus absorbing a number of graduates. As a result, the Ministry of Education reported, only about 7,600 new teachers would be available for other assignments.

873 E. Schools for Peasants, Workers, Cadres, and the Illiterate

To give political and technical training to peasants, workers, and other "cadres" is one of the basic principles of the Communists'

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[51] *People's Education*, Jan. 1954, pp. 17-18.

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873 theory of education. A broad program for this purpose was outlined at the All-China Conference on Education for Peasants and Workers by Ch'ien Chün-jui, Vice-Minister of Education, on September 30, 1950.[52] He quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying that, because the peasants and workers constituted over 80 per cent of China's population, they were the main force upon which would depend the transition of Chinese society from "New Democracy" to Socialism. Ch'ien stressed the following points: (1) The most immediate task was to combat illiteracy. (2) The cadres among the peasants and workers must be the first to be educated so that they would provide proper leadership for the masses. (3) This type of education must be fitted to local conditions which might vary from place to place.

[665] No line of demarcation can be clearly drawn between the educational institutions for peasants and workers and those for Party and other government cadres. Altogether these schools form a part of the regular school system. As Ch'eng Fang-wu, former president of the College of the War of Resistance at Yenan, reported in July 1952,[53] the development

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[52] People's Education, May 1951, pp. 12-16.

[53] Ibid., July 1952, p. 6.

873 of this type of education under the Communists could be traced back to Mao Tse-tung's Peasant Movement Institute in Hunan in the early days of the Chinese Communist movement. Later, when the Communists established a stronghold in southern Kiangsi Province, cadre schools were established to train political and military personnel. These institutions were succeeded by the College of the War of Resistance and by the Northern Shensi Institute in Yenan in the 1930's and early 1940's. As the Communist Army occupied North China after World War II, the North China University and the North China People's Revolutionary University were established for cadres training. After 1949, the Chinese People's University emerged in Peking, with 30 per cent of its curriculum devoting to political education and 70 per cent to the specific fields in which the cadre students were specializing.

The first government effort in Southwest China to promote a "study drive" for peasants and workers resulted in registering 350,000 participants in 1951. In the municipality of Chungking, it was reported, over 96 per cent of the workers took part in spare-time studies. In the same year, over 6,000,000 peasants in Southwest China enrolled in "winter schools," and later about 4,000,000 continued their studies by registering in "year-round" peasant schools. Eight schools were established in

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873 various cities in this region, enrolling a total of 2,604 students in 1952; of these students, 200 were graduated and registered in "proletarian accelerated" middle schools.[54] No report is available on the exact number of such middle schools in Southwest China, however, as early as 1950, the Southwest Experimental Proletarian Accelerated Middle School was established; another was established by Szechwan University in Chengtu in 1952.[55]

In the proletarian accelerated secondary schools (see Chart 2),[1] a formal curriculum is pursued. The courses taught there are similar to those in regular secondary schools except that emphasis is placed on technical subjects while anything without direct bearing on farm or factory work is simplified in order to shorten the time of study. In the classes irregularly conducted during the spare-time of the peasants and workers, political study consists of lectures and discussions, using as topics whatever happens to coincide with the most recent official Party propaganda line.

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[54] Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 17-19.

[55] New China Daily, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 3.

[1] [see p. 284 -- Analyst]

823 665 For political cadres, regardless of their own professions, study of Marxian and other Communist theories are required. The Central Committee of the Communist Party periodically issues directives listing the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung to be studied. Chiefs of local Party branches are charged with the responsibility of supervising these studies at weekly meetings.[56]

Classes to teach beginners to read the Chinese language are held separately, but once the students have graduated from these classes they are given the opportunity to advance to higher levels of learning. An attempt is made to raise the academic level of cadres among peasants and workers to that of graduates of regular schools. 873 In a directive issued by the Communist Party on December 24, 1953,[57] it was stated that those who pursued spare-time study at least six hours a week for forty weeks a year, covering the essential courses prescribed for the primary school level by educational authorities, were entitled to enroll in a junior secondary school. Three years of

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[56] A sample list of materials to be studied is found in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 535-36.

[57] Ibid., p. 538.

8B similar spare-time study covering junior secondary school courses would enable students to enroll in senior secondary schools. In this way, any person pursuing studies in his spare-time can eventually complete his education by attending night colleges.

871 The Communist government expressed concern over two aspects of the "proletarian" education program. One was that so far the schools have not been paying sufficient attention to the children of the proletariat, in spite of the fact that more and more children of peasants and workers were reported to be enrolled in schools. The government admitted that in certain schools children from peasant- and worker-families still felt themselves discriminated against, and that the cost of education often hindered the furtherance of their education. The other aspect was the lack of preparation on the part of some of the cadres enrolled in higher level cadre schools.[58] To remedy this situation, educational authorities are now trying to strengthen the spare-time classes by giving refresher courses to deficient students.

~~F.~~ Education for Minority ~~Nationalities~~

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[58] People's Education, Aug. 1953, pp. 31-32.

F. Education for Minority Nationalities

871 563 With the slogan "All the ethnic groups in China are brothers in a big family," the Communists have been encouraging the establishment of a program to provide educational opportunities for minority nationals. Regular schools are encouraged to enroll minority nationals, and special schools have been established for minority groups. Communist statistics asserted that in 1951 there were 9,103 special primary schools (with 943,285 students) and 117 secondary schools (with 45,628 students) throughout China. These figures, it was claimed, increased in 1952 to 10,668 (1,474,244 students) for primary schools, and 182 (90,000 students) for secondary schools.[59] At the end of 1953, the Communists claimed that over 4,000,000 minority nationals were attending schools,[60] and this would mean that one out of every eight minority nationals was attending school.

In Southwest China, three colleges and a number of middle and special technical schools have been established; the total enrollment of these schools in 1951 was 6,800.

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[59] Ibid., March 1954, pp. 40-42.
[60] Ibid., Oct. 1954, p. 35.

871 563 In addition, 130,000 minority nationals attended spare-time schools in the same year. In 1952, the enrollment of regular middle schools and colleges for minority nationalities in Southwest China increased to 10,000. There were also 694 primary schools with 200,000 students.[61] By 1952, the three colleges for minority nationalities had graduated 3,000 students. The special courses arranged for [665] minority cadres had graduated 25,000 students, including 379 women.[62]

871 563 186 The Communists claimed that their policy of providing educational opportunities for minority nationalities had met with warm reception. At the same time, the Communists also admitted difficulties in convincing the minority peoples with their "benevolent" intentions. At Ma-erh-k'ang in western Szechwan Province, the establishment of a primary school at the beginning was eyed by the local people with suspicion. Parents were hesitant to send their children to school for fear that the school was going to take their children away from home. It was after much persuasion that more parents began to let their children attend school, increasing the enrollment from 40 in 1951 to 126 in 1954.[63]

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[61] Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 17-19.

[62] Ibid., pp. 9-10.

[63] Primary School Teacher, Sept. 1954, p. 20.

V. SOME OBSERVATIONS

A. The Character of Communist Education

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Two significant characteristics of the Communist educational system are the degree of specialization found in the school system and the centralization of control over the content of the subjects taught. The measures so far adopted by the Communists in reorganizing the schools, with emphasis on the development of technical institutions, are expedient in view of the urgency of economic reconstruction outlined in the first Five-Year Plan. The centralization of control begins with the indoctrination of the teachers and the centralized publication of textbooks. In other words, every teacher is told what to say and how to say it. To be sure, the Communists have yet to achieve complete uniformity in education in comformity with the Party line, but all possible efforts are made to guard against deviation.

B. Ideological Orientation and Its Effect on the People's Attitudes

The ideological orientation of the Communist educational system can be readily seen from the basic policies and the major movements instituted in Chinese education during the past five years. Through "education" the

876 Communists expect to teach the Chinese people to hate "American imperialism" and to respect the Soviet Union as "the leader in the revolutionary bloc of nations." The social sciences taught in schools are oriented on the basis of Russian socialism, "because China must learn from the Russian revolutionary experiences." In technical courses, Russian technique is singled out as the "advanced model" to be copied. This is particularly observable in institutions of higher learning in North China. Hostility toward all non-Communist traditions and ideals is stressed throughout the country. Any person, Chinese or foreign, who is not sympathetic toward Communism is assumed to be either an actual or a potential enemy and is to be treated as such.

There is a lack of subtlety in the Chinese Communists' attempt to reconcile their theory of patriotism with their pro-Russian propaganda line. When they directed the teachers to abandon the use of English except in foreign language classes, they defended their position by saying that Russian would be taught in certain schools in order to expedite the process of translating certain Russian works into Chinese, but that even this practice would be terminated as soon as the goal was attained.[64] However,

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[64] People's Education, Feb. 1952, p. 7.

876 they failed to specify the time when such practices would cease. Since learning a foreign language is no easy matter, the substitution of Russian for English has been a controversial point and may remain an unresolved issue of the Communist ideological orientation in education.

C. Noted Inadequacies

871 Lack of teachers, as has been noted, will continue to hamper the development of education and the improvement of the standards of the schools. Lack of educational equipment can only be partially solved by improvisations. Lack of financial support for students causes preoccupation with means of livelihood when they should be studying. Above all, the lack of well-trained educational administrators will be the greatest obstacle to the Communists' efforts to achieve progress.

Despite government efforts to run the schools according to a centralized plan, the lack of co-ordination leads to the "piracy of teachers and students." Government agencies in need of technical personnel often call away teachers and students without notifying the school authorities. Although it is not clear if such practices are continuing in Southwest China, the situation was serious enough in 1951 for the Government Administration Council in Peking

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871 to issue an order banning such a practice.[65] Too frequent transfers of teachers in Kweichow Province resulted in the temporary suspension of classes at the Ch'ien-hsi Primary School.[66] Too many government-required extra-curricular activities deprived the students at the First Normal School in Chungking of 65 class-hours in a period of 24 days.[67] Too many extra assignments reduced the effectiveness of the teacher's instruction. One teacher at the Kuan-hsien Primary School in Szechwan Province complained that he had to serve on 13 committees, concerned with problems ranging from the repair of school buildings to dissemination of political propaganda.[68] Multiple control and supervision of school administration tends to confuse the administrators. The School for Iron and Steel Industries in Chungking had to

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[65] *Ibid.*, Aug. 1951, p. 8.

[66] *Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia Ti Kuei-chou* [*Kweichow Under the Communists*], Taipei Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1955, pp. 12-13.

[67] *New China Daily*, Chungking, Jan. 23, 1953, p. 1.

[68] *Ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 2.

871 take orders from six government agencies; as a result the school administration found it difficult to please everybody.[69] According to Southwest China press reports, these were not isolated cases; they reflect the confusion that plagues the entire educational system in China today.

Until adequate officially-approved textbooks become available, the Communists have to resort to translations of Russian works in order to meet temporary needs. Since such translated works have not yet been slanted to the needs of the Chinese, it is doubtful that they will help to improve the educational system of Communist China.

The effort of the government to place college graduates wherever they are needed is undoubtedly required by the Communist plan for economic reconstruction. But even if the graduates are all thoroughly indoctrinated in Communism, there is still no reassurance that dissatisfaction will not grow among those who have been denied the choice of jobs.

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[69] Chu Po-ch'i, *Chung-kung Ti Hsüeh-hsiao Chiao-yü* [*Formal Education in Communist China* Hong Kong, Ya-chou ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 225.

871 In summary, it should be noted that, although the Communists have launched a thorough reorganization of the Chinese educational system, their work is far from accomplished. The attitudes of the many people involved in the system of education can not be quickly changed; hence the renewed effort on the part of the government to root out "bourgeois" and anti-Communist thought among teachers and students. The expedient nature of "accelerated schooling" apparently has had a detrimental effort upon the graduates. According to a Communist report, some students of primary schools spent more than four years in a single grade; in some middle schools about 17 per cent of the students failed; in 1954, 73 per cent of the applicants for engineering department failed in mathematics in the college entrance examination.[70] There is no information available on how the college graduates fared; but it seems reasonable to assume that they could not have done much better.

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[70] People's Education, Jan. 1955, p. 5.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

RELIGION

I. INTRODUCTION

771 Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

[178] With the slow collapse of the traditional
order the effectiveness of government control
of religion diminished. The Western powers,
771 as they gained more and more rights and conces-
648 sions from a weakening China, demanded and

771 got "rights" of religious and missionary
648 activity which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of
771 Western nations. Would not a religion -- a
668 religioned Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive

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[1] Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

771/668 and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged the government's right to control all aspects of public and private life.

771/777 Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of the Western powers which held China in thrall.

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[2] O. Brière, "Les courant philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

[3] O. Brière, op. cit., passim.

771 668 Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the triumph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as the intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church property and the secularization of the clergy. The Communist Constitution provides that "Citizens of the People's Republic of China have freedom of religious belief."[4] This means, in practice, that people of various religious persuasions are allowed a limited and shrinking area of belief and action by an authoritarian government which reserves the fundamental right to control all education, communication, and public and private morality. On the grounds of anti-superstition, anti-imperialism, and anti-feudalism, the government and Party move steadily, with only occasional tactical retreats, towards the liquidation of religion in China.

Both pre-Communist trends and Communist policies should be kept in mind as we consider religion in the Southwest China Region.

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[4] Article 88, Ch. III.

II. BUDDHISM

779 This oldest of imported religions shows,
798 in its recent development, some of the trends just noted. Despite the efforts of the noted abbot Tai Hsü (1889-1946), Buddhism never competed successfully for the allegiance of the intellectuals. The effort to transform it into a modern religion, by updating both its doctrine and its social program, failed, although for a time it seemed to show signs of an increasing vitality. Under warlord and Nationalist governments its personnel and establishments suffered severe attrition. Its establishments were taxed, its temples were converted to secular use by warlords, Kuomintang officials, and the local gentry. Much Buddhist property was confiscated, and tenants on Buddhist land refused to pay their rent. Monks and nuns were driven from their temples in the cities where up to 80 per cent of Buddhist establishments were converted to use as schools, barracks, and police stations.[5]

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[5] Cf. Wing-tsit Chan, Religious Trends in Modern China, New York, 1953, pp. 55-56. This summary is from Ta-hsing, "Fifteen Years of Religious Catastrophes in Retrospect," Hai-ch'ao-yin magazine, Vol. XVI, No. 1, Jan. 1935.

779 The Japanese attempt to use Buddhism as an ideology to bind together their puppet regimes in China and Southeast Asia generated widespread anti-Buddhist sentiment throughout Free and Occupied China.

779 792 The older clergy of monks and nuns was accused of being corrupt and parastic by modern Buddhists, but efforts at sweeping fundamental reform failed; the motivation for becoming a member of such a clergy remained largely negative.[6] Thus gradual extinction of

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[6] Chan, Religious Trends, pp. 81-82, citing Reichelt, Truth and Tradition in Chinese Buddhism, pp. 231-34, lists reasons given by Chinese nuns for entering holy orders. Unhappy marriages account for a great number, and 60 to 70 per cent made the choice because no other solution presented itself. Other reasons for entering holy orders include: genuine and deep faith; presented to the church by parents because of devotion, sickness, lack of support, or an astrologer's advice; sense of helplessness after husband's death; poverty, family troubles or other disappointments; influence of sisters, et al, who had become nuns; and servants seeking escape from the cruelty of their mistresses.

791 the Buddhist order seemed only a matter of time. 792 But as late as 1930, the Buddhist clergy and establishments in Southwest China were numerous, especially in the rich and populous province of Szechwan.[7]

Provinces	Buddhist Clergy	Temples, Monasteries and Nunneries
Szechwan	158,610	39,089
Yunnan	37,180	9,920
Kweichow	720	410

It is not possible to trace the decline from 1930 onward, but the pressures of war and invasion added to those noted above probably contributed to a sharp reduction of boty clergy and establishments in this area. Communist measures have probably eliminated most of what remained. Buddhist establishments in China as a whole appear to have declined in number from 268,494 in 1930[8] to about 130,000 in 1947[9] to "less than 100" in 1954.[10]

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[7] Shen-pao Nien-chien [Shen-pao Yearbook], 1933, p. T2.

[8] Ibid., Basis of figures is data collected by the China Buddhist Association.

[9] [see following page]

779 792 Estimates on the total number[11] of clergy vary, but in 1931 they appear to have numbered 500,000 to 600,000. Refugees in 1949-50 reported that four out of every seven clerics had been forced to return to lay life.[12] By 1954 it was estimated that there were only 2,500 clergy remaining in the whole of China, "of which half are Chinese Communist Party agents."[13] Even allowing for exaggeration, it would appear that the Buddhist clergy as a group has been nearly eliminated and that its dwindling influence in society has reached the vanishing point.

779 While the traditional clergy was in decline, Buddhist laymen assisted by a few monks attempted the reinvigoration of the Chinese Buddhist community. The leadership of the movement

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9. Communist Atrocities and Persecutions of Buddhism on the China Mainland, (a four-page pamphlet), Buddhist Association of China, Taiwan, 1954; hereinafter cited as Atrocities.
10. Ibid.
11. Chan, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
12. Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91.
13. Atrocities.

[redacted]

779 was largely from the East China Region. In the Southwest, Szechwan was an important secondary center. Modern-minded Buddhists felt that a lesson could be learned from Protestantism in the West: that an entrenched clergy could not be the instrument of sweeping reform. Hence their efforts were concentrated on building lay organizations of various kinds: social welfare organizations such as the YMBA and YWBA patterned on the YMCA and YWCA, Buddhist schools and seminaries to train a modern clergy, and research centers for the re-evaluation of the Buddhist heritage. They attempted to reach out and join hands with Buddhists in other Asiatic countries, and good-will tours and conferences were organized. Buddhist writing and publishing were encouraged.[14]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, founded in 1914 to oppose the effort to make Confucianism a state religion, continued as

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[14] Chan, op. cit., pp. 1-62, points out that 537 Buddhist works and 58 Buddhist periodicals were published in the years 1920-35 in all parts of China. Most of the periodicals were short-lived.

979 the main organization of Chinese Buddhists. It claimed 4,620,000 members in 1947, but its organization was loose and weak; it included heterogeneous components: Buddhist philosophers, simple believers, reformist clergy and many of the old clergy, nationalists, internationalists, and Japan-oriented pan-Asians. The great abbot Tai-hsü, master monk-politician, tried to weld these elements into a strong, effective, and enduring organization which could formulate an attractive, long-range program and defend Buddhism against attack. But he ultimately failed, and the Buddhists of China had not the means to defend themselves against Kuomintang pressure; when the Communists came, the Buddhists had a stronger adversary and neither the means nor the spirit to resist. Some residue of the modern Buddhist movement may be found in the Southwest, perhaps only in Szechwan. The following is a breakdown, by provinces, of the number of Buddhist believers claimed in 1930 by the China Buddhist Association. The second column gives the number of modern type Buddhist organizations such as schools, translation and publication societies, missionary societies, etc.[15]

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[15] Shen-pao Yearbook, 1933, p. T2.

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Szechwan	490,700	190
Yunnan	36,130	1
Kweichow	2,730	17

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668 Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped in Chungking and elsewhere, and publishing houses closed. The Han-Tibetan College in Chungking, along with other Buddhist colleges, has been closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[1] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders.[17] Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend

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16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

17. According to Buddhism in China, Peking, Nationalities Publishing House, 1955, p. 2, the effective date of organization was June 1953, when 93 persons representing "the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen of different nationalities and Buddhist schools of the various regions" were elected to serve as its board of directors.

779 their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, 668 and manipulated by the state and the Party. In China's relations with the Buddhist countries of Asia, it will be used as a propaganda device to allay their fear that China is an enemy of Buddhism; it will also be used to "soothe" and control Buddhist populations in Mongolia, the former Sikang province, and Tibet.[18] Domestically, the new association, like all others in Communist China, will be used primarily for the indoctrination and control of its members. As early as May 1951, a central committeeman of the Party outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[19]

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18. The Dalai Lama, the Panchen Ngoerhtehni, the Chagan Kogen of Inner Mongolia, and the Venerable Hsu Yun have been chosen as honorary presidents of the Buddhist Association. Cf., Buddhism in China, p. 20. A photograph in the same volume shows an encampment of Tibetan tribesman in Sikang listening to a lama's sermon. Another shows a Southern Buddhist temple in the Tai Autononous area in Yunnan.

19. Richard Walker, China Under Communism, New Haven, 1955, pp. 188-89.

779 In the principal cities, especially those visited by delegations from Buddhist countries like Burma and Ceylon, a few temples are maintained for religious use. But the greatest number of temples have been converted for use by the state. One source, admittedly strongly biased, asserts that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1, in Shanghai from 600 to 2, and in Hangchow from 300 to 1.[20] Certain Buddhist monuments of historical and cultural importance are being restored and preserved.[21]

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792 As we have pointed out, the clergy has been largely secularized. In Shanghai, as in other cities, monks have opened restaurants specializing in Buddhist dishes. Everywhere the clergy has converted temples into small factories in order to produce hand-made articles. Monks of the Fa-tsang temple in Shanghai now work on

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20. Atrocities.
21. Buddhism in China, introduction and plates.

779 nearby farms. In Hangchow, some 1,800
772 monks and nuns have opened restaurants or are working in mills and on farms; they have established an association in order to co-ordinate their enterprises.[22] We have few details on the fate of the Buddhist clergy in the Southwest.

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778 There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birth day.[23] But the general impression is that Buddhism is dying. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed under the present regime. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern religious community, has turned to other pursuits. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer

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[22] Chan, op. cit., pp. 90-91. Based on testimony of refugees, 1950.

[23] New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, 1058, p. 48; also photograph of the ceremony of "Bathing the Buddha" on May 20, 1953, in Buddhism in China.

779 to resist totalitarianism or the trend of the
178 times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[24]

III. TAOISM

779 Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purposes to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism

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[24] The outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religious, and social work -- the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. also, Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in *China Reconstructs*, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

779 as an organized religion; the other is Taoism as a folk religion at the village level.[25] The Taoist religion developed as a reaction to the challenge of the imported faith of Buddhism. It borrowed extensively from its alien rival; its scriptures, its clerical hierarchy and organization, its rituals, its heavens and hells were often scarcely disguised copies of those of Buddhism. Its decline over the last five-hundred years has been slow but steady; in recent years its decline has accelerated. Some aspects of this should be noted. Intellectual vitality has long since disappeared, and there was little doctrine on which to base a modern revival of the religion. The priesthood, divided between northern and southern sects, was largely locally recruited; there was no central control exercised by the hereditary "Heavenly Teachers" (*T'ien-shih*) of the two sects, and the monks gained the reputation of being idle and corrupt. If their way of life was hardly inspiring, their practical function no longer involved spiritual leadership but only astrological and magical performances for those of the population who might still believe

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25. The residue of philosophic Taoism is dealt within the chapter on Basic Attitudes in this handbook.

in them.[26] The last "Heavenly Master" of the Southern School was driven from his headquarters in Kiangsi by the Communists in 1927; in 1949 he was again a refugee in Macao and had "decided that it was time for him to buy some books to read."[27] The last abbot of the headquarters of the Northern School, the Po-yün-kuan at Peking, was burned alive by his fellow monks in 1947 when his corruption became too flagrant; the Nationalist Government then confiscated the lands which had long supported the Po-yün-kuan.

Religious Taoism has not had the inspiration or the leadership to develop modern doctrines and programs as Buddhism and Islam have done. There was an abortive effort at a national Taoist association in the years 1912-15,[28] but this was not accompanied by any rallying of believers, nor was it followed by

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[26] Chan, op. cit., pp. 146-52.

[27] Ibid., p. 152. Another source says that he was "deposed" by Chinese Nationalist troops in 1927. Cf. Ch'en Hung-shun, "The Taoist Press in China" in Rudolf Lowenthal, ed. The Religious Periodical Press in China, Peking, 1940, p. 167.

[28] Shina mondai jiten [Encyclopedia of China Problems], Tokyo, 1942, pp. 416-17.

779 the development of any social, educational, or medical program. (Efforts along these lines proved abortive.) Taoist temples have been steadily secularized, and the Communist will complete this process. The Communists them-
779 selves recognize that "Religious Taoism" is
668 dead. In 1949, when bidding for the support of religious groups, they invited representatives of Buddhism, Protestantism, and Islam to the People's Political Consultative Conference but no representative of Taoism.[29]

779 Folk Taoism in the present study includes all of the local cults and practices that have, for millenia, been characteristic of the villages of China. Organized Taoism in many respects, simply magnified and encompassed a wide variety of folk cults, giving this amalgam some of the trappings of an organized "religion." Folk Taoism, like organized Taoism, has been in a long slow decline. The gods of its pantheon have been increasingly neglected; the shrines and temples in the towns and villages have fallen into neglect. The arrival of modern school teachers, the appearance, even occasional, of effective modern doctors have steadily undermined belief in the efficacy of magic, alchemy,

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29. Chan, op. cit., p. 146.

779 and charms. The City God, tutelary deity of an urban center, is no longer enshrined and worshipped; in many villages the god of grain no longer has his altar.[30] One sample survey showed that in the early 1930's, 58 per cent of the folk shrines were no longer being used for their original purpose;[31] the decline in the last twenty-five years has been accelerated. It should be noted that many of the folk cults of Yunnan and Kweichow are of local origin and do not share the common characteristics of the folk Taoism of the old settled provinces.

798 In the case of folk Taoism, and other local cults, the Communists have moved to bring to an end a complex of ancient practices that had long been dying out. Their method has been a campaign against superstition, a campaign carried out with all of the many devices of propaganda and pressure which are described elsewhere in this volume. It may be sufficient here to point out a few typical methods of attack on folk religion. In a rhymed indoctrination text for women we find exhortations to stay

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[30] Cf., Chan, op. cit., p. 145, for an excellent summary of their development.

[31] C.S. Braden, Modern Tendencies in World Religions, New York, 1933, p. 113, as cited in Chan, op. cit., p. 145.

798 away from local witch doctors and, when ill, to consult a physician. And they are warned not to believe in prayer to the images of some divinity, "for these are only of mud and[32] lacquer." At all levels of education and in the annual cycles of "campaigns," such as the Patriotic Hygiene Movement, and the Resist-America-Aid Korea Movement, reference is made to the false and debilitating character of the old beliefs, which are held to be "feudal," "unscientific," "reactionary," etc. It is doubtful that the remnants of folk religion -- in recent years the resort only of the aged and the ignorant -- will long survive the campaigns being waged against them.

575 Another Taoist-linked institution is the secret society. These organizations have traditionally drawn their rituals, liturgies, doctrines, and patron deities from religious and folk Taoism. They have had a variety of social and political functions: they provide, especially in times of disorder, a closely knit confraternity from which the member can draw help and security. They offer a focus of social and religious life particularly appealing to those who travel beyond the limits of their local kinship groups. Throughout the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), many secret societies had a

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32. Fu-nü San-tzu Ching [The Three-character Classic for Women], Shanghai, Hsin-hua, 1950, passim.

575 strong political function as a focus of anti-dynastic and anti-official sentiment and activity; they made a notable contribution to the victory of the republicans in 1911. Yet Sun Yat-sen found them unmanageable political allies, and by 1930 Chiang Kai-shek -- despite whatever support he may have derived from them in his seizure of power in 1927 -- began to campaign against them.[33] This was interrupted by his campaigns against the Communists and his preparations to resist the Japanese.

575 668 The Communist regime obviously will not tolerate any such closed, self-supporting, potentially subversive groups, and a series of campaigns has been carried out against them. At the end of a major drive in 1953, P'eng Chen reported that "four million duped members had withdrawn from these reactionary sects and societies and that the battle was essentially won."[34] That his claims of victory were premature is suggested by a recent report of the dissolution of five secret society

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[33] Cf. B. Favre, Les Sociétés Secrètes en Chine, Paris, 1933, p. 177.

[34] NCNA dispatch of Sept. 18, 1953, quoted in Walker, China Under Communism, p. 189.

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575 668 organizations in the vicinity of Kalgan. The report accused the societies of elaborate clandestine organizations, hidden headquarters, an elaborate hierarchy of leadership, and efforts to infiltrate Communist organizations.[35] (The societies' power of resistance are discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

575 Secret societies have been particularly numerous and powerful in North China, but those which have had important followings in Southwest China might be mentioned here:

1. Hung-chiang hui. The Society of Redspears, an offshoot of Pai-lien chiao, the White Lotus Society. Once powerful in the north, since 1924 it has been active in Kiangsu, Hupeh, Hunan, and -- in Southwest China -- in Szechwan.[36]

2. Ko-lao hui. The Society of the Elders. It is somewhat more religious than other societies, has a history of resistance to government. Founded in Fukien, has been

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[35] NCNA, June 16, 1955; SCMP, 1078, June 28, 1955, pp. 27-28.

[36] Chan, op. cit., pp. 158-59; Encyclopedia of China Problems, p. 480.

particularly in Central, North, and West China. It is "the most extensive, well-organized, and influential of China's secret societies."[37]

3. I-kuan Tao. The Way of Pervading Unity. Founded soon after the 1911 Revolution, grew rapidly from 1928 on. It gained strength and extended its activities during World War II, especially in Japanese-occupied areas. It was ordered suppressed by the National Government, but its activities have continued and spread.[38] Apparently radiating from a center in Shensi, I-kuan tao groups were formed throughout the Southwest.[39] The society was mentioned in connection with three counter-revolutionary cases in Chungking[40] and was reported active in Yunnan and Kweichow in the Spring and Summer of 1955.[41] This secret society has apparently been resourceful in surviving the concerted and severe attacks of the Communist government.[42]

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[37] Ibid., pp. 160-61.

[38] Ibid., pp. 166-67; Willem Grootaers, "Une société secrète moderne, I-kuan Tao, bibliographie annotée," Folklore Studies, Vol. V, 1946, pp. 316-52.

[39] JMJP, June 5, 1951, p. 3, identified eight sub-groups operating in the Southwest.

[40] JMJP, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 3.

[41] Cf. SCMP, No. 1001, March 5-7, 1955, [see following page]

IV. MOHAMMEDANISM

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563 Islam was introduced into China, not by missionaries but by immigrants arriving overland from the west and northwest and by sea to Canton; they have since spread until there are some in every province, although the highest concentration is in the northwest and southwest. Since their ancestors were immigrants, the Mohammedans have been treated by Chinese governments as both an ethnic minority and a religious group. (Hence, cf. the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Adherents have tended to live in separate communities, their mores and customs governed by religious law rather than by the laws and customs of China. Not only did Islam prescribe for the believer a different way of life from that of the Chinese, it also had international connections and a tradition of militancy. These aspects of Mohammedanism made their communities in China the object of government distrust, and governments in modern times have alternated between policies of suppression and of appeasement.

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41. (continued) p. 3, and *JMJP*, July 7, 1955, p. 3.

42. The account of the suppression of I-kuan tao and other secret societies in the Kalgan area includes details of their considerable resourcefulness. Cf. *SCMP*, No. 1078, pp. 27-28.

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563 The Chinese Mohammedan is set apart from other Chinese by such special customs and observances as these: many greetings are exchanged in Arabic or Persian; believers wear white headdresses resembling turbans; they abstain from alcohol and pork; marriage and funeral rites are different from the Chinese, e.g., they do not use coffins in burial. Traditionally, they seldom engage in farming but rather in certain occupations which in some areas they virtually monopolize: keeping inns and organizaing caravans, butchering leather working, metal-work, or managing shops which deal in curios and jewelry. Because of oppression and a strong sense of religious community, they tend to live in special districts or streets. They have been more inclined towards athletics and military careers than the Chinese.[43]

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563 The Moslem sector of a city or the Moslem village community centers on its mosque presided over by its Iman, usually elected from among senior leaders; the Imam and the elders invite an Ahung who preaches, settles disputes,

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[43] Chan, op. cit., p. 6; Encyclopedia of China Problems, pp. 421-22.

779 interprets Islamic law, and presides at
563 ceremonies.[44] The Ahung is usually versed in
794 Arabic, although until very recently few had any direct contact with major centers of Islam in the Near East.

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563 In the Southwest China, Mohammedan communities are found in all provinces, but by far the highest concentration is in the province of Yunnan where tension and conflict between Han-Chinese and the Moslems has been endemic in modern times. The following table indicates the provincial distribution of believers and religious establishments (probably places of worship rather than Islamic schools or any such institutions) throughout the region as of 1938.[45] Population estimates for the same period are added to suggest the proportion of Moslems in the total population. The source of the Moslem figures gives the total number of Moslems in China as more than 48,000,000, a figure that some scholars regard as far too high.[46]

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[44] Chan, op. cit., p. 189; Encyclopedia of China Problems.

[45] Chung-kuo Nien-chien [Chinese Yearbook], 1948, pp. 126-27.

[46] Cf. the admirable summary of the statistical argument in Chan, op. cit., pp. 187-88. Chan, p. 188, note 12, cites the leading Chinese Mohammaden scholar Pai-Shou-i's estimate of between 30 and 40 million Moslems in China. The picture publication Chinese Moslems, Peking, the Foreign Languages Press, 1955, gives the figure 10 million.

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Province	Pop. in Millions	Moslems	Mosques
Szechwan	48.	2,615,330	2,279
Yunnan	15.	4,567,290	3,971
Kweichow	14.3	519,160	449

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668 Islam in modern times has manifested some of the tendencies which Buddhism showed under the impact of various modernizing forces. One of these was the tendency for lay leaders to rise in influence over the Ahung. Another was the foundation of a Chinese Islamic Association in 1912 to represent the interests of all Chinese Moslems, to work for social reform, and to foster closer relations between Moslems and non-Moslems. It claimed 3,000 branches by 1923. Its successors participated in the resistance against Japan, sponsored students abroad and the importation of modern scholars of the Koran from other countries, and developed young men's associations and medical services.[47] The total effect of this activity was to foster a trend to liberality and modernity. It served also to identify the Chinese Moslems with the national aspirations of other Chinese.

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47. Cf. Chan *op. cit.*, pp. 190-91.

779 As the Chinese Moslems came out of
795 isolation and into contact with the rest of Islam and with modern culture generally, there was a considerable difference of view as to the perpetuation of Islam in China. Visits to Mecca in the 1780's had impressed some Chinese Moslem with how far, in their long isolation, they had diverged from orthodox practices. This experience led to the foundation of the New Sect, which stressed return to pure and orthodox Islamic practices. They were resisted by the Old Sect, which favored holding to the customary ways developed in China through the centuries. A new New Sect (Tsan-hsin chiao) was founded by Ma Fu-ch'u (1794-1874) of Yunnan Province, and this sect, emphasizing religious ethics, the spirit rather than the letter of scripture, and modernism in dress, has recently been strong along the coast of China and has spread to modern cultural centers.[48]

779 Chinese Mohammedans, in their moves
563 towards modernism, came to accept the Chinese
873 translation of the Koran, hitherto only in the sacred language of Arabic. They had, by 1936, opened eleven high schools for Moslem children, and they began to send students abroad to foreign centers of Islamic learning. Yunnan

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[48] Ibid., pp. 192-94.

779 Province led in this movement; in 1937,
563 eighteen Chinese students were sent to Egypt,
873 and half of these were from Yunnan. By 1930,
the Islamic Theological College attached to the Chungking mosque had been in operation five years, and the Chinese Islamic Association had set up or co-ordinated two hundred primary schools and twenty high schools.[49] Yet the spread of modern type education was handicapped by the poverty of the Moslem communities and by religious prejudice against Chinese learning. For example Shantien, in Yunnan, was the outstanding Islamic cultural center in China and sent more students abroad than any other town; yet in 1949 it had a population of only 5,000, of which two were college graduates and "some thirty" high school graduates; it had one grade school with 360 students but no high school.[50]

779 What have been Chinese Communist policies
668 toward the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem
that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The

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[49] Ibid., pp. 198-201.

[50] Ibid., p. 200.

771 668 policies adopted towards major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: An All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before[51] liberation. This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

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51. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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668 The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[52]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech of Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

> "...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[53]

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[52] SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

[53] NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

779 The Chinese Communists' policy
668 towards the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems."[54] Selections from the works of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not read Chinese; probably these translations will be used in Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities such as Canton, Shanghai, and Peking have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to Moslem visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

779 We have little detailed and reliable
563 information on the Islamic communities of the

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[54] Chinese Moslems, introduction.

779 Southwest today. But some trends should be
563 noted. The education of Islamic youth, although
special Moslem schools have been set up by the
government, will be in the pattern ordained by
the goverment, and the youth will tend in time
to become more Communist than Moslem.[55]
Secondly, the break-up of the closely knit
communities in the Southwest will probably
779 proceed apace. The Communist government
563 boasts of the increasing number of Moslem youth
177 now classified as "workers";[56] this means
integration of the youth into new state-ordained
patterns of activity in factories and workers
organizations; it means that they will slowly
be alienated from their parents' values as
well as from their parents' occupational roles.
Thirdly, as Moslems increasingly share in
government and social activities, there will
be less inclination on their part towards a
defensive separatism; it is claimed, for
example that 72 Moslems have been deputies
to Shanghai municipal and *chü* congresses,
and token participation tends to bring them into
new orbits of activity.[57] Among the 29,000

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[55] A NCNA dispatch of June 9, 1955 states that there are five primary and one middle school for Moslems in Shanghai and that 90 per cent of the students have received free or reduced tuition.

[56] NCNA, Peking, June 10, 1955; *SCMP*, 1067, p. 23.

[57] *Ibid.*

779 Moslems in Shanghai, measures have allegedly
563 been taken to provide for their special
177 religious dietary needs,[58] and there are references to special food shipments for Ramadan. Such measures would tend to reduce initial suspicion and resistance among the Moslems and, in the long run, to make integration easier. The processes of Communization, secularization, and integration will probably advance less rapidly in a strongly Moslem province such as Yunnan than in the provinces of North China and the Yangtze valley. The measures we have noted plus the activity of the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of Communist government, will ultimately do more to reduce the age-old separatism and resistance of Islam than the measures of earlier Chinese governments.

V. CATHOLICISM

779 The older of the two Christian faiths in
797 China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational experience. It is, in China as elsewhere, resourceful, flexible, and highly disciplined. In modern China, Catholicism has repeatedly come under nationalistic attack

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[58] *Ibid.*

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779 because of its foreign support and its allegiance
797 to Rome. The church has countered these attacks in a variety of ways: it has encouraged the Sinicization of Church symbols, e.g., the Virgin is portrayed as a Chinese woman in Chinese dress; it has given its foreign missionaries a more thorough grounding in Chinese language and culture, so that the best of them, wearing Chinese scholars' gowns as habits, speaking excellent Chinese, can make their way successfully in any stratum of Chinese society. The
793 most striking response to nationalistic attacks has been the increasing use of Chinese priests throughout the hierarchy. This is part of worldwide policies in any age of rising nationalism. The following figures indicate the dimensions of the change since 1900:[59]

	Chinese Catholics	Foreign Priests	Native Priests
1900	700,000	1,375	471
1948	3,275,000	3,015	2,676

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59. Jean Monsterleet, S.J., Les Martyrs de Chine parlent: L'Empire de Mao Tse-tung contre l'Eglise duChrist, Paris, 1953, p. 32; hereinafter cited as Monsterleet.

[redacted]

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793 797 This process of replacing foreign clergy with Chinese clergy has made greatest progress in the older Catholic areas in North and Central China, the least in such provinces as Kweichow and Kwangsi. There are 144 dioceses or apostolic prefectures, and 29 of these, in the major cultural and commercial centers, are administered by Chinese prelates.[60] The elevation of a Chinese priest to the College of Cardinals in 1946 was a striking symbol of the Church's intention to advance the process of Sinicization.

873 797 Catholic cultural and educational activities have played an important role in the advance of the Church. Schools, colleges and universities have, on the one hand, made it possible for the youth of Chinese Catholic families to have a complete modern education under Church auspices and control; on the other, the colleges and universities have given the clergy a chance to win over non-Catholic youth enrolled as students. Catholic scientific and cultural research, such as that carried on at the famous Zikawei Observatory near Shanghai, make it clea that the Church and modern science are not in direct opposition to one another.

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[60] Ibid.

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797 The situation in 1945-46 was encouraging to Chinese and foreign Catholics. The clergy was being rapidly Sinicized, charitable work was going forward, Catholic educational institutions were full. Native and foreign clergy had gained approval for their work in the war of resistance against Japan. At the same time there were developments which, especially in the light of later events, promised trouble to the Church. The exchange of [648] envoys between the Vatican and the Nationalist Government took place in 1946; that Bishop Paul Yu-pin was widely believed to have strong influence with the Nationalist Government, boded ill for the Church when the government declined in power. As the Communist power increased, 668 798 797 779 the persecution of the Church, begun in Communist area in 1937, was a grim warning of what might be in store for Chinese Catholicism as a whole.[61] Catholic Action, the association of enthusiastic laymen for the advancement of the Faith, had been growing in all parts of the country from 1928 onward; there were

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[61] Cf. Raymonde de Jaegher and I. Corbally Kuhn, Tempête sur la Chine, Paris, 1953.

668 two-hundred adult groups and thirty youth
798 groups as early as 1930.[62] In 1948 the Papal
797 Nuncio ordered the formation of the Legion
779 of Mary, a more militant, zealous, and disciplined organization of Catholic laymen, which in many areas absorbed the Catholic Action groups. The new organization was set up by an American priest, and it had the Chinese name of Sheng-mu chün, Army, or Legion, of Mary. Many experienced Catholic missionaries were doubtful if any strong Chinese government would tolerate this type of militant organization. The group has proved of major propaganda value to the Communists and an object of their most ruthless measures of oppression.[63]

798 Communist policies and propaganda have
797 made the most of all the vulnerabilities of the
779 Chinese Catholic Church. Its foreign "imperialist" and Kuomintang connections were played

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[62] Monsterleet, p. 148. It seems to have had much less strength in the Southwest than in the major cultural and commercial centers. Cf. Monsterleet, pp. 32-33.

[63] Cf., Hsü, Hsin-Chung-kuo ti tsung-chiao ko-hsin yü-tung [The Movement for Religious Reformation in New China], Shanghai, 1951, pp. 9-13. Hereafter cited as Hsü.

798 up, and nationalistic feelings against it were
797 aroused. Its role as property owner --
779 "foreign capitalist-imperialist oppression" --
was dramatized during the land reform period, and local ignorance and hatred turned against it.[64] Old and long discredited accusations were made against Catholic charitable organizations: the Sacred Heart Home for Children in Nanking was labeled a "little Buchenwald" and the sisters were accused of torturing, neglecting, and selling Chinese children.[65] The war in Korea provided the occasion for an increasing number of accusations of espionage against Catholic clergy.

Communist government measures have been many, but the main steps resemble those taken against other religious groups. The 1950 campaign for "triple independence" or "triple autonomy" involved freedom from foreign administration, financing, and evangelistic policy control. This was given emotional significance by the warfare in Korea, with the Communists' well-managed propaganda campaigns against imperialism and

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64. Cf. the dramatic eyewitness account of F. Legrand, Le Communisme arrive au village Chinois, Peking, 1947. This observation was made before the nationwide land reform campaign.

65. Cf. Walker, China Under Communism, [see following page]

799 espionage.[66]

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779 In 1951 the campaign against the Church was accelerated. All Catholic schools and universities and many hospitals and churches were confiscated. Priests were "tried" and imprisoned, and the Papal Nuncio was expelled from China.[67]

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779 The next step in the campaign against Catholicism resembled the policy followed in Russia and in the East European satellites. This was the foundation by the Communists of a "national church" whose guiding spirits were a small minority of disaffected clergy and laymen. This group was constituted as the "Committee of the Reform Church." It was not subject to episcopal or pontifical directives. The group was to decide what was to be taught, who could say mass or give the sacraments; and it advocated "progressive," i.e., orthodox Communist teaching. Under its sponsorship certain "model parishes" were set up with "progressive" priests in charge.

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65. (continued) p. 190. Such accusations recall the stories circulated by the gentry which touched off the Tientsin massacre of Chinese Catholics and foreigners in 1870.

[66] Monsterleet, pp. 25-29.

[67] Ibid., p. 28.

798 Apparently this organization has had only limited
795 success. Monsterleet estimates that only 2
797 per cent went over to the "reform church";
779 many openly proclaim their faith; some died as
martyrs.[68]

798 From October 1952 on there was less
797 persecution of Catholics, although between
January 1951 and November 1953 the number
779 of missionaries was reduced through expulsion
from 3,222 to 364.[69]

797 Catholic missionary and organizational
work came rather late to the Southwest, and this
area has not been served by any of the great
missionary orders that have had a long-term
impact on areas in north and central China.
Few if any of the dioceses were under Chinese
bishops, and the two provinces of Kiangsi and
Kweichow together had fewer Catholic clergy
797 than the diocese of Peking alone.[70] Another
204 index of the relative weakness of Catholicism
in the southwest is the number of Catholic periodicals in the area; as of 1938 the three provinces

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[68] Monsterleet, p. 29. It should be emphasized that these figures are given by a Catholic author.

[69] Mission Bulletin, April 1952, p. 323, *and Jan. 1954, p. 56; cited in Walker, op. cit.* p. 189.

[70] Monsterleet, pp. 32-33.

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204 of the region had a total of 9 periodicals, while the province of Hopei alone had 40.[71] The following table indicates the number of Catholics and the distribution of Catholic centers in the Southwest:[72]

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[71] Cf. R. Lowenthal, The Religious Periodical Press in China, Peking, 1940, p. 8.

[72] Figures on Catholics are from Annuaire des missions catholiques de Chine 1939, Shanghai, 1939. Distribution of Catholic centers from Monsterleet, pp. 16-17.

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Province	Pop. in Millions	Catholics	Metropolitan Bishoprics	Suffragan Dioceses
Szechwan	53	176,772	Chungking	Chengtu Shun-ch'ing (Nan-ch'ung) Wanhsien Chia-ting I-pin K'ang-ting Hsi-ch'ang (Ning-yüan)
Yunnan	15.	19,999	Kunming	none
Kweichow	14.3	36,866	Kweiyang	none

798 Government and Party moves against the
797 Catholic communities of the Southwest followed the general pattern outlined above. The bishops of K'ang-ting and I-pin, Szechwan, were seized, imprisoned, and tortured in 1951. They were accused of espionage, of recruiting for the Legion of Mary, of sabotaging the movement for "triple autonomy," etc. At the end of 1952 in K'ang-ting, the bishop had been expelled from China, six Chinese priests were in prison, and only two were allowed a limited freedom. Thirty Catholics were in prison; the Franciscan lay missionary brothers were dispersed; the hospital, the orphanages, the leprosarium had been taken over by the Communists.[73] From this and other reports from the Southwest it would appear that the Communists have destroyed a great deal of the young and weak Catholic organization in these provinces. The missionaries returning from this area are generally more pessimistic about the future of Catholicism in China than those returning from areas where the church is better established. Commenting on the situation in Szechwan in July 1952, an authoritative Catholic journal said that there was not a single foreign missionary active in the entire province and

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[73] Monsterleet, pp. 44-45.

798 only four in prison. In the dioceses under the
797 Foreign Missionary Fathers of Paris, and in those in the charge of native clerics, the situation was appaling; the visible hierarchy of the church had disappeared or had been completely neutralized; the faithful deprived of organization and supervision, were left to shift for themselves.[74]

There was a respite from persecution from the Autumn of 1952 onward, though it is doubtful that this permitted any arrival of Catholicism in the Southwest. Churches in Shanghai were well attended, and although missionaries and native priests were continually harassed, they went on with their work. A group of British residents who left Shanghai in November 1955 testified that "Church attendance... has remained large, and Roman Catholic churches, in particular, are said to be jammed at all masses."[75] But the following month the Bishop of Shanghai and his "principal accomplices" were arrested and charged with "plotting a counterrevolutionary uprising." It seemed likely that another wave of persecution was rising in

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[74] Bulletin de la Société des Missions Etrangères de Paris, quoted in Monsterleet, pp. 211-12.

[75] New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

798 Shanghai and elsewhere.[76] It might well lead to
797 the extinction of the church in areas such as the Southwest when its situation was already desperate.

The Church in China obviously faces further trials. The fundamental question is how can the church resist a totalitarian state and gain converts when conversion brings political and social sanctions against them? Father Greene, who witnesses the persecution in Kwangsi, sounds a sombre note of warning, He is speaking of the cadres:

> "It was impossible for me, as I watched these well-trained youths perform their inhuman tasks, to minimize the seriousness of their convictions and the thoroughness of their methods. These convictions were deeply impressed on their minds.... The new ideas and strange thoughts are unconditionally accepted by the young, and accepted with a fanaticism which fears neither suffering, hardship

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[76] New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, U.P. dispatch dateline London, Dec. 10; China News Analysis, Hong Kong, 105, p. 1. No details of action taken outside of Shanghai are given.

> 798 797 nor death. I saw shy youths changed into courageous apostles; I saw the ambitious and selfish give up their goals and possessions; I saw some of my Christian youth break the bonds of family and friendship for this Cause."77

The basic question is whether the harrassed and persecuted Church can find the means to give its own youth these qualities. If it can not, its future throughout China is dark indeed.

VI. PROTESTANTISM

177 779 797 In many respects the Protestant missionaries and their converts set the pattern for the modernizing movements which took place in Buddhism and Islam. Protestant religious work in the twentieth century came to be accompanied by wide-spread, diverse, and large-scale social service, medical, and educational activities. The Protestant missionaries helped to awaken the social conscience of the Chinese, and the missions were major centers for the dissemination of general knowledge about the West. Sun Yat-sen was a devout Christian, and Christian thought left its mark on much of his work. As pioneers

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77. Robert W. Greene, Calvary in China, New York, 1953, pp. 76-77.

177 in medical education, in many fields of
779 technical education, in women's education, and
797 in many other spheres, the Protestants made
striking contributions to the dissolution of the traditional order in China. But it was beyond their powers to replace that order with a Christian democratic society. And they failed also to forge an effective instrument to work for that end: a disciplined, independent, vigorous body of Chinese Protestants.

797 Protestant missions began in the ports of
779 the China coast that were gradually opened up
after China's successive defeats by the Western powers. The rights of residence, travel, and property ownership for both Catholic and Protestant churches were exacted in the successive treaties which China was forced to sign. This background of, as it were, forced entry into China has handicapped Christianity in China in two important respects: as the tide of nationalistic sentiment rose, anti-Christian movements invariably accompanied anti-foreign and nationalistic manifestations. Secondly, the decades of foreign protection and foreign support prevented the Christian churches -- the Protestant perhaps more than the Catholic -- from developing their own means of self-support and their own mechanisms of survival in times of political upheaval.

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779 Protestantism has suffered from its own sectarianism. A rational division of Christian effort was usually impossible when Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians and innumerable small sects were at odds with one another and brought diverse and conflicting interpretations of Christianity to the Chinese.[78]

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[78] There were 66 different Protestant missionary societies in China in 1906. By 1919 there were 130 different societies, groups, and other missionary organizations. Cf. Pr. Damboriena, "Les Missions Protestantes en Chine" Bulletin de l'Université l'Aurore, Ser. III. Vol. 8, No. 1, Shanghai, 1947, p. 18; hereinafter cited as Damboriena; Creighton Lacy, "The Missionary Exodus from China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4, Dec. 1955, p. 305, observes: "Far more disruptive in almost every mission area has been the swarm of small, independent sects -- pentecostal, holiness, fundamentalist -- most of them divisive. Not only do they assert their unwillingness to co-operate with other Christian groups, but they seek most of their converts from the established churches."

797 Naturally the antagonism between Catholic and 779 Protestant mission workers -- their tendency to depreciate one another when dealing with the Chinese -- further weakened the whole effort. Martin Yang describes the antagonisms that developed in the Shantung countryside between Catholic and Protestant Chinese; this added to the tension that already existed between the mass of the villagers and the converts to both forms of Christianity.[79] Yang, himself a Christian, has this to say of the motivations of conversion in the village he studied: "The first converts were members of the Ch'en and Yang families and included a Ch'en scholar and his second brother. They were all ambitious men, and their primary purpose in conversion was to get positions as country preachers, and then to establish a church-subsidized village school, to use foreign influence through the church to deal with their opponents, and to sell food to the missionaries."[80] Chinese governments, imperial and nationalist, found the Christians troublesome, and, in the twenties and thirties there were serious efforts to curb them. One of the effects of government sanctions, combined with the relatively poor

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[79] Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, pp. 158-64.

[80] Ibid., p. 159.

799 results after ninety years of effort, was to
779 reduce the enthusiasm for China missions among Christians abroad. This was reflected in the decreased flow of funds, notably from the United States. From nearly $6,000,000 in 1928, Protestant contributions fell to a little over $3,500,000 in 1933 and did not greatly exceed $4,000,000 in 1935 and 1936.[81] This handicapped nearly all fields of missionary endeavor.

Another arena in which the Protestants tried for influence was the great polemical struggle of the 1920's and 1930's over the nature and future of Chinese civilization. In this prolonged and important controversy, the Protestants found themselves handicapped by the divisions among themselves, notably that between modernists and fundamentalists, and also by the rising tide of nationalism. In the end the Protestants shared with idealistic Chinese and Western philosophers the failure to stem the rising tide of materialism in thought.

[722] The Sino-Japanese War and the war in the Pacific disrupted missionary efforts in north and central China. At the war's end, the

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[81] Damobriena, p. 83.

797 Protestant missionaries returned and set
779 about the rehabilitation of church establishments. Apparently progress was made, but there were disquieting aspects. The interdenominational unions which the Japanese had imposed during their occupation broke apart and sectarian rivalries sprang up again.

> "The measure of self support achieved in wartime necessity collapsed before the inflowing torrent of foreign funds. Leadership which had demonstrated both courage and competence through years of crisis politely yield to colleagues returning from the West."[82]

American financial support also drew upon the Protestants an increasing barrage of Communist and left-wing criticism as the Nationalist Government -- receiving American support -- became increasingly discredited. Protestants, because of their preponderant emphasis on the social gospel (serving God through service to society) and their less formidable unity and discipline, suffered less in Communist-occupied areas than did the Catholics. Yet the more clear-headed of the Protestants could not but dread the rise of Communist power.

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[82] Lacy, op. cit., p. 306.

798 The timetable of Communist moves
797 against Protestants and their organizations follows approximately that for the Catholics noted above. The "national church," the "three autonomies," the confiscation of church property, church schools, and hospitals were accompanied by a steady expulsion of the missionaries. The following figures show the decrease in Protestant missionary personnel between 1935 and 1949 and the almost total elimination of missionaries since that time.[83] In 1935, there were 5,816 Protestant missionaries in China; in 1949, about 3,000; in April 1952, only 100.

It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. The "three autonomies" -- in support, government and propagation -- has been a stated goal of Chinese Protestantism since 1851, and the Chinese Protestant community has generally accepted this, when stated by the

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[83] The first figure is from the Handbook of the Christian Movement, reproduced in Damboriena, p. 82. The other figures are from Walker, op. cit., p. 19.

798 Communists, as a praise-worthy end.[84] A
797 leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[85] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which even go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against the Romans.[86] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist

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[84] Lacy, op. cit., pp. 307-08.

[85] Ts'ai Yung-ch'un "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 3.

[86] Hsü, op. cit., p. 41.

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798 regime is unknown. Again, as in the case of
797 the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future of the church in China is dark indeed.

204 Southwest China was a relatively late
797 and underdeveloped field of missionary effort; it suffered from the tendency of Protestant missions to concentrate in the coastal and easily accessible provinces. The distribution of Protestant periodicals serves to illustrate this fact. Between 1914 and 1937, 18 Protestant journals were established in the southwestern provinces (none in Kweichow). During the same period 124 were started in Kiangsu -- most of them probably in Shanghai -- and 115 in Kwangtung --
797 most of them probably in Canton. The following table shows the distribution of Protestants in the three provinces of the Southwest.[87]

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[87] Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis XI, 1938, pp. 272, 281. Tables reproduced in Damboriena pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from The China Yearbook, 1924. Ku's percentages appear to be far too high and would yield a larger number of Protestants than the churches ever claimed.

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Province	Pop. in Millions (1938)	Percent age of Protestants (1938)	Gross number of Protestants (1924)
Szechwan	48.	3.9	12,954
Yunnan	13.9	2.4	7,816
Kweichow	14.7	2.8	9,446

In social composition, the small Protestant communities of the Southwest probably are roughly those of Chinese Protestantism as a whole: 75 per cent rural, 25 per cent urban, with farmers, petty merchants, and workers predominating.[88]

798 797 Chinese Protestant leaders have not suffered in the way that Catholic leaders have. They have apparently led their churches in a policy of accomodation to the new regime. An account by a Chinese Protestant -- and it is 797 impossible to check its accuracy -- states that there are 140 Protestant churches in Shanghai holding services every Sunday, and we know

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[88] Percentage estimates by the Dean of the University of Nanking as of the early 1930's. Damboriena, p. 30.

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777 from British evacuees from Shanghai that churches are well attended there.[89] The same Chinese Protestant describes the renovation or building of churches, nine in Hangchow, one at least in rural Kiangsu. He stresses particularly the assumption by Chinese Protestant sects of their own missionary functions -- one of the "three autonomies," he mentions missionary work in Fukien, but none in the Southwest. He further states that nearly 200 students have been enrolled in divinity schools in both Nanking and Peking.[90]

The future of Protestantism is uncertain. The key to its survival is whether, within the strict limits imposed by the new Communist-Nationalist orthodoxy, a Christian church can win over a significant number of the youth. Christianity is continually castigated in education and in the press as backward, superstitious, and unscientific. The rewards of place and prestige go to those Chinese most fervent in their acceptance of the Communist orthodoxy. It is doubtful if a significant number of youth will act to cut themselves off from these rewards by embracing an alien religion.

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[89] Wu Yao-tsung "Freedom of Religious Belief in Prosperous Strong Fatherland," Hong Kong, Wen Wei Pao, Oct. 1, 1955; SCMP, 1159, Oct. 28, 1955, p. 41; New York Times, Dec. 11, 1955, p. 32.

[90] Wu, op. cit., p. 41.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 1p,
Sociological Background

HEALTH AND SANITATION

I. BACKGROUND

722 744 During the War of Resistance against Japan, while a major part of China was under the domination of Japan and Japanese-controlled puppet governments, Southwest China emerged as the base of operations of the Chinese government. The city of Chungking in Szechwan Province became China's wartime capital. With the air-route over the Himalayas and the opening of the Burma Road, the Southwest Region also furnished China important lines of communication with the outside world. Following the moving of government to Chungking, government organizations and workers moved in. Taking refuge from the Japanese, numerous educational and cultural institutions moved to the Southwest and settled in their temporary quarters in Szechwan, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Sikang. Although this worked hardship on both the natives and the newcomers, it gave an opportunity for a cultural fusion which was a great benefit to the Southwest. Along with this cultural invasion, modern medical and health organizations were given a chance to spread and expand at a faster pace in this region of China.

744 751 In the four Southwest provinces, in 1947, there were 59 government health organizations at the provincial level, with 6,529 medical and health personnel. At the county level, there were 904 government health organizations.[1] As to preventive medical care, in the year 1946, 720,702 people received vaccinations against smallpox, 1,029,541 were inoculated against cholera, and 448,415 were inoculated against both cholera and typhoid by various government health agencies.[2] Statistical data are far from satisfactory for the presentation of a balanced picture of the health work and health conditions of the Southwest before 1949, particularly since figures for private practitioners and private institutions are not available; however, it is hoped that the few figures given above may serve as background. Furthermore, there are indications that all the achievements claimed by the Chinese Communist regime in health and sanitation are not completely new developments; many projects were begun under the Nationalist Government.

II. COMMUNIST OFFICIAL REPORTS

In July 1950, Ch'u T'u-nan, chairman of the Committee on Culture and Education of the

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[1] Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien [Statistical Yearbook of China], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 341, 342, 344.

[2] Ibid., p. 347.

744 Southwest Military and Administrative Region,
751 made a progress report.[3] On the basis of
incomplete statistics, he claimed that in 1950
there were in the Southwest 43 public hospitals
with 2,935 beds, 79 private hospitals with
2,573 beds, 130 county health bureaus and over
1,800 clinics. He also claimed that there were
2,395 doctors practicing modern medicine,
409 doctor's assistants, 46 dentists, and 2,920
doctors practicing traditional Chinese medicine.
Reporting on the subject of preventive measures,
he stated that in the spring of 1950 there were
927,800 persons vaccinated against smallpox,
including 540,000 who received the service free;
for this work 1,179 medical workers were
mobilized. For the prevention of cholera and
typhoid, 3,500,000 units of vaccine were used.
He reported that 1,055,000 persons were given
free service in this campaign by late July 1950.
[874] The report also disclosed that in the year 1949-50,
seven new middle schools for the training of
health workers, with a total enrollment of 1,100
students, were founded in the Southwest. In 1950,
there were also 52 manufacturers of medical
supplies in this region.

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[3] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1950, p. 199; Wen-chiao T'san-kao Tzu-liao [Reference Material on Culture and Education, Series No. 10], Peking, Committee on Culture and Education, 1950, pp. 335-36.

744 Ch'u's report indicated that the Communist 751 regime was placing emphasis on prevention of disease, on improvement and restoration of organizations of health and sanitation, development of health programs for women and children, organization of health and medical workers, and dissemination of health knowledge and education. All these points of emphasis seemed to be in conformity with the general policies on health and sanitation set forth by the Central People's Government in Peking.

Two years later, in September 1952, Lu Chih-chün, vice-chairman of the Health Department of the Southwest Region, spoke on "The Development of the People's Health Work in the Southwest in the Past Three Years."[4] He began with acknowledgment of the guidance given by the Party and the government, and went on to "prove" that noticeable achievements had been accomplished in the Southwest in accordance with the general principles set forth by the Central People's Government. Since one important aspect of health work undertaken by Communist China was disease-prevention, this report placed stress upon preventive measures and enumerated those taken against contagious diseases in the Southwest Region.

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[4] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, September 26, 1952, p. 3.

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751 Smallpox headed the list. To combat the possibility of an epidemic, 50,000,000 people were reported to have been given vaccination in the three years covered by the report. As a result, the threat of smallpox was greatly reduced. In twelve important cities, Chungking, Chengtu, Pei-p'ei, Wanhsien, Tzu-kung, Nan-ch'ung, Nei-chiang, and Wu-t'ung-ch'iao in Szechwan Province, and in Hsia-kuan and Ho-k'ou in Yunnan; Tsun-i in Kweichow; and Ya-an in Sikang (now incorporated into Szechwan), there were no smallpox epidemics in 1952.

Recurrent fever was second on the list. In 1951, preventive medical corps were sent into many localities for the prevention and treatment of this disease. At the same time the public was alerted to check its spread by exterminating fleas. Thus in Lung-ch'ang, a special district of Szechwan, the number of sufferers from this disease in the spring of 1952 was claimed to be only 7 per cent of the number so afflicted in the spring of 1951. In Pi-chieh, a special district of Kweichow, the number of people affected by recurrent fever in March 1952 was half the number reported in March in the preceding year.

Only slightly less common causes of epidemics in the Southwest were typhoid and cholera. To combat these epidemics, the chief measures were the disinfection of drinking water

744 and the betterment of environmental hygiene.
751 Early preventive inoculations were also recommended. Lu Chih-chün claimed that there were no cases of cholera in the region and that the number of cases of typhoid had been greatly reduced.

Malaria was a common disease in the Southwest Region, according to the report. In addition to the promotion of environmental hygiene, malaria-prevention centers and malaria-prevention corps were established in the key cities in the four Southwestern provinces. Preventive centers for other local contagious diseases, such as bubonic plague and hookworm, were also established, according to Lu's report.

Referring to the improvement of health conditions in the Southwest, it was claimed that in large cities like Chungking and Chengtu that there were "fewer" people reported sick in 1952 than in 1951. Finally it was claimed that health centers had been established in 85 counties, and that the number of hospital beds in 1952 had been doubled since 1950.

III. WOMEN AND CHILDREN

744 At the First Session of the First National People's Congress (1954), Li Teh-ch'uan (General Feng Yü-hsiang's widow), Minister of

744 Health, spoke on public health.[5] She reported that efforts to protect the health of mothers and children made much headway, and that the mortality rate of expectant mothers and infants had dropped. Special attention to the health of women and children is urged in a Chinese Communist document, "The Common Program." Article 48 of this document declares that "Public health and medical work shall be expanded, and attention shall be paid to the protection of the health [844] of mothers, infants, and children."[6] She reported that the training of midwives, the re-educating of "old-style" midwives, and the prevention of various childhood diseases have been stressed throughout China as well as in the Southwest.

To cite the municipality of Chungking, for example, by the middle of 1953 there were 26 health centers for women and children and 70 maternity stations with 684 midwives on duty. The practice of modern obstetrics showed a noticeable increase; modern methods were used in 10 per cent of the births in 1951, 30 per cent

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5. *Survey of China Mainland Press*, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 922, pp. 41-42.

6. *The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 18.

744 in 1952, and 68.75 per cent in 1953. Vaccinations and inoculations against smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough, and tuberculosis were given 751 to children. In the three-year period, 56,197 children were given B.C.G. shots and 96,293 children received preventive care against whooping cough. In the city there were 125 nurseries (including feeding rooms), caring for some 6,000 children.[7]

IV. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

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563 The Southwest Region, like the Central-South Region, has a number of minority peoples scattered throughout it. Cultural advancement programs conducted by the Communist government among these groups are often publicized by the press. The government believes that through education and medical work it can exercise a strong control over minority nationalities areas.[8]

744 In August 1951, the Ministry of Health
563 called the National Conference on Health of the
164 Minority Nationalities. In this conference it

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[7] New China Daily, June 2, 1953, p. 3.

[8] Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia-ti Kuei-chou [Kweichow Under the Control of the Communists], The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, 1955, p. 15.

744 was reported that the minority groups in both
563 the Southwest and the Central-South suffered
164 from malaria, cerebrospinal meningitis,
diphtheria, scarlet fever, typhoid, and recurrent fever. These contagious diseases took a heavy toll of lives and caused a serious loss of manpower. In Yunnan Province in 1950, from 64 to 94 per cent of the children of the minority peoples were affected with enlargement of the spleen, and 39 per cent had malarial parasites in their blood. The basic measures proposed for the improvement of health conditions in the minority nationalities were the establishment of additional public health agencies and the training of additional health workers.[9]

944 Two years later, twenty-five mobile health
563 corps units had been formed and were serving
the minority nationalities areas in Southwest China, according to Communist sources. Not only were the treatments and preventive injections said to have been administered free, but the dissemination of modern methods of sanitation and education in hygiene were the responsibility of these traveling medical workers. A special effort was made to train members of minority groups as health workers among their own people. Incomplete statistics for 1949-52

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[9] Current Background, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 152, pp. 5-7.

744 563 claim that among minority groups in the Southwest Region, 98,406 people received free medical treatment and 72,900 people were given vaccination against smallpox.[10]

V. THE PATRIOTIC HEALTH MOVEMENT

744 668 In 1952 the Communists launched the Patriotic Health Drive. It was designed primarily to integrate health work with the mass propaganda campaign which accused the United States of engaging in bacteriological warfare. The Patriotic Health Drive was, therefore, stimulated by the conflict in Korea and became a part of the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement. In the name of patriotism the Chinese people were called upon to clean their cities and work for the general improvement of environmental hygiene.

Upon the launching of the Patriotic Health Drive in April 1952, some 70 to 80 per cent of the population in the key cities of the Southwest Region were mobilized. According to statistics released in September 1952, the following accomplishments were claimed:

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[10] New China Daily, Sept. 25, 1952, p. 3.

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Refuse removed		1,000,000	tons
Flies exterminated		20	tons
Fly larvae destroyed	some	70	tons
Mosquito larvae destroyed	some	23	tons
Mosquitos exterminated		190	pounds
Ditches dredged and repaired		868	miles
Rats exterminated		800,000	
Rat holes sealed up		96,619	
Public comfort stations improved and constructed		7,993	
Wells improved and dug		9,418	

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The Communists claimed to have used new types of rat traps, and more efficient ways of exterminating fleas and other pests were utilized. One activist of the Patriotic Drive, it was claimed, killed 9,000 flies in a single day and on the following day surpassed his own record by killing 13,900.[11] We must assume that the New China Daily, in enthusiasm for such a display of industry, has quoted approximate figures.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

1. In 1953, the Patriotic Health Drive began earlier in the year. In many localities it was integrated with house-cleaning before the Chinese New Year. Instead of killing flies in the summer, the people were called upon to dig up and destroy fly larvae. To publicize these activities and accomplishments, the Party bureaucrats demanded further details with which to adorn their reports. One county government in Szechwan asked each village farmer to answer 120 questions. When exterminating rats, for example, the farmer was to classify them as being large, medium, or small. The weight of each rat was to be given; farmers were expected to give the length of the rats' bodies and the length of their tails.[12]

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[11] New China Daily, Sept. 26, 1952, p. 3.
[12] Ibid., June 7, 1953, p. 3.

744 668 Obviously the requirements for preparation of the reports grew ridiculous. This undue emphasis on detail, when one examines Chinese Communist statistical reports, seems to be a common failing of the bureaucratic mind. At times, the Chinese Communists themselves have criticized this frequent preoccupation with niggling details. An editorial entitled "On the Counting of Mosquitoes," which first appeared in the People's Daily (Organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party), was later quoted by the New China Daily of Chungking.[13] The editorial states that acts as absurd as these should be regarded as the inevitable growing pains of a newly founded government during a period of national construction. Red tape and wasteful practices should be exposed; the value of self-criticism is not to be ignored. The editorial states, in conclusion, that both the weaknesses and strengths of Communist China should be carefully evaluated for the insight they will bring.

[[31]] 744 157 2. The southwestern provinces produce the majority of China's medicinal herbs. One of the principal tasks of the Chinese Communist health program was "to unite the strength of native and Western medicine."[14] The South-

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 922, pp. 42-43.

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744 west Region occupies a position of importance in the fulfillment of this aim. In 1952 a school [374] was founded in Chungking for the orientation of doctors trained in traditional medicine.[15] In 1953, a special committee was set up to take charge of a study of Chinese medicine under the Chungking branch of the China Pharmaceutical [378] Society. The committee reported that, among the 233 species of medicinal herbs in common use, 80 per cent were found in the Southwest Region.[16]

On the basis of recent reports, the attempt "to unite the strength of native and Western medicine" may not be progressing smoothly. During the National Conference on Cultural and Educational Work in Peking in 1955 it was reported that the conference criticized the "bourgeois" ideas of certain leaders in the Ministry of Health who were inclined to discriminate against and eliminate traditional medicine; the conference considered the attitude taken by the Ministry of Health toward traditional medicine a "very serious fundamental mistake."[17]

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[15] New China Daily, Jan. 28, 1953, p. 3.

[16] Ibid., Nov. 18, 1954, p. 2.

[17] Survey of China Mainland Press, American Consulate-General, Hong Kong, No. 1068, p. 15.

744 757 In a joint convention in Chungking, a similar criticism was voiced.[18] Although many traditional practices have proved to be effective, it still remains to be seen to what extent the use of medicinal herbs can be justified by modern science. It also remains to be ascertained whether this enthusiasm for traditional medicine on the part of the Chinese Communists is more than an evanescent interest.

744 The health of the people of a nation depends on many factors. Preventive medical care or even a lower infant mortality rate does not necessarily mean the general betterment of public health. Malnutrition as the result of an inadequate diet may offset whatever has been accomplished by vaccinations and inoculations. Since little information is revealed in Chinese Communist publications, on the diet and nutrition of the people, it is necessary to point out that while reports on health and sanitation improvements on the mainland of China should not be discounted, other factors must also be taken into consideration in the evaluation of the general health of the Chinese people.[19]

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[18] Ibid., No. 1012, Supplement, pp. 4-5.

[19] For medical education and health in schools, see chapter on Education; for health and sanitation in the factories and among industrial workers, see chapter on Labor.

Annex "A," Subparagraph lq, Sociological Background

PUBLIC WELFARE

I. INTRODUCTION

746 Under the Nationalist Government during the war years (1937-1945), the first and foremost agency in the work of public welfare was the National Relief Commission. It was the pivot upon which China's machinery of relief and rehabilitation depended. Through its various efforts from 1938 to 1944, 30,152,131 refugees from war and famine were benefited.[1] In addition to immediate war and disaster relief, it also operated clinics, occupational relief works, and organizations for the training and care of children. A number of private and semi-private welfare and relief agencies were also active, and most of these were founded to meet the needs of the war conditions.[2] For women and children, there were the National Association for Refugee Children, the National Child Welfare Association of China, and the Women's

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[1] China Handbook 1937-1945, compiled by Chinese Ministry of Information, New York, Macmillan, 1947, pp. 521-37.

[2] Ibid.

[redacted]

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746 Advisory Council. For servicemen, there were the Friends of the Wounded Society and the YMCA Emergency Service to Soldiers. And for general war work there were the China Wartime Relief Association, and the National Chinese Women's Association for War Relief. Foreign agencies, such as the United China Relief and the American Red Cross in China of the United States, and British and Canadian contributions distributed through different medium also helped to aid China in her distress.

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657 The Ministry of Social Affairs as a department under the Executive Yuan of the Nationalist Government was established in November 1940. Throughout the 1940s, during the war years in Chungking as well as in the postwar years in Nanking, this ministry led and guided the development of public welfare and helped to co-ordinate the work of the many relief and welfare organizations. The following chart will give some idea of the state of public welfare in 1947 in Southwest China.[3] With Chungking as the wartime capital of China, and the Southwest provinces as the base of operations in the long resistance war against Japan, the Southwest Region, in spite of material hardships made cultural and social progress. This was equally true in public welfare.

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[3] *Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi Nien-chien* [*Statistical Yearbook of China*], Nanking, Bureau of Statistics, 1948, pp. 365-72.

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RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHWEST CHINA */

(June 1947)

Province	Relief Organizations	Farmers' Welfare Socities	Child Welfare Units	Social Service Offices	Employment Agencies	
					Independent/	Auxiliary
Szechwan	571	32	295	181	22	19
Sikang	33	1	10	9	1	1
Yunnan	160	22	53	6	7	5
Kweichow	97	22	42	32	10	6
Chungking	78	5	76	21	13	3
Total	939	82	476	249	53	34

*/ See Footnote 3.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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657 On November 9, 1943, China became a member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). The Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CRRA) as a department of the Nationalist Government on the level of ministries, was established in January 1945, as was the China office of UNRRA. In co-operation the two administrations planned and worked on the gigantic problems of relief and the rehabilitation of postwar China.[4] It was extremely unfortunate that peaceful projects of this sort did not continue; their efforts were suspended when the Chinese Communists became the victors on the Mainland of China.

II. CALAMITIES SINCE 1949

73! Since the establishment of the Communist regime in China, many natural disasters have occurred. Droughts, floods, locusts and other harmful insects, frost, wind-storms, and hail-storms, have caused famines, beginning in the rural districts and spreading through the entire nation. According to one estimate, natural calamities, climaxed by the floods of 1954, affected many millions as shown

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[4] China Handbook, pp. 538-541.

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1949	60,000,000
1950	38,000,000
1951	28,000,000
1952	33,000,000
1953	47,000,000
1954	180,000,000

above.[5] No region has escaped entirely from these disasters. If there are differences between them, it is only a matter of degree.

In Southwest China, spring and summer droughts were severe in 1950 and 1951. Some 246 counties were affected and some 4,471,970 people faced starvation. Before this condition was remedied, the spring drought of 1952 affected 133 counties and another 2,000,000 were in danger of starvation.[6] In the Li-chiang special district there was a severe earthquake in 1951. As a result some 300 people died, 2,000 were injured, and 20,000

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[5] *Kung-fei T'ung-chih Hsia-ti Wen-hua yü she-yün [Cultural and Social Movements Under the Communist Rule]*, The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1953, p. 103.

[6] *Pei Kuan-chin T'ieh-mu Hou-ti Hsi-nan [Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain]*, The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1954, pp. 35-37.

731 houses were destroyed. This calamity created 120,000 refugees.[7]

731 668 As if these were not enough, the people on the mainland of China were beset by a number of man-made adversities -- the land reform, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and warfare in Korea. About 90,000,000 people were affected.[8] Land Reform has been completed in 12,165 villages (about 82 per cent of the total area) in the Southwest Region, and the number of people involved in this violent change was estimated at 74,315,489, of which 3,715,774 were landowners. One estimate gives the number of casualties of these purges as follows:[9] some 2,600,000 landlords suffered from the land reform, with 148,430 put to death; some 2,500,000 died as counter-revolutionaries as the result of the Three-Anti

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7. Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

8. Kung-fei-ti Chiu-chi Kung-tso [Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists], */ The Sixth Section of the Central Committee of the Nationalist Party, Taipei, 1955, pp. 2-3.

9. Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 2-5.

*/ Hereinafter cited as Relief Work.

731 668 and Five-Anti campaigns, 272,800 men were mobilized and sent to fight in Korea from the four southwest provinces. Among the prisoners of war who chose to go to Formosa rather than return to Communist China, 5,184 men were from Southwest China.[10]

III. COMMUNIST RELIEF AND WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS

657 744 After the Hwai River flood of 1949, the Central Relief Committee was formed (February 1950) under the Government Administration Council as a temporary but integral part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Later, similar committees were set up in the provinces and municipalities. Their existence, on the whole, have been in name only, and little relief work has been accomplished.[11]

During the convention of the All-China People's Relief Administration of China was organized as the successor to the China Liberated Areas Relief Administration. This was not a government department but a "People's" organization. Soong Ching-ling (Madame Sun

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[10] *Ibid*., pp. 4-5.

[11] *Relief Work Under the Chinese Communists*, pp. 5-6.

657 744 Yat-sen) was elected chairman. It was this organization which took over all U. S. charities after the outbreak of the war in Korea. In the organizing of branch offices, four years later it was reported that twenty-three large cities in all regions of China had branch offices of the People's Relief Administration. In Southwest China, branch offices have been established in Chungking and Chengtu in the province of Szechwan and in Kunming in the province of Yunnan. A special provincial branch office was also set up in Kweichow Province.[12] There have been meetings and conferences, but the only actual relief work to date has been the collection in 1950 of 6,800,000 outfits of winter clothing for the flood refugees in northern Anhwei.[13]

464 657 Due to the increase of unemployment, the Labor Employment Committee was established in July 1952 under the Government Administrative Council. Regional Labor Employment Committees were established in August of the same year. Later similar committees were formed on lower administrative levels in the provinces, counties, and municipalities.[14]

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[12] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1955 [People's Handbook, 1955], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, pp. 396-397.

[13] Cultural and Social Movements, pp. 6-8.

[14] Ibid., p. 8.

747 The Red Cross Society of China has had a history of 50 years. In August 1950 the Communists assumed control and reorganized it under the leadership of the Ministry of Health. It has done more medical work than relief work, especially in and around construction projects where large numbers of laborers congregated. In Southwest China, the Communist Red Cross sent medical and epidemic-prevention corps to serve the laborers in the building of the Chungking-Chengtu Railway and the Hunan-Kwangsi Railway (Hsiang-Kuei Railway). This organization also did medical and propaganda work among the minority nationalities in the Southwest province.[15]

During the war of resistance against Japan, the China Defense League was founded (June 1938) by Soong Ching-ling in Hong Kong. It acted as the channel for international aid chiefly to bring medicine and relief to Communist bases. In 1941, its headquarters was moved to Chungking. After the establishment of the Chinese Communist regime, this organization changed its name to the China Welfare Institute (August 1950). Its chief

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15. Ibid., p. 8; People's Handbook, 1955, p. 396.

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747 [204] activities have been in Shanghai.[16] Beginning in January 1952, the China Welfare Institute has published an international, propaganda-disseminating, bimonthly magazine, China Reconstructs, in the English language.

The Chinese People's National Committee for the Defense of Children was formed on November 26, 1951 in Peking, in response to the call issued at the Berlin conference of the International Federation of Democratic Women. The head of this organization is also Soong Ching-ling. The policy of this committee, apart from the promotion of child welfare, was defined as anti-imperialisism and the defense of world peace.[17]

A group of professors in Shanghai founded the China Tuberculosis Prevention Association in 1948. The Communist regime brought this organization under their control and then moved it to Peking in 1951. In August 1953, a conference of the workers was called, and certain tasks and policies of the association were outlined. It is reported that tuberculosis prevention units all over the country are affiliated with this organization.[18]

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16. Ibid., pp. 397-398; Relief Work, pp. 8 - 9.
17. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 260-61.
18. Ibid., p. 398; Relief Work, pp.8-9.

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IV. RELIEF AND RELIEF POLICIES

746 During the convention of the National People's Congress in Peking in September 1954, Hsieh Chüeh-ts'ai, Minister of Internal Affairs of the Chinese Communist regime, made a report on the state of relief and welfare on the China Mainland. After alluding to the expanse and severity of natural calamities from 1949 to 1954, he reiterated the policies of the Chinese Communist Government in conducting its relief work. The first effort is to mobilize the masses to work on the prevention of drought, frost, harmful insects, and flood. Secondly, when disaster strikes, the people are expected to adopt measures to "help themselves through production," "to economize during the famine period," and "to offer mutual-aid." Only when it is absolutely necessary should the government be expected to offer outright relief.[19]

In discussing public welfare and relief in Communist China, it is necessary to recognize how the Communists interpret certain common terms. The word *relief*, although it is generally taken to mean "money or necessaries given to people who are in need,"[20] to the Communist

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[19] *People's Handbook, 1955*, pp. 211-12.

[20] Fairchild, H. P. *Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences*, Ames, Iowa, Littlefield, Adams, 1955, p. 255.

746 carries no implication of unconditional succor. Their basic relief policy, including emergency relief, is "self-help through-production," and their basic relief method is the substitution of work for relief. From this the Chinese Communist have not deviated. As a matter of fact, most of their projects for water conservation, road building, and the laying of railroad lines are undertaken, in part, by famine refugees, who thus are expected to pay in labor for government efforts to prevent starvation.[21]

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73/ In an official report on relief work in 1952, the deputy chief of the Department of Civil Affairs of the Southwest Region gave some interesting slogans used by the government to rally the people in famine areas.[22] In order to ensure a good harvest, "one must get rid of the traditional belief of relying on nature (God or heaven) to live." "One must believe that men can conquer nature." In preventive measures against drought, the Southwest mobilized 30,000,000 people to build and repair waterways. In the southern part of Szechwan, 252,182 water-wheels were set up, and enough people were mobilized to tread them

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[21] Relief Work, pp. 9-12.

[22] New China Daily, Oct. 4, 1952, p. 6.

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day and night. When 15 counties were faced with flood in East Szechwan, people were called out to fight the inundation and to build dikes. To exterminate insects, 1,560,000 people were mobilized in South Szechwan, and "260,000,000 insects amounted to some 70 tons in weight" were caught, according to the same report. Against the traditional spring and summer famine spells as many as 150 kinds of secondary production (usually handicrafts) were developed in the various parts of the Southwest. In reporting on the substitution of work for relief, it was revealed that in addition to the building of roads, railways, and dikes, the famine refugees also undertook the shipment of coal and salt and the building of granaries and army camps. In 1951, the report said, 200,000 refugees were engaged in cutting timber and in reforestation in southern Szechwan. Expanding the theme of self-help, the Communists advocated mutual-aid. In Southwest China there were drives to economize in order to be able to contribute for relief. Slogans demanded that everyone give each day a bowl of rice and a handful of vegetables for relief. In this way the cities contributed their share for the welfare of the rural areas, and even other administrative regions. The 1952 report also stated that in 1950 JMP$ 57,250,000,000 were contributed to the winter clothing fund for the refugees of northern Anhwei and

746 northern Kiangsu provinces in East China by the people of the Southwest. In 1951, the
731. city people of East Szechwan contributed JMP$ 425,000,000 and some 2,700,000 pounds of food to the famine-stricken rural areas.[23]

464 In the cities, especially in the early period of the Communist regime, unemployment was an extremely serious problem. In the Southwest Region it was estimated that in 1952 about 2,600,000 people were unemployed or partly unemployed,[24] and as a result the Communist regime established a Labor Employment Committee in Peking as well as on the various levels in local governments. Under this committee the "registration of labor employment" was conducted. The following steps were taken to alleviate the problem of unemployment: (1) the centralization of employment agencies under the Labor Employment Committee, (2) the establishment of training courses, (3) the substitution of work for direct relief, (4) the advocation of self-help-through-production, (5) outright relief (only to cases of extreme hardship), and (6) a

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Relief Work, p. 13.

464 campaign to encourage workers to return to the rural areas to engage in production.[25] All in all, the basis of city relief was self-help-through-labor, which was also the emphasis of rural relief policies. For example, in Chungking needy people were organized into handicraft-production teams. Early in 1955, it was reported that in addition to those performing regular and seasonal labor, 32,000 needy people were organized into productive labor teams in Chungking. Among the people who were unable to make a living, including the aged, the cripple, and the young, relief was given to 41,828 families in the period January-October 1954, according to a Communist source.[26]

735 Beggars, pickpockets, and prostitutes
733 were the subjects of an intensive campaign.
548 It was reported in 1952 that the majority of
these three city elements had been sent to
institutions for reform and training in productive
works.[27] In a speech in September 1954, the
Communist Minister of Internal Affairs told the
National People's Congress that prostitutes,
beggars, and opium smokers were "basically

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25. Ibid., p. 16.

26. Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, America Consulate General, No. 1008, Supplements, March 16, 1955, pp. 8-10.

27. New China Daily, Sept. 28, 1952, p. 4.

733 "non-existent" in Communist China and the
735 number of vagrants had been greatly reduced.[28]
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V. CHILD WELFARE

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746 Following the international practice of dedicating one day in the year to the children, in 1931 April 4th was promulgated as China's Children's Day by the Nationalist Government. But the Chinese Communist regime changed this date to June 1st, in accordance with a decision made by the International Democratic Women's Federation in 1949 at Moscow.[29] Children's Day as it is celebrated in the United States and in Great Britain was branded as capitalistic, i.e., not designed for the well-being of the children of the laboring classes. Around June 1st every year, all the propaganda media are mobilized for the promotion of child welfare, praise of the happy state of children in Communist China and in the Communist bloc of nations, and references to the "plight" of children in the free world. And it is also around this time in most large cities on the Mainland of China that health examinations for

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[28] People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 211-13.

[29] Hung Hsin-t'ao, Chi-nien Chieh-jih Shih-shih Tzu-liao [History of the Memorial Days], Shanghai, T'ai-lien ch'u-pan she, 1953, Vol. II, pp. 180-83.

527 children are conducted. In the period 1950-52,
746 according to one report, more than 1,000,000 children received a health examination.[30]

In the Southwest, in Chungking, on Children's Day 1953, more than 33,000 children gathered at the "Working People's Cultural Palace." Entertainment and games were on the day's program, as well as speeches by the mayor and vice-mayor of the city. In eleven other cultural centers" in the municipality of Chungking on that same day, special motion pictures for children were shown. The New China Bookstore opened its new department for children, and on the first day a sale of more than 3,700 children's books was reported.[31]

746 The first conference of the workers in
668 women's and children's welfare was convened October 3-12, 1951, under the aegis of the All-China Democratic Women's Federation. With national production as the over-all purpose, the scope of their welfare work was described as to serve the masses of working

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[30] New China Daily, May 30, 1953, p. 3.
[31] Ibid., June 2, 1953, p. 1.

746 668 women and their children. Their main tasks were to promote the health of women and children and to solve the problems which arise in the rearing and educating of the children of working people. At the conference it was reported that 15,700 child welfare organizations, including creches, kindergartens, and relief institutions, had been established on the China Mainland. Another report claimed that in two years (to November 1951) 4,340 persons were trained to care for children and 3,743 were trained as health workers to care for women and children. During the same period, propaganda agencies arranged 128 exhibits to promote good health among women and children; 7,295,095 people were reported to have attended these exhibits.[32]

746 By the end of 1952, there were 34,000 public health agencies for women and children, with additional mobile corps, organized under all the provincial governments. In 1952, in mining and construction work, in other enterprises, in public organizations and schools, 2,738 creches were in existence, in larger cities, 4,346 street creches were set up, and in the rural areas 148,000 creches were

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32. Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Peking, 1951, No. 12, Dec. 1951, pp. 47-48.

746 organized during the busy farming seasons to care for an estimated 850,000 children of agricultural families.[33] In the Southwest Region, many factories were reported to have provided creches to care for the children of working mothers. In a report made in 1953, the total number of creches of this category was given as 77, caring for approximately 4,400 children.[34] For the region as a whole, this number is far too small to be considered adequate.

VI. AID TO FAMILIES OF "MARTYRS" AND SERVICEMEN

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746 In relief work in Communist China, aid to the families of "martyrs" and servicemen has been regarded with utmost seriousness and has been treated as relief work in the more usual sense. The welfare of the members of the armed forces and their families was specified in Article 25 of the Common Program, one of the earliest documents adopted by the Peking regime. It states: "Dependents of those who have given their lives for the revolution and of members of the revolutionary forces, who are in need, shall receive preferential treatment from the state and from society. The People's Government shall make appropriate arrangements for disabled or

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33. New China Daily, April 18, 1953, p. 4.
34. Ibid., May 30, 1953, p. 3.

729 retired servicemen who have participated in
746 the revolutionary war, providing them with the means of livelihood or with occupation."[35] However, the nationwide campaign did not begin until late in 1950, which indicates that this necessity was caused by the warfare in Korea.[36] On December 11, 1950, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Peking regime promulgated five sets of regulations relating to compassionate payments. These were provisional regulations governing preferential treatment of families of revolutionary "martyrs" and servicemen; preferential treatment of, and compassionate payments to, disabled servicemen killed in action or upon illness; citations and compassionate payments for revolutionary workers injured or killed; and citations and compassionate payments for members of the People's Militia and laborers in military service injured or killed.[37] The preferential treatment of families of "martyrs" and servicemen included receiving land and farming implements as well as government scholarships for their children, lower prices, discounts from commercial establishments, and so forth. Only in cases of extreme hardship were direct payments given.

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35. The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign LanguagesPress, 1949, p. 10.

36. R[illegible] W[illegible] p. [illegible]

37. New China Monthly, Vol. III, No. 3, Jan. 1951, pp. 516-21.

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746 At the time of the Spring Festival in 1951, 10,000,000 people were rallied to take part in the campaign to honor servicemen and their families, according to a report made by the Department of Civil Affairs of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee. Festivals at the lunar New Year and again on August 1, the Chinese Communist Army Day, have since become annual affairs. Through the Government relief and rehabilitation program, the report claimed, many members of the families of "martyrs" and servicemen and many disabled veterans became local Party leaders, and members of Communist cadres and others were elected as delegates and committeemen to Communist conventions and assemblies. In the county of T'ung-chiang[38] in Szechwan Province, as many as 963 cadres were chosen from among these people in 1953.

The system of substitute-tilling during the absence of responsible family members was promoted in most rural areas in the Southwestern provinces. Among the 7,040 families of "martyrs" and servicemen who lived in the rural districts in the Chungking municipality, 1,431 families were granted substitute tillers to cultivate their lands in 1952. In 71 other counties and municipalities of Szechwan,

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[38] New China Daily, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 2.

729 746 according to the same report, out of a total of 209,813 families of "martyrs" and servicemen, 80,174 families were granted substitute tillers during 1951. However, the report also mentioned confused management and inadequate enforcement of this system in many places in the Southwest.[39] Apparently, much improvement is to be desired and substitute-tilling may always remain a source of dissatisfaction among the rural population.

In the cities in the Southwest Region as well as in all other regions, the dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen were organized for production and trained for employment. Statistics covering the cities of Chungking, Chengtu, Wanhsien and Nan-ch'ung in Szechwan Province, Kweiyang in Kweichow Province and Kunming in Yunnan Province, showed 102 organized production units involving 2,139 people, and further, that 9,550 people obtained employment through the efforts of the government. In addition, in 22 counties in southern Szechwan Province, 202 units were organized and 3,726 members of servicemen's families engaged in 729 746 657 production work. For those who were unable to work (as of June 1952), the regional government appropriated relief payments amounting

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39. Ibid.

729 746 657 to JMP$ 29,409,100,000. About 30 per cent of the dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen received this relief, but later the majority of these dependents were obliged to undertake production work.[40]

[873] Some 3,855 children and minor dependents of "martyrs" and servicemen were given government scholarships and financial aid in the three municipalities of Chungking, Chengtu, and Kweiyang, and 19,371 children and dependents in southern Szechwan were given scholarships, the Communists report.[41]

As a measure of encouragement, the Chinese Communists in June and July 1952 mobilized the populace of the Southwest Region to elect "model dependents" of "martyrs" and servicemen, "model disabled veterans," and "model workers for the protection and betterment of the servicemen's families."[42] Those elected were honored by recognition similar to that afforded "labor heroes" during the Land Reform Movement.

729 874 In September 1954, there were 67 special schools for disabled veterans on the China Mainland, with a total enrollment of 5,000; from these schools, 10,000 graduates had already

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40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.

[redacted]

729 874 gone into construction work.[43] Some of these schools are in the Southwest, but the number and their locations are not known. According to their own criticism, expressed in Communist newspapers, Southwestern schools for disabled veterans are few in quantity and poor in quality.[44]

According to a broadcast in January 1955 by the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Peking regime, incomplete statistics from 13 provinces showed more than 60 per cent of the families of "martyrs" and servicemen had become participants in mutual-aid groups and cooperatives and many were elected officials of these organizations. Others were elected as delegates to the People's Congress or village cadres.[45] The People's Daily reported that 382 rehabilitated veterans were elected "labor heroes" in July 1954.

VII. CONCLUSION

746 In almost all documents concerning public welfare and relief in Communist China, the emphasis is on production rather than the alleviation of suffering. In regard to famine relief in the rural areas as well as unemployment relief in the cities, the people are asked to save

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[43] Relief Work p. 19. [redacted]

[44] New China Daily, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 2.

[45] New China Monthly, No. 2, Feb. 1955, p. 19.

746 themselves by "self-help-through-production." Even in concern for the welfare of women and children, the chief purpose is to gain energy to further production. The Communists are not concerned with the welfare of individuals or the lives of individuals. Whereas the humanitarian element prevails in public welfare in the free world, it is generally lacking in a Communist state. In the charter of the People's Relief Administration, Article 2 explains its function in the following sentence: "This Administration is an organization of the people under the leadership of the Central People's Government to unite and guide...all relief and welfare workers to help the Government in the organization of the masses for the promoting of production and economy, labor and mutual-aid, so that the relief and welfare works for the masses of the people shall be enhanced."[46] The key words here are production, economy, labor, and mutual-aid. There is no allusion to the alleviation of suffering or the promotion of the well-being of the people.

000 When one understands the Communist attitude toward public welfare, it helps one to grasp the overwhelming plight of those who become the victims of man-made calamities.

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[46] Ho-pei Jih-pao [Hopei Daily], Paoting, May 5, 1950, p. 1.

100 Perhaps no written passage could illuminate the situation so vividly and succinctly as a parable recounted in one of the ancient Chinese classics.

> "In passing by the side of Mount Thai, Confucius came on a woman who was wailing bitterly by a grave... 'Your wailing,' said he, 'is altogether like that of one who has suffered sorrow upon sorrow.' She replied, 'It is so. Formerly, my husband's father was killed here by a tiger. My husband was also killed, ... and now my son has died in the same way.' The Master said, 'Why do you not leave [this] place?' The answer was, 'There is no oppressive government here.' The Master then said to [his] disciples, 'Remember this, my little children. Oppressive government is more terrible than tigers.'"47

Have man-made disasters in Communist China become fiercer than nature's floods and droughts? This may be the reason why so many Chinese prisoners of war in Korea did not choose to return to the China Mainland.

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47. James Legge, tr., The Li Ki: [The Book of Rites], Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1885. Vol. 27, of The Sacred Books of the East, ed., by F. Max Müller, pp. 190-91.

747 On April 4, 1950, in Taipei, the capital of Formosa, an organization called the Free China Relief Association was formed. Its purpose is to aid Chinese refugees from the Mainland and some of the suffering masses still under Communist rule. In the past five years, the association has aided more than 967,000 refugees and helped 51,846 people to escape to Formosa. During the flood of 1954, this organization sent thirty-five airplanes to the Mainland of China and dropped about 100,000 pounds of rice and 7,500,000 handbills. The Free China Relief Association was also responsible for the rehabilitation of 14,500 Chinese prisoners of war from Korea, who chose Free China rather than return to the Communist fold. Over one-third (5,184) of these men are natives of the Southwestern provinces. The group arrived in Taiwan on January 23, 1954. The FCRA has established connections with the UN and the United States and has extended aid to Chinese refugees in many places, including Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea.[48]

At the UN Security Council meeting on November 28, 1950, the American delegate, Warren Austin, spoke of the relief supplies sent to China from the United States, of

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48. Chiu-chi T'e-k'an [Special Relief Bulletin], The Free China Relief Association, Taipei, Sept. 1, 1955.

American efforts to feed and to clothe thousands and thousands of Chinese people in the postwar years, and of the friendship expressed by the American people for China. Friendship between America and China has a long history. Because this is true, and a truth remembered by millions of Chinese, the Peking regime and the Communists do all in their power to slander the United States.

During a period of some two years after V-J Day (1945-47) China received millions of US dollars in American aid through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.[49] Although relief and rehabilitation work was disrupted by the civil strife between the Nationalists and the Communists and was brought to an abrupt end by the Communist domination of the Mainland, many people were benefited. After the outbreak of warfare in Korea, the Chinese Communist Government made the decision to assume control of all American-subsidized educational, relief, and religious organizations. According to a Communist report, American assets in these three categories amounted to

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[49] Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 46, Jan. 11, 1951, pp. 17-20.

747 US$ 41,900,000. Of this sum, 47 per cent was for relief and welfare work, the operation of 200 orphanages, 20 leper asylums, 10 schools for the mute and deaf, and 30 schools for the blind.[50] It is apparent that without American aid much welfare work will be suspended. It is unlikely that those who have received the benefit of subsidized institutions will readily forget such gestures of American friendship.

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[50] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Dec. 30, 1950, p. 1.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1r,
Sociological Background

ATTITUDES AND REACTIONS OF THE PEOPLE

181 The attitudes of an individual, although conditioned by the environment in which he lives and influenced by the persons with whom he comes in contact, are subject to changes that are well-nigh unpredictable; he may simultaneously adopt diametrically opposed attitudes without being aware of inconsistency. This circumstance, coupled with China's multitudinous regions and groups of people of varying characteristics, makes the task of gauging the attitudes of the Chinese people an exceedingly risky one at best. The Chinese, in general, are traditionally less outspoken than Americans. However, since attitudes manifest themselves in reactions and some of the reactions of the Chinese people are observable even in official Communist announcements, a few very general and broad conclusions may be drawn. In this discussion, attention is focused on the attitudes of the various groups of Chinese toward their country, the Communist government, and the ambitions and aspirations of the individual.

In sociological studies, occupational stratification is one recognized criterion for analyzing any society. In adopting this approach for our discussion, we do not propose to overlook the significance of grouping people according to other equally valid criteria, such as age, sex, and income. Older people, for example, are generally more conservative, less willing to

181 adapt to change, and less likely to show enthusiasm for the Communist program. The rich, who have more to lose, are generally more dissatisfied with the Communist regime than their poorer countrymen. These patterns of attitudes tend to cut across occupational stratification. In view of the technical limitations imposed on this discussion, occupational stratification will be used, with allowance for the exceptions within each category.

I. FARMERS

565 184 The rich absentee-landowners of China, whose social status ranks with that of government bureaucrats and whose interests are identified with those of rich merchants, are all but nonexistent in Mainland China today. The Chinese farmer class consists chiefly of poor peasants and "middle farmers" holding small lots of land. These people have had little opportunity to identify themselves with the state or its destiny. Especially in Southwest China, where warlords ruled until the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan, the development of a national feeling among the farmers has been late and slow. 565 722 184 However, the cessation of what used to be perpetual skirmishes between warlords and the presence of a single centralized authority during World War II furnished many farmers in this region with a basis on which to form a concept of nationalism. Although no part of Southwest China was overrun by Japanese troops, the experiences of enemy bombings, anti-Japanese propaganda, and contact with refugees made

565 many farmers realize that the Yangtze River
722 gorges were not a dependable natural defense,
and that they could no longer live in an "isolated
184 utopia" in West China, as Szechwan Province had
been traditionally regarded.

The Communists have been making intensive efforts to "educate" the farmers. Although the learning of a few political terms is not enough to make the farmer nationalistic, at least he knows more about China as a nation than he ever did in the past.

423 The idea that he is to be given land of his own
565 (and concomitant responsibility) probably has
generated apprehension even in the poorest peasant
184 who always believed he wanted to own land. To
be sure, his gain through the process of land reform must have given the peasant some satisfaction, but subsequent grain taxes remain heavy and Communist efforts to collectivize the production and marketing of farm produce impose restrictions on the farmer. Compared with Central-South China, land reform and the establishment of co-operatives were carried out rapidly and with less resistance in this region. The fact that all farmers have been permitted to retain title to their land has led the peasantry to give support to the regime. Good crops, which have made this a grain-surplus region since 1953, helped to maintain the illusion of a prospering society.

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177 The Chinese farmer's picture of a foreign
565 culture was originally derived from contact with

177 565 184 foreign missionaries. In Southwest China, foreign churches were seen only in a few larger cities. The presence of American troops in Kunming, Chengtu, and a few other cities where military installations were located during the war against Japan made possible a different view of the foreigner. The farmer's reaction to the sight of a swashbuckling American soldier was generally puzzlement, envy, and a measure of disapproval. But on the whole, very few farmers in this region have had much experience with foreigners, nor did anti-foreign uprisings in the past directly involve the Southwestern farmer. The frightening image of "Western imperialism" created by Communist propaganda organs, therefore, is likely to pose no meaningful threat to these long-isolated people. The majority of the farmers in this region are not concerned with the fate of foreign missionaries in Communist China.

565 184 The Chinese farmer has always hoped to safeguard his family by acquiring more land to provide a better education for his children and to maintain the respect of fellow villagers. Now that the farmer's hopes for obtaining land are strictly limited, his interest turns to finding ways in which his children, through education, can advance on the socio-economic ladder. The fact that many young people from peasant families have been absorbed into the government "cadre" system may induce the Chinese farmer to look more kindly upon the present regime. Of course, there are exceptions among the farming population. Farmers active in secret societies, which

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575 Farmers active in secret societies, which
565 are traditionally opposed to government control,
184 may have a different set of attitudes toward the nation, foreigners, and the individual's role in society. The I-kuan Tao (Way of Pervading Unity) sect was reported active as late as the summer of 1955 and apparently has survived Communist efforts to stamp it out. Other secret societies are of minor importance in comparison with those operating in Central-South or East China

II. URBAN WORKERS

565 Southwest China had been backward in indus-
178 trial development until the late 1930's when
184 some industrial plants were moved from the coastal areas to places like Chungking and Wanhsien in Szechwan Province. Even as late as 1952 there were still very few industrial workers in this region. Most of them were not organized until after 1949 and were not involved in earlier political movements. Before unionization, industrial workers in Southwest China had no greater national feeling than was commong among the farmers.

565 The Communists' avowed attempt to raise
184 the status of the worker must have given the worker a feeling of importance as he learned of the Communists' economic reconstruction plan. He derives a measure of pride when a steel plant is erected or when a bridge is built, although he may not really believe that the workers, as the Communists say, are the masters of the New China. Other promised benefits, including job security and welfare provisions, also add to the popularity of the Communist regime among the workers, despite the fact that most

565 184 of these benefits are limited and there have been only a small number of beneficiaries.

565 466 184 On the liability side of the Communist policy toward the worker are: the lack of substantial increase in the standard of living, a harsher work schedule and loss of leisure time, and growing disillusionment as it becomes obvious that the "proletariat" has not really become the master of the New China. The recent let-up in "labor emulation" drives and the sudden flurry of official warnings against overwork and overly rigid demands upon the time and temper of the laborer indicate that the laboring class is not necessarily most productive under pressure. In addition, the worker's attitude may also be greatly influenced by the rise of a new, Communist-fostered managerial class, which, for whatever reasons, receives more benefits than does manual labor.

565 648 Foreign advisers had been employed in many Chinese factories in pre-Communist days, and many workers may have become accustomed to recognizing the general excellence of Western technology. However, any government effort to impose foreign leadership in technical fields may injure the pride of the worker and provoke his resentment. There is no evidence to suggest that many Russian technicians or advisers are employed in factories in this region, or that those employed have caused resentment among the native workers.

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The Chinese worker has not abandoned his aspiration of personal advancement in the material sense. The promotion of the young and ambitious to serve in the huge government bureaucracy may satisfy some of the workers, but the lack of a substantial increase in their standard of living will lead many to feel that their aspirations cannot be fulfilled under the Communist regime.

III. STUDENTS AND INTELLECTUALS

Of all the groups of people in China, the intellectuals are probably the most varied in their attitudes. They do not constitute a "class," hence their attitudes do not show any distinctive "group" characteristics. There are those whose strong convictions make them active leaders of social and political movements in defiance of authoritarian rule; there are others whose education and experience make them flexible under pressure. Hence no dependable conclusion on the attitudes of the Chinese intellectuals as a group has been arrived at.

Although the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals may differ, the great majority of them are exceedingly patriotic. It is therefore conceivable that to some of them at least the Communist emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than the traditional loyalty to the family must have a great appeal. There is reason to believe that most of them who accepted Communism in 1949 did so because they saw in the Communist program some hope of restoring China to a position of power among the nations. After five years of Communist

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565 rule, some of the intellectuals are probably 184 elated by the truculence with which Red China has been conducting its foreign affairs, and by the feeling that China, at long last, has been unified. But on the negative side, severe restrictions on intellectual freedom have been imposed by the Communists. Furthermore, the Communist policy of gradually substituting the freshly trained and well-indoctrinated intellectuals for those who have had a"liberal" or "conservative" background must have created a feeling of insecurity among many of the intellectual group.

Traditionally, Chinese intellectuals aspired to high positions in the government, the principal means to wealth, social esteem, and influence. For those intellectuals who still harbor such personal amibitons, it must be heartening to see people with no seniority in either the Party hierarchy or the government bureaucracy among the ranks of the nation's leaders in all fields. For others, who have modified their personal ambitions and who sincerely wish to make their training useful to the country, something they have not been able to do for many years, Peking's policy of finding a place for intellectuals in the national reconstruction program is undoubtedly welcomed. So far, the vast underdeveloped areas in Southwest China have offered a great challenge to the educated, and many who accepted assignments in such areas have been reported to feel that they finally have started contributing to the welfare of their country. However, it must be remembered that in an effort to place college graduates and other trained personnel where they are most needed, the Communist government has been guilty of misassignments which have caused dissatisfaction and open criticism in the Communist press.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have always had enthusiastic support among most of the students. Many loyal Communist cadres are recruited from among the students who, so far, have not shown any lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause. But while accepting Communism as their ideal, the students may not be able to entirely suppress a simultaneous impulse toward individualism. Furthermore, they may also find the reality of Communism or the individual's place in the regime less exciting and idealistic than promised by Communist preachments.

VI. BUSINESSMEN AND INDUSTRIALISTS

Few industrialists are left in Communist China today, but small-businessmen and manufacturers, who made up the larger part of China's urban population continue to exist in reduced numbers. The merchant has always occupied an inferior position in the traditional Chinese social strata, while industry is something relatively new, and an industrialist's position in Chinese society has yet to be clearly defined. In general, merchants and manufacturers, who had been forced to operate under government restrictions even in pre-Communist days, are cool-headed realists. They are not easily swayed by high-sounding phrases. There have been few occasions when symbols of the state could evoke sentiment among the merchants and small manufacturers

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except, perhaps, at a time when foreign goods flooded the Chinese market and caused dislocation in the Chinese economy.

Under the Peking regime, businessmen and industrialists as a group fare badly (possibly not much better than rich landowners), and the general mood in industrial and commercial circles is most probably unfavorable toward the government. The Communists have made it clear that small businessmen and manufacturers are only tolerated in the transitional stage of the "New Democracy," and that there will be no room for private enterprise in the socialist society which is the ultimate goal of the Communist regime. Meanwhile, these people have to carry a large share of the tax burden and face the stiff competition of and regulation by state enterprises. There is evidence that the businessmen and manufacturers, accustomed as they are to government interference, are finding the controls imposed by the Communist government increasingly harsh and ever more difficult to evade. In Southwest China, this mood may not be easily discernible since there are fewer large commercial and industrial centers.

If profit has been the most common motive among businessmen and manufacturers, under present circumstances they have been forced to abandon or at least restrain their amibitons. Some members of this class who were allowed to do so have made a second choice -- that of changing their careers. The more adaptable have escaped the purges by co-operating with

565 184 the Communist regime. In this connection, the Communists have appointed a few erstwhile influential industrialists to serve in the government; it may be merely a conciliatory gesture of the Communists to win the support of small business, but it does provide this class of people with one temporary alternative to their lost hope.

Ad additional factor in provoking dissatisfaction among the merchants is the control on export trade. Southwest China has a few traditionally profitable export commodities, such as tung-oil, hog bristles, and foodstuffs. Now that the government has virtually completed its monopoly of export trade, the merchants are denied of the opportunity to take part in this lucrative undertaking.

V. WOMEN

562 184 The customary position of women in China is subordinate to that of men. This tradition is so deep-rooted that it took superhuman courage for the first women to claim their rights in pre-Communist days; and the pain of "emancipation" continues under the Communists.

To the "emancipated" belongs responsibility; this is at least theoretically true, and the Chinese women who have thus assumed more active roles in society are generally expected to have a degree of political consciousness similar to that of men

562 of equal education and comparable environment. 184 In many cases women prove to be even more "patriotic" than men as a result of the unprecedented government effort to show the women that they, too, can achieve enviable social recognition by a show of nationalism.

How much improvement in the status of women has been brought about by the Communists? Women are encouraged to participate in political activities and industry; they are provided with facilities for child care and adult education, as well as other welfare benefits if they will join the working force. If the increase in the number of women workers in factories can be taken as an indication of the women's own free choice, then women in Communist China may indeed feel favorably disposed toward the Communist regime. But upon closer observation this may not be the case; many women are reluctant to work in factories and those who undertook factory work after 1949 may have done so as a financial necessity rather than as a result of free choice.

The much-publicized Marriage Law in Communist China embodies nothing new in principle but its vigorous and often arbitrary enforcement is unprecedented. Acceptance of this law will mean the destruction of some of the most stubborn traditions in China (See discussion of the Marriage Law in the chapter on Family).

562 184 Some women hold high posts in government, and there are "labor heroines" in all industries. Housewives of well-to-do families in larger cities may live in leisure. Those of families of modest means may have to accept employment, but as long as the work does not require strength, they do not resent it. The age-group differential asserts itself in the reaction of women to the new regime; older women who had learned to live in peace with the extended family system are likely to dread the Communist effort to reduce the extended family to the conjugal family; young women are more apt to feel favorably disposed toward the Peking regime.

562 369 184 A sharp difference in attitude is to be observed between the women in such urban centers as Chungking and Chengtu, and those in the vast frontier areas where little urbanization has taken place. City life, plus opportunity to receive education in new schools, had caused changes in attitudes among women in urban centers even before the Communist regime announced its policy with regard to women and their status in society. Such women are likely to expect much of their "emancipation" and resent the Communist effort to add them to the labor force. To them sustained Communist indoctrination may amount to boredom. In the outlying villages, women remain more strictly tradition-bound and are less prepared to accept the new roles the Communists have assigned them.

VI. MINORITY NATIONALITIES

513 184 Among the regions in China proper, the Southwest has the largest number of ethnic

563 184 minority groups. Traditionally isolated to varying degrees, these groups had been given little reason to feel favorably disposed toward a central government in China; in their eyes, a central authority appeared a threat to their traditional way of life. Until it has been proven that by identifying themselves as a part of the "greater" Chinese community they would be in a better position to realize their aspirations, it would be difficult for these groups to share the national feelings of the *Han*-Chinese.

The Communist government has been trying to cultivate a feeling of kinship between all the ethnic groups and to assimilate the minority nationals without provoking their resentment. Preferential treatment has been extedned minority nationals who left their villages for the *Han*-Chinese areas. Many of the ethnic minorities have been granted "autonomous" status by the Central People's Government to win their support. Schools have been established and languages designed for the minority groups so that Communist ideology can be taught to them. Special efforts have been made to publicize the achievements of individuals belonging to such groups. All these measures are meant to foster a favorable attitude among the minority groups toward the Peking regime.

It is impossible to measure the success or failure of the Communist policy toward the minority groups at this stage. However, it appears reasonable to say that the Communists have been doing more to win support from these groups than to alienate them.

VII. OTHER GROUPS

665 In addition to the groups discussed, there
184 are other groups which, although minor in numerical strength, are of importance because their attitudes have significant bearing on the tensions in Chinese society.

It is evident that all Communist Party members and all government bureaucrats do not necessarily have the same attitudes, in spite of the fact that they are regimented by a well-controlled machine. High-ranking Communist officials exhibited intense feelings of Party loyalty and dedication to the "cause" in the early days of their careers, and so far there has been no indication that their feelings have changed. Granted that the behind-the-scene struggle for personal power in a Soviet system is most difficult to discern, the top Communist leaders in Southwest China have yet to offer evidence of power-seeking at the risk of disrupting Party harmony and hegemony. Those who contributed to the victory of the Communists received assignment commensurate with their service, and they seem to remain active and content with their positions.

The personnel in lower Party echelons are subject to tremendous pressures from all sides. Even the most devoted Party workers are expected to repeatedly prove their loyalty to the Communist regime. The fact that the Party relies

665 on close surveillance and an atmosphere of 184 fear in order to keep members in line indicates the existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence within the Party ranks. The expansion of a bureaucracy necessitates the promotion of numerous lower-level Party functionaries. This certainly tends to make the old Party cadres resentful when they see the rise of new cadres to positions equal to or higher than their own. Generally speaking, cadres assigned to rural areas are less enthusiastic about the regime than those in urban areas who live in more comfortable circumstances and have more frequent opportunities for advancement.

Former Nationalist officials had their darkest days during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, when almost all lived under the imminent threat of violence and death. After these intensive campaigns had subsided, a few former Kuomintang personnel remained among the Communist government bureaucrats. Even former warlords who has chosen to co-operate with the Communists have been assigned government positions without true authority, but which at least insure their livelihood and prestige. A sense of insecurity may continue to affect some members of this group, but as time goes on they will consolidate their positions in the "new" society.

VIII. CONCLUSION

184 The Communist system of multiple control, which extends to all aspects of life, and the Communist effort to maintain a strong tie with

184 Russia are two major causes of dissatisfaction among the Chinese people. Regimentation, when carried to the extreme, provokes the resistance of the people. Subservience to Russia destroys the spirit of nationalism which the Communists have been trying to cultivate in China. Vigorous and continuous government efforts to promote friendship with Russia through the extensive Sino-Soviet Frendship Association is an indirect admission that anti-Russian feeling either already exists or can easily develop.

The general patterns of attitudes we have discussed can serve only as indications of the prevailing social mood among various groups. Sociologists agree that it is difficult to predict group response. This, it appears, must apply to a study of a people so various in temperament as the Chinese.

CONSTITUTION

SOUTHWEST CHINA

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Since the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in September, 1954 is designed to serve the country as a whole, it will be undesirable to deal with it on a regional basis. However, a study of certain interesting phases of the Constitution is included in this handbook as Appendix A, and readers are urged to consult it.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2b,
Political Background

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

I. MILITARY CONQUEST

101 Southwest China was the last region to come under the power of the Chinese Communists.

The term Southwest covers the following provinces: Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Sikang. However, Sikang has been incorporated into Szechwan since July 1955.

669 A brief account of the conquest of these four provinces follows. The Communist army began their move toward this region at the beginning of November 1949. This task was entrusted to the 1st Field Army under P'eng Te-huai and to the 2nd, under Liu Po-ch'eng. When these two armies were fighting in the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, they were further reinforced by the 4th army under Lin Piao. While the main force of P'eng's army went ahead for a direct attack of the Northwest Region, a part of his army remained in Shensi to fight the Nationalist army under the command of Hu Tsung-nan, who was withdrawing from Shensi to Szechwan and Sikang.

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669 The second field army under Liu Po-ch'eng coming from Shansi and Shensi encountered the Nationalist army on the border of Hupeh, Hunan, and Szechwan. This army was under the command of Sung Hsi-lien, who tried to stop the Communist advance. A battle took place between them, and Liu succeeded in destroying Sung's main force at I-ch'ang and Sha-shih and in crossing the Yangtze River. Liu, not satisfied with this partial success, continued the pursuit of Sung's army to Kweichow and Szechwan.

While Hu Tsung-nan's army was on the way to Chengtu, in the west of Szechwan, it was threatened on both sides: on the northern side by P'eng, and on the southeastern side by Liu. Hu Tsung-nan tried to escape to Ya-an and Hsi-ch'ang, but as Lin's army had already entered Yunnan after the surrender of Governor Lu Han, Liu crossed the border of Yunnan and annihilated Hu's army in Hsi-ch'ang, while Hu himself excaped by plane. Thus the Nationalist Army was completely wiped out.

721 Tibet, which was then a buffer state between China and British India, was still beyond the reach of the Chinese Communists. Liu Po-ch'eng raised the question of Tibet at a meeting of the Southwest Military and Political Committee held on July 27, 1950 and announced that the Tibetan campaign would follow quickly in order to get rid of Anglo-American imperialism. Following this declaration, the Communist Army

721 marched into Tibet from both neighboring provinces, Sikang and Tsinghai. The battle of Ch'ang-tu cleared the way for the march to Lhasa. In May 1951, an agreement of peaceful solution was signed by the Tibetan and Chinese delegates in Peking. Thus the military conquest of the Southwest came to an end with an extension of Chinese sovereignty to Tibet.

631 In the first period of conquest by the Chinese Communists, this region was divided into eight units: namely, (1) Ch'uan-tung (East Szechwan), (2) Ch'uan-hsi (West Szechwan), (3) Ch'uan-nan (South Szechwan), (4) Ch'uan-pei (North Szechwan), (5) Yunnan, (6) Kweichow, (7) Sikang, and (8) the Special Municipality -- Chungking.

After two years, the four sections of Szechwan were reassembled into one province as before. Sikang, which had been considered attached to Tibet long ago and declared a separate province only in 1928, was now incorporated into Szechwan. Chungking's status as a special municipality under the Peking government, was cancelled. Thus today the Southwest Region comprises only the three provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow and Yunnan

II. THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION

423 The first program of this period was based on the eight points[1] announced by Mao Tse-tung in the third session of the seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party held on June 6, 195

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[1] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Gov't Reports 1950], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 1.

The first item of the 8-point program was *land reform. The official reports of the Military* and Political Committee of this region on landownership were prepared to indicate necessity for reform. Chang Chi-ch'un, a member of the Southwest Military and Political Committee, stated that in Ch'uan-tung in 12 *Paos* (a group of villages) there was a population of 17,465 persons and an acreage of land which could produce 24,139 *tan* (piculs) and 7 *tou* of rice. Of this land, 60 per cent was owned by 1,147 "landlords." Approximately 25 per cent of the land was owned by 15,369 "middle poor" peasants, 5.8 per cent was owned by 4,967 poor peasants, and 2.6 per cent was owned by 8,490 tenant farmers.[2]

Wang Wei-kang, a member of the Ch'uan-nan Administrative Committee, reported that while in the three *paos* of the Yung Country, the landowners, 8 per cent of the population, owned 68.37 per cent of the land, the peasants, the moderately well-to-do, the poor, and the hired farm hands who constituted 85.4 per cent of the population, owned only 24.7 per cent of the land.[3] Chang Chi-ch'un reported similar conditions of land monopoly in Kweichow and to a lesser degree[4] in Yunnan. He said that land monopoly was most acute in the municipality of Chungking where 96.2 per cent of the land was in the hands of the rich

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[2] *Compendium of Government Reports*, p.1006

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 1049.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 1006.

423 landowners, and less than 3 per cent in the hands of the middle and poor peasants.[5] He came to the conclusion that as 40,000 people out of a total population of 57,400,000 were on the verge of starvation, the policy of Mao Tse-tung was justified and should be carried out.

745 In this period it was also found that there
162 was a large number of persons in Southwest China who depended upon the government for a living. Teng Hsiao-p'ing reported on April 11, 1950 that there were 900,000 disbanded Kuomintang soldiers, 400,000 old civil service men, and 700,000 Communist soldiers. He emphasized that if they were not well-fed, a state of disorder might result.[6] The Communists considered the collection of a grain levy on the whole population in order to feed the armies and the civil service men as the most urgent need at this time.

169 The Communists were greatly concerned that the Kuomintang members would make trouble. Their fears were confirmed when the rebellion led by Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan, two Kuomintang generals, took place in Kunming. Part of the 2nd and 4th field armies were sent from southern Kwangsi to Yunnan, and the rebellion was quickly stamped out, although the rebel leaders succeeded in escaping to the border of Burma.

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[5] Ibid., p. 1006.

[6] Ibid., p. 991.

178 Another problem was the number of steel
499 plants and textile mills which had been established in the Southwest during war against
653 Japan. The years of civil war in 1949 and 1950 had produced a depression, and industry and commerce could no longer maintain themselves. As a remedy the Communists proposed the construction of the Chungking-Chengtu Railroad. In spite of the great financial difficulties in which the Communist central government was involved at that time, it was decided to invest an amount of money equivalent to 76,000,000 catties of rice for highway construction and 180,000,000 catties for railroad construction. These projects stimulated the revival of the steel, coal, and electrical engineering industries and the economic condition of Szechwan gradually improved.

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162 A further problem special to this region wa that of the national minorities which amounted, according to the latest census and the report of Wang Wei-chou, to about 12 million

Tibetans	2,775,627
Yi People	3,254,269
Miao People	2,511,339
Chung-chia	1,600,000
Mohammedans	1,000,000
Min-chia	600,000
Thai People	400,000
Total	12,341,235

636 In order to meet the demands of these minorities
563 autonomous areas were established. The Tibetans in Sikang constitute a special area, even though

573 636 the latter is now a part of the province of Szechwan. Below the provincial level, there are 21 autonomous 631 counties, 15 autonomous sections below the county 563 level and 49 autonomous hsiang. In addition, 11 administrative districts, 53 counties, 27 sections, and 72 hsiang, coalition governments representing different nationalities have been formed.[7] The Communist Regime attached special importance to winning over the national minorities in order to counteract Kuomintang efforts at infiltration.

635 For a short period the Chinese Communists tried a system of Regional Governments called "The Military and Political Committees of the Greater Areas" for the regions of China proper; and in Manchuria "The People's Government of the Northeast." The Regional Governments were patterned after the Union Republics of the USSR. However, after a two-year period of experiment they were found unsatisfactory and condemned by Liu Shao-ch'i as "Independent Kingdoms." Chou En-lai's Government Administration Council then passed a resolution in November 1952 that the Committee of the region should change its name from the Military and Political Committee to the Administrative Committee, with the status of an agent of the Central Government. After the nature and function of the Administrative Committee was changed into that of an agent of the Central Government, the members of the same committee were no more appointed by the Central People's Government, that is, Mao Tse-tung's Council, but were recommended by the Government Administration Council -- Chou En-lai. Though the Political-Legal Commission, Financial-Economical Com-

[7. on following page]

635 mission, Cultural-Educational Commission and the People's Control Commission within the Committee of the Greater Area were kept intact, some of the departments of the same Committee became subordinate to the ministries of the Central People's Government.

The change from Military and Political Committee to Administrative Committee indicates that China, which has been a unitary state for two thousand years, cannot be transformed into a federal state following the pattern of Soviet Russia.

The organization and structure of the Administrative Committee of the Region is given as follows:

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7. [continued from previous page] Wang Wei-chou's report on the national minorities, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] , Peking, February 11, 1952.

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GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION
COUNCIL OF PEKING

THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE REGION

(1) Political-Legal Commission

(2) Financial-Economic Commission

(3) Cultural-Educational Commission

(4) People's Control Comm.

THE PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE

1. Department of Civil Affairs
2. Dept. of Public Security
3. Dept. of National Minorities
4. Dept. of Overseas Chinese
5. Dept. of Finance
6. Dept. of People's Provincial Bank
7. Dept. of Industry and Commerce
8. Dept. of Industries
9. Dept. of Transportation
10. Dept. of Post and Telegraph
11. Dept. of Agriculture and Forestry
12. Dept. of Labor
13. Dept. of Education
14. Dept. of Culture
15. Dept. of Health
16. Dept. of Information & Publication
17. Dept. of Committee for Prevention of Illiteracy

135 All these Departments were subordinated in three ways: (1) to the Administrative Committee of the Region through its commissions, (2) to the Provincial People's Government, (3) to the appropriate ministries of the Central Government. Such a complex system of subordination and control tends to slow down administration. More important, too much power was given to the Administrative Committee and in some areas this power was monopolized by leading regional figures. The system was again revised and then finally abolished on June 14, 1954.

On the provincial level, personnel were formerly appointed by the recommendation of the Regional Committee to the Peking Government. Later when the provincial Representatives' Conference was called into existence, the right of electing the governors of the provinces was transferred to the Conference. In reality the choice of a provincial governor was in the hands of the Communist Party and the Central regime, although on the surface it appeared that he was elected by the Representatives' Conference.

The relation between the provincial governor and the Provincial People's Congress (until 1954 called the Provincial Representatives) can be best explained by the actual working of these two branches. With the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the Provincial People's Congress assumed new functions.

The Szechwan Provincial People's Congress was convened for the first time in the period

635 August 1-8, 1955 and was attended by 650 members consisting of Chinese, Tibetans, Chuang's, Yi's and Miao's. Li Ching-ch'üan, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, made a report on the work of the past two years and the important tasks to be done in the coming winter and
178 spring. He referred to improvements in
241 agriculture and industry, giving the following figures for 1952 as 100:

	1953	199.11
Industries	1954	307.9 estimated
Agriculture	1953	86 %
	1954	6 %

There were 34 national and local factories and mines in the region, 604 agricultural co-operatives and 990,000 mutual-aid teams. In the same report he claimed that the people of Szechwan supported the building of the railroads from Chungking to Chengtu and from Chengtu to Pao-chi, and also the surveying of oil fields in Szechwan.

635 With regard to the tasks of the coming winter and spring, he asked the people of Szechwan to try to reach the goal for the second year of the five-year plan. Li's report was passed. Another report on the Constitutional draft was made by Governor Li. After a serious debate, it was given a unanimous support. Finally, 87 delegates to the National Congress were elected with Chu Teh at the head of the list.[8]

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[8] *Kuang-ming Jih-pao* [*Enlightenment Daily*], Peking, August 10, 1952.

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635 In Yunnan, the first Provincial People's Congress met from August 6-12, 1954. It was attended by 376 members, who represented a population of 17,000,000, which, besides Chinese, is composed of 28 national minorities. The delegates of the Yunnan People's Congress were elected by 126 units. Out of the 17,000,000 population, 6,000,000 belong to the minorities. The delegates from them make up 41.1 per cent of all the delegates sent to the National Congress. Women delegates took up 15 per cent.

Kuo-ying Ch'iu, vice-chairman of the Yunnan Government, gave a report on the administration of Yunnan which was passed and ratified. A debate on the constitutional draft, which was given full support, followed. The Congress passed a resolution in support of the policy of liberating Formosa. Finally the election of 45 delegates to the National Congress took place -- an election in which each of the 14 minority groups had a share.[9]

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

631 Two years before the promulgation of the Constitution, the Chinese Communist Party decided that China should be a unitary state, with

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[9] Enlightenment Daily, August 14, 1954.

631 each province standing under the direct control of the central government. In the Constitution the structure of provincial local units was clearly defined on the basis of democratic centralism. Since the membership in the National Congress was made up of delegates elected by the provinces, the special municipalities, the military forces, the overseas Chinese, each provincial congress became a part of the electoral machinery of the National Congress. But since the executive-administrative and the legislative organs on a higher level have the power to cancel or revise inappropriate resolutions of corresponding organs on a lower level, the administrative and legislative organs in a province, a county, or a hsiang are not really independent, nor do they have any power on the basis of a charter or a special grant.

A. The Provincial Government

635 The promulgation of the New Constitution has placed the Provincial Governments on a new basis. On the one hand, each province regains its traditional status of an administrative district under the supervision of the Central Government, while, on the other hand, there is a change from tradition insofar as the members of the Provincial Government are elected and a Provincial People's Congress has a share in the deliberative functions. The avoidance of the term "legislative" in the section on Provincial Government suggests that the People's Congress was limited to the function

635 of deliberation and is not entitled to hold the corresponding executive organs accountable. It can be said that each province, according to the Communist Constitution Article 53, is a modified administrative district subject to control from above but empowered to pass budget, enforce laws and safeguard the rights of citzens. Though the Provincial Government is elected and a Provincial People's Congress sits next to it, it does not have the reserved powers of a state under the American Constitution, nor the powers granted by special charter to a British borough. It is stipulated that the Provincial Government stands under the leadership of the Central Government, and that the Provincial People's Congress can only pass resolutions within the framework of the laws which govern it.

631 Similarly, autonomous regions and municipalities are administrative districts directly under the central government. Counties and Hsiang (villages) are also an administrative district, though they are not considered as being directly under the authority of the Central Government.

635 The executive, deliberative, and judicial branches of the Provincial Government are constituted as follows:

The Provincial Executive consists of one governor, a number of deputy-governors, and twenty-five to fifty-five members of the Provincial People's Council. The governor, the deputy-governors, and the members of the Provincial

635 Council are elected by the Provincial People's Congress, while the Commissoners of the Civil Affairs, Public Security, Finance, Grain, and other twelve departments are appointed by the Central Government. The fact that the Commissioners are appointed confirms the view that the provincial administration is not a kind of self-government, but stands under the centralized control of the Peking Government.

The Provincial People's Congress according to the Constitution has the following powers:

(1) To ensure observance and execution of the laws, decrees, and the resolutions of the National People's Congress; (2) to adopt and promulgate resolutions within the limits of their functions and powers; (3) to plan economic construction, cultural construction, public works, pension work and relief work; (4) to consider and approve budgets and financial statements; (5) to elect members of the Provincial People's Council; (6) to elect presidents of the Provincial People's Courts and of the intermediate People's Courts; (7) to elect deputies to the National People's Congress of the next higher level; (8) to hear and examine the work reports of the Provincial People's Councils and the Provincial People's Courts; (9) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions of the People's Congresses and People's Councils on the county level; (10) to protect public property, maintain public order, and safeguard civil rights; (11) to ensure the equal rights of the national minorities; (12) to recall the members of the Provincial People's

635 Council and its president.

From this list the powers of the Provincial People's Congress are enumerated. It should be noted, however, that while the Provincial People's Congress has a number of powers over organs on the provincial and lower levels, it is itself under the ultimate control of the National People's Congress and inevitably of the Central Government.

666 The Provincial People's Congress is elected indirectly. Its size is determined by: (1) the population of the province; (2) the number of the counties within the province. According to the Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China for the Congresses of all levels, a province with a population not exceeding 20 million shall elect from 100 to 400 deputies; a province with a population exceeding 20 million, from 400 to 500 deputies. In a province where the population and the number of counties are exceptionally small, the number of deputies may exceed 500 but shall not exceed 600.

Since the members of the Provincial People's Congress are elected, not directly by the people of the province, but indirectly by the counties, the provincial municipalities, towns, and others, the size of the Provincial Congress is governed by a second principle: a county with a population not exceeding 200,000 shall elect one to three deputies; a county with a population between 200,000 and 600,000 shall elect two to four deputies; a county with a population exceeding 600,000 shall elect three to five deputies.

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From the municipalities and towns and the important industrial and mining districts within the provinces, one deputy shall be elected by every 20,000 of the population. Based on the abovementioned principles, the number of the members of the Provincial Congress as of the Southwest is as follows: Szechwan, 650, plus Sikang, 101; Yunnan, 344; Kweichow, 284.

635 It is important to note the relationship between the provincial government and the provincial congress in their actual work. Usually, the chairman or the governor gives a report on government work, followed by another report on the tasks of the coming year, which announced not only the measures planned by provincial government but also the methods by which the people can fulfill the agricultural and industrial production quotas. As examples, the procedure of the Szechwan and the Yunnan Provincial People's Congresses have been described in the above paragraphs. The procedure of the first Kweichow Provincial People's Congress affords a further illustration.

The first Provincial People's Congress of Kweichow was convened in the period July 22-30, with an attendance of 284 members. Chou Lin, the vice-chairman of Kweichow, made a report on the work of the Kweichow government in the past four years. He pointed out that great improvement had been made in handling the affairs of the minority groups. In the counties where the minorities were 40 per cent of the

635 population, the loan of 11,600,000,000 yuan had been made as rural credit, while cultivating machinery and equipment with a value of some 13,800,000,000 yuan had been distributed. 2,000 party cadres who came from the minority groups were trained, and 674,000 students enrolled in the primary schools. It has always been difficult for the people of Kweichow to obtain salt for cooking because it must be imported from Szechwan and carried by coolies on their shoulders Chou Lin reported that the per capita consumption of salt had risen from 5.7 catties in 1951 to 8.15 catties in 1953. Chou also reported that there were 265,900 mutual aid teams in which 64 per cent of the peasant population were member and that besides the 519 agricultural producers' co-operatives already established, another 5,000 were expected to be added in the spring of 1955. Finally, the Kweichow People's Congress passed a resolution giving full support to the Constitutional draft and elected 26 delegates to the National Congress, of which six were from the minority groups.[10] From the above proceedings of the provincial congresses, it can be seen that policy-making was in the hands of the Governor, while the congress was a mere echoing machine, reflecting the popular response.

The Provincial People's Congress in the constitutional period has the power to elect the Governor, the Deputy-Governors, a number of members of the Provincial People's Council, and the President of the Court.

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[10] Enlightenment Daily, August 5, 1954.

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635 A list of the governors, deputy-governors, presidents of the People's high courts recently elected in the three provinces of the Southwest, is as follows:

A. Szechwan:

Governor -- Li Ta-chang.
Deputy-governors -- Teng Hsi-hou, Yen Hung-yen, Jen Pai-ko, Chung Ti-ch'ien, Yü Chi-t'ang.

Provincial Higher People's Court
President -- name not revealed

B. Sikang (before merging with Szechwan):

Governor -- Liao Chih-kao
Deputy-governors -- Pai Jen, Sana-rygas-shes (Tibetan), K'ang Nai-erh, Chang Wei-chiung, Kuo-chi-mu-ku, Yi Shargur Dobdeng (Tibetan).
P.H.P.C. President -- Liu Ch'ang-chien.

C. Yunnan:

Governor -- Kuo Ying-ch'in
Deputy-governors -- Chang Ch'ung, Liu Tai-feng, Liu Ming-hui, Kung Tzu-chih, Wu Tso-min.
P.H.P.C. President -- Jou Hsing-ts'ai

D. Kweichow:

Governor -- Chou Lin

Deputy-governors -- Chou Su-yüan, Hsü Chien-sheng, Wu Shih, Ou Pai-ch'uan
P.H.P.C. President -- Yeh Ku-lin.

In general, most judicial affairs are handled on the national level. However, the Provincial Congress plays a certain role.

Article 59 of the Constitution, "The People's Congress at county level and above, elect and have power to recall the presidents of People's Courts at corresponding levels," and accordingly is a version of articles 105-09 of the Constitution of the USSR. The jury system, which is provided for in Article 75 of the Communist Constitution, is the first in Chinese history.

Besides the elective presidents of the local courts, another institution which follows the Soviet pattern is the procuratorate. The provincial procurator is not elected, but appointed for four years by the procurator-general in Peking. Each county has a similar official appointed by the provincial procurator with approval of the Procurator-general.

The following paragraphs deal with the governments below the provincial level: the municipal governments, the county governments, and the hsiang or chen governments. The urban population lives in a municipality, while the county and the hsiang or chen consist entirely of rural or half-rural population. However, between the provincial and the county level, there is an agent of the provincial government who inspects the work of the different county governments within the district.

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635 The number and the respective names of the municipalities, counties and administrative districts in these three provinces of Southwest China are given as follows:

Political Subdivisions

The political subdivisions of this region, like those of other regions in China, have been modified many times since the Peking regime was established. The latest of these changes is the abolition of Sikang Province and the incorporation of that area into Szechwan Province, approved by the People's Congress in Peking in July 1955. The Ch'ang-tu District, formerly the western half of Sikang Province, had already been merged with the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The following political subdivisions were current in August 1955.

A. Szechwan Province. Capital, Chengtu.

1. Ten municipalities (cities): Chengtu, Tzu-kung, Lu-chou, Wu-t'ung-ch'iao, Nei-chiang, I-pin, Wanhsien, Nan-ch'ung, Ho-ch'uan, Ya-an.

2. Three minority nationality autonomous districts under the direct control of the provincial government:

a) Szechwan Tibetan Autonomous District (District government at Shua-ching-shih), 12 counties: Mou, Wen-ch'uan, Li, Hsiao-chin, Ta-chin, Sung-p'an, 635 A-pa, Ssu-t'u, Hei-shui, Nan-p'ing, Jo-erh-kai, Ch'o-ssu-chia.

b) The former Sikang Tibetan Autonomous Chou [11] (Chou administrative office at K'ang-ting), 20 counties: K'ang-ting, Lu-ting, Chiu-lung, Ya-chiang, Ch'ien-ning, Tan-pa, Li-t'ang, Tao-ch'eng, Te-yung, I-tun, Pa-t'ang, Teng-k'o, Te-ko, Kan-tzu, Lu-huo, Tao-fu, Hsin-lung, Pai-yü, Shih-ch'ü.
c) Liang-shan Yi Minority Nationality Autonomous Chou [12] (Chou administrative office at Chao-chüeh), 7 counties: Chao-chüeh, P'u-hsiung, P'u-ko, Hsi-te, Pu-t'o, Mei-ku, Chin-yang.

3. Twelve districts:

a) Wen-chiang (District administrative office at Wen-chiang), 18 counties: Wen-chiang, P'i, Ch'ung-ning, P'eng, Hsin-fan, Hsin-tu, Hua-yang, Shuang-liu, Ta'i, Ch'ung-ch'ing, Kuan, Ch'iung-lai, Hsin-chin, Ming-shan, P'u-chiang, Kuang-han, Chin-t'ang, Shih-fang.
b) Mien-yang (District administrative office at Mien-yang), 15 counties: Mien-yang, Chang-ming, Tsu-t'ung, Lo-chiang, Te-yang, Mien-chu, An, Kuang-yüan, Chao-hua, Wang-ts'ang, Chien-ko, Chiang-yu, Pei-ch'uan, P'ing-wu, Ch'ing-ch'uan.
c) Hsu-ning, P'eng-ch'i, T'ung-nan,

[see following page for 11. and 12.]

An-yüeh, Lo-chih, Chung-chiang, San-t'ai, She-hung, Yen-t'ing.

d) Han-ch'ung (District administrative office at Yüeh-ch'ih), 11 counties: Yüeh-ch'ih, Wu-sheng, Nan-ch'ung, Hsi-ch'ung, Nan-pu, P'eng-an, Ying-shan, I-lung, Ts'ang-ch'i, Lang-chung, Kuang-an.

e) Ta-hsien (District administrative office at Ta-hsien), 11 counties: Ta, P'ing-ch'ang, Pa-chung, Nan-chiang, T'ung-chiang, Wan-yuan, Hsüan-han, K'ai-chiang, Ta-chu, Ch'ü, Lin-shui.

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11. Chou is a traditional Chinese term for an administrative division. This term was adopted to replace the former designation of "District" at the 1st session of the Second People's Representative Conference of the Tibetan Autonomous District in Sikang, convened at Ya-nan, March 2-6, 1955. There so far has been no information on the name chosen for this chou following the abolition of Sikang Province.

12. This district was renamed "chou" in in April 1955.

f) Wan-hsien (District administrative office at Wan-hsien municipality), 9 counties: Wan, K'ai, Yün-yang, Ch'eng-k'ou, Wu-ch'i, Wu-shan, Feng-chieh, Chung, Liang-p'ing.

g) Fu-ling (District administrative office at Fu-ling) 11 counties: Fu-ling Ch'ang-shou, Feng-tu, Shih-chu, Ch'ien-chiang, Yu-yang, Hsiu-shan, P'eng-shui, Wu-lung, Nan-ch'uan, Tien-chiang.

h) Chiang-chin (District administrative office at Chiang-chin), 10 counties: Chiang-chin, Yung-ch'uan, Yung-ch'ang, Ta-tsu, T'ung-liang, Ho-ch'uan, Pi-shan, Chiang-pei, Pa, Ch'i-chiang.

i) Lu-chou (District admininstrative office at Lu-chou), 8 counties: Lu, Fu-shun, Lung-ch'ang, Ho-chiang, Na-ch'i, Ku-sung, Hsü-yung, Ku-lin.

j) I-pin (District administrative office at I-pin), 9 counties: I-pin, Nan-ch'i, Chiang-an, Ch'ing-fu, Ch'ang-ning, Hsing-wen, Kung, Kao, Yün-lien.

k) Lo-shan (District administrative office at Lo-shan), 15 counties: Lo-shan, Chia-chiang, Ch'ing-shen, Mei-shan, P'eng-shan, Hung-ya, Tan-ling, Ching-yen, Ch'ien-wei, Mu-ch'uan, P'in-shan, Lei-po, Ma-pien, O-pien, O-mei.

l) Nei-chiang (District administrative office at Nei-chiang), 7 counties: Nei-chiang, Wei-yüan, Yung, Jen-shou, Chien-yang, Tzu-yang, Tzu-chung.

m) Ya-an (District administrative office at Ya-an), 7 counties: Ya-an, Yung-ching, Han-yüan, Shih-mien, T'ien-ch'üan, Pao-hsing, Lu-shan.
n) Hsi-ch'ang (District administrative office at Hsi-ch'ang), 11 counties: Hsi-ch'ang, Ning-nan, Te-ch'ang, Hui-li, Hui-tung, Yen-pien, Mien-ming, Yüeh-sui (pronounced Yüeh-chün locally), Mi-i, Chin-k'uang, Yen-yüan; one minority nationality autonomous subdistrict; the Mu-li Tibetan Autonomous Subdistrict.

B. Yunnan Province. Capital, Kunming

1. Two municipalities (cities): Kungming, Ko-chiu

2. One mining district under the direct control of the provincial government: the Tung-ch'uan Mining District.

3. Eleven districts

a) Chao-t'ung (District administrative office at Chao-t'ung), 11 counties: Ta-kuan, Sui-chiang, Yen-chin, Wei-hsin, Chen-hsiung, I-liang, Lu-tien, Ch'iao-chia, Yung-shan, Hui-tse, Chao-t'ung.
b) Ch'ü-ching (District administrative office at Ch'ü-ching), 13 counties: Ch'ü-ching, Chan-i, Yung-feng, Fu-yüan Ma-lung, Sung-ming, Hsün-tien, I-liang,

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Lu-liang, Lo-p'ing, Shih-tsung, Lu-hsi, Lu-nan.

c) Wen-shan (District administrative office at Wen-shan) one municipality: Ma-li-p'o Municipality; 7 counties: Wen-shan, Yen-shan, Ch'iu-pei, Kuang-nan, Fu-ning, Hsi-ch'ou, Ma-kuan.

d) Meng-tzu (District administrative office at Meng-tzu), one municipality: Ho-k'ou Municipality; 7 counties: Meng-tzu, P'in-pien, Shih-p'in, Chien-shui, the county level: the Mi-lo-hsien Yi Minority Autonomous Subdistrict.

e) Yü-ch'i (District administrative office at Yü-ch'i, K'un-yang, Chin-ning, Ch'eng-kung, Ch'eng-chiang, Chiang-ch'uan, Hua-ning, T'ung-hai, Ho'hsi, Hsin'p'ing, I-men, Yuan-chiang; one minority nationality autonomous subdistrict: The O-shan-hsien Yi Minority Autonomous subdistrict.

f) Ssu-mao (District administrative office at P'u-erh), 7 counties: Ssu-mao, P'u-erh, Ching-tung, Mo-chiang, Lan-ts'ang, Ching' ku, Chen-yüan ; 3 minority nationality autnomous subdistricts at the county level: the Lang-ts'ang Lahu Minority Autonomous Subdistrict, the Meng-lien-hsien, T'ai, Lahu, and K'awa Minorities Autonomous Subdistrict, the Chiang-ch'eng-hsien Hani and Yi Minorities Autonomous Subdistrict.

g) Lin-ts'ang (District administrative office at Lin-ts'ang), 5 counties: Lin-ts'ang, Shuang-chiang, Ts'ang-yüan, Keng-ma, Chen-k'ang.

h) Pao-shan (District administrative office at Pao-shan), 4 counties: Pao-shan, Ch'ang'ning, T'eng-ch'ung, Lung-ling; one town: Wan-ting.

i) Ta-li (District administrative office at Hsia-kuan), 13 counties: Ta-li, Teng-ch'uan, Pin-ch'uan, Hsiang-yün, Feng-i, Mi-tu, Wei-shan, Yün, Feng-ch'ing, Yung-p'ing, Yang-pi, Yün-lung, Erh-yüan.

j) Li-chiang (District administrative office at Li-chiang), 9 counties: Li-chiang, Yung-sheng, Ho-ch'ing, Chien-ch'uan, Lan-p'ing, Wei-hsi, Chung-tien, Hua-p'ing, Ning-lang: one minority nationality autonomous subdistrict: the Te-ch'in-hsien Tibetan Autonomous Subdistrict.

k) Ch'u-hsiung (District administrative office at Ch'u-hsiung), 17 counties: Ch'u-hsiung, Mu-ting, Yen-hsing, Kuang-t'ung, Lu-feng, Shuang-po, Nan-hua, Yao-an, Yen-feng, Ta-yao, Yung-jen, Wu-ting, Lu-ch'üan, Fu-min, An-ning, Lo-tz"u, Yüan-mou.

l) Hsishuang Panna T'ai Minority Autonomous District (District administrative office at Yungchinghung), 12 Baan Naa (Panna, or Baan Naa -- "Land" in the Yi language. Baan Naa and an autonomous subdistrict have the equivalent status of "subdistrict"): Yung-ching-hung, Meng-hai, Meng-wang, I-wu, Meng-na, Meng-h'un, Meng-che, Meng-yang, Meng-la, Meng-lung, Meng-wang, Man-tun;

two minority nationality autonomous subdistricts: the Kelang and Hani Minorities Autonomous Subdistrict and the Pailang Minority Autonomous Subdistrict.

m) The Tehung, T'ai and Ching-p'o Minority Nationalities Autonomous District (Autonomous People's Government at Mang-shih), 6 counties: Lu-hsi, Jui-li, Lung-ch'uan, Ying-chiang, Lien-shan, Liang-ho.

n) The Hung-ho Hani Minority Nationality Autonomous District (Autonomous People's Government at Hsin-chieh), 3 counties: Hung-ho Yüan-yang, Chin-p'ing.

o) The Nu-chiang Lisu Minority Nationality Autonomous District (Autonomous People's Government at Chih-tzu-lo), 4 counties: Pi-chiang, Kung-shan, Fu-kung, Lu-shui.

C. Kweichow Province. Capital, Kweiyang Municipality.

1. One municipality (city): Kweiyang Municipality

2. One county under the direct control of the provincial government: Kuei-chu hsien.

3. Eight Districts:

a) Kuei-ting (District administrative office at Kuei-ting), 9 counties: Kuei-

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ting, Weng-an, K'ai-yang, Hsi-feng, Hsiu-wen, Ch'ing-chen, Lung-li, Ch-ang-shun, Lo-tien; one autonomous subdistrict: The Hui-shui-hsien Pu-i Minority Autonomous Subdistrict.

b) Tsun-i (District administrative office at Tsun-i),one municipality: Tsun-i Municipality; 11 counties: Tsun-i, Jen-huai, Ch'ih-shui, Hsi-shui, T'ung-tzu, Sui-yang, Cheng-an, Tao-chen, Wu-ch'uan, Feng-kang, Mei-t'an.

c) T'ung-jen (District administrative office at T'ung-jen), 9 counties: T'ung-jen, Sung-t'ao, Yen-ho,Te-chiang, Ssu-nan, Ying-chiang, Shih-ch'ien, Chiang-k'ou, Yü-p'in.

d) Chen-yüan (District administrative office at Chen-yüan), 10 counties: Chen-yüan, Ts'en-kung, San-sui, T'ien-chu, Chin-p'in, Chien-ho, Lei-shan, Huang-p'ing, Shih-ping, Yü-ch'ing; 2 minority nationality autonomous subdistricts: the Lü-shan-hsien Miao Minority Autonomous Subdistrict, the T'ai-chiang-hsien Miao Minority Autonomous Subdistrict.

e) Tu-yün (District administrative office at Tu-yün), 10 counties: Tu-yün, Ma-chiang, Fu-ch'üan, San-tu, Yung-chiang, Li-p'ing, Ts'ung-chiang, Li-po, Tu-shan, P'ing-t'ang; one minority nationality autonomous subdistrict: the Tan-chai-hsien Miao Minority Autonomous Subdistrict.

635 f) Hsing-i (District administrative office at Hsing-i), 10 counties: Hsing-i, P'an, P'u-an, Ch'ing-lung, Hsing-jen, Kuan-jen, Kuan-ling, Chen-feng, Wang-mu, Ts'e-heng, An-lung.

g) An-shun (District administrative office at An-shun), 6 counties: An-shun, Tzu-yün, Chen-ning, Lang-tai, P'u-ting, P'ing-pa.

h) Pi-chieh (District administrative office at Pi-chieh), 9 counties: Pi-chieh, Ta-ting, Chin-sha, Ch'ien-hsi, Chih-chin, Na-yung, Shui-ch'eng, Wei-ning, Ho-chang.

In examining the nature and functions of local governments from the Municipality down to the county and hsiang level, it is found that since the Communist regime, there has been a radical change. While a laissez-faire policy characterized under the Republic and Kuomintang period the political scene, now the Communists put stesss on organizing people of every municipality, county, or hsiang, and each individual is under surveillance.

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE MUNICIPALITY, COUNTY, AND HSIANG

A. The Municipality

633 The Communist regime pays a great deal of attention to city life, because industrial enter-

prises and, consequently, the laboring classes are concentrated there. In this region, Chungking was, at first, one of the seven municipalities which were under the direct control of the central government. After the promulgation of the Constitution, the control over the Chungking municipality was transferred and placed again under the Government of Szechwan, with the same status as ordinary municipalities in other provinces.

A municipal People's council consists of a mayor, a number of deputy-mayors, and from 9 to 25 members, but in a municipality where the population is especially dense, the members of the council can be increased to 45.

The municipal People's congress is governed by Article 16 of the electoral law of the People's Republic of China. "A municipality with a population not exceeding 100,000 shall elect one deputy for every 500 to 1,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 100,000 and up to 350,000 shall elect one deputy for every 1,000 to 2,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 350,000 and up to 750,000 shall elect one deputy for every 2,000 to 3,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 750,000 and up to 1,500,000 shall elect one deputy for every 3,000 to 5,000 persons; a municipality with a population exceeding 1,500,000 shall elect one deputy for every 5,000 to 7,000 persons. The number of deputies to a municipal people's congress shall be not less than 50 and more than 800."

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According to Article 17 of the same law, the armed forces are entitled to elect from 2 to 10 deputies to the municipal People's congress.

An advertisement[13] of the Chungking Municipality published in the Chungking newspapers on January 6, 1952 asked the citizens of the city to take part in the election and to give their suggestions to the delegates. It also gave the agenda of subjects which were to be discussed in the coming session: (1) a report of work done in 1951 and the tasks to be done in 1952; (2) examination and approval of the budget and the financial statement; (3) debates on the suggestions made by the people; (4) election of the mayor, the deputy-mayors, and the members of the government. This list shows clearly the operation of the municipal People's congress. But at the first session of the Municipal Congress in Chungking, called before the opening of the National Congress, besides the works mentioned above, both the National Congress and the Provincial Congress had to be elected. The Municipal People's Representative Conference had gone through three stages. In the first stage it consisted of members recommended by professional groups, the different parties and popular organizations. In the second stage the members of the Conference were given the right to elect the mayor and the deputy-mayors. In the third stage, from 1954 on, the members have been further given the right of electing the delegates to the National and provincial congresses, and they are now elected

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[13] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, January 6, 1952.

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in sectional meetings throughout the city. They are still not elected by direct popular vote.

B. The County

634 Under the Republic and the Kuomintang, a county was run mostly by a single person called the magistrate, though at times he was also assisted by a few department heads of his own choice. Now, the county people's council, according to the Communist Constitution, consists of a Head, a deputy-Head, from 21 to 31 members, and 10 heads of administrative departments, namely (1) civil affairs, (2) public security, (3) finance, (4) grain, (5) taxes, (6) industry and commerce, (7) agriculture and forestry, (8) transportation, (9) culture and education, and (10) health; with others to be added when necessary.

As a concrete example, the Representatives' Conference of Lung Chang county is described below, though it was an institution of the pre-Constitution stage. In Lung Chang the first session of the Sixth Representatives' Conference convened from December 1-5, 1951. It consisted of reprsentatives who were recommended by the different occupational groups. In the first period, the voters did not appreciate the right of suffrage which had been given to them. When they were asked to go through the different stages of election, they considered it a sheer waste of time. As a result, the method of recommendation by the different groups and decision by mutual

634 negotiations was adopted. However, the debate in the session was found to be very useful because a great deal of misunderstanding due to conflict of interests among the different groups was cleared up. After the session, a standing committee was set up to supervise the handling of the resolutions passed and to be the liaison between the citizens at large, the congress, and the government.

C. The Hsiang

633 A hsiang council can have a head, a deputy-head, 3 to 31 members, and also four or five department heads.

On the national and provincial levels, power is in the hands of administrative organs, but on the county, the hsiang, and the municipality levels, power is exercised by both (1) the administrative organs and (2) the organizations of the people themselves.

The People's Congress on a county or hsiang level exercises the same functions as the Provincial Congress, which is covered by the Article 58 of the Constitution:

1. to ensure the observance and execution of laws and decrees;
2. to draw up plans for local, economic, and cultural development and for public works;
3. to examine and approve local budgets and financial reports;

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4. to protect public property;
5. to maintain public order;
6. to safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal rights of national minorities.

Article 59 stipulates that the congress elects and is empowered to recall the members of the government on the hsiang level.

The departments under the hsiang head are as follows: (1) civil affairs, (2) security, (3) militia, (4) producer's co-operatives, (5) finance and grain, (6) culture and education, (7) conciliation. Besides the above, there are also voluntary associations: (1) Joint Association of Commerce and Industry, (2) Democratic Youth League, (3) Student Union, (4) Democratic Women's Association (5) Housewives League, (6) Inhabitants League or Street's League.

As a concrete example of hsiang government, a report on Kao Tai Hsiang in the county of Pa can be given.

From December 1951 to April 1953, there were sixteen sessions of conferences. 80 per cent of the population took part in the voting. The people were interested in the proceedings of the conferences and even demanded the dismissal of a few members of the hsiang government. Resolutions for making ditches and for the prevention of floods were passed and put into practice by the people of the hsiang.[14]

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[14] New China Daily, May 17, 1953.

In conclusion, it may be said that although the Chinese Communists are serious in carrying on the work of democratic reconstruction, they are, at the same time, making use of the constitutional machinery, the "democratic" institutions, and other voluntary associations for getting the popular support for the purpose of building a broad foundation for their own monopoly of power. Even before the promulgation of the Constitution, two or three years were spent in paving the way by educating the people to be interested in polling and registration and parliamentary procedure, leading to the final implementation of the Constitution.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2c, Political Background

POLITICAL DYNAMICS

665 The fundamental aim of the Chinese Communist regime is to concentrate all political power in the hands of the Communist Party of China. This fact has determined the pattern of political dynamics in Southwest China. Political dynamics is concerned with political power and the political process. Since political power is monopolized by the Communist Party of China, and since the political process is patterned upon the controls exercised by the Party, the study of political dynamics is little more than a study of the Party itself and its methods of political control, together with a study of the role and policies of minor parties. The power structure is such that the decision-making process follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party. Through a well-established network of control over organizations of all types, political activities are regulated and guided by the Party. Thus, it is the Party, not society, that generates the vitality which shapes the political process. In order to determine the course which society will follow the Party

must control closely all types of political organizations and make use of all available instruments of coercion.

A campaign[1] is one of the political devices used by the Party to implement its decisions. Since it calls for concerted action by all groups and organizations, a campaign also can be used to test the loyalty and effectiveness of those taking part in it. It may be carried on at both a national and a local level and directed at either the entire population or a segment of it.[2]

Governmental and Party centralization is another factor which determines the pattern of political dynamics in Southwest China. The Party maintains control over local authorities by four major means: (1) maintenance of a unified and effective Party organization within the region; (2) close supervision of regional administrative and judicial organizations, armed forces, public security agencies, and

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[1] For a discussion of campaigns, see Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100; W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, 1955, pp. 72-98.

[2] Typical drives of a local nature are those (continued next page)

115 People's procuratorates; (3) control of all mass organizations; (4) instigation of movements and campaigns designed to arouse popular enthusiasm and manipulate public opinion.

I. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS AFFILIATED ORGANS

A. The Present Status of the Party in Southwest China

Two facts must be kept in mind when discussing Communist activities in Southwest China. First, the Communist Party always has been relatively weak in this region. Second, the region was one of the last to be conquered by the Communist armies. Although there was some Communist activity in certain areas during the early 1930's, the Party was weak in the cities and had almost no strength in the countryside. Not until 1952 did the Communists begin to build up a strong Party organization. Prior to that time the Party relied primarily upon its military forces and

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2. (continued) conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing, Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and others.

665 the co-operation of the New Democratic Youth Corps, a Party affiliate, for the implementation of its policies. There was little Party activity in the rural areas. In fact, only 7 per cent of the hsiang (groups of villages) had Party organizations.[3] One of the first steps taken by the Party was to create Party branches in rural areas and establish close control over all rural organizations. This resulted in a general tightening of Party control over the whole region.

In spite of the many handicaps that confronted it in the Southwest, the Party quickly accomplished its basic objectives. The land reform program was merely one of many campaigns brought to successful completion by the end of 1952. Since that time the regional Party organization, operating under the close control of Peking, has carried out Party directives with increasing speed and efficiency. Three things are clear: (1) the

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[3] Report of Yü Chiang-chen, head of the Department of Organization of the Southwest China Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Hsin-hua Daily [New China Daily], Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.

665 regional Party organization is extremely flexible and is being adjusted and expanded continually in order that it may cope with the many tasks assigned it; (2) Since 1952 the Party has maintained a concerted drive to increase its total membership. It is especially anxious to attract more workers, technicians, and managers into its ranks; (3) Party members continually are exposed to a thorough indoctrination and training program, which imposes upon them the duty of constant rectification and reform. Party organizations are periodically overhauled and reorganized.

B. Party Organization

Three principles governing Party organization should be borne in mind: (1) Party organization is an integrated system, which symbolizes the extreme centralization of political power and the fullest demand for unity and discipline. (2) Party organization is pyramidal in structure and is erected on a territorial and functional basis. (3) Party organization is flexible.

Prior to 1955, the organization of the Communist Party of China in Southwest China was divided into two parts: (a) the delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the region and (b) the local party bodies extending from the provincial

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665 party layer down to the hsiang (group of villages) level. Since the abolition of the Southwest regional government in June 1954, the need for the Southwest Party Bureau has diminished. Although the abolition of the bureau has not yet been announced, bureau representatives, with the exception of those from the Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, and Sinkiang bureaus, were not present at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 and the 6th Plenary Session (enlarged) of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held in October 1955.[4] Presumably, the bureau organization in the different regions no longer exists. However, since the Party bureau had long been active in regional politics, and since it can be established at the will of the Central Committee of the Party, some explanation of its operation seems necessary.

Delegates to the Central Committee. The Central Committee of the Communist Party

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[4] Reports on the conference and the plenary session are found in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin (London), No. 1278, April 7, 1955, p. 4; and ibid., No. 1413, October 18, 1955, pp. 6-7.

665 was represented in Southwest China by the Southwest Bureau. Prior to the formation of the Szechwan Provincial Government in 1952, the bureau had direct jurisdiction over the provincial Party organizations in Kweichow, Yunnan, and Sikiang, and the four special districts Party organizations in Szechwan. The local Party bodies are divided into tiers from provincial Party organizations to administrative district, county and city, ch'ü (district) and hsiang.

The Party bureau exercised its authority through two channels, the bureau secretariat, an executive organ, enjoyed power comparable to that of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Its standing departments were: organization, propaganda, rural work, urban work, social affairs, united front; its commission dealt with trade unions, youth, and women; it also had offices of policy planning, military affairs, and other functions.

The bureau has not hesitated to use the regional Party conference for the transmission of directives and for periodic controls. In

665 the past few years, the bureau convened many enlarged cadre conferences and administrative, joint district-secretariat sessions. Bureau departments might also call their own sessions, thereby placing the different Party secretariats directly under their respective jurisdictions.

C. Local Party Hierarchy[5]

1. Provincial Party Layer. The provincial Party organization is the highest layer of the Party hierarchy within a province. Its first obligation is to enforce the directives and decrees transmitted to it by the Central Party. As will be seen, the provincial and city/county layers have a mixed party-governmental function while the administrative district and ch'ü layers are primarily concerned with the Party.

2. Administrative District Party Layer. The Party unit at this layer generally

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[5] For local Party organizations, consult the Constitution of the Communist Party of China; English text in Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1951, pp. 185-90.

665 corresponds with that of an administrative district under the jurisdiction of the provincial government. Its great importance derives from the following facts: (a) its major work is Party affairs; (b) owing to administrative requirements, its functionaries are allowed some initiative and independence. For example, it holds authority in the selection and placement of personnel -- Party as well as governmental -- within its jurisdiction.

3. County and City Party Layer. This layer of organization corresponds to the county and city governments. Like the provincial Party agencies, the county and city Party units have the dual tasks of carrying out Party work and of securing complete control over other administrative and mass organizations.

4. Ch'ü Layer. Party bodies are installed below a city or county irrespective of the ch'ü organization. Like the administrative district Party agencies, ch'ü Party units are directly responsible for the management of Party affairs and the implementation of Party policy.

5. Hsiang Layer. This is the lowest layer of the local Party hierarchy. It is here that the Party and government fusion is most obvious and the Party control over other

665 administrative and mass organizations most clearly revealed.

In addition to the territorial division of Party organization -- the central delegate to the region and the local Party hierarchy -- there is an organization known as the Party branch or Party cell, which acts as a link between the Party and the masses in all organizations. Party branches are organized in any factory, mine, village, enterprise, street, army, government office, or school, wherever there are three or more Party members. Branches can be grouped into general branches and Party groups, depending largely upon the number of members and the place of function.

D. Organization

In each of these constituent party units, quadripartite division of authority is maintained: the Party Congress, the Party Committee, the Control Committee, and the Party Conference.

1. Party Congress. The Party Congress of each unit is the highest organization of that unit. In theory, Party congresses at all local levels meet every two years; in fact, the National Party Congress has not convened since 1945, and local Party congresses as

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665 such have not been held. But theoretically, in order to carry out its announced function of supervising the Party Committee, the Party Congress hears and approves or disapproves the Committee's report, decides on questions pertaining to that area, and elects members of the Party Committee on its level and delegates to the Party congress at the immediately higher level, subject to the approval of the Party Committee at that higher level.

2. Party Committee. The executive body of the Party unit on each level is the Party Committee, whose power is concentrated. At the provincial level, power within the Party Committee is further centralized in a Standing Committee which has the same permanent and temporary functional departments and working commissions as the Party bureaus. The Party Committee convenes Party conferences between sessions of Party congresses and sets up various subordinate Party organizations, allocates Party personnel and finance, and directs the work of Party agents in non-Party organizations.

Although Party committees in the district and below have no standing committee, power within the committee is further centralized in the hands of secretaries. Certain basic departments and commissions form the backbone of the committee. The operational aspect of the Party Committee is uniform at all levels, in the sense that all committees adhere to democratic-centralism and other basic centralized devices characteristic of the Communist Party.

3. Control Committee. The National Party Conference[6] of the Communist Party of China held in March 1955 established new Control Committees to replace the Discipline Inspection Committees established in November 1949. The change was made necessary because of the need for an intensified drive toward socialism and as a campaign against corruption and laxity in the Party. Members of the committees are elected by the Party congresses or conferences of the respective levels, subject to the approval of the Party

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[6] English text in New China News Agency Daily Bulletin, No. 1277, April 6, 1955, p. 3.

665 committees of the next higher levels. Local control committees are also subject to the supervision and direction of the higher control committees. They may set up branch offices. Their relationship is centralized and permits no deviation.

4. Party Conference. The Party Conference in fact is an executive meeting. Convened by the Party Committee on a higher level, it is attended by representatives of Party committees on lower levels. Unlike the delegates to the Party congresses who are elected at large, representatives to the conferences are appointed by their own Party committees. The conference has the power to appoint or remove up to one-fourth of the members of the Party committee convening the conference and to reach decisions on Party work within its jurisdiction.

E. Party Expansion

The Communist Party has conducted two major membership drives in Southwest China. The first was launched in 1952 and the second in 1955. Prior to 1952 the Party was extremely weak in the Southwest and had failed to win appreciable popular support. Party leaders believed that this situation had resulted from the failure of the Party to increase its membership in the region. Only 7 per cent of the hsiang had Party organizations; at the ch'ü level, Party organizations were few in number and generally ineffective.[7] The situation was even worse in the cities. It was reported that between 1950 and 1952 Party organizations in Chungking had admitted only 300 new members.[8] In some Party organizations not a single new member had been admitted during this period. Local Party leaders were accused of neglecting expansion work and seeking to make the Party a closed caste.

In order to remedy this situation the Party launched its great membership drive of 1952. The goal of this drive was the creation of a Party branch in every village and the expansion of Party organizations in factories, schools, and government offices.

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[7] The New China Daily, Aug. 9, 1952, p. 3; Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.

[8] Ibid., Sept. 3, 1952.

US In October 1952 the Southwest China Party Bureau issued a directive[9] outlining four tasks to be undertaken by all Party organizations: (1) Party members must be organized into groups for the study of documents on Party expansion; (2) all organizations above administrative district Party committees must form inspection teams to supervise the expansion work of lower Party organizations; (3) all organizations must publish directives and pamphlets on Party expansion and make them available for mass circulation; (4) monthly reports on the progress of the membership drive must be submitted to the Central Committee of the Party.

This directive was elaborated by Yü Chiang-chen, chief of the Department of Organization of the Party Bureau. Yü instructed Party secretaries to organize teams led by responsible Party members and to promote Party expansion in villages and factories. He also called for the organization of temporary ch'ü Party branches wherever possible and greater efforts on the part of the Department of Organization and the Discipline Inspection Committee. He pointed out that the success of the membership drive

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[9] Ibid., Oct. 18, 1952, p. 1.

665 depended upon the enthusiasm and sense of responsibility of individual Party members, especially those employed in the Department of Organization who were charged with conducting the drive.[10]

The first membership drive brought thousands of new members into the Party. Four months after the beginning of the drive Szechwan had filled over 7 per cent of its quota. Chungking alone contributed 3,000 new Party members.[11] The campaign in Kweichow netted even greater gains -- 11,000 new members.[12] Government offices contributed the largest number of new Party members (35%), followed by rural areas (18%), factories (9%), commercial establishments (9%), and schools (6%). New members were selected from among 220,000 activists recommended by trade unions, the New Democratic Youth Corps, and other organizations.[13] Special training schools were established for their instruction and indoctrination.

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[10] Ibid., Oct. 23, 1952, p. 1.
[11] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1952, p. 1.
[12] Ibid., Nov. 13, 1952, p. 1.
[13] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1952, p. 1.

665. During 1953 and 1954 the membership of the Party continued to increase. The growth of industry in the Southwest and the national campaign for the creation of agricultural co-operatives provided an environment favorable to Party expansion. By June 1954 there were 117,536 Party members serving in rural areas.[14] Recently conquered Yunnan contributed 30,000 new members to this total.[15] Expansion also took place in the cities. Between 1953 and 1955 over 8,000 new members were admitted into the Party's Chungking branch.[16] In the factories almost 10 per cent of the workers were Party members. Members usually were selected from among the most skilled and experienced workers. Four hundred and sixty nine new Party branches were organized.

During this period the Party also sought to attract members of ethnic minorities into its ranks. There are over 18,000,000 of these minority peoples, scattered over the

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[14] People's Daily, June 6, 1954, p. 3.

[15] Ibid., Oct. 23, 1954, p. 5.

[16] Ibid., June 30, 1954, p. 3; Survey of China Mainland Press, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, No. 1018 (Supplement), April 15, 1955, p. 34.

665 entire Southwest. Their close ties with communities in Southeast Asia enhance their value to the Party (See chapter on Ethnic Groups.) In November 1954, 5,000 members of ethnic minorities residing in Yunnan became Party members.[17] Most had been members of Party organization teams or were graduates of the Institution for Nationality Groups.

These efforts to increase Party membership in the Southwest were accelerated by the inauguration of a national membership drive in 1955. Under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Party teams sought to increase Party membership in rural areas. At that time, the Party had over 4,000,000 members in rural areas and had established Party branches in 70 per cent of the hsiang.[18] At present, Party membership is expanding rapidly.

F. Party Overhauling

Party overhauling generally involves

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[17] Ibid., Nov. 28, 1954, p. 1.

[18] People's Daily, March 9, 1955, p. 1.

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665 four major activities: (1) rectification,[19] a step which involves examination and the political education of Party members; (2) review and criticism of Party members' work; (3) arousal of mass interest in the criticism of Party members, and (4) increased study.

The examination of individual Party members centers upon the eight conditions set forth by the Party and upon the San Ch'a ("three checks" principle). The eight conditions required of a Party member have been set forth in the Party's Constitution. They include the realization of the ultimate goal of the Party, devotion to the cause and interest of the Party, and absolute obedience

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[19] Prior to the assumption of power, there had been two rectification movements in Party history, in 1942-44 and in 1947-48. For a study of the 1942-44 rectification, see Boyd Compton, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44., Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952. The 1952 rectification movement was aimed at the promotion of the fighting spirit in the Party and the study of administrative and organizational material.

65 to Party leaders.[20] The San Ch'a principle is employed by the Party as a means of eliminating undesirable members. San Ch'a can mean a check on work, work style, and ideology; it can also mean a check on viewpoint and personal history. During the Land Reform Movement, work, style, history, and class status constituted the three checks. This practice may not appear violent, but its psychological effect upon the individual is alarming.

Even the selection of Party members for further training can be used to eliminate undesirables, for it is a device to re-examine the qualifications of Party members; those who fail to pass the examination may be expelled. While rectification and overhauling are constant, the examination given four times a year increases the pressure upon Party members.

Because of the extreme weakness of the Party in the Southwest, no serious overhauling of Party organizations in this region

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[20] For detailed discussion of the eight conditions, consult Tzu-wen An, "Strengthen the Work of Party Reform and Party Expansion on the Foundation of Victory in the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns," Current Background, No. 251, July 25, 1953, pp. 5-6.

665 took place prior to 1955. The reorganization of agricultural producers' co-operatives, which took place in 1955, was the first Party reform movement conducted in the Southwest.

G. Indoctrination and Training

Another way of maintaining Party unity and discipline is by the constant indoctrination and training of each member.[21] This practice is aimed at the revitalization of adherence to Party doctrine.

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874 Southwest China maintains two schools, a cultural school to raise the general level of education and an ideological school to tighten adherence to doctrine.

In the country as a whole, one half of the cadres, most of them Party member, have less than a junior high school education,

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[21] Pamphlets published by the 6th Section of Kuomintang on Formosa relative to this subject are of interest: Fei-tang Hsün-lien Ti P'ou-shih [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1952; Chung-kung Tang Ti tsu-chih yü K'ung-chih [Organization and Control of the Communist Party of China], Taipei, 1951.

665 874 and some actually are illiterate.[22] To remedy this, a cultural school system, administered by the Party and the government was established in this region in 1951, with the aim of raising the cadre standard to the junior high school level.[23] The course called for two semesters of twenty weeks, with four two-hour evening classes per week. In January 1954, a revised plan was ordered by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, establishing a nationwide system and bringing both individuals and the responsible secretaries below the county and *ch'ü* levels into the new plan.[24] The plan called for cadre education equivalent to grade school and/or that of junior high school. Also included in the program, and to be completed in three or four months, was a class for the illiterate. Evening schools for the average cadre took twenty weeks at six hours a week. The secretaries and administrative personnel of the Party who were unable to take time off during the day for the supplementary

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22. *People's Daily*, Jan. 22,1954, p. 1.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*

665 classes were expected to attend school in the
874 evening.

The purpose of the ideological school is to train Party members, candidates for membership, and leaders of mass organizations. Located in Chungking, the Southwestern ideological school is under the joint control of the Southwest Party Bureau and the Chungking Municipal Party Committee. Together with its 108 branch schools, it trained some 80,000 people in 1952. Instructors are trained in two special schools, where they study such things as Party history, the Party Constitution, and Soviet works on economic reconstruction.[25]

H. Affiliated Party Organizations

668 The Party attempts to utilize the enthusiasm of youth through two organizations which, although not a part of the Party, are under its supervision: the New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC) and its subordinate group, the Young Pioneers, for youths aged

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[25] New China Daily, Jan. 17, 1953, p. 1.

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9 to 15. The Young Pioneers are subordinates of the Youth Corps, looking to the latter for leadership and guidance.

1. New Democratic Youth Corps

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668 The Party controls the NDYC through the Southwest China Working Committee of the corps. The constitution of the corps assures the Party of effective control.[26] It permits Party members to be in charge of corps above the county level, thus placing the direction of corps activities in the hands of the Party. The first function of the corps is to provide a reservoir of potential new Party members; for example, the corps contributed the highest number of new Party members during the 1952 membership drive.[27] Its second task is to supply needed activists in all organizations, particularly in the factories and rural communities. In Chungking, for example, corps units are maintained in all

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[26] The Chinese text of the Constitution of the NDYC and Li Ch'ang's explanatory report in People's Daily, July 7, 1953, pp. 1, 3. English text in Current Background, No. 258, Sept. 10, 1953.

[27] New China Daily, Nov. 3, 1952, p. 1; Oct. 11, 1952, p. 3.

883 668 organizations.[28] The final task of the corps is to engage in the broadest possible range of activities in order to reach segments of society which have no Party organizations. In 1952, when Party organizations were small and relatively ineffective in the Southwest, the NDYC had 440,000 members. Thus, it paved the way for the sharp increase in Party membership that took place after that date.

The organization of the corps follows that of the Party. Prior to 1955, a Southwest China Working Committee of the NDYC was established to serve as the representative of the Central Committee of the NDYC. Local corps organizations on provincial, municipal, and county levels are empowered to establish representative committees in the administrative districts and *ch'ü*.

With the exception of those working committees on administrative-district and *ch'ü* levels, the constituent corps organizations rest upon a dual authority. Each level has

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[28] *Ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1951, p. 3.

883 a congress and a committee elected by it.
668 These committees are the executive organs of the corps and their component members are approved by the upper-level committee.

The corps branch, like the Party branch, is an essential link with the population as a whole. It may be formed in any factory, mine, enterprise, farm station, village, government agency, company of the armed forces, school, or street where there are three or more corps members. A general corps branch and corps committee can be formed, depending upon the size of the branch. These basic-level agencies of the corps serve to mobilize youth and the masses and also may take over Party functions where Party agencies are inadequate.

The New Democratic Youth Corps has at least 3,000,000 more members than the Party itself. However, it is not an organization with political power; it is rather the instrument through which the Party exercizes control over youth, and, more particularly, over youth organizations in the militia, the army, and the schools.

2. The Young Pioneers Chapter 7 of the constitution of the corps governs the

883 668 relationship between the corps and the Young Pioneers.[29] The pioneers are completely subordinate to the corps and their regional influence is far less apparent. Earlier, the pioneers concentrated upon the promotion of patriotic fervor among the youth between the ages of nine and fifteen; since 1953 they have placed increasing emphasis on cultural education. In October 1952 there were 183,000 Young Pioneers in Southwest China. Since that time efforts have been made to acquire additional members in rural areas.[30] National membership now stands at 70 million, about 15 per cent of the youth in that age group.[31]

II. POLITICAL CONTROLS

668 The Party has consolidated its power by a network of controls not only over Party agencies but over all bureaucratic, military. public security, and mass organizations. The control is maintained by placing members of the Communist Party of China in key positions in all these crganizations, by reserving all policy-making decisions to the Party, and

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[29] Chinese text of the Regulations of the Young Pioneers, People's Daily, June 1, 1954, p. 2.

[30] New China Daily, Oct. 7, 1952, p. 6.

[31] Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], March 14, 1955, p. 1.

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668 by agitation to arouse popular enthusiasm in favor of the Party

A. Party Controls Over Government Organs

1. **Party and Government Fusion.** Control of government organs has been accomplished primarily by the fusion of government and Party in authority, in functions, and in personnel at all levels and in all spheres of political activity. Two systems, the report and the inspection system, have been introduced into all Party organizations in order to facilitate this fusion. The former requires that all Party organizations periodically report to and seek instructions from Party units at a higher level. The latter directs high level Party units to check regularly on the conduct of subordinate units.

Another powerful means of control is the placing of Party members in key administrative positions. On the regional level, for example, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the First Secretary of the Southwest China Party Bureau, served concurrently as deputy chairman of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee between 1950 and 1952. The several committee

668 chairmen under the regional government also were Party secretaries, thus holding key positions in both hierarchies. One example is Sun Chih-yüan, who served concurrently as Secretary General of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee and as Secretary of the Party Military and Political Committee.

The pattern on the provincial level is similar. Li Ching-ch'üan, First Secretary of the Szechwan Communist Party, formerly served as chairman of the Szechwan provincial government. Liao Chih-kao and Hsieh Fu-chih held similar positions in Sikang and Yunnan, respectively. At present, the newly elected governors generally are second secretaries of their branch Parties; however, all real power has been retained by the first secretaries.

At lower levels this fusion is even more frequent.

2. Cadre Utilization. A second method through which the Party exercises control over state organs is the appointment of

668 faithful and capable cadres (Party members as well as non-Party members) to serve in the rank and file of judicial and administrative organizations.[32] Party secretaries in charge of Party personnel are appointed to head the personnel offices of the government organizations. For example, in 1952 Yü Chiang-chen, the chief of the Department of Organization of the Southwest Party Bureau, was appointed director of the Department of Personnel in the regional government. In Szechwan, An Fa-hsiao, head of the Department of Personnel in the provincial government, served concurrently as deputy chief of the Department of Organization of the provincial Party Committee.[33]

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[32] For a discussion of the Party's role in the control of state organs, see Hsiung Hsi-yüan, People's Daily, November 18, 1954, p. 3; for definition and the utilization of cadre, see Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Cambridge, M.I.T., 1942, ii.

[33] A list of the members of the Szechwan Provincial Government can be found in New China Daily, Nov. 18, 1952, p. 1.

668 After the Constitution was promulgated, all government personnel offices of the central and provincial governments were disbanded. This may mean even firmer Party control of personnel policy.

3. The Department of Supervision and Other Instruments of Control. One of the most common and effective instruments of Party control over the government is the Office of Supervision, formerly the People's Control Commission. It is found at all levels from the central government down to the county government. This system of control should be distinguished from the judicial agencies of control, namely, the People's procuratorates, and from the public security agencies.[34] Supervisory offices of all levels and in all organizations are strictly controlled by the Party. As a rule, heads of these offices are either Party secretaries or chiefs of public security agencies. Personnel working in these offices are usually activists, who, like the members of the Party, only carry out Party directives.

The offices of supervision check the execution of government policies directed

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[34] Discussions of judicial and public-security organs will be found in later studies.

G68 against officials guilty of misdemeanors, disobedience, and corruption. Unlike the People's procuratorates, they check only government employees.[35]

The highest supervisory agency is the Southwest People's Control Commission. Control branches have been established in state enterprises, financial and economic offices, transportation agencies, notably railways, and post offices.[36] At the provincial level, such offices are formed within each department and bureau dealing with financial and economic matters. From two to four workers are employed in each branch.

The work of the supervisory offices in the region is co-ordinated with the major yearly drives. The tasks for the nation in 1955 are the elimination of nationwide waste, corruption, and degeneration within the government.[37]

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[35] T'an Cheng-wen's article in "Chien-ch'üan Jen-min Chien-ch'a Chih-tu, Kung-ku Kuo-chia Fa-chih," ["Construct a People's Protectorate and Reinforce State Judicial System"], New China Monthly, No. 2., Feb. 28, 1955, pp. 28-29.

[36] People's Daily, Jan. 6, 1953, p. 1.

[37] Kuang-ming Jih-pao, June 13, 1955, p.3.

People's supervisory reporters are sent out by the supervisory commission or selected within the organization itself. They are organized into small working broups to spy on the individual worker for evidence of misdemeanors, waste, corruption, bureaucratic attitudes, and other behavior not in the "best interest" of the State. Their techniques are varied. They may make direct accusations, establish a network of mass contact, spy on their own colleagues, tamper with People's complaint boxes, and control the hearings of the "reception room." The complaint boxes are used to encourage accusations and complaints against officials and agencies. This arrangement is required in all government offices, and the head of the office is responsible for the examination of these letters and appropriate replies. The reception rrom enables people to make accusations and complaints directly to the government. In 1952 there were 749 supervisory reporters in Southwest China.[38]

B. Party Control Over Mass Organizations

Communist policies toward mass

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38. New China Daily, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 3.

668 organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. These policies encourage and regulate the activities and political utilization of mass organizations.

From the Party point of view, mass organizations are a political asset because each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social or economic force.

Immediately after the Communist seizure of power in this region, mass organizations sprang to life. Not until 1952, however, were mass organizations placed upon a permanent basis. There are as many mass organizations in this region as at the central level.[39] The most influential are examined to illustrate the patter of Party control.

467 668 1. Trade Unions. Trade unions are regarded as the transmission belt between the Party and the workers.[40] Their

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[39] See Chao Kuo-chün, The Mass Organization in Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, M.I.T., 1953.

[40] Constitution of All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

467 organization is patterned after that of the
668 Party. A branch office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions has been set up in the Southwest. Under this regional office, local trade union councils stretch from provinces, municipalities, and counties to towns. Since farmers and handicraft workers are ineligible, hsiang are not included.

The establishment of Party control over the trade unions in Southwest China did not prove to be an easy task. A sweeping and drastic campaign was required before control was comfortably secured. The "democratic reform" campaign, launched in 1951, was directed at the trade unions and was aimed at the liquidation of the old trade union leadership and the strengthening of the Party's hold on the urban population.[41]

To facilitate the Party's political control of trade unions, there is a basic trade union branch or cell, similar to the Party branch, composed of the trade union members working in the same enterprise. If the branch is of sufficient size, this basic trade union committee will set up a workshop (department) committee. The trade union

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[41] Reports of the campaign are printed in the following issues of the New China Daily, Nov. 24, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 25, 1951, p. 1; Jan. 1, 1952, p. 3.

467 committee may be divided into trade union
668 teams according to production units. The general methods employed by the Party for political control of other organizations are applicable here. Trade union affairs are subject to the direction of the Party commission on trade unions; and Party members are placed in key positions within the unions.

However, the most effective method is the initiation of union policies in the Party rather than in the union.[42] This involves three steps: first, the Party branch within the union initiates major policies, including directives, working plans, and cadre policy. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium direct the trade union meeting and successfully guide the Party proposal through the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as activists to make certain that it is carried out.

668 2. Federation of Democratic Women. By October 1951 almost one-third of the women of Southwest China had become

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[42] People's Daily, May 8, 1953, p. 2.

members of the Federation of Democratic Women and its affiliates.[43] The federation's importance in the region, however, is not based solely on the large size of its membership. The position of women in society is such that they not only constitute an important part of the labor force, but also exert a profound influence on the entire population. The Communists correctly regard the federation as a major political force and are most eager to see that women's organizations are formed.

At the village level, the federation plays the most active role in the rural movement. The wide participation of women in the Peasants' Association should be noted. In October 1951 there were 7,700,000 women enrolled in Southwestern associations. The federation plays a political role in all the farm drives and gives full support to the hsiang governments and party apparatus. Since the completion of land reform, women have begun to take an active part in the producers' co-operatives. In May 1954, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women held its first "rural work meeting" and called upon all women on the farms of China to join the movement.[44]

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[43] People's Daily, May 9, 1953, p. 2.

In the cities, women are important to the urban inhabitants' committees and the worker's family committees, both Party devices for urban control. Apart from participation in all drives in the cities -- notably the "democratic reform" movement and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns -- the Federation of Democratic Women also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions. In addition, it urges all women to participate in social work.

Women have played an increasingly active role within both the government and the Party. For example, the Chungking Party branch listed 5,759 women among its members.[45] Furthermore, in 1954, twenty per cent of the elected representatives of *hsiang* People's Congresses were women.[46]

Party control of women's federations follows the same pattern as that of other mass

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[44] *People's Handbook,* 1955, p. 3.

[45] *People's Daily*, March 11, 1955, p. 3.

[46] *Ibid.*, June 11, 1953, p.1.

668 organizations. The Party, as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps, maintains a commission on women's affairs. The commission has the power of direction and policy-making. However, the work of the commission is subject to the supervision of other basic departments such as the departments of organization, propaganda, rural work, and so forth. Party personnel are placed in key positions in the federations.

3. Other Mass Organizations. A number of mass organizations which have a strong influence on society are represented in this region. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth maintains branches in all key cities and counties in each province.[47] Also active is the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles. The most elaborately organized group is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, established in 1949. By April 1951 it had 33,583 members in the Southwest.[48] Party control of these mass organizations follows the usual pattern.

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[47] Regulations governing the ACFDY can be found in the People's Daily, June 17, 1953, p. 1.

[48] Hopei Daily [Paoting], April 15, 1951, p. 1.

668 C. Political Control in the Rural Areas

The rural movement is the foundation of Communist political power in Southwest China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is most revealing and Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

The establishment of Communist power in the rural areas can be divided into three stages: the initial construction period prior to the completion of land reform, when political power was centered in the peasants' associations and closely related to land reform in the rural areas; the consolidation period, a period of experiment for the producers' co-operative movements, marked by a gradual shift of pOlitical power from the Peasants' Association to the hsiang government, controlled by the Party; the election and the post-Constitution periods when the continuous suppression of opposition in the rural areas (during the elections of 1953-54) strengthened the foundation of Communist political power, and when such political power has been firmly entrenched in the government and the Party (during the post-Constitution period).

G68 1. Initial Construction: 1950-1952. Communist leaders have emphasized the political significance of land reform.[49] They regard it as a political struggle, and its essence is conceived to be the abolition of the "feudal" system of land ownership, the creation of a political force under Party control, and the establishment of "democratic authority."

Land reform is divided into three stages: preparation, execution, and re-examination. The preparatory stage is aimed at the liquidation of the existing holders of political power. The executive stage includes confiscation and redistribution of land in order to destroy the basis of the landlord class. During the re-examination period, the foundation of new political power is laid.

During the land reform period, political power in the rural area rested upon: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasants' Association, (3) the hsiang government, (4) the militia, and (5) other mass organizations, notably the women's federations and the youth organizations.[50] Of these, the Peasants' Association and the militia, organized as instruments of terror, were of particular importance.

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[49] Liu Shao-ch'i's report on land reform in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, June 30, 1950, p. 1; English text in The Agrarian Law of the People's Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950.

The Communist conquest of the Southwest was accompanied by widespread disorder and unrest. Therefore, the initial organization of peasant associations took place under the auspices of Communist military forces. In addition, Communist soldiers helped the peasants organize militia units for the suppression of "bandit activities" and carried out the first stage of the land reform program. Unrest was so prevalent that in some areas land reform had to be delayed until the fall of 1952.[51] Once the land reform program was

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[50] For reference, consult Kung-fei Jo-ho K'ung-chih Nung-ts'un Yü Ch'eng-shih [How the Communists Control Villages and Cities], Taipei 1954, also Nung-ts'un Kung-ch'an-tang-yüan K'o-pen [Textbook for Rural Party Workers], Canton, Hua-nan, 1951.

[51] By the spring of 1952, land reform had been carried out by most of the rural areas. Further delay occurred only in areas occupied (continued next page)

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668 under way, membership in the Peasants' Association increased rapidly. For example, during the initial stages of land reform, membership in the Eastern Szechwan Special District rose from 455,990 to 619,000, an increase of 30 per cent.[52] The number of "poor peasants" who entered the associations also increased rapidly. In the Northern Szechwan Special District, "poor peasants" made up 65 per cent of the membership of the peasants' associations and 70 per cent of that of the militia. In addition, they represented 80 per cent of the membership in hsiang governments and militia units.[53]

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668 The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people.[54] Prior to the Communist conquest, there were no militia units in Southwest China. Although Communist forces immediately set about building up a militia, only 500,000 recruits had been enrolled by 1950. Central control of the new units was not established

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51. (continued) by national minorities and in some parts of Kweichow. See New China Daily, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 2; Sept. 28, 1952, p. 1; May 10, 1952, p. 1; and Oct. 2, 1951, p. 2.

[52] Ibid. Oct. 2, 1951, p. 3.

[53] Ibid., Oct. 3, 1951, p. 2.

[54] For a study of the militia, see Li Tang, Militia of Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

701 until 1952, following the completion of land
668 reform. At the present time, the militia of Southwest China is far smaller than that of other regions.

The duties of the militia in peace time are to assist the public security forces in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintanence of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

668 2. Consolidation Period: 1952-53. As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established, but challenged, in the rural areas. Party organizations had not yet been established in many rural areas. Even where they existed, they generally were weak and ineffective. Party indoctrination was neglected, with the result that Party members acted like dictators and Party leaders became confused. In order to remedy this situation, the Party launched its membership drive of 1952 and sought to

strengthen already existent Party organizations.[5

Together with reports of general apathy was the Wu-to (the "five-too-many") phenomenon. Its name has reference to the practice of permitting an individual to hold a number of different jobs at one time, and it was one of the causes contributing to Party inefficiency in the rural areas. It was reported that in one hsiang in Szechwan, the deputy county chief held more than ten jobs, spent most of his time in meetings, and neglected his official duties.[56] This phenomenon was nationwide and was so serious that the Communists issued directives against it.

At the same time, the Party sought to establish hsiang governments and bring them under its firm control. Various organizations, notably the peasants' associations and other mass organizations, were instructed to select representatives to a hsiang People's Representative Conference. These delegates in turn elected the members of the new hsiang government. The new governments consisted of one

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[55] New China Daily, Aug. 16, 1952, p. 3.
[56] Ibid., June 7, 1953, p. 2.

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668 chief, one or two deputy chiefs, and anywhere from nine to eleven committeemen. Administrative organs included commissions on civil affairs, finance, food, education, sanitation, production, militia, and public security.

The Party especially sought to establish closer control over ethnic minorities. First, military forces were used to liquidate "bandits" hiding in the remote mountainous regions inhabited by these minorities. Under the auspices of these forces, schools were organized for the training and indoctrination of political cadres and activists. By December 1952, 65 autonomous area governments and 127 coalition governments had been formed among ethnic minorities in the Southwest.[57] Over 368 trade stations had been established to exploit the economic resources of the region. Acting through 170 purchasing teams, agent of the trade stations scoured these areas for raw materials. to be exported to the Soviet

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57. See the report of Ho Lung, Deputy Chairman of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee in New China Daily, Dec. 11, 1952, p. 1.

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668 Union.[58]

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666 3. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period:. 1953-1955. Premier Chou En-lai's announcement of a nationwide election in 1953 and the fact that the majority of 280,000 hsiang had held all-circle People's conferences indicated the degree of Communist confidence in their power.

At the village and hsiang levels, the key task in the period prior to the election was the consolidation and strengthening of the hsiang government and the allocation of electoral districts.[59] The ts'un (village) lost its status as an administrative unit. Its powers were taken over by the new hsiang government. At the same time, delegates to the hsiang representative conference were formed into a team for liaison work between the ts'un and the hsiang government. The jurisdiction of the hsiang governments was reduced, in order that they might exert closer control over the population under their authority. Jurisdiction was limited to area within a radius of 30 li

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[58] Ibid., Sept. 29, 1952, p. 2.

[59] See the directive issued by Chang Chi-ch'un in Ibid., Nov. 21, 1951, p. 2.

668 666 (approximately 10 miles) of the local headquarters and a population between 500 and 10,000. Ch'ü and county administrations were dealt with in similar fashion. The former was to have not more than 10 hsiang under its jurisdiction and the latter, not more than 10 ch'ü. Finally, electoral delegates were alloted on the basis of hsiang population.

668 After the promulgation of the Constitution, Communist political power was further strengthened. The hsiang People's congress now holds the highest formal authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the hsiang People's council. Resistance remains strong in the rural areas, however, and in 1955, two strong countermeasures were passed by
474 the Party.[60] Further expansion of agricultural
668 producers' co-operatives was temporarily checked, and the first Rural Basic-Level Organization Conference was held in April 1955 for the purpose of strengthening Party

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[60] "Wei-shen-ma Pi-hsü Chung-shih Nung-yeh Sheng-ch'an Ho-tso-she Ti Kung-ku Kung-tso?" ["Why Should Productive Co-operatives Be Strengthened?"], New China Monthly, March 1955, pp. 133-134.

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474 668 leadership over the agricultural producers' co-operative organization before gradual collectivization began.

The following resolutions were adopted at the Conference:[61] (1) Party organization shall be based on territorial and production units, with emphasis on the development of more Party branches in the agricultural producers' co-operatives. (2) Collective work rather than individual achievement is to be stressed. (3) There is to be further expansion of Party indoctrination programs. (4) The county Party secretary's leadership and the Party's political role in the producers' co-operatives is to be strengthened.

The chief problems which the agricultural program of the Party faces are the need for cadre education, the lack of Party strength, and the peasant's sense of individuality and love of his own land.

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D. Political Control in the City

The establishment and consolidation of

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[61] Summary report on the conference in New China Monthly, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 27-28.

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369 Communist power in the cities followed the
668 same general course as in the rural areas. The Democratic Construction Movement, directed in particular at the urban population and the trade unions, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, directed at the Party itself, the government administration, and industrial and business circles of society, in effect, performed functions similar to those in the land reform in rural areas.

668 Communist power in the city is retained through the maintenance of a set of control organizations, extending from workers' trade unions to the students' federation.[62]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committee, composed of one-hundred to six-hundred families, is organized with the stated aim of contributing to the welfare of the residents. The basic unit is a family residing in or sharing a house with others. Under the committee are sub-committees representing

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[62] Regulation of committees, People's Daily, Dec. 31, 1954, p. 1-2. English text in Current Background, No. 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

668 fifteen to forty families. Minority nationality groups and workers' residential areas are organized in similar units. It is reported that more than 70 per cent of the cities in China are under the control of these organizations.

The Urban Street Office is a representative of the city government and acts as a liaison between the government and the street for the maintenance of public order. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus enforcing a double-check on residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

The Mediation Committee is a mass organization established both in the city and in the village.[63] Its function is to mediate disputes and to propagandize government statutes, and, provisionally, to exercise "judicial" power in the village or street for misdemeanors not under the jurisdiction of the People's tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third party in a dispute, it represents

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[63] People's Daily, March 23, 1954, p. 1.

668 the government's view and emphasizes the technique of self-criticism.

Communist control in the city is much more rigid and forceful than in the village. With the spread of Communist domination over many organizations, factories, and other professional organizations, Communist domination is strengthened. Although public security sub-stations play a leading role in enforcing government decrees, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the People's courts, should not be minimized.

III. ELECTIONS AND POLITICS OF MINOR PARTIES

666 A. Elections

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The nationwide election which produced the People's congresses at all levels was held in the Southwest between 1953 and July-August, 1954.

1. Election Mechanism. The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China was

665 666 promulgated on March 1, 1953.[64] Article 3 stipulates that deputies to People's congresses of a province, county, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected by a like People's congress of the next lower level. Deputies to the People's congress of a *hsiang*, town, municipal district, or municipality divided into districts shall be elected directly by the electors. To administer these elections, the electoral law provides for the establishment of election committees at all levels down to the *hsiang*. Members of the committees are appointed by the People's government of the next higher level. The eight functions assigned to the committee at the *hsiang* level were reinforced by the directive issued in April 1953 by the Central Election Committee.[65] The chairman of the committee is appointed from the higher level. The committee defines electoral districts: each district consists

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[64] *The Electoral Law of the People's Republic of China for the All-China People's Congresses and Local People's Congresses of all Levels*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1953.

[65] For the eight functions of the committee, see Article 39, *ibid.*

665 666 of at least 200 people, in order to supply two or three representatives. A voter-qualification examination board is established; only those who pass the examination may receive the electoral certificate. Committees at the hsiang level directly control the selection of candidates through negotiations between the Party representatives and representatives of mass organizations within the election committee.

Although the election of the People's congresses above the county level must be conducted by secret ballot, the election of deputies to the People's congresses of a hsiang, town, municipal district, and the election of hsiang or a town deputy may be conducted byeither secret ballot or a show of hands (Article 55).

665 208 66 During the period prior to the general elections of 1953 and 1954, the Party accelerated its program of propagandaand indoctrination. Every phase of the campaign was designed to induce mass participation and greater adherence to Communist values and objectives. Szechwan was the center of an especially intense propaganda campaign.[66]

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[66] New China Daily, May 16, 1953, p. 1; also May 30, 1953, p. 1.

665 Fifty nine thousand election handbooks were
666 distributed by some 180,000 specially trained
208 propagandists, many of them members of the Szechwan Federation of Literature and Art Circles. Among other devices used were 34 mobile motion picture projection teams, 400 slide-projector units, innumerable "cultural" exhibits, and periodic radio
665 broadcasts. Election personnel were chosen
668 from various Party, governmental, and mass organizations. Students also were widely used. For example, in Kweichow some 400 students of political science and law, together with several hundred graduates of the Provincial Institue of Nationalists, served as election officers.[67]

The result of the election was a foregone conclusion. In all provinces, between one-fourth and one-third of the deputies elected to the Provincial People's Congresses were members of the Communist Party.[68] Most non-Party deputies enthusiastically supported the Party's program. It would seem that, like most elections in Communist states, the general elections of 1953 and 1954 were

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67. Ibid., May 19, 1953, p. 3.

68. People's Daily, March 21, 1954, p. 3; also April 28, 1954, p. 3.

665 conducted in order to facilitate the indoctrination
666 of the masses, rather than to secure leaders who enjoyed the support of the majority of the electorate.

2. Selection and Nomination of Candidates. Article 47 of the Electoral Law regulates the nomination of candidates. Members of the Communist Party of China, the various democratic parties, the various People's organizations, and electors or representatives who are not affiliated with the above-mentioned parties or organizations may be nominated as candidates for election as deputies, either jointly through negotiation among the groups or separately by each party, according to electoral districts and electoral units. In all cases, however, joint nomination is the rule and the caucus method is adopted. Negotiations on the nomination of candidates at the provincial or municipal level are made through the consultative conference of the level in question. At the county level or below, where such conferences do not exist, negotiations are carried out by the election committee. There is little doubt that the Communist Party of China commands the selection of candidates in the negotiations. At the hsiang level, a preliminary list of the candidates is given to the electors' discussion group for approval

665 and returned to the election committee. The
666 final list is then published five days before the
election.

3. Election Campaign and Fund. The practice of joint nomination of candidates usually eliminates the need for election campaigning. Candidates from other parties and organizations so selected must first meet the approval of the local Party organization; if they are approved, their election is assured. Any campaigning must take place only at the Party meeting and discussion group meetings, where candidates may be questioned and qualifications discussed. With respect to electin expenses, Article 8 of the electoral law permits a disbursement from the national treasury. Since campaigning is rare, the collection of a campaign fund is not provided for. Article 62 singles out bribery as an offense. Other unlawful practices include violence, intimidation, and fraud. Offenders are subject to fine or imprisonment.

B. Politics of Minor Parties

After 1950, minor parties gradually re-established themselves in the key cities of Southwest China. The most noted are the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang,

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665 the China Association for the Promotion of
666 Democracy, the Democratic League, the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, and the Chih Kung Tang.

The Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, composed of former Kuomintang officials, forms the largest group participating in government. The next largest is the Democratic League. As a party made up of the petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, it serves as a symbol of coalition. The China Association for the Promotion of Democracy is a party of the national bourgeoisie, including industrialists and capitalists. Its services are needed in the nation's economic programs. Minor parties having some political importance are drafted for other activities. Of special importance is the Chih Kung Tang, which, as an overseas Chinese political association, has been a major medium through which the Communists seek support from abroad.

The status of minor parties in this region is determined ultimately by their status in the central government -- a status which changed after the promulgation of the Constitution. While the Constitution still calls for the continued functioning of the People's

665 Democratic United Front led by the Communist
666 Party of China, the democratic groups of the United Front are rapidly losing their identity.

The local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, which are the organizational forms of the United Front, are no longer politically important. In 1951 their duties included assisting local governments, reflecting public opinion, examining decrees submitted by the government, and participating in government-sponsored drives. Article 18 of the Constitution has reduced them to advisory agencies.[69]

It is true that minor parties may still participate in government affairs, either through the nomination of candidates to the People's congresses or through the local consultative committees of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference; hosever, as the foregoing sections have indicated, the People's congresses and People's councils fail to provide for real popular participation. Equally significant is the reduction in the establishment of consultative committees below the provincial level. Prior to the

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[69] English text of the Constitution of the Chinese People's P.C.C. in Current Background, No. 309, Dec. 25, 1954.

[redacted]

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665 666 promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority.

With the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transitional stage certainly will reduce the power of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties no longer will exist as political forces in the ordinary sense of the term, simply because they no longer will exert political influence.

665 668 1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties. The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

665 indicates the degree to which these minor
668 parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion ... to maintain close contact with the masses ... to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the U.S.S.R. .... and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice self-criticism and criticism, and strive for ideological remolding."

The Communist Party relies chiefly on infiltration to eliminate minor parties. Through the Party Committee's Department of the United Front, the Party maintains a close control over the policies and activities of the minor parties. Often it virtually dictates their policies. For example, the resolution on party expansion adopted by the Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party in December 1951 authorized the appointment of Communist Party members to high posts within the organization. In addition, it forbade the establishment of party units in the countryside and excluded party activists from such organizations as the People's Liberation Army, the public security agencies, and intelligence units.

665 668 2. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics." In a democracy, the political activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of effective democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party nor do they take part in the making of decisions.

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to priase, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

CONCLUSION

665 Since 1952 both the size and the influence of the Communist Party have increased

665 rapidly in Southwest China. By 1954 Party branches had been organized in 63 per cent of the hsiang, an increase of 900 per cent over 1952. Nevertheless, this abnormally rapid expansion merely reflects the original weakness of the Party in this region. In fact, as late as 1953, the Party had so little support among the mass of the peasants, that it had to use force to bring about the organization of agricultural producers' co-operatives.

The rapid growth of industry in the Southwest, together with the recent decision of the 6th Plenary Session of the 7th Central Committee of the Party to accelerate the organization of collective farms, will necessitate even greater Party expansion in the immediate future. Such expansion may well arouse unprecedented opposition, requiring violent methods of suppression similar to those employed in the Soviet Union in the 1920's.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2d, Political Background

PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY

692 In a totalitarian regime, the employment of terror is a primary strategy by which "public order" is maintained and the consolidation of political power is assured. The Communist regime in the Southwest Region has not hesitated to pursue such a policy, employing it on an intensive scale which covers all spheres of activity. Such a policy is insured by the maintenance of rigid control over the populace and the employment of various means for the suppression of opposition. The judicial organ of government is conceived neither as an institution of justice nor as a protector of individual rights, but it is designed to serve as a weapon of the state for the suppression of all opposition, thereby "safeguarding the people's democratic system and protecting public property." Likewise, to insure observance of Communist law," the local People's Procuratorate, although a "judicial organ," exercises procuratorial authority over all local state agencies, over government workers, and over all citizens in general. The procuratorates serve as instruments of control over the People's courts and public

692 security agencies, particularly since they have the power to supervise the People's courts in adjudication matters, the security agencies in investigation activities, and the execution of judgment in criminal cases. Both the police and public security agencies with their own security forces are instruments of violence. They assume direct responsibility for the maintenance of public order and constant vigilance over the entire populace. They are integrated systems, subject to the control of the Central People's Government and rigidly supervised by the Communist Party.

The use of terror is inherent in a dictatorship, where subordination to a single will is required. The imposition of a single will upon an entire society is certain to meet opposition; the more rapid and drastic the change, the stronger the resistance. To crush this resistance, terror and violence are employed. The Communist regime imposes upon society a new political ideology and its acts are calculated to destroy the old order while creating a new one. It is for this reason that violence and terror are widespread and their impact upon the entire society alarming. (The activities of resistance groups will be discussed in the chapter on Subversive Potentialities.)

I. PEOPLE'S COURTS AND PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES

A. People's Courts

692 As political weapons of the state, the People's courts have actively engaged in the suppression of counterrevolutionary activities and maintenance of public order. The Supreme People's Court was established in November 1949, and a year later the Southwest China Branch Court was formed and given final authority in the region.[1] Local People's courts were formed at all levels, and mediation committee functioned in rural areas. The Municipal People's Court in Chungking handled 11,550 criminal and 7,635 civil cases in the first year of its operation.[2] Kweichow prosecuted 5,260 civil and 5,041 criminal cases in a period of nine months.[3]

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[1] Official report by Chuen-ju Shen, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], June 2, 1950, p. 1.

[2] Report in Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports of 1950], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 1016-24.

[3] Report of Tseng-ku Ch'en, ibid., pp. 1098-1112.

692 The courts, like other agencies of the state, underwent several stages in development; however, they followed dissimalar courses and their functions varied from time to time. For instance, during the first stage, prior to June 1952, the courts served as instruments of violence, carrying out with relentnessness the Land Reform Movement in the rural areas and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in the cities. During the second stage, between June 1952 and the spring of 1953, the courts completed judicial reform that enabled them to legalize their authority, replacing that of the former courts. The reform affected Southwest China two months later than other regions and was not as vigorously carried out, chiefly because other regional projects demanded greater attention. During the third stage, from September 1954 to the present, the courts have consolidated their authority and have begun to function as judicial agencies in conformity with the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China.[4]

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[4] English text of the law is available in Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, No. 303, Nov. 5, 1954, pp. 1-7.

692 1. The First Stage. The distinguishing feature of judicial activities during this stage is the wide use of the People's tribunal in the land reform, and in Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. This devotion to the administration of the criminal code in connection with the suppression of opposition made possible the concentration of judicial authority in the hands of Party functionaries and the complete subordination of judicial functions for political expediency..

The city and county governments were empowered by the Central Government to organize People's tribunals for land reform. People's tribunals were established in every two or three ch'ü and were given sole authority in dealing with criminal matters, including the authority to impose sentences of not more than five years' imprisonment. They also have the authority to prosecute counter-revolutionaries and to initiate arrests. The political character of the tribunal can be detected by the composition of the adjudication committee, composed of a president, a deputy, and several judges, half of whom were to be appointed by the People's government and the rest "elected" by the People's representatives

682 from public security, the Peasants' Association, and other mass organizations. Specifically, the county head in some cases and the *ch'ü* head in all cases were the presidents of the tribunals.

A directive issued by the Southwest China Military and Political Committee in December 1951 offered specific regional instructions.[5] Tribunal personnel, drawn from those showing strong class consciousness, were to be trained by provincial and county governments. County governments were to hold training courses, and provincial governments were to supply instructors and instruction materials. Government authorities claimed that by September 1950 People's tribunals were functioning in all key areas of Southwest China.[6]

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[5] *Hsin-hua Jih-pao* [*New China Daily*], Chungking, Dec. 24, 1951, p. 2.

[6] Report of Tan Mou-hsing, head of the Department of Justice of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, *ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1951, p. 2.

692 The operation of these tribunals relied 695 heavily on mass hysteria and mob hatred. The administration of the trials by Party functionaries insured the use of terror. When cases were heard, the judges of the People's tribunals bombarded the masses with propaganda. The masses were sufficiently agitated to denounce as reactionaries those whom the Party had previously singled out for prosecution. After mass emotion was aroused and denunciations were made, judgment was passed by the masses and sentence rendered at the instigation of the adjudication committee controlled by the Party. Such a mass trial could not avoid intimidation and violence toward the accused.

During the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, People's tribunals were established by the directives of the Government Administration Council.[7] Members of the committee were activists representing various Party-controlled organizations. These tribunals were empowered to mete out death sentences.

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[7] Directives on the Three-Anti tribunal in People's Daily, March 31, 1952, p. 1; on the Five-Anti tribunal, ibid., March 25, 1952, p. 1.

692 The effective use of People's tribunals as weapons of force was introduced after the judicial reform.[8] During the nationwide electons in 1953-54, People's tribunals were again widely used. Their main function was to suppress and punish violators and unqualified candidates and voters, including those citizens accused of counterrevolutionary activity. These tribunals worked in co-ordination with the election committees at all levels.

2. The Second Stage. The Judicial Reform Campaign was a mass movement aimed at eliminating judicial personnel previously serving with the Nationalist Government.[9] Exaggerated accounts of corruption and practices detrimental to the state were publicized. Mass meetings were held to identify, accuse, and pass judgment upon the accused workers. A large percentage of the old-established personnel was affected. For example, in the city of Chungking about 50 per cent of the total personnel in the Municipal People's Court had served under the

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[8] For functions of the election tribunal, see People's Daily, Feb. 7, 1954, p. 3.

[9] For reports on campaign conducted in Chungking, see New China Daily, Aug. 29, 1952, p. 1, and ibid., Sept. 19, 1952, p. 3.

692 Nationalist Government; some 60 per cent were charged with corruption.[10]

Mediation committees were set up to deal with local disputes and disseminate government propaganda. The active participation by the public security sub-stations in the cities and the _hsiang_ governments in the rural areas indicates the political nature of the mediation.[11]

692 In regard to the elimination of old judicial
695 practices, the Communists attacked the old system on four counts:[12] (a) that the judiciary was a weapon employed by one class for the suppression of the opposing class; (b) that the exceedingly mechanical procedure of the old courts should be condemned as a bourgeois practice; (c) that the assumption of a purely legalistic approach to a case that does not reflect the economic and social relationship of the society was contrary to the socialist view of law; and (d) that the use of precedents for adjudication of a case should also be discarded as a bourgeois practice.

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[10] _Ibid._, Sept. 27, 1952, p. 1.

[11] Report on the conclusion of the campaign in this region, _ibid._, Dec. 14, 1952, p. 1.

[12] _Yangtze Daily_, Feb. 18, 1951, p. 3, and Li Kuang-ts'an, "P'i-p'ing Jen-min Fa-lü Ti Chiu-fa Kuan-tien" ["Criticizing the People's Law from the Old Jurisprudential Viewpoint"], _Hsüeh-hsi_ [_Study_], No. 7, Oct. 1, 1952, pp. 16-19.

692 695 To stress the development of a new judicial system, the Communists introduced several innovations: (a) the simplification of jurisdiction, the reduction of appellant cases, and the concentration of judicial authority in the lower courts; (b) the adoption of adjudication committees and the administration of law by collegia; (c) the review and periodic check of non-appellant cases by the higher courts and the practice in the lower courts of seeking instructions from and reporting to the higher courts; (d) the conduct of circuit hearings; (e) the use of People's assessors, a system similar to the Western jury system, which includes representatives from various People's organizations; (f) the use of trials for cases involving disputes among Party members and workers in factories, offices, and enterprises; and (g) such new techniques as oral inquiries and on-the-spot investigations and the establishment of People's reception rooms and mediation committees as means of enlisting mass support as well as for the intimidation of the masses.

692 3. The Third Stage. After judicial reform, further effort was concentrated upon the establishment of the new system and the training of new cadre to fill the vacancies which resulted from large-scale liquidation of

692 the former workers. In 1953, as a result of the second session of the All-China Judicial Conference, a directive was issued calling for the immediate training of 200 to 500 judicial workers and for the drafting of a training plan in each region.[13] Effort was made to strengthen judicial authority at the lower levels and to set up special courts in industrial and mining centers as well as courts with jurisdiction over railways and waterways. As of September 1954, only eight railway courts and one waterway court had been established in the entire nation.[14]

"Comrade trial courts" were established in factories. Members of these courts were activists of the trade unions, and their tactics were similar to those of the mediation committeemen. Their jurisdiction was limited to disciplinary cases, and they were to recommend suitable punishments. As of June 1954, 70 comrade trial courts had been reported in major cities of the nation.[15]

The new judicial system was made permanent by the Organic Law of the People's Court of the People's Republic of China, which was promulgated at the First Session of the National People's Congress.[16] The law also formalized the relationships among the various courts.

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[13] People's Daily, Sept. 10, 1953, p. 1.
[14] Ibid., Sept. 4, 1954.
[15] Ibid., June 5, 1954, p. 3.

B. People's Procuratorate

The People's Procuratorate is called a "judicial organ" but is, in effect, a prosecuting agency exercising control over both People's courts and public security agencies. It is in itself a centralized system. Powers exercised by the local offices include the supervision of decisions, orders, and measures of local state agencies, inquiry into criminal activities, supervision of the work of the People's courts, guidance in passing judgment on criminal cases and the activities of the agencies for "Reform-through-Labor," and the right to prosecute criminal cases or to join in the prosecution of important civil cases involving the interest of the State and the people.

Prior to 1954, the Supreme People's Procuratorate was represented in Southwest China by the Southwest China Branch.[17] At the Second Session of the National People's Congress in July 1955, Chang Ting-ch'eng, the Supreme People's Procurator, announced

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[16] Text in Current Background, No. 303, Nov. 5, 1954, pp. 1-7.

[17] Text, ibid., pp. 8-9.

692 the course of action for the People's procuratorates for 1955.[18] He emphasized the suppression of counterrevolutionaries and the establishment of procuratorates in all transportation centers and in the armed forces. From September 1954 to July 1955 the number of People's procuratorates increased from 199 to 1,963.

II. PUBLIC SECURITY ORGANS AND POLICE

625 Perhaps the most powerful instrument of violence, with the exception of the armed forces, is the public security organ which exists in all government and functional organizations throughout China. It maintains close control over the entire populace and assumes the responsibility for arrests and punishment. Furthermore, it has at its disposal the public security forces, which are said to be efficiently staffed. There is no doubt that the public security agencies, by collaborating with other secret agencies of the Communist Party and the armed forces, have become the best physical and psychological instruments for the maintenance of public order.

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[18] People's Daily, July 24, 1955, p. 2.

A. Organization

625 For reasons of secrecy and the potentially sinister role played by public security agencies in the structure of the regime, information on their organization and activities is withheld by the Communists. However, it is known that, in addition to the Ministry of Public Security in the Central Government, each level of government has a department or bureau in charge of matters of public security. This public security system extends from the provincial government down to the *hsiang*.

In the past, the Department of Public Security of the regional government was directly responsible for the maintenance of public order and safety in the Southwest China Region. According to a Nationalist study from Formosa in 1953, the Department of Public Security in a provincial government was said to have the following five sections as well as an administrative office:[19] political security, security administration, police, general service, and "Reform-through-labor."

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[19] *Kung-fei Chün-shih Kung-an T'e-wu Tsu-chih Hsi-t'ung T'u-piao Hui-pien [Compendium of Organizational Charts of Communist Military, Public Security, and Intelligence Organs]*, Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1953.

625 Other units such as a cadre school, border public security bureaus, and forced labor batallions were also under the department's jurisdiction. Public security bureaus were organized within administrative districts and municipalities. County bureaus were empowered to establish security stations for the strengthening of public security work in ch'ü and hsiang, and they were placed in charge of detention houses and prisons.

B. Public Security in the Rural Areas

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701 During the land reform period, rural security relied on peasant associations and the militia to enforce decrees and destroy the old rural system, to crush the intelligence agencies controlled by the Kuomintang, to suppress banditry, and to eliminate landlords and "despots."

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669 At the time of the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in the cities, climaxed by the use of violence in 1951, a similar campaign was carried out in rural areas. Official reports during this time indicated the unrest and the resistance of the peasants, expressed in the forms of organized "underground armies," the killing of militia,

625 the burning of granaries, and the slaughtering
701 of cattle. Communist authorities in the
669 Southwest China region called for the strengthening of rural public security.[20] Village committees, composed of from 3 to 11 members, were organized, and public security teams were formed.[21]

The extent of rural unrest was indicated by Wen-hui Liu, deputy from the province of Szechwan, at the second session of the National People's Congress.[22] He reported destruction of agricultural implements, sabotage of a dam, murder of Communist cadres and activists, arson, and impairment of relationships between the Han and the minority groups.

In August 1953, bands of armed police were transferred from the military command to the public security agencies in an attempt to strengthen rural public security.

C. Public Security in the Cities

625 The maintenance of public order and

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[20] New China Daily, June 29, 1952, p. 1, and Oct. 9, 1952, p. 3.

[21] People's Daily, Aug. 11, 1952, p. 1.

[22] Ibid., July 29, 1955, p. 5.

625 safety in the cities is more complex than in the rural areas. The Communists approach this problem from at least four different angles: (a) an extensive public security organization; (b) rigid census control over resident movements; (c) the establishment of resident organizatins to watch over the entire populace, including committees in all organizations; and (d) the strict regulation of all commercial and recreational activities.

The Public Security Bureau in a municipal government maintains eight sections and several other units. The eight sections include a secretariat, political security (including intelligence, investigation, confidential communication), security administration, police, sanitation, fire prevention, supply, and personnel. Other units under the bureau include prisons, detention houses, and "Reform-through-labor" camps as well as security-training schools and security forces. Under the bureau, ch'ü sub-bureaus and security sub-stations have been established. The organization of the sub-bureau is as elaborate as that of the bureau itself. The sub-bureau takes charge of detention houses and directs the work of security stations and security committees under them.

625 In 1951, the Communistsbegan to tighten
659 census control throughout the Southwest. The directive on census control, issued by the

625 659 Government Administration Council in July 1951, restricted the movement of city dwellers.[23] Any resident who wished to move had first to obtain a permit from the security station. Likewise, any person who moved into the district had to report his arrival to the station. Even house guests staying three days or more were required to register. The nationwide census taken in 1953 placed urban residents under stricter vigilance. "Planned purchase and marketing," a form of rationing introduced at the end of 1953, strengthened security control. The recent institution of a regular system of registration increases the burden of established regulations.[24]

625 The Security Committee was first organized in the cities during the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951. Dwellers in a street or an alley formed a unit for the establishment of a committee. Under the security sub-station, which might have jurisdiction over several streets, security committees were linked to form

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[23] Yangtze Daily, July 18, 1951, p. 4.

[24] Directive of the State Council in People's Daily, July 3, 1955, p. 1; see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], April 2, 1955, p. 1.

625 a general committee with the sub-station chief as its chairman. The sub-station consists of a chief, deputy chiefs, and several policemen, assigned to maintain public order and enforce decrees pertaining to it. These functions include the enforcement of laws on public security, the suppression of sabotage, the prevention of bandit activities, the surveillance of counterrevolutionaries, census-taking, and the supervision of the security committees.

Security in factory, business enterprises, and other industrial organizations is the concern of committees established in each of these organizations. These committees are expected to supervise every phase of industrial production and labor discipline.

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656 The establishment of regulations governing the conduct of business in the Southwest enables the Party to maintain control over all activities. For example, the regulation controlling the supply and sale of radio and electrical appliances[25] requires each electrical shop to secure a permit from the security agency before requesting a license from the local Department of Industry. A monthly report of sales and a monthly inventory also are required. Failure to report suspicious

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[25] *People's Daily*, July 26, 1955, p. 3.

625 656 patrons to the security agency is a punishable offense. Equally rigid regulations govern the ownership and use of firearms.[26] Regulations governing the operation of hotels, warehouses, and recreational facilities also are extremely stringent.[27] Owners first must have permits from public security agencies. The procedure regulating the issuance of permits requires the submission of the personal history of the owner, complete information concerning others involved in the business, and a diagram of the geographic location of the shop or office. Hotels must make daily reports upon their guests, and recreational centers are subject to inspection at any time.

B. Police

625 The police should be distinguished from the security forces, which are a component of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Effective August 1955, as a result of a State Council order, security forces at the level of the administrative district were organized into an armed police force.[28]

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[26] Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, June 29, 1951, p. 5.

[27] Ibid., May 1951, p. 2.

[28] The only Communist report on security forces appeared in People's Daily, Aug. 11, 1953, p. 1; Text of the State Council order, ibid., July 31, 1955.

III. CRIMINAL CODES AND LAWS GOVERNING COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

671 Although the establishment of a criminal and civil code is assigned to the Commission on Codification under the Government Administration Council, to date no report has been made by the committee. However, decrees and orders concerning counterrevolutionary activities have been issued by all levels of government.

A. Criminal Code

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694 A decree promulgated by the chairman of the People's Republic of China in December 1954 explained the procedure for arrest and detention.[29] As a rule, arrests must first be approved by the People's court or by the People's procuratorates, and before making an arrest, public security agencies must obtain a warrant from the People's Procuratorate. However, there are circumstances under which immediate arrests can be made. These exceptions, in fact, grant the security agencies more power than the decree would suggest. For example, persons who are unable to establish their place of residence

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[29] People's Daily, Dec. 21, 1954, p. 1.

671 are subject to immediate arrest. It is true 694 that certain provisions in the decree guarantee each individual the right to demand a warrant, a minimum period of detention, and an early and rapid trial; nevertheless, at least two factors minimize the value to the individual of these provisions -- warrants for arrests are not always obtained by security agencies, and exceptions to these provisions are allowed to facilitate the arrest of counterrevolutionaries.

687 Apart from those decrees relating to the punishment of counterrevolutionaries, discussed below, other orders that may be singled out for discussion include the decree on the safekeeping of confidential information[30] and that implemented in cases involving the violation of laws concerning national currency.[31] Since "confidential material" is loosely defined by the Communists, the "unlawful disclosure" of any information whatsoever can be regarded as a crime. "Confidential information" includes not only national security and military matters in the usual sense, but also any data relating to economic and financial affairs, transportation conditions, and matters of a

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[30] Yangtze Daily, June 11, 1951, p. 1.
[31] Ibid., April 28, 1951, p. 4.

687 judicial and legislative nature. In the same fashion, any violation of the laws governing national currency committed with the intention of aiding counterrevolutionary activities is regarded as an act of counterrevolution and carries a severe penalty.

B. Counterrevolutionary Decrees

According to the Communists, "counterrevolutionaries" are persons who engage in activities contrary to the interest of the state. This term specifically includes bandits of all kinds, landlords, "despots," spies, Kuomintang intelligence agents, former high-ranking Nationalist officers continuing to engage in counterrevolutionary activities, and members of secret societies.

Regulations on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries[32] were first issued by the Government Administration Council in February 1951. These regulations are reportedly based on the "spirit" of Article 7 of the Common Program, which registered the determination of the Communist regime to punish all counterrevolutionaries and "other criminals" and to impose upon them the punishment of "Reform-through-labor." Counterrevolutionaries are those who collaborate with foreign imperialist powers, instigate mutiny in the militia and armed forces, or organize secret societies. Counterrevolutionaries are subject to trial both by the People's courts and by the military tribunals. Former members of political parties, including the Kuomintang, the Chinese Youth Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party, former intelligence personnel under the Nationalist regime, and former Nationalist officers above the rank of captain are required to register with public security agencies.[33] Their political rights may be witheld for a period of time, their property may be confiscated, and they are subject to political surveillance.

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[32] Yangtze Daily, Feb. 23, 1951, p. 1.

The control of counterrevolutionaries is made possible by two laws promulgated by the regime -- the law of control of counterrevolutionaries and regulations governing "Reform-through-labor." The law concerning counterrevolutionaries was issued in July

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[33] Ibid. Aug. 13, 1951, p. 1.

1952 by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council.[34] Decisions on the means of suppression of counterrevolutionaries can be made either by the People's court or by the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. In the villages, hsiang and ch'ü governments may initiate this control, subject to the approval of the public security agencies at the county level. Sub-stations in the city may also initiate control, subject to the approval of public security sub-bureaus. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. The period of surveillance may be three years or less. During the period, the individual is sent to a forced-labor camp.

The regulations governing "Reform-through-labor," issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provided a detailed scheme for the establishment of forced labor throughout China.[35] Centralized authority no doubt facilitates control of counterrevolutionaries.

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[34] People's Daily, July 16, 1952, p. 1.

[35] Ibid., Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

COMMENTS

625 The prevalence of banditry and disorder in the region, together with the activities of remnants of Nationalist military ~~units~~, made it exceedingly difficult for the Communist Party to re-establish "peace and order" in the Southwest. The difficulty of maintaining control over ethnic minorities, the multitude of secret societies, and the hostility of the peasants to many Communist economic schemes constituted further obstacles. The Party was so preoccupied with these problems that it made little headway in the organization of the usual civil security agencies, such as the People's courts and the People's procuratorates. Instead, the regime was forced to rely upon military force and terror in order to maintain "public order."

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 2f,
Political Background

SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

669 The most serious challenge to the Communist regime immediately after its assumption of power in the Southwest Region was the open resistance of armed groups. The Communists credit the Nationalist Government with having established fifteen guerrilla bases and organized thousands of intelligence workers in Southwest China before evacuating the region. Nearly one million members of Nationalist units and various resistance groups "controlled by the Nationalists," in addition to 80,000 intelligence agents, were reported by the Communiststo have been left behind to harass the new regime.[1]

600 Even after the Communists consolidated

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[1] Report of Chou Hsing, head of the Department of Public Security of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Nov. 12, 1951, p. 2; and report of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Minister of Public Security, Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

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Even after the Communists consolidated

668 their hold on Southwest China, open and clandestine opposition of all kinds was reported by the new regime. Two main sources of subversion were marked as targets for destruction by the government: (1) "Counterrevolutionaries" or "basically hostile elements" -- inclusive terms embracing all social, economic, and political elements considered enemies of the socialist state. (2) Harmful activities such as corruption, waste, and theft which are reported to have caused degeneration and inefficiency in Party and government organizations, industrial
578 establishments, and rural co-operatives. A third source of danger to the Communist regime -- tension and discontent within the party, government, and the populace -- can be inferred as concommitants of excessive control by an extremely centralized state, though little explicit reference is made to such feelings by the regime.[2]

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[2] Studies of the USSR can be helpful in understanding this subject. Cf. Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955; Barrington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.

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I. SUPPRESSION OF COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES

669 The term "counterrevolutionaries" as used by the Communists is only vaguely defined. It includes all persons whose past or present actions are deemed contrary to the purpose and interests of the Communists, particularly "bandits," landlords, armed resistance groups, spies, saboteurs, secret societies, and unrepentant former Nationalist Government officials, army officers, and members of the Kuomintang. Any person to whom the term was applied was generally subject to the penalty of death or forced labor.

A. Extermination of Nationalist Forces and "Bandits"

Prior to 1952, the term "bandits" applied only to remnants of the Nationalist Government forces on the Mainland and long-active bands of robbers, the great majority of which were regarded by the Communists as "agents of Nationalist underground forces." The politically subversive nature of the "bandits" in the Southwest Region was emphasized from the beginning of the Communist attempt to consolidate control there by Liu Po-ch'eng, then chairman of the Southwest China Military and

669 Political Committee and commanding general of the Second Field Army.[3]

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727 Another factor that contributed to the nature of the "bandit-suppression campaigns" in the Southwest was the large number of Nationalist troops that surrendered to the Communists in this region. The Communists claim they accepted the surrender of 900,000 Nationalist soldiers in Southwest China -- 400,000 of them in organized units and the remainder in scattered groups or as individuals. Part of the captured forces were reorganized and relocated as Communist units, but large numbers were discharged and ordered to their homes. Some of this latter group remained at large to create serious problems for the Communists, including reported participation in open rebellions during 1950 and 1951.

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725 Communist military campaigns in the Southwest against the remnants of Nationalist

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[3] Report of Liu Po-ch'eng, Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-Kao Hui-Pien, 1950, [Compendium of Government Reports 1950], Peking, People's Press, 1951, pp. 989-91.

669 725 forces and robber gangs were conducted in the same manner as in other regions. Elements of the regular Red Army encircled the opposing forces, while Party cadres organized and indoctrinated local militias. The combined Communist forces then cut the opposition into small groups and destroyed the main body of resistance. The mopping up of isolated elements was entrusted to the local militia, permitting large numbers of regular troops to be shifted to pacified rural areas for political work.

669 Within the general pattern of "bandit-suppression" strategy, different timing and tactics were employed in each province to meet the varying conditions encountered by the Communists. The work of eliminating armed resistance in Szechwan was undertaken within four special districts.[4] Counter-revolutionary activity organized by Kuomintang elements and aided by professional bandits, as the Communists described it, seems to have posed the greatest threat in the southern and eastern special districts of Szechwan. Simultaneous campaigns launched during the spring of 1950 in the four special

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[4] For reports of the work of the four special districts in Szechwan, see Compendium of Government Reports 1950, pp. 1025-70.

669 districts were brought to a close in September with the announcement that 170,000 "bandits" had been eliminated in the southern special district, 120,000 in the eastern district, and lesser numbers in the other two districts.

Pacification of Kweichow was a far more difficult and prolonged problem. The Communists admit that in April 1950 they controlled only the cities and county seats of 48 counties as against 31 counties held by counterrevolutionary forces. Fifteen Nationalist regiments and numerous Nationalist-organized local militias were said to form the backbone of the opposition, which was not overcome until November 1950.[5]

A similar situation confronted the Communists in Yunnan.[6] Many Nationalist troops were identified as taking part in open resistance to the new regime during 1950-51. The situation was complicated by the operation of Nationalist elements along and across

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[5] On the Kweichow situation, see New China Daily, Oct. 2, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 23, 1951, p. 3.

[6] On the Yunnan situation, see People's Daily, Oct. 24, 1950, p. 3; New China Daily, Dec. 17, 1952, p. 1.

669 Yunnan's border with Burma and within ethnic minority areas of the province. In December 1952, the Communists announced the capture of the last Nationalist stronghold inside Yunnan and the annihilation of 21,573 Nationalist soldiers and intelligence agents. However, the presence of Kuomintang forces under Li Mi and Yü Ch'eng-wan across the Yunnan border in Burma constituted a continuous threat to the province's security until they were withdrawn to Formosa in late 1954.

In Sikang, the "bandit-suppression" campaign was on a much smaller scale.[7] It lasted from February to November of 1950 and was reported to have destroyed 30,000 "bandits."

B. Landlords

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668 Under the Land Reform Law and the joint directive of the Government Administration Council and the People's Supreme Court,

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[7] Compendium of Government Reports, 1950, pp. 1071-73.

565 landlords were convicted of a variety of crimes
668 during the Land Reform Movement. Punishment ranged from death to short terms of imprisonment. After release from prison, landlords were given a small piece of land to work and placed under the surveillance of public security agencies or were required to
[697] serve in forced-labor camps. During and after the Land Reform Movement, forced-labor units were established throughout the Southwest Region, and nearly every county maintained a forced-labor battalion.[8] These battalions were engaged in all types of construction from the building and repairing of roads in ethnic minority areas to the extraction of minerals in mining areas. Still other landlords were classified as counterrevolutionaries within the meaning of the term as used in the Decree on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council[9] in Feb. 1951. They

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[8] For example, see report on the province of Kweichow, New China Daily, Oct. 8, 1951, p. 1.

[9] Text of the regulation in People's Daily, Feb. 22, 1951, p. 1.

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668 were deprived of their political rights and subject to surveillance for at least three years as well as being made liable to forced labor at any time and in any place they were needed.

A new type of "potential landlord," regarded by the Communists as hostile to the new regime, came into existence after land reform. This "new rich" group was composed of Party members and former middle peasants who had acquired wealth following the redistribution of land. Since 1953, they have been accused of such hostile acts against the state as seizing control of rural governments, destroying agricultural producers' co-operatives, and disrupting Communist political control in rural areas. Cases of these kinds have been reported everywhere.[10] (See section on Rural Security in chapter on Public Order and Safety.) According to Communist accounts, the "new rich" group destroyed rural co-operatives by bribing Party cadres and responsible persons in the organizations or by employing collaborator

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[10] For an early report see New China Daily, Oct. 9, 1952; for more recent accounts see the reports of deputies to the National People's Congress, People's Daily, July 29, 1955, pp. 5, 6; and July 31, 1955, p. 3.

565 to infilitrate and capture key positions. Through 568 these agents, the "potential landlords" spread rumors among the peasants, falsified co-operative accounts, and engaged in other disruptive maneuvers to disorganize the co-operatives' work and membership.

C. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries and Espionage Agents

668 687 As early as July 1950, the Government Administration Council of the Central Government and the People's Supreme Court issued a joint directive calling for the suppression of all counterrevolutionaries throughout China. The directive demanded the apprehension and severe punishment of organizers of open resistance, saboteurs in factories and warehouses, and murders of government officials. Nationalist intelligence agents and "bandit leaders" were particularly singled out for elimination. However, not until the nationwide Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951 did the campaign against subversiv^es reach major proportions and involve mass participation. At the conclusion of the movement, the foundation had been laid for the construction of a network of mass security organizations.

668 1. Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951. Like other mass movements

668 initiated by the Communists, the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement of 1951 relied heavily on techniques for arrousing mass hysteria. The people were drawn into mass meetings to be bombarded with propaganda. With mass fear and emotion aroused, the populace was led to make accusations in public and in private and to sign patriotic agreements. The campaign was carried on in factories, schools, and other organizations. Finally, security committees were established in every organization, street, and village, so that a public security network reached into every sector of social, economic, and political life. In Chungking, for example, four area-security committees, 90 branch-security committees, and 1,211 security teams were set up between June and September 1951. The membership of the committees was overwhelmingly made up of workers' representatives.[11]

Throughout the movement, cases of subversion and espionage were deliberately manufactured or exaggerated by the Communists, This deceptive practice seems

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[11] New China Daily, Oct. 7, 1951, p. 1.

668 to have been a convenient means of absolving the regime of responsibility for any of its failures. In the Southwest Region, 5,168 cases of counterrevolutionary activity were reported during the movement, and 70 per cent of them were described as involving open resistance.[12] Their crimes were reported to have included the murder of 14,000 government workers and activists, the poisoning of 6,000 others, and the destruction or theft of several billion yuan worth of crops and other property.

Toward the end of the movement, its general success was praised in a spate of reports. At the same time, the Communist press noted failures, stressed the need for continuing vigilence, and issued warnings to particular areaswhere the movement had not been carried out successfully or had been completely ignored. In the Fu-ling Administrative District of Szechwan, for instance, only 34 per cent of the hsiang were credited with having done an adequate job in ferreting out counterrevolutionaries. Chou Hsing, head of the Department of Public Security of the Southwest China regional government, pointed out that the enemies of the regime had not

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[12] Ibid., Nov. 12, 1951, p. 2.

668 been entirely eliminated. He called for continued efforts to detect and suppress Nationalist intelligence agents, "bandits," and landlords, and for concentration on the strengthening of the "democratic reform movement" and the establishment of public security committees.

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2. Suppression of Nationalist Spies.

669 The threat of Nationalist expionage in Southwest China was greatest at the time the Communists assumed power in the region. The Communists not only reported 80,000 Nationalist intelligence workers at large in the region, but also claimed their influence and operations extended to the remnants of Nationalist forces, "bandit" units, and secret societies in Southwest China. Great emphasis was placed on the necessity of ridding the region of these spies to assure the well being of the new regime.

During 1950, the Communists concentrated on the disbanding of Nationalist espionage organizations and obtaining the surrender and arrest of spies. In the western Szechwan special district, the Communist authorities reported the surrender of 2,000 spies and the arrest of 318 others in the first half of 1950. During the same period in the southern Szechwan special district,

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2,451 spies were arrested and 1,200 gave themselves up, according to Communist sources. Throughout the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement in 1951, further efforts were made to apprehend Nationalist intelligence personnel. As one means to this end, the Communists required that all former Kuomintang officials and army officers above the rank of captain register with public security agencies. The officers who complied were placed under surveillance.

Despite the emphasis placed on uncovering spies during the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement, relatively few of the cases dealt with during the campaign involved espionage. In the eastern Szechwan special district, of all prosecuted cases, 79 per cent dealt with "bandits" and "local despots" and only a small percentage concerned intelligence workers.[13]

Counterrevolutionary activities, including Nationalist espionage operations, have received increased publicity since 1954. Three counterrevolutionary cases presented for mass trial in January 1955 at Chungking[14]

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13. Ibid., Dec. 4, 1951, p. 2.
14. People's Daily, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 3.

726 669 apparently were intended to convince the people that spying by Nationalist agents still constituted an actual threat to the Communist regime. Indeed, it may be that espionage organizations had been revitalized by internal or external forces.

726 668 798 3. Foreign "Intelligence Agents." Closely connected with the suppression of Kuomintang intelligence personnel on the Mainland was the apprehension of "foreign intelligence agents." During the 1951 suppression movement, church groups and foreign missionaries were accused of engaging in espionage against the regime. Arrests of missionaries and foreign residents were frequently reported throughout the Southwest Region. A Catholic organization, Sheng-mu Chün (Legion of Mary), was made a particular object of attack. Members of the organization were required to register with the authorities and were subject to investigation by public security agencies. Persons who failed to comply were arrested and charged with counterrevolutionary activity.

687 4. Sabotage. Acts of sabotage reported in the Communist press included the destruction of factory property, the theft of economic information, the spreading of rumors among workers, and the organization of strikes.

687 During 1950-52, sabotage was combatted by the reinforcement of union control and the organization of security committees and safety teams in factories and industrial organizations. Nevertheless, 146 sabotage cases were reported in the Southwest China region[15] during 1950 and the first half of 1951. One case cited involved the open assault on a mining installation by 1,000 persons.

With the inauguaration of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953, regulations on safety and labor discipline were strengthened.[16] "To observe labor regulations, to guard state property, to safeguard economic information, and to observe all safety and security regulations" became the duties of every worker. However, increasing the responsibility of the workers did not eliminate industrial sabotage. The woman minister of justice Shih Liang told the Second Session of the First National People's Congress in July 1955 that 364,604 cases of sabotage[17] had occurred throughout China between January 1954 and May 1955.

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[15] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1951, p. 2.

[16] Text of the regulation in ibid., July 14, 1954, p. 2.

[17] Text of the speech in ibid., July 30, 1955, p. 6.

687 The revival of Communist concern with counterrevolutionary activities since 1954 after a lapse of only two years, could indicate an upsurge of resistance against the regime. Nearly all the reports made by the various ministers and deputies from all over China at the Second Session of the National People's Congress in July-August 1955 contained references to serious instances of subversive activity. In Kweichow in 1955, counterrevolutionary crimes of all types were reported to be 13 per cent higher than in the previous year; subversive acts involving murder had risen 27.4 per cent, those involving arson, 90 per cent.

D. Secret Societies

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687 Secret societies have been a source of irritation, if not subversion, for every regime in China, including the Communist. The latter, on attaining power, took immediate steps to wipe out these clandestine organizations. In the Southwest Region, the Ko-lao-hui sect had been for centuries the most influential of the secret societies.[18]

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[18] See Wei Ta Fa-shih, Chung-kuo Pang Hui [Chinese Secret Societies], Chungking, Shuo-wen-she, 1949; and Ko-lao-hui Yü Ch'ing pang Kai-k'uang [General Survey of Ko-lao-hui and Ch'ing-pang], Hsi-pei Yen-chiu-she, 1940.

575 687 Formed at the end of the Ming Dynasty in the seventeenth century, the Ko-lao-hui served as center of resistance against the succeeding, alien dynasty. The sect initiated several organized uprisings against the Manchu (Ch'ing) rulers, and its influence gradually extended to all sections of society. In the last days of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the Ko-lao-hui was one of the secret socities which supported the revolutionary movement of Sun Yat-sen, the leading figure in the founding of the Republic of China. After 1911, the society was an open organization participating in politics. Particularly in Southwest China, warlords relied considerably on this sect for support, and many of the local military leaders were heads of the organization. These militarists either were eliminated by the Communists or absorbed into their ranks when the Red Army overran the Southwest Region. As a result, the Ko-lao-hui has not been active under the Communist regime.

Another major secret society, I-kuan Tao, was practically unknown in the Southwest Region before the advent of the Communists but is now the most active sect opposing the Communist

575 regime.[19] Founded in Shantung during the early 1920's, it began to spread only in the 1940's. The Communists claim I-kuan Tao received direct financial and political support from the Japanese during World War II to spy on the Nationalists and Communists. As one of the largest secret societies in North and East China after the war, the sect was asserted by the Communists to have become a Nationalist espionage organization. Whatever the truth of the Communist claim, I-kuan Tao is the most active secret society on the China Mainland. Its influence extended to Southwest China and other regions beginning in 1950. The society is reported to have had a centralized command capable of directing and co-ordinating operations in all regions since 1951.

The suppression of I-kuan Tao was associated with the drive to eliminate other subversive elements. Leaders of the organization were arrested; some were placed on mass trial to publicize their "crimes."

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[19] See Shih-shih Shou-ts'e [Current Affairs Handbook], No. 4, December 1950, pp. 77-81; No. 6, Jan. 5, 1951, pp. 38-43.

575 Since 1954, I-kuan Tao activities have increased rapidly. In Kunming, eight leaders of the society were sentenced to death in February 1955 by the Provincial People's Court of Yunnan.[20] One of them was charged with having organized and directed branches of the society in nine counties of the province since 1952. He also was charged with having prepared fraudulent papers, spread rumors, and sabotage planned grain purchases. Another of the leaders was accused of having performed destructive acts in the rural districts, undermined the co-operative movement, and slandered the government's rural political guidance. I-kuan Tao activities were reported to be widespread in the western part of Kweichow,[21] and in various parts of Szechwan. The three widely publicized counterrevolutionary cases tried at Chungking in January 1955 were linked to the I-kuan Tao movement in the Southwest Region.

The Communist regime undertook other than legal measures to suppress secret societies. After they were outlawed and their

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[20] Survey of China Mainland Press, 1001 Supplement, pp. 16-17.

[21] People's Daily, July 7, 1955, p. 3.

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575 memberships dissolved, the Communists invaded and controlled the societies' former areas of strength. This move was largely accomplished through the "democratic reform movement,"[22] which involved mass participation in public meetings, at which evidence of crimes committed by the societies was displayed and people were urged to reveal knowledge of the societies' membership and activities. Another part of the movement consisted of a concentrated attack upon all labor organizations suspected of being under the influence or control of secret socieites. Some of them had acquired leadership of labor groups in charge of wharves, railway, stations, and wheelbarrow "transportation centers." To eliminate the power of the societies, the Communists introduced a campaign to reorganize small transport firms into state-owned companies and to organize workers into Communist trade unions under the disciplined management of Party cadres.

II. CORRUPTION, WASTE, AND THEFT

A. The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns

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668 In December 1951, the Communists

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[22] New China Daily, Oct. 14, 1951, p. 2; Nov. 29, 1951, p. 1; July 24, 1952, p. 2.

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668 launched the Three-Anti Campaign against waste, corruption, and bureaucracy; a few months later the regime initiated the Five-Anti Campaign against bribery of government personnel, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and the purchase of economic information. These campaigns did more than affirm the Communists' determination to eliminate corruption and the most common causes of "degeneration" within the Party, state organizations, public enterprises, and private business firms; the drives also enabled the Communist leadership to tighten its grip on private enterprise, heighten discipline throughout the Party and public organizations, and exert closer surveillance and control over the whole state apparatus. The Three-Anti Campaign was directed at administrative and Party personnel, and the Five-Anti Campaign at merchants and industrialists. Since Party members were, in most cases, administrative officers, the first campaign hit Party and administrative personnel from two sides and since state-operated enterprises and administrative organizations were involved with private business, the attack upon business also was felt by administrators and Party members.

B. Corruption

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685 Most of the charges and disclosures that accompanied the progress of the Three-Anti

661 and Five-Anti campaigns can be grouped under
685 the general heading of corruption. In Southwest China, the department of industry was one of the first to be singled out for attack.[23] An initial study of the department's operation under two years of Communist rule disclosed 157 cases of corruption involving 173 persons and property valued at 668,000,000,000 _yuan_. One worker was accused of corruption amounting to 79,000,000,000 _yuan_, and another, in collaboration with a merchant, of stealing from the state equipment and material valued at 100,000,000 _yuan_. Many of the cases revealed in the financial and economic organizations of the Southwest Region were reported to be connected with espionage activities.[24] Not only individuals were charged with supporting Nationalist espionage through corruption in state organizations; the bureau of taxation in one county was reported to have appropriated 20,000,000 _yuan_ from tax revenues for the use of counterrevolutionaries. The total loss to the government in 1950 and the first half of 1951 from the corrupt practices of personnel working in the tax-collection organizations of

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[23] _Ibid._, Dec. 17, 1951, p. 2.

[24] _Ibid._, Dec. 25, 1951, p. 1.

the Southwest Region was set at over 11,000,000,000 yuan.[25] Charges of widespread corruption were also lodged against military organizations. At the conference of the general Party branch of the Southwest China Military Command held in December 1951, regional Party leaders warned the gathering of the seriousness of the situation.[26] Corruption was reported to be most rife in the quartermaster and political and cultural departments of the command.

The most frequently mentioned type of corruption in all organizations was the misappropriation of funds.[27] Government employees were accused of living luxuriously at the expense of the state. One means to this end was the extravagant appropriation of funds for government meetings. A meeting called by the department of industry of the Southwest China regional government lasted 21 days, during which 10,000,000 yuan were spent on food and an equal sum on the furnishings for one of the living accommodations.[28] The political and cultural department of the region's military command was accused of having spent

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[25] Ibid., Dec. 19, 1951, p. 1.

[26] Ibid., Dec. 19, 1951, p. 1.

[27] See for instance reports in ibid., Jan. 1, 1952, p. 2; June 17, 1952, p. 1.

[28] Ibid., Nov. 22, 1951, p. 2.

661 58,000,000,000 for the repair of one theater
685 and 40,000,000,000 *yuan* for the construction of one film factory.

Within the 26 departments of the Southwest China regional government, 139 persons accused of corruption involving less than one billion *yuan* were arrested during a six-month period;[29] another 182 individuals in the municipal government of Chungking were arrested within the same span of time;[30] personnel of the provincial governments were also charged with corruption and taken into custody. Among the members of the Kweichow Provincial Government arrested were Chang Chin-po, deputy head of the department of public security, and Wang Jen and Yen P'u, both officials in the bureau of information and publications.[31]

Charges of corruption entailing bureaucratic abuses ranging from dictatorial acts to disobedience were lodged against Party and government officials during the Three-Anti Campaign. Some of the accused were dismissed from the party; others were

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[29] *Ibid.*, Feb. 9, 1952, p. 1.

[30] *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1952, p. 1.

[31] *Ibid.*, March 12, 1952, p. 2; Jan. 23, 1952, p. 1.

661 placed on trial in the People's courts. Among
685 the Southwest China officials punished for bureaucratic abuses were Tu Hung, chief of the secretariat of the Chungking Municipal Government and concurrently secretary of the Party branch of the municipal government. He and his deputy chief were accused of dictatorial acts.[32] Similar charges were lodged against T'u Kuo-lin, deputy of the Southwest China broadcasting station;[33] T'ang P'eng, deputy of the New Democratic Youth Corps school; and Mei Wen-hua, an official of the Chungking Federation of Democratic Women.[34] Kou Hsing-ts'ai and his deputy, Chang Tse-min, officials in the public security department of the eastern Szechwan special district, were accused of disobedience.[35]

C. Theft and Waste

687 The Communist definition of theft extends beyond the usual meaning of the word. Tax evasion and the falsification or default of government contracts are considered theft

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[32] Ibid., Jan. 13, 1952, p. 1.

[33] Ibid., Jan. 16, 1952, p. 2.

[34] Ibid., Jan. 7, 1952, p. 1.

[35] Ibid., Jan. 17, 1952, p. 1.

687 from the government. Contracting firms experienced a particularly bad time during the Five-Anti Campaign. The Chien Yüan Contracting Company, for example, was accused of cheating on its government contracts to the amount of 10,000,000,000 yuan.[36] The Ta Hua Pharamacy was charged with theft from the government for supplying substandard first-aid kits to the People's Liberation Army in Tibet. Theft of other kinds was involved in the cases of Wang Jo-hsi, a merchant who was accused of stealing economic information for profit; and Fan Wei-ch'ao, another merchant who was reported to have collaborated with a government employee in the sale of food stolen from a state-owned food trading company.

One of the most publicized examples of large-scale, organized theft to be disclosed during the Five-Anti Campaign involved a business organization known as the "Thursday Club."[37] According to the Communist account, the club was organized by the owners of

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36. Ibid., Jan. 22, 1952, For examples of other cases see ibid., Jan. 18, 1952, p. 1; March 14, 1952, p. 1; and Jan. 21, 1952, p. 1.

37. Ibid., Jan. 24, 1952, p. 1; Feb. 29, 1952, p. 1; and March 16, 1952, p. 6.

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687 several privately operated iron and steel companies to exchange information on government contracts with the intent of monopolizing government contracts and, thereby, increasing profits. Originally, the group was said to have concentrated its efforts on the factories managed by the Ministry of Heavy Industry. When the club later extended its manipulations to shipbuilding and accounting contracts, according to the Communist account, the members organized a "Friday Club" and a "Saturday Club" to handle the new interests. The businesses operated by the group were substantial and, following the prosecution of their owners, were taken over by the Communists and transformed into state-owned enterprises. Similar cases of large-scale theft became more numerous as the regime expanded its industrialization program and the accompanying conversion of private enterprises into elements of state-owned industry.

Waste was another "poison" singled out for detection and elimination during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. Industrial and trading organizations bore the brunt of the drive against waste, which seems to have resulted in large part from the inefficiency of Communist manufacturing, transportation, and

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storage methods. For example, during one four-month period of 1951, 317,000,000 pounds of crops worth 28 billion _yuan_ were reported to have spoiled due to improper warehousing.[38] Instances of waste increased as industrialization was accelerated. An inspection during the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 of a major industrial organization with a factory in Chungking revealed an accumulation of excess materials valued at 350 million _yuan_ (new currency). One of the construction jobs in which the Communists originally took great pride was the four-year task of building an auditorium in Chungking patterned on the "Temple of Heaven." In 1955, the Communist press reported that the structure required the annual expenditure of 100,000 _yuan_ (new currency) and the services of 50 men for maintenance.[39]

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687 The cases cited above are only examples of the charges and prosecutions brought against thousands of firms, private individuals, government officials, and Party members in the Southwest Region during the Three-Anti

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[38] _Ibid._, Nov. 11, 1951, p. 1.
[39] _Ibid._, April 9, 1955, p. 2.

661 and Five-Anti campaigns. Some of the cases
687 undoubtedly involved conscious attempts to defraud the government or misuse public office, but others probably arose out of unintentional errors and mistakes. It seems apparent also, that many firms and individuals were innocent victims of the Communist regime's attempt to take over private industry, tighten discipline within Party ranks, find scapegoats for the Party's errors, and establish firmer control over the people generally.

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III. TENSION AND PUBLIC DISCONTENT

Public discontent and tension are invariably the result of excessive centralization of government and strict regimentation of the populace in any state. The Communist regime in China has not only regulated and restricted the people through Party, state, and mass organizations, but also has imposed on the population terror, high taxation, and extensive public obligations. Despite the attempts of the Communists to seek popular support and persuade the people to believe in a brighter future, both discontent and tension in China today cannot be overlooked or minimized.

Popular unrest is inferred in the frequency, intensity, and nature of such programs as the Suppression-of-Counter-revolutionaries Movement and the Three-Anti

578 and Five-Anti campaigns. Other signs are
668 apparent in press references during the past few years to the deleterious effects on the health and efficiency of the people in forcing them to over-extend their energies in work or study and to sacrifice all their free time to participation in indoctrination programs and propaganda drives. Still another clue to domestic unrest may be detected in the regime's admission of popular resistance to implementation of the Marriage Law and the consequent necessity of making the reorientation of marriage and family practices a long-term and continuing task. From such evidences of restiveness in the population and from our knowledge of human reaction to excessive regimentation, the causes and pattern of public discontent and tension can be treated with some accuracy.

A. Public Discontent

1. Regimentation and Restriction.

The Communists' regimentation of the people and all their activities is a primary cause of resistance and discontent among the populace. The establishment of agricultural producers' co-operatives in the rural districts and the organization of all workers into unions are notable examples of attempts to achieve complete control.

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668 The restrictions resulting from regimentation cause great inconvenience. However, the demand that spare-time be devoted entirely to various Party-inspired activities and duties is even more objectionable. Peasants are required to attend meetings, go to winter schools, keep advised of all farm matters, and perform various other duties depending upon the sex and age of the individual. Even how the farmer spends his money is circumscribed by Party counseling. Advise on the disposition of his excess cash is imparted by a Party member in a series of interviews heavily spiked with propaganda. The process is not only time-consuming, but also trying on the collective patience of the peasants.

City dwellers are forced to accept similar restrictions. On the job, workers are required to observe "labor discipline." They are severely punished for tardiness or for leaving the factory early. Loafing and belligerence are punishable crimes. During off-hours, workers are required to participate in all organizational and cultural activities and to attend technical and cultural classes. Participation in mass meetings, propaganda discussion groups, and urban community committees is expected. Almost no time is left for taking care of private affairs.

2. High Taxation and Public Obligation.

651/ The high taxes and business restrictions

imposed by the Communist regime are likewise
651 unpopular. In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting policy, initiated at the end of 1953, taxes and regulates the production, purchasing, and marketing of farm produce. The forced sale of surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- at a central, government-controlled market has created great resentment among the peasantry. Urban businesses are subject to a similar scheme of taxation and control. Businessmen must pay high taxes, purchase bonds, and make regular "voluntary contributions" to government-sponsored organizations. The transformation of private businesses into elements of state-owned enterprises is a major cause of discontent among the business class.

Public obligations imposed upon the people are a further cause of public discontent. The average peasant is required to perform duties for the state periodically and on demand. The four seasonal drives in the rural districts require his active participation. In the construction of flood-control projects, peasants are forced to abandon their fields to labor in distant regions. Young persons in the villages
651 are required to participate in military training
701 and to perform military service whenever the state deems it necessary. All railways are

constantly patrolled, and each village near the
651 right-of-way must maintain a specially
701 organized force for this purpose and participate
in the guard duty for a 72-hour period every
month.[40] In addition, the village maintains a militia in which all the young residents must serve. Besides training or participating in the unit's cultural and indoctrination activities, the militia patrols key areas in the village, guards government grain, helps in loading it for shipment, and assists in keeping the village free of bandits. Misuse of the militia by the Southwest China Military Command in 1953 was criticized as having wasted 24,700 man-hours per day.[41]

Similar public and military services are required of city dwellers. They must engage in military training, participate in the local military unit's cultural and organizational activities, and serve on patrols in their own or neighboring areas whenever needed.

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208 Controls imposed upon the people by security agencies and other organizations

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[40] Ibid., Nov. 11, 1951, p. 4.

[41] Report of the Second Southwest China Militia Conference, Ibid., May 20, 1953, p.1.

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208 have been frequent causes of public discontent. The large-scale rationing program enforced in the cities and the constant investigations conducted by public security agencies cause a great deal of anger, if not outbreaks of violence. To some extent, at least, the Communists recognize the limits of public inconvenience and dissatisfaction. The regime seeks to offset disaffection by emphasizing in its propaganda the necessity and patriotism of individual sacrifice for the national welfare. If some non-vital aspect of the Communist program occasions bitter and widespread complaint, the regime bends to public opinion and institutes changes. Wherever possible, the Communists attempt to avoid the flagrant use of threats and force in approaching and controlling the public. Nevertheless, the regime has been far from successful in preventing public discontent.

B. Tension within Organizations

578 The use of various overlapping control agencies to supervise and ensure the execution of Party directive has created suspicion and tension within the control agencies themselves and the supervised state, Party,

578 and mass organizations. A government office or factory may be subject simultaneously to as many as four control agencies -- the control committee of the Party, the supervisory office of the administration, the People's procuratorate, and one of the public security teams. Although the immediate focus of the policing agencies may differ, the effect of the multi-control system is to press in on every organization from all sides and extend control to each member .

Tension within organizations also results from over-centralization. In any centralized and "planned" society, not only are economic decisions based on a master plan which cannot allow for the unique problems of various organizations and localities, but also all political and social policies are determined by directives originating at the head office. Pressures increase in direct proportion to the distance from the originating office; thus tension is greatest at the lowest echelon of the chain of command. Most directives emanate from the central government, are passed to the provincial governments, and then are filtered down to governments on consecutively lower levels until put into effect by the lowest political unit. In the

578 process, each level of government has a particular target in mind and exerts influence on the next lower political echelon to achieve that objective. The result is an accumulation of pressure at the base of the political pyramid.

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466 In the economic field, each factory is given a production quota, assigned through a similar chain-of-command method. To fulfill the quota, every possible means of control is resorted to. The pressure engendered is constant. Both management and labor are held directly responsible for the attainment of assigned quotas. Failure to meet them means severe penalties. Recently, the Communists have attempted to improve their system of checking on the fulfillment of production quotas in order to eliminate the practice of submitting false reports of production achievements -- a strategy attempted in an effort to gain some temporary relief from mounting pressures.

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578 Within the Party itself, pressure and tension are most intense. In the first place, the Party apparatus as the center of power and activity of the regime is subject to pressure by both the Party and the state. Secondly,

665 578 Party members cannot escape the endless program of Party indoctrination and rectification. The dual pressures and resulting tension are in large part responsible for the high rate of expulsion and resignation from the Party. Many people who are outwardly in favor of the regime are reluctant to join the Party. The fate of former Parry members after expulsion or resignation is not known, but they are undoubtedly confined in prisons or forced labor camps for some period of time. If allowed to remain free or when released, ex-members are probably subject to security surveillance. However, they may in time form a new subversive group.

668 578 Tension also exists in mass organizations as the result of pressure imposed upon them by the Party and higher organizations. The broadest and also the most unstable mass organizations are the Democratic Youth Corps and the All-China Federation of Democratic Women. Lacking a common political, economic, or community base, these organizations are composed of heterogeneous social and political elements, directly or indirectly coerced into membership. These group must be handled carefully. The key to preventing tensions within an organization from

668 expanding beyond safe limits seems to lie in
578 constant vigilance and an incessant barrage of propaganda. By instituting stricter controls and by disposing of undesirable members, the regime has sought to keep these organizations in the service of the Party.

CONCLUSION

Subversive potentialities cannot be eliminated however effective a dictatorship or tyranny may be. The forces in opposition to Communist rule in Southwest China are the victims of power, the traditional resistance groups, and discontented ex-members of the Communist Party.

The victims of Communist power -- landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and other elements which have been named by the Communists as "counterrevolutionaries" -- constitute the most threatening opposition to the current regime. Most of the former Nationalist forces have been eliminated, imprisoned, or placed under surveillance, but some of them may still remain at large. Because of past experience, any officials of the former regime still operating in the

578 668 Southwest Region are in the best position to assume leadership over all resistance groups. Potential additions to the subversive elements in the region are present in the peasants opposed to collectivization and the "new rich" group, classed as hostile by the regime.

The operation of traditional resistance groups is manifest in the continued activities of the secret societies. Because they are attractive to illiterate peasants and laborers, the regime may find itself in the curious position of having to eliminate considerable numbers of the proletariat and peasantry, whose interests the Communists claim to protect and advance.

Too little is known of the fate and activities of the former Communist Party members in China to be able to speculate on their subversive potentialities. However, it seems certain that the chances for opposition by this group and its possible strength and cohesion will vary inversely with the success, power, and unity of the Chinese Communist Party.

Public discontent and tension within organizations in the Southwest Region are by no means indications of the impending collapse

578 of the Communist regime. Rather, they
668 are the reactions to be expected from a controlled society under a tight dictatorship. Tension and public discontent would have to develop in intensity and proportion far beyond their current manifestations before the regime would be weakened or seriously handicapped, and the loss of Party morale and unity would have to extend far beyond its present level before the entire Communist system was threatened with disruption.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2g, Political Background

PROPAGANDA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION

I. SCOPE OF DISCUSSION

208 In Communist China, public information lays a heavy stress on propaganda and education. As is true of all Communist countries, the Chinese People's Republic is guided by the inviolable principle that all facts and issues must be selected and interpreted in the light of Marxist theories and whatever the current Party line dictates. Limited by source materials of a regional character, the following discussion on public information and propaganda in Southwest China will attempt to cover only the basic facts about the formal structure, operations, and government control of the principal media of mass communication in the region. Wherever possible, exemplary cases in each medium will be included.

II. PRESS

A. News Services

204 Before the Communists occupied the Southwest China Region, the nationalist government-operated Central News Agency played a leading part in supplying the newspapers in this area with materials. Services of foreign press associations were available. Dispatches from such

204 major institutions as the Associated Press, United Press, International News Service, Reuters of England, Agence France, and Tass frequently appeared in local newspapers. Until shortly before the Communist offensive against the Nationalist bastion of Szechwan Province towards the end of 1949, the Chinese Communist official outlet, the New China News Agency, was also operating in Chungking, Chengtu, and a few other large cities in this region. This last news service was subject to varying degrees of government suppression as the Nationalist-Communist conflict blew hot and cold throughout World War II and subsequent years.

Immediately upon the occupation of Southwest China, the Communists moved to expand the New China News Agency. The Kuomintang Central News Agency went out of business. One after another, American and European news service representatives packed up and left. Within months the New China News Agency became the sole news-gathering agency in this region. Under the direct control of the Information Administration in Peking, this Communist news agency established its branches in both military and civil subdivisions:

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Table 1. Hierarchy of the New China News Agency */

	Branch Headquarters	Branch Office	Section	Correspondence Center	Liaison Office
Civil	Region	Province	Municipal	*Hsien*	*Hsiang*
Military	Field Army Corps	Army	Regiment	Battalion	Company

*/ Jen Chung, "Lun Chung-kung Ti Hsin-wen Kung-tso" ['The Chinese Communist Press"], *Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an* [*China Weekly*], Hong Kong, March 29, 1954, pp. 7-9.

Although the organization of the New China News Agency is essentially the same in all regions, in Southwest China the agency's branches attached to the armed forces are most extensively developed. A large number of troops have been engaged in road building in western Szechwan Province (former Sikang Province) and Tibet, and publicity given the accomplishments of the People's Liberation Army in developing the long-neglected land of Southwest China will not only help to sustain the soldiers' morale but will give support to Peking's theory of national reconstruction, Soviet-styled.

The organization of the New China News Agency is highly centralized. Through the chain of command shown in Table 1, every staff member is placed under rigid government and Party control. Careful selection of correspondents is only the first step the agency adopts to ensure the allegiance of its employees to the government and the Party. According to some anti-Communist sources, correspondents must submit ideas and outlines for approval before writing them. The finished articles go through another thorough screening before they are released.[1]

Another news agency, the China News Service was established in October 1952, with branches in Southwest China. The head of this agency, Chin Chung-hua, was a member of the East China Military and Political Committee (supreme authority in this region until 1954) and

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[1] Jen Chung, "Chung-kung Pao-chih Ti Nei-yung Chi An-p'ai" ["The Contents and Formats of the Chinese Communist Newspapers"] , ibid. No. 71, May10, 1954, pp.14-15.

204 vice-chairman of the Cultural Department under the committee. The agency serves as an interpreter of events in China for foreign consumption; its branches in this region are not active.

B. Newspapers

1. Pre-Communist Newspapers.

Compared with the North and East China regions, Southwest China had been slow in newspaper development until the early 1940's when the war against Japan caused many journalistic institutions and personnel to move from the coastal areas to the interior. No statistics are available on the number of newspapers and their circulations in the period before the Communist occupation. However, a survey of available files shows that there were at least forty-three newspapers in this region under the Nationalist Government. Their distribution was as follows:

Table 2. Newspapers in Southwest China

Place of Publication	Number
Szechwan Province	31
Kweichow Province	7
Yunnan Province	3
Sikang Province	2
Total	43

*/ Compiled from the collection at the Hoover Library, Stanford University.

With few exceptions, the newspapers listed in Table 2 were in operation during 1946-47. Of the thirty-one papers published in Szechwan, seventeen were in the city of Chungking and eleven in Chengtu. Six of the Kweichow papers were printed in the provincial capital of Kweiyang. The two papers in Sikang Province were published in Hsi-ch'ang, which was incorporated into Szechwan in July 1955. Only five of these papers can be identified as Nationalist Party organs, and only one was a Communist organ per se. Some were irregularly published periodicals, with the appearance of tabloid newspapers. Since these newspapers formed the basis for the development of the Communist daily press, a representative sampling is selected for brief review.

a) Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily] . This was one of the largest newspapers in pre-Communist China, with branches in several large cities in China. Labeled "the New York Times of China," it at one time appeared under the masthead, L'Impartial. During and immediately after World War II, this daily offered conservative and impartial news coverage, reflecting its editorial policy. In 1946, when Wang Wen-pin succeeded Ts'ao Ku-ping as published, L' Impartial was dropped from its masthead and Ta-kung Pao remained. This newspaper was printed in Chungking, China's capital during World War II. A table, giving a percentage breakdown of contents of a typical issue in January 1949, is included to show the coverage offered by the Ta-kung Pao, before the Communists began to use it as a medium of propaganda.

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Table 3. Contents of Ta-kung Pao (January 1949) */

Type of Material	Percentage of Total Space
Editorial	3.5
Foreign News	6.2
National News	13.3
Regional News	12.1
Local News	3.4
Features	4.7
Letters to editor	2.3
Graphic materials	0.0
Advertising	50.0
Market news	4.5

*/ Compiled from files at Hoover Library

The Ta-kung Pao regularly published four pages a day; the size of the page was 14' x 20', divided into fourteen horizontal columns, using for the text "new No. 5" type, about one-fourth the size of the type used in the Chinese dailies now published in America. Among all the dailies available in Southwest China during World War II, this paper probably gave the most thorough news coverage, printing news briefs compiled from the major wire services. Toward the end of 1948, the paper was critical of the Kuomintang economic policy, but continued to support the government in its fight against the Communists. After the

204 Communist occupation of Southwest China, the Ta-kung Pao in Chungking was suspended, but its branches carried on in those cities unoccupied by the Communists.

Most of the major dailies in this region during World War II imitated the physical appearance of the Ta-kung Pao.

b) Kuei-chou Shang-pao. The Kweichow Commercial Daily copied the format of the Ta-kung Pao. Established in 1940, it remained the leading daily in Kweichow Province until 1949. Its editorial policy was conservative, and it put strong emphasis on economic and commercial news. Editor Lai Yung-ch'u retired from publishing immediately after the Communists came to power and has not been heard of since.

c) Tien-tung Jih-pao. The Eastern Yunnan Daily, published in Chao-t'ung, is a typical example of the smaller tabloid which flourished in Southwest China prior to the Communist conquest. Most of these tabloids were predominantly local in character, and a large segment of the reading public in outlying districts relied on them for news of local interest. A table, giving a percentage breakdown of contents of a typical issue in May 1947, is included to show the coverage offered by the Tien-tung Jih-pao before the Communists appeared.

Table 4. Contents of Tien-tung Jih-pao (May 1947)*

Type of Material	Percentage
Editorial	6
Foreign News	7
National News	13
Local news	19
Features	25
Commercial News	5
Advertising	25

*/ Compiled from files at the Hoover Library

The Tien-tung Jih -pao was a four-page paper, 13' x 9'. For a tabloid of this kind, the space devoted to foreign news offered unusually broad coverage and increased its appeal to readers of varying educational backgrounds. The feature columns, as a rule, contained literary works, a common characteristic of many pre-Communist papers. The editorials paid particular attention to local political matters, the efficiency of the local government, and the organization of local groups, with strong anti-Communist overtones. Editor Li Ping-ch'ang has not appeared on the regional political scene since 1949. It is not known if the paper continues in operation.

2. Communist Newspapers

a) Development and Control

204 The occupation of Southwest China was not complete until the end of 1949 when the evacuation of the Nationalists gave the Communists control of this region. The only daily published by the Communists, Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], with headquarters in Chungking, has ceased publication. If there were clandestine pro-Communist papers in this region, they had difficulty in publishing under strict surveillance. Immediately after the Communists took over the administration of this region, an organized effort was made to "convert" the independent papers to Communism and expand official Party organs. By July 1950, Ch'u T'u-nan, chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee (the supreme authority in this region at that time), was in a position to claim success. He urged newspaper publishers to "face reality, get closer to the masses, and strengthen their criticism and self-criticism work." [2] Ch'u reported that as of July 1950, seven government-operated newspapers were being published in this region. Four of these were at the administrative level (under province but above hsien) and two were designed for the workers exclusively. The circulation of the seven papers

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[2] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien [Compendium of Government Reports] , Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 1003.

totaled 90,000. In addition the armed forces units stationed in this region published their own papers, and six newspapers, with a total circulation of about 20,000, were operated by private interests.[3] The total circulation of the newspapers in Southwest China amounted to 193,000. There was a daily paper for one out of every 400 persons in Southwest China in 1950.

An incomplete survey in August 1951 showed that thirty-five papers were in operation on the administrative level, and in northern and southern Szechwan Province alone, fifty-four hsien level newspapers were being published. The total circulation figure had jumped from under 200,000 persons in Southwest China in 1951 to over 450,000. There was a daily paper for one out of every 200 individuals at that time. There were also privately published newspaper not forced to suspend operations, and these non-government newspapers[4] had a total circulation of about 20,000.

By September 1952, the total number of newspapers in this region had increased to 234, of which 18 were at the regional and provincial levels,

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[3] Ibid., p. 1002.

[4] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Oct. 1, 1951.

204 33 at the administrative level, and 183 at the *hsien* level. The aggregate circulation figure for all the regional and provincial papers was 600,000; no information on the circulation of the other 216 papers is available.[5] It is not certain whether these figures included any non-government organ, but it is presumed that no "independent" voices existed in the midst of a government-controlled press.

204 563 The inauguration of a Tibetan-language newspaper on June 10, 1953 in northern Szechwan may prove to be of far-reaching significance. Named *Min-chiang Pao* [*Min River Daily*], this paper is intended for the Tibetan minority population inhabiting the upper reaches of the Min River. The first issue of the paper appeared in tabloid form, and carrying a portrait of Mao Tse-tung and messages from officials of the Tibetan Autonomous Area in Szechwan Province. The paper was to appear every five days.[6] Establishment of minority-language newspapers is in line with Peking's policy toward the non-Chinese speaking ethnic groups on the Mainland. Unfortunately no sample of this paper is available for analysis.

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[5] *Ibid.*, September 30, 1952, p. 3.

[6] *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 593, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, June 19, 1953, p. 20.

204 In January 1954, there were eight newspapers on the administrative district level in Szechwan Province alone. Six of these were intended to serve the farming population and one was the above-mentioned Min River Daily. The total circulation of these papers was about 80,000. Thirty-six papers were published at mining centers and factories near Chungking, where a number of others were published.[7] The exact number of hsien newspapers printed in this province are unknown.

[439] The total number of newspapers published in Southwest China today are unknown. The Communists began tightening their control on export of newspapers in the winter of 1951. By the spring of 1953, all but a few official and national newspapers were placed on the contraband list. Since then it has been extremely difficult to secure accurate statistics on the press in any region of China. Although the over-all policy of the regime has been to expand newspaper publishing, with the ultimate goal of a newspaper at each political level from the province to the village, there have been modifications in the execution of this policy during the past six years. Under the pretext of economy, some papers have been merged, and some new periodicals have been inaugurated. If the total national figures are any indication, the number of newspapers published currently in Southwest China is about

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[7] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily] , Peking, January 17, 1954.

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204 the same as in 1952.[8]

As to the general line adopted by the editors of these newspapers, the Communist press has made it clear in a statement on the role played by the newspapers in Southwest China: "Gradually the papers on the administrative district level have become the tool with which local party cadres and those at industrial centers keep contact with and educate the masses.[9]

Among the twenty-eight major newspapers of Mainland China listed in the 1955 *People's Handbook*, the following four are in Southwest China:

Table 5. *Major Newspapers in Southwest China (1955)* *

Name	Place of Publication
Ssu-ch'uan Jih-pao [*Szechwan Daily*]	Chengtu
Yun-nan Jih-pao [*Yunnan Daily*]	Kunming
Hsin-ch'ien Jih-pao [*New Kweichow Daily*]	Kweiyang
Hsi-k'ang Jih-pao [*Sikang Daily*]	Ya-nan

*/ *People's Handbook, 1955*, p. 553.

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8. There were 276 newspapers at administrative district level in China in 1952. In 1953, the figure dropped to 260. *Jen-min Shou-ts'e* [*People's Handbook*], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 554.

9. *People's Daily*, Peking, January 17, 1954.

204 None of the papers in Table 5 are available for this investigation. However, one of the most influential Party newspapers, New China Daily, was exported until July 1953. It was first published in Chungking in 1938, when the Nationalists and Communists joined in the "united front" against Japan, and continued in operation until 1947 when the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists brought about its suspension. In December 1949, it resumed publication and functioned as the official organ of the Communist Party in Southwest China until its dissolution sometimes after 1953 when the Szechwan Daily succeeded it as the official organ for the entire region.[10] After the abolition of the "greater administrative regions" in the summer of 1954, the People's Daily (the Pravda of China), published in Peking, was reprinted in Southwest China and served as the leading Party organ for this region as well as for the entire country.

b) Contents and Readership

A table giving an average percentage breakdown of contents of typical issues of the New China Daily is included to show the coverage offered.

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[10] Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia Ti Ssu-ch'uan [Szechwan under Communist Rule], Taipei, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, January 24, 1954, p. 27.

Table 6. Content of the New China Daily (June-July 1953) */

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Type of Material	Percentage of Total Space
Editorial	5.6
Foreign news	14.3
National news	16.2
Regional news	25.1
Local news	4.7
Features	18.7
Letters to the editor	3.5
Graphic materials	1.2
Advertising	9.9
Market news	0.8

*/ Compiled from the file at the Hoover Library

The editorials in the New China Daily are often reports from the People's Daily in Peking. They are long-winded harangues on such current subjects as "Open the Way to a Peaceful Settlement in Korea" (June 10, 1953, p. 1), and "Strive to Better Raise Our Younger Generation" (June 2, 1953, p. 1). The paper itself also prints shorter editorial comment; for example, "A Positive Attitude Should Be Adopted toward the Workers' Rationalization Suggestions" (June 9, 1953, p. 2), which appears side by side with a news item depicting how a worker's suggestion to increase efficiency was ignored. This same news item also serves as an illustration of how a local issue is treated by the New China Daily, which, as a rule, carries very few local items.

In the above issues of this newspaper, most of the foreign news items deal with the peace talks in Korea. In the national and regional news columns, economic reconstruction and preparation for the imminent general election (which took place in 1954) are central themes. It is interesting to point out that the news items often resemble feature stories. Both are usually lengthy and contain much editorializing. Even the headlines are long and opinionating statements. However, compared with many major newspapers in other regions, the New China Daily appears to be more carefully edited and few phrases directly glorifying Mao Tse-tung and his regime have found their way into the headlines. In the news items, the traditional western journalist's "what-where-when-how" approach is missing.

There is no society column in the New China Daily of Chungking, unless the commencement speech at the local party cadres school, or the report on the proceedings at a local factory mass meeting can be so considered. There is no sports page; news items having any bearing on physical education are either speeches by the Director of the Physical Education Department or brief statistical summaries of athletic events without any "color material." Crime and murder news is positively ruled out. Fires and other disasters appear in the paper only when they contain possible "sabotage" angles to be exploited for propaganda effect. What little space allocated to advertising is taken up by government agencies' announcements and few commercial classified advertisements. Display advertisements, however modest, are a rare item.

The potential of graphic materials is being fully exploited within the paper's physical limitations which, at least in 1953, did not allow elaborate illustrations. Photographs are used. In the June 2, 1953 issue, for instance, seven pictures appear on different pages, all contributing to the timely occasion of Children's Day. The captions are so phrased as to depict the "Life of Lucky Children in the Mao Tse-tung Era."

The "letters to the editor" column is a common feature for amny newspapers on the China Mainland. Sometimes the New China Daily carries a digest of several letters on the same subject; at other times the paper prefaces several letters on the same subject with a critical analysis or reply; at still other times the paper merely prints its editorial reply without reproducing the letters. None of the criticisms touch upon the basic policy of the Communists. If a letter is critical of a particular government agency, the concerned agency is given space to reply in a subsequent issue. Such criticism on occasion can constitute a basis for action on a high level to correct the condition criticized. Once the Southwest Construction Bureau was forced to adopt a measure to improve its personnel training program as a result of a critical letter printed in the New China Daily.[11]

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[11] New China Daily, Chungking, May 28, 1953, p2.

The New China Daily was regularly published in four pages, size 14" x 20", divided into seven horizontal columns. The text was printed with old "size No. 5" type, which was slightly larger than the new "size No. 5" type used in pre-Communist press. Typographically, the New China Daily was an improvement over its predecessors before 1949 in this region. An interesting feature in the make-up of this paper was the two ear-boxes on the front page. The left ear was always a digest of the day's important news, and the right ear was occupied by a photograph showing, in most cases, a construction project.

It is possible that most of the larger newspapers in Southwest China today are fashioned after the New China Daily. Some of the hsien newspapers presumably are printed in the tabloid form, of which no sample is available. However, one may study the physical appearance of the tabloids described in the foregoing sections of this discussion to derive an approximate picture of what may be in circulation now in Southwest China.

c) Distribution and Sales

Subscriptions to the major newspapers in Southwest China are handled through either the local post offices or the China Publications Distribution Company, a government-supervised organization, which has branches throughout Mainland China. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of allowing the smaller local papers to manage their own subscriptions and sales. If subscribed through the post office,

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204 the paper is delivered together with the mail. Street sale constitutes a part of the distribution, through the existing book stores and sidewalk stands which will be discussed in the section "Magazines, Pamphlets, and Books." There is no evidence of news hawkers or delivery boys who, before 1949, used to roam the streets in Southwest China.

The circulation figures of the newspapers and methods of distribution are misleading if one attempts to use them to gauge the readership of the press in Southwest China. Each subscription and each copy purchased on the street may be shared by dozens of readers. Most of the schools include newspaper reading in their regular curricula. Factories and government offices organize newspaper reading and discussion groups. The newspapers all run "social service departments" to provide guidance for these reading groups. The New China Daily particularly has a reputation for its activities in fostering these groups. The paper sends news analysts to preside at reading sessions. In outlying areas where the public is mostly illiterate, the news analyst reads and explains the content of the paper to his audience. He also works in collaboration with the "propaganda officers" and "radio receiving officers" who are responsible for putting out blackboard or wall newspapers.

The street sale price of the New China Daily in 1953 was JMP 600. This was the price for five to ten ounces of rice, or three ounces of pork at that time. The government makes an effort

204 to keep down the price of all publications so that they can be more readily available to larger numbers of readers. At the same time, Communist authorities in Southwest China are following the national practice of making the newspapers self-supporting. The reason of the move is not only economy, but the belief that if the papers are sufficiently "popularized," they will have enough support from the masses, making government subsidy unnecessary. By October 1951, official reports showed that except three dailies -- the North Szechwan, South Szechwan, Sikang -- all the newspapers in this region had been paying their own bills.[12]

C. Magazines, Pamphlets, and Books

1. Reorganization of Publication and Distribution

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214 In pre-Communist days, publication of magazines and printing of books were, in most cases, two separate enterprises. Local magazines were operated by private groups and printed in local printing plants found in such larger cities as Chengtu and Chungking in Szechwan Province, Kunming in Yunnan Province, and Kweiyang in Kweichow Province. National magazines were distributed through local book stores. There was little book printing done in this region until the Sino-Japanese war when many eastern China publishers moved west. Many national book publishers had branches in Southwest China. Most notable of these were the Commercial Press, and the Chung-hua, Shih-chieh, K'ai-ming, Sheng-

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[12] New China Daily, Chungking, Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

204 huo, Erh-t'ung, and Cheng-chung bookstores.
214 Shortly before the Sino-Japanese war started, the Communist New China Bookstore also began to establish branch outlets in this region.

214 After 1949, the Communist policy for the publishing industry was "centralization and specialization." Publishing facilities were centralized, and each consolidated firm was required to specialize in one field of publication. National distributors were established to handle the sales. With publication and distribution clearly divided, the Communists believed that it would then become possible to control the entire publishing industry by means of a rigid quota system. In Southwest China, control of publication and distribution rested with the Cultural and Educational Mission. Extensive merging eliminated the majority of small publishers. The official New China Bookstore played a leading part in reorganizing the larger ones. The existing branches of formerly independent national publishers followed the policies of their headquarters in North and East China and effected a complete overhaul of management and personnel policies. Most of these publishing houses entered into partnership with government interests. By July 1950, the New China Bookstore already had in this region seven branch offices and thirty-two stores, all directly responsible to their regional headquarters in Chungking.[13] The number of branch stores of this firm increased rapidly to sixty-two in this region

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[13] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 1002.

by the fall of 1951.[14]

Following the announcement by the Government Administration Council in Peking on August 16, 1952 of the "Temporary Regulations for Control of the Publishing and Printing Industries," and the "Temporary Directive on Registration of Periodical Publications," authorities began to tighten their control in Southwest China on the publishers. All publishers, regardless of the fact of whether or not they had already been cleared for operation, had to register once again with the government.[15] The penalty for failure to do so before October 12, 1952 was immediate suspension. At that time the branches of the New China Bookstore in this region had already increased to seventy-nine. In addition, there were forty-one branches of the People's Bookstores on the hsien level -- meaning that at least forty-one out of a total of 382 hsien in Southwest China had one People's Bookstore each.[16] The People's Bookstores are outlets for the official People's Publishing Company.

The official plan for 1953 called for the increasing of New China Bookstore branches in this region to 129, and of the People's Bookstores, to 191. There is no report on whether this plan has been fulfilled or not, but a survey of 1953 announcements in the press of Southwest China shows that at least the following book publishers were selling their products in this region:

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[14] New China Daily, Chungking Oct.1,1951.

[15] Ibid., Chungking, Oct.6, 1952, p. 4.

[16] Ibid., September 30, 1952, p. 3.

Table 7, Book Publishers Advertised in Southwest China 1953 */

Name	Specialization
Hsi-nan Ch'ing-nien Ch'u-pan-she [Southwest Youth Publishing Co.]	Youth
Hsin-hua Shu-tien [New China Book Store]	All Subjects, with preponderance on political
Hsi-nan Kung-jen Ch'u-pan-she [Southwest Workers' Publishing Co.]	Technical, popular readers for workers.
Hsi-nan Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she [Southwest People's Publishing Co.]	All subjects
Hsin-ya Shu-tien [New Asia Book Store]	Technical, sciences
Lung-men Lien-ho Shu-chü [Dragon Gate Associated Bookstore]	Textbooks on natural sciences
Shang-wu Ying-shu-kuan [Commercial Press]	Technical, sciences

[continued next page]

Table 7. [continued

Name	Specialization
Kuo-chi Shu-tien [International Bookstore]	Translated works
Jen-min Chiao-yü Ch'u-pan-she [People's Education Publishing Co.]	Education
Chi-hsieh Kung-yeh Ch'u-pan-she [Mechanical Engineering Publishing Co.]	Mechanical Engineering
Ssu-ch'uan Jen-min Ch'u-pan-she [Szechwan People's Publishing Co.]	All subjects

*/ Compiled from New China Daily, Chungking, January 1953 issues.

Obviously Table 7 does not represent an exhaustive list, but the fact that those listed were advertised in the leading regional newspaper indicated the importance of these publishers. On January 15, 1953, the Southwest Youth Publishing Company was disbanded and its function consolidated with the central Youth Publishing Company in Peking. The New China Bookstore had the largest number of branches throughout the region. The Southwest People's Publishing Company, established as a branch of the People's Publishing Company in Peking, was abolished in early 1953. A combined office of the Peking People's Publishing Company and People's Education Publishing Company was set up to handle for this region the publications of these two national institutions.[18] The People's Bookstore, which had numerous branches in this region, merely served as a distributor and was not the publisher. All the publishers listed in Table 7 were branches of national publishers. There is no information on whether at present there is any publisher in Southwest China that operates independently from Peking and exclusively for this region.

2. Quantity of Publications

There is no information on the total quantity of publications produced and sold in Southwest China before 1949. After the reorganization of book publishers and distributors, the New China Bookstore reported in July 1950 that during the first half of that year it printed 4,764,000 copies of 149 different titles. In addition, the store and its branches in this region sold 1,850,000 copies of text books and 1,110,000 books, pamphlets, and periodicals published by government-approved concerns. The San-lien Bookstore, jointly operated by government and private interests, sold 278,000 books and 198,000 magazines from January to June 1950.[19] No statistics are available on sales

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[18] *New China Daily*, Chungking, May 23, 1953, p. 4

[19] *Statistics from Compendium of Gov't. Reports*, p. 1002.

214 by small independent bookstores still in operation at that time.

Rapid expansion of book distribution in this region was claimed by the Communists when in October 1950 they reported the publication of 469 titles totaling 12,250,000 copies since "liberation." The bulk of these publications was printed to serve the workers, peasants, and soldiers. As has been mentioned under the "newspapers" section, the presence of large numbers of troops engaged in road construction in western Szechwan Province augmented the demand for reading material. Consequently attention was focused on publications suitable to member of the armed forces. The above statistics do not indude textbooks which constituted a separate category. The same Communist officials claimed that during a six-month period in 1951, over 24,000,000 copies of textbooks were printed in this region. Compared with the 1950 record, a six-fold increase in text book output was claimed.[20]

The increase in book distribution continued. By fall of 1952, the progress during the past three years was traced as follows:

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[20] Figures in this paragraph are from New China Daily, Chungking, October 1, 1951, p. 3.

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Table 8. Publication and Distribution in Southwest China */

Period	Books Published Titles	Books Published Copies	Books Published Titles	Books Published Copies	Number of Copies Distributed
Jan-Dec. 1950	149	4,764,000	---	---	13,000,000
Jan-June 1951	469	12,250,000	---	---	20,000,000
July-Sept 1952	196	37,986,000	---	---	17,000,000
Total	814	55,000,000	66	11,000,000	150,000,000

*/ New China Daily, Chungking, October 1, 1951, p. 3; September 30, 1952, p. 3; Pei Kuan-chin T'ieh-mu Hou Ti Hsi-nan [Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain], Taipei, The Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1954, p. 19.

[redacted]

214 The figures in Table 8 are all based on Communist claims, and they have to be examined with caution as exaggerations may be involved. One thing does emerge quite clearly from them. The Communists in Southwest China are relaying on national publishers to supply books, and official attention is concentrated on distribution. The figures for "number of copies distributed" in Table 8, therefore, do not reflect the quantity of books and magazines "printed" in Southwest China; a good portion of the items sold in this region are apparently shipped in from North or East China. Some sources even say that "no major publishers in this area are permitted separately to publish any books."[21] While this may mean that most of the publishers in Southwest China are reprinting books prepared by national publishers, it does not preclude the possibility of some publishers still continuing to print items of regional interest with government
204 approval. A survey of available sources reveals that the following regional publications were available in Southwest China in 1953:

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[21] Szechwan under Communist Rule, loc.cit., (p. 27).

Table 9. Major Regional Magazines Advertised in Southwest China (1953) */

Name	Type	Publisher	Price
Hsi-nan Wen-i [Southwest Literature]	Monthly	Southwest Workers' Publ. Co.	JMP $2,500
Hsi-nan Fu-nü [Southwest Women]	Monthly	Southwest Workers' Publ. Co.	- - -
Hsi-nan Ch'ing-nien [Southwest Youth]	Biweekly	Southwest Youth Publ. Co.	JMP $1,300
Ta-chung Hua-pao [Popular Pictorial]	Semi-monthly	- - -	JMP $700
Shuo-ku Ch'ang-chin [Songs and Verses of Yesterday and Today]	Semi-monthly	Southwest Workers' Publ. Co.	- - -

*/ Compiled from New China Daily, Chungking, January 1953 issues.

In addition to those listed in Table 9, there were undoubtedly many more lesser regional magazines which failed to compete for attention in a regional newspaper's advertising columns. On the other hand, many major national magazines were listed, such as People's Pictorial, New Reconstruction, Study, and the Chinese version of For A Lasting Peace and For A People's Democracy. The prices listed in Table 9 may be compared with the price for rice, about JMP$700 a pound, and pork, about JMP$2,850 a pound, in 1953 in Chungking. 204

3. Contents and Readership

Textbook distributors, in the Southwest China Region, have been doing a profitable business. Next to textbooks, popular literature, cartoons, periodicals and pamphlets have been and resumably still are easiest items to sell.[22] One of the typical booklets is the "March on Snow Mountains toward Tibet," published by the Southwest People's Publishing Company in 1952.[23] It 214 814

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[22] A national survey in early 1950 showed that popular literature, with 43 titles, topped the list of periodicals then in circulation. See Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], Vol.I, No. 5, Peking, March 1950, pp. 1255-58. Another national survey in Feb. 1951 showed that popular literature, with 1673 titles, ranked first among all categories of books published from Nov. 1949 to Dec. 1950.

[23] T'a-p'o Hsüeh-shan Chin-chün Hsi-ts'ang [March on Snow Mountains toward Tibet], Chungking, Hsi-nan jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1952.

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214 is a collection of articles by different authors, 814 as collective authorship has become a fad in Communist China. About a hundred pages is the average length of most of these booklets, and 5" x 7", the usual size of their format. A few photographic illustrations at the beginning of the work depict the "peaceful liberation of Tibet" and the scenes along the route traveled by the Communists army. The picture showing how Communists Army cadres give medical treatment to the native people is a tell-tale selection reflecting the purpose of the whole booklet. In the preface, the editorial department of the publisher states that the publication is designed to show the "greatness of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's troops, and their contribution to the Tibetan people." Depsite its minor flaws, the book seems to be well prepared, well presented, and very readable to people with a basic command of Chinese.

214 Subheadings such as "The Kindness [of the 208 Communist Army] Is as Deep as the Ocean" on page 94, and "Our Tibetan Brothers and We Have Become One Family" on Page 92, need no elaboration on their propaganda slant. There is a good deal of excellent descriptive material, emotion-packed, sweeping, and touchingly vivid. An objective evaluation of such writings cannot but lead to the conclusion that the propaganda pens of trained Communist writers are skillfully used and, judging by this particular sample, the writers seem to have a sincere feeling for the subjects they are treating in the book.

204 Clues to the contents of the magazines in this region are found in their titles which often specificy the reader groups for which the publications are intended. The titles of the articles are also self-explanatory. The "Good News for Our Mother Country," in Southwest Literature, No. 13, eulogizes the achievements of Communist China; the "Hero's Blood Nurtures Flowers of Victory" in Southwest Women, No. 19, praises patriotism of the Chinese dead on Korean battlefields, thus giving consolation to their widows who may be reading this magazine at home. The "Sing and Cheer for 1953" in Songs and Verses of Yesterday and Today, No. 24, recounts Communist success in 1952 and entertains a rosy prospect for the new year. The Popular Pictorial in its first 1953 issue is loaded with news photographs, showing, of course, the promising side of every subject,and "New Year" paintings designed for the readers to clip off and use for decorative purposes. These paintings are a good propaganda medium of which a fuller discussion is presented in the chapter on "Artistic and Intellectual Expressions."

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208 Are the people in Southwest China reading these books and pamphlets? According to Table 8, about one out of four persons during the first half of 1951; and about one out of two persons bought three copies during the period of July 1951 to September 1952. This is better than the records available for both Central-South and East China for the same periods. (In Central-South China,

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about one out of ten persons bought a copy during the twelve months from September 1949 to August 1950. In East China, one out of eight person bought an item during April-November 1950.) Again, these figures may reflect gross exaggerations for propaganda effect. Anti-Communist press reports have given accounts of how the mainland people bought books and newspapers under duress.[24] Some of these reports may have factual bases as the Communist cadres, intent on carrying out Peking's orders, abused the book promotion program by cajoling the people into purchasing the publications. Nevertheless these cases did not involve the minority of the book buyers. Three days before the third volume of Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works appeared in Chungking bookstores, the New China Bookstore posted an advance announcement. According to the Enlightenment Daily of Peking, "crowds of readers rushed to the New China Bookstore in Chungking at the break of dawn on April 10, 1953 to await their chance to buy the book."[25]

Such manifestations of enthusiasm on the part of the book buyers may not be a common occurrence in Southwest China, as the Communists would like to have the world believe, but undoubtedly the books are read and understood at least by the literate segment of the population. Among the minority peoples in western Szechwan and southwestern Yunnan, books printed in their own languages have been rare. Consequently, Communist books printed in such languages have little

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[24] Szechwan Under Communist Rule, p. 27.

[25] Enlightenment Daily, Peking, April 11, 1953, p. 1.

[redacted]

214 208 difficulty in finding eager buyers.[26]

4. Libraries and Cultural Centers

217 In order that financial strain may not curb the people's desire to read, the Communists in Southwest China have designed and established small libraries throughout this region to serve the workers, farmers, and shopkeepers. Librarie already in existence in larger cities were reorganized in 1949. According to anti-Communist reports, the original collections at these old libraries were all destroyed by the Communists and restocked with propaganda pamphlets. The Communist press admitted a wave of book burning in 1951-52.[27] However, that cultural disaster was said to have most seriously affected Central-South China and, to a lesser degree, East China. There has been no specific report on book destruction at any particular place in Southwest China. The small libraries established by the Reds numbered thirty-eight, with a total of 3,255,000 volumes by September 1952.[28] About twenty of those libraries were found in Szechwan Province.

368 The cultural center is a version of the Communist cultural palace on a smaller scale. Both are provided for Communist-conducted cultural activities such as discussion group meetings, political rallies, and reading classes. The larger

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214 563 [26] There is no information on the exact scope of distribution of books printed in minority languages in this region. However, it has been Peking's policy to promote such distribution wherever national minorities are found. In 1951, a

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368 ones have facilities for showing motion pictures. Most of them have enough space for reading rooms. In September 1952, there were 294 such cultural centers open to public in Southwest China, and they were claimed to have been effective in educating the masses. It is claimed that in 1951, the cultural centers in northern Szechwan alone enabled over 9,000,000 people to receive "political propaganda," and that about 1,700,000 people attended reading classes there.[29] The official plan for 1952 was to increase the number of libraries to 2,500.[30] It is not known if this goal had been reached.

203 Mobile bookstores and libraries on wheels found in North and East China appear in Southwest China in a different manner. Lack of means of transportation in this region has forced the people to go on foot, and so a new term, "cultural couriers," for the people who work for the mobile bookstores and libraries on wheels, has been coined. Each courier carried two loads of books and periodicals on a pole on his shoulder, and travels on the back roads of the countryside. He brings the publications to the doors of the farmers, usually announcing his arrival with a gong. This mode of peddling is not new, but the goods peddled are. Large crowds

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563 total of 2,200,000 copies of 176 different titles were printed in minority languages and distributed throughout China. These figures were increased to 4,300,000 and 376 respectively in 1952. NCNA Peking, Jan.15,1953,. quoted in SCMP, No.493, Jan.16,1953, pp.13-14.

[27] Enlightenment Daily, Peking, Jan.25,'53, p3.

[28] New China Daily, Sept.30,1952, p.3.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid., Oct. 1, 1951, p. 3.

gather around him wherever he goes. About 1,000 of these couriers were on duty in Szechwan Province in January 1955,[31] but there is no information available on how many such couriers there are altogether in Southwest China. 203

There are also popular science programs designed to educate the public in basic scientific knowledge. But in comparison with East and North China, this region is lagging behind in the development of this type of program, for it has yet to report the establishment of any "science education center."

D. Application and Effectiveness of the Press as a Propaganda Medium

Having thus examined the organization and operation of the Communist press in this region, let us see how the Communists have made use of the press for propaganda propaganda purposes, and if their effort has been successful. However, because the Communist experiment with the press in this region is still new and information on it is even more scarce than that of the other regions, our findings can hardly be expected to be too conclusive. At any rate the following observations on the characteristics of the Communist press in Southwest China are made with a view to providing some understanding of the problems involved. While some of these characteristics may tend to hamper the response of the people in the region to 204 208

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[31] Szechwan Under Communist Rule, p. 26.

204 the press operated by the Communists, others
208 may enhance it.

1. As a part of their reorganization of the press, the Communists in Southwest China have started a concerted drive to "reform" the thought of the newspapermen. A salvo is fired at the traditional beliefs of the journalists, and a new professional standard established. The new standard is to report the facts selected and interpreted for the sole purpose of educating the readers to support government policy. As a result, the body of information the public receives via the newspapers is restricted to only what the government deems fit for public consumption. The same standard applies to magazines, books and other publications. Writers are subject to the same screening and indoctrination. Those who have failed to be converted simply have to give up writing as a profession.

Although in this region there has been no incident involving severe penalty meted out to politically "undesirable" writers, the execution of six journalists in Canton in 1951 has produced far-reaching repercussions and will remain as a warning to those who tend to deviate from the official party line. Subsequent literary purges that time and again jolted the literary circles in China will also contribute to the submissiveness of writers. (For a more detailed discussion on literary purges, see chapter on "Artistic and Intellectual Expressions.") The response of the press to every turn of the political wind is instantaneous and done with amazing efficiency.

204 As soon as Peking decides to weed out wavering
208 elements from the party ranks, regional newspapers will pick up the message and splash it all over their front pages. The next day local papers will follow suit. In the course of a week pamphlets harping on the same theme will flood the book market. Throughout the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, the "Resist-America-Air-Korea Movement, the "Anti-American-German-Warfare" Movement, and the "Oppose American Effort to Revive Japanese Militarism" Movement, the press in Southwest China answered the call as quickly as the newspapers and pamphlets in any other regions of China.

2. The Communists are always keenly aware of the importance of making newspapers easy to swallow for the masses. Early in their underground days they made a motto of O. A. Piatnitskii's utterance that "revolutionary newspapers must be written in plain and popular language so that they can be understood by the masses."[32] In Southwest China, where public education has been even less developed than in North or East China, the newspapers catering to uneducated and semi-educated readers are making a special effort to carry out the long-established policy of "explaining the political problems in the simplest possible terms."[33]

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[32] A translation of this article appears in Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], Jan.15,1932. Osip Aronovich Piatnitskii, who wrote such standard treatises on Communist propaganda and agitation as the World Economic Crisis: the Revolutionary Upsurge

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208 Ch'u T'u-nan, chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission for this region, took pride in announcing in 1951 that this policy was observed in the development of the southwestern press. Not only did the newspapers strive to move closer to the masses, Ch'u said, but the books published also went more than half-way to meet the needs of workers, farmers, and soldiers.[34] In most of the publications, local expressions and trade jargons are freely adopted. To a person trained in classical Chinese and accustomed to reading the serious writing of pre-Communist days, the new language of the Communist press would sound strange if not unintelligible. Yet the new language style, accentuated by the occasional use of words and expressions of minority-languages, could possibly increase the popular appeal of the newspapers. One other factor that contributes to the effectiveness of the press as a whole is the Communist drive to eliminate illiteracy. In the reading classes, mimeographed news bulletins, wall newspapers, and other handy means of news communication are employed. Although these

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[32. continued] and the Tasks of the Communist Parties, and World Communists in Action, was idolized by the Chinese Bolsheviks in the early 1930's.

33. Red Flag, March 10, 1932.

34. New China Daily, Chungking, October 1, 1951, p. 3.

204 smaller papers are not as elaborate as the *New*
208 *China Daily* of Chungking, they contain the same
basic political messages in boiled-down versions. This seems to coincide with Lenin's theory that an "agitator uses a few words to present a single idea."[35] Anybody studying the Communist press at work will do well to remember the enticement to a semi-illiterate person of a printed message he vaguely understands. He will want to read it again and again until he feels that he has understood it fully. The ability to read has always been highly treasured in China. (See chapters on "Family" and "Social Structure.") Thus, Communist propaganda has been contributing a great deal to whetting the intellectual appetite of the semi-illiterate class in this region as a whole.

3. It would be misleading to compare the Chinese Communist press with the U. S. press and to judge the former's effectiveness accordingly. To begin with, the Chinese Communist press has never permeated community life to the same degree that the U. S. press has. Except for a small section of China's urban population, no Chinese will feel that he has missed something if he has no morning paper to read at the breakfast table. However, it may be said that the Communists in this region are helping the people to cultivate a newspaper reading habit by means

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[35] David Shub, *Lenin*, New York, The American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1954, p. 31.

204 of organizing news paper reading groups and
208 other encouragements. The reading of newspapers or having newspapers read and explained to him is exciting to the average peasant on a Szechwan farm or in the western Yunnan mountains. Since he has no previous experience which he can compare with the present one, he will hardly know what else there is to be desired in a newspaper other than what he finds there. Compared with North and East China, the Southwest has an even smaller sophisticated population. To the unsophisticated, the press in Southwest China is conveying a good deal of new information.

4. While the Communists are feeding the public with their diatribes, using the press as a spoon, they are also bringing to the public a considerable amount of much-needed rudimentary knowledge on the natural sciences, public health, and sanitation. This may not particularly be true of the New China Daily because it has as its primary mission the interpretation of government policy to the public. But as an established policy, the Communists have been assigning local papers the duty of carrying special columns devoted to various popular sciences and technical subjects suitable for their readers. In addition, there is at least one magazine for each of the population segments in Southwest China; for youths there is the Southwest Youth Biweekly; for women, the Southwest Women Monthly; for mechanical workers, the Mechanical Worker, etc. For each periodical on a certain subject, there are dozens of pamphlets published every year to reach readers of varying

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204 degrees of education. The propaganda angle in
208 most of these publications is obvious. Even the most technical treatises do not neglect to contrast the present with the past. The past is treated with disdain and its shortcomings are blamed on the "reactionary Kuomintang" or "American imperialism." The present, however, is praised and excessive credit is given to Mao Tse-tung or Russia.

5. Another general criticism voiced by anti-Communist elements is that the newspaper in Communist China as a whole contains very little timely news. With the Communist system of censorship and double-checking, news dispatches are often delayed before they reach the press. However, it must be noted that lack of promptness in reporting news may not seriously impair the effectiveness of the controlled press in South China as a medium of propaganda; many of the readers are unsophisticated, and to them the Communist press, regardless of its content, possesses a great appeal because it is something new and exciting.

6. Two developments may impair the effectiveness of the press in Southwest China. One is the lavish use of statistical data to support or refute an issue. Although so far no gross inaccuracies have been discovered in the major newspapers here, cases involving inaccurate reporting have

204 been exposed in the Central-South China press.[36]
208 Bent on propagandizing as it does, the Southwest China press is always faced with the danger of carrying propaganda too far. As the reader in time becomes more sophisticated, inaccurate reports will destroy his confidence in the press. The Communists claim that they are trying to be careful. They have even gone so far as to standardize the usage of punctuation marks, something which has never attracted the attention of the Chinese press.[37] The other development is the action taken by the Communists in Southwest China in response to a Peking order to restrict the circulation of local newspapers to their own respective districts only.[38] According to anti-Communists sources, this move is designed to "hide the deplorable conditions of one locality from the knowledge of those in another locality." The Communists explain it on the grounds of economy and planned distribution. Whatever the true reason is, this move will, in the long run, tend to impair the effectiveness of the press when newspapers cannot freely circulate from one place to another. Books and pamphlets in this region seem to be free from this restriction.

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36. The expose of inaccuracy in the New Hunan Daily, a major regional paper in Central-South China, was printed in Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, April 22, 1954.

37. People's Daily, Peking, September 26, 1951.

38. Central News Agency dispatch quoted in Review of Hong Kong Chinese Press, No. 174, American Consulate-General, Sept. 19-20, 1953.

III. RADIO

A. Facilities and Control

207 The development of radio networks in Southwest China followed a series of official directives. Upon the establishment of the Peking regime in 1949, the Common Program, which formed the basis of Communist China's "constituion," specifies that "People's radio and publication work shall be developed." [39] Immediately after that, a central agency in charge of radio administration was established in Peking. In April 1950 the Information Administration at Peking issued a directive on the "establishment of radiobroadcast receiving networks." Based on this directive, provincial and special administrative district authorities in Southwest China issued in the same year their announcements on how to establish radiobroadcast receiving networks. On July 27, 1950, Ch'u T'u-nan, chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission for this region, reported that "one of the most important tasks for the Southwest is to strive for improvement in the content of radio programs, expand receiving networks step by step, increase radio facilities and supplies, so that radio can and will become an essential Tool ly means of which the government can direct all its functions in this region." [40] Ch'u was the official interpreter of

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[39] The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1949, p. 18.

[40] Compendium of Government Reports, p. 1003.

207 government policy on radio, and his interpretation made it unmistakably clear how and for what purpose radio networks in the Southwest China Region were to be developed.

According to these announcements, radio networks (broadcasting as well as receiving) were to come under the joint jurisdiction of the local People's government, the Communist Party's local branches, and the regional radio station which directly received instructions from the Central People's Radio Station in Peking. Since the abolition of the regional administrations in June 1954, it is presumed that provincial and municipal radio stations have been directly responsible to Peking while still subject to control by local People's governments and Communist Party branch offices.

The multiple system of control is necessary, in the eyes of the Communists, because the Peking regime and regional authorities have made it amply clear that radio is one of the most effective instruments of mass education to prepare the masses for "socialist construction of China."

One characteristic of radio control in China and other Communist countries is its extent, covering not only the broadcasting networks but receiving stations as well. Organizing "receiving stations" may serve two purposes; one is to ameliorate the shortage of facilities, the other is to insure that available facilities are used in the way approved by the government. The services of private radio owners are enlisted by the government

207 to expand the radio network. These owners are called "friends of the radio." They receive free radio program announcements from the government and some free maintenance services. In turn they are expected to reciprocate by reporting the listener's reactions to the government. Each of these private radio owners may serve as a receiving station, or as a nucleus for a listener's group, if the owner has already registered with the government. Communist authorities also appoint official radio receiving officers in each military unit, government office, school, and in other institutions.

Receiving stations are established on the hsien (county), city, hsiang (group of villages), and village levels. Within a larger city, more than one station may be maintained on the public square, at the public library, in factories, and other places. Outlying industrial and mining districts also may have them. Each complete receiving station is equipped with a radio set and manned by a monitor (called a "receiving officer"), who monitors news and other important broadcasts, and a technician responsible for maintaining the set.

As a supplement to the receiving stations, whose audiences may be limited in number, there are public address systems either directly hooked up to the radio receiving sets or operating separately. The Communists call these public address systems "wire broadcast" (one type of radio

207 diffusion exchange) in contradistinction to "wireless." When a "wire broadcasting" station operates separately, the receiving officer organizes a separate program based on the news and ~~important~~ broadcasts he has monitored. To these materials he then adds whatever caters to local needs. In a large factory, the public address system may have a number of loudspeakers distributed among the departments on the premises.

The receiving officer at a station which has no supplementary public address systems is usually required to run a news bulletin. Such a bulletin may be issued from once a day to twice a week, and the method of publication depends on the location of the station and the audience it serves. Sometimes the radio receiving officer may also be required to prepare a "blackboard newspaper," which involves his transcription on a conspicuously-placed blackboard of the news items he has monitored from the radio.[41]

A few terms in connection with the Communist radio work may be somewhat puzzling to Western observers. Lieh-ch'e Kuang-po [broadcast on the train] is a "wire broadcasting" system installed on the train for the benefit of the passengers. T'u Kuang-po [native broadcast] and

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[41] For regulations governing radio receiving officers, see People's Daily, Peking, April 30, 1950.

207 Wu-ting Kuang-po [rooftop broadcast] are but Communist cadres shouting at the top of their voices the monitored news items through megaphones (trumpet funnels). When they do so at a street corner, they are performing "native broadcasting." If they do so on rooftops, they are performing "rooftop broadcasting." These cadres are identified with "propaganda officers," about whom more will be said later. All these forms of broadcasting are in use in Southwest China.

The relationship between these broadcasting stations and receivers, and the chain of control, can be illustrated by the following chart:

RADIO BROADCASTING AND RECEIVING IN COMMUNIST CHINA


Long wave
Short wave
Peking
Regional
Provincial
Munici-pal
Individual Receiver (Friend of Radio Broadcast)
Receiving Station
Monitor
News Bulletin
Wall News-paper
Blackboard Newspaper
"Wire Broadcasting Station"
Monitor & Editorial Staff
Intensifier
(Loud Speakers)
School
Factory
Public Square
Other Places

Similar receiving arrangements are repeated at all levels.

(Facing p. 655)

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In 1947, the following seven stations were broadcasting in this region:

Table 10. Radio Stations in Southwest China (1947)*/

Name	Location	Call Signal	Kilocycles
Kunming	Kunming, Yunnan	XPRA	700; 6,404
Chungking	Chungking, Szechwan	XGOB	1,200
International	Chungking, Szechwan	XGOY	9,658; 11,913; 15,170;7,153
Ku-sheng	Chungking, Szechwan	XLDA	1,340
P'ei-tu	Chungking, Szechwan	XLDB	950
Kweichow	Kweiyang, Kweichow	XPPA	9,430;1,000
Chengtu	Chengtu, Szechwan	XGOG	560

*/ Chung-hua Nien-chien [China Yearbook, 1948], Nanking, Chung-hua nien-chien she, 1948, pp. 1956-63.

After the Communist occupation, there was no immediate report from this region on the re-organization of the broadcasting stations. Other reports, however, indicated that some stations were apparently taken over

207 and operated by the Communists in 1950. Among the major stations operating in China, the 1952 People's Handbook listed the Southwest Regional Station and the Chungking People's Station for this region.[42] Programs of the two above-mentioned stations also appeared in Southwest regional newspapers in 1952. On October 1, 1952, a third station -- the Szechwan People's Station -- started broadcasting.[43] The announcement failed to indicate the location of this station. As a rule, such provincial stations are located in provincial capitals; thus the Szechwan People's Station could be the successor to the Chengtu Station of 1947. Since the Communist policy of expanding radio networks appears to have been in effect during the past five years, there is reason to believe that at least one major broadcasting station has been operating in each province. The former province of Sikang is an exception. It never had a radio broadcasting station and now, having been incorporated into Szechwan since July 1955, it apparently must be relying on the Szechwan Station for radio broadcasting.

Two reasons may account for the fact that the Communists are in no great hurry to establish many broadcasting stations. One is Peking's policy favoring rapid expansion of major, well-controlled media of information.

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[42] Jen-min Shou-ts'e [People's Handbook], Shanghai, Ta-kung pao, 1952, p. 436.

[43] New China Daily, Chungking, October 2, 1952, p. 3.

207 This has been true with the press where the government promotes circulation of large official papers while voicing caution from time to time against "blind expansion" of small local newspapers. A larger number of broadcasting stations, like newspapers, will present a more complicated problem of control. The other reason is the shortage of facilities. With these limitations, the Communists have been placing emphasis on the establishment of receiving stations in their policy of expanding radio work. In January 1951, every administrative district and hsien, except in certain areas of Yunnan Province, was reported to have at least one receiving station in operation. In Szechwan and Kweichow provinces, 256 such stations were established. This number does not include those in the two provincial capitals of Chengtu and Kweiyang. Where there was electricity, "wire broadcasting" stations were already[44] functioning

By September 1952, officials in Southwest China claimed that a receiving network had been completed for the entire region. Even in northwestern Sezechwan in the remote hsien of Sung-p'an, there was one such station in each sub-district. Eight hundred receiving officers manned these stations in the region, maintaining over 100 mimeographed news bulletins and about 20,000 blackboard newspapers.[45]

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[44] New China Daily, Chungking, October 1, 1951, p. 3.

[45] Ibid., September 30, 1952, p. 3.

207 Newspaper advertisements in this region show that in 1953 basic facilities for radio reception were available in the market. Four- and five-tube receiving sets, operating on either direct or alternating current, were for sale in Chungking. Batteries, loud-speakers, and microphones could also be bought. Some of these supplies were possibly manufactured in Chungking.[46]

There is no later information on radio facilities in this region,[47] but the expansion of receiving stations is believed to be still in progress.

B. Operation and Audience

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208 The programs of these broadcasting stations are organized to deliver and explain

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[46] Ibid., January 1, 1953, p. 5.

[47] Some statistics on radio in China, however, are available. In March 1953, there were 20,591 receiving stations, 15,850 listening groups, and 32,667 receiving officers. In addition, there were many special listening groups of women, children, and neighborhood units organized in special districts. Over 85 per cent (or about 1,800) of the nation's hsien have such stations, including minority banners and leagues. Chin Ta-k'ai, "Chung-kung Ti Kuang-po-wang," ["The Radio Network in Communist China"], China Weekly, No. 65, March 29, 1954, pp. 10-12.

207 political messages to the audiences. The
208 pattern is fixed and changes in content occur in accordance with the commands of central authorities. If the current issue is "Resist-America-Aid-Korea," then everything on the programs is anti-American propaganda. If it is "Production Emulation to Greet Labor Day," then every speech or news item has something to do with model workers and heroes. The following table is a survey of the programs presented by the Southwest Regional People's Broadcasting Station and the Chungking Municipal People's Broadcasting Station in June 1953:

Table 11. Radio Programs in Southwest China (1953) */

Program (daily)	Time (in minutes) Southwest	Chungking
Rebroadcast of Peking program and nat'l hookup	90	90
Lessons in Russian	60	60
Literature	45	75
News	15	15
People's Liberation Army programs	105	--
Music, announcements	35	95
Calisthenics	---	20
Women, children, and other programs	---	30
Tibetan-language program	20	--
Total	370	385

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207 208/ */ New China Daily, Chungking, May 31, 1953, p. 4.

In 1953, the stations in this region were broadcasting twice or three times a day. The regional station was on the air from 6:00 to 7:00 and from 18:10 to 23:20, broadcasting on 570 and 6,154 kilocycles. The Chungking Municipal Station's schedule was 6:00-7:35; 15:50-17:00; and 18:50-22:30, on 1,300 kilocycles. Common to both stations were the rebroadcasts of Peking programs, consisting of "important" speeches by high government officials and lectures. When a national campaign like the preparation for the general election in 1953-1954 was on, a portion of radio time would be devoted entirely to a national hookup organized and controlled by the Central People's Station in Peking. Studying Russian has been in vogue in Mainland China, hence the daily allocation of almost one-sixth of broadcasting time to this purpose. Literature programs included reading of poems and stories whose central theme never varied from praising the working class and the achievement of the Communist regime. Since many "news" items were covered in the rebroadcasts and other special programs, the comparatively small portion of time devoted to news reporting was used to give summaries only. In our foregoing discussion of the press, it has been shown how news items in Communist China resemble feature stories; the same difficult exists when one attempts

207 to draw the line between news and other features
208 on the radio program. The initial musical
number to start the day's broadcasting was either
"All Red the East," or "We Sing for Our Motherland," the two most popular tunes in Communist China. There was no evidence of the use of works by western composers on the prgrams in this region, although in 1953 the stations in Shanghai featured the works of Beethoven. Local operas and plays were occasionally used to fill the music hours.

"Liberation Army" and Tibetan-language programs were special features of the regional station for Southwest China. Correspondence from writers assigned to army units on the Sikang-Tibet Highway constituted the bulk of the materials broadcast for regional and even national consumption. "How our Troops Conquered the Difficulties in Building the Sikang-Tibet Highway," "Our Recreational Club in the Liberation Army," and "Learn from the Russian Army,"[48] were some of the common subjects presented on the Army program. On this program, brief items of news were also read. Radio monitors attached to the Army used these news reports to run their mimeographed or wall newspapers for the troops. The Tibetan-language hour was designed to serve the minority nationals in northwestern Szechwan Province. It consisted of summaries of the day's important items.

Calisthenic lessons were broadcast early in the morning, while special programs catering

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[48] New China Daily, Chungking, June 4, 10, 2, 1953, p. 3.

207 to women, children, and other groups were left
208 to the municipal station which served a more limited audience. The regional station also went on a slightly different schedule on Sundays to present more music and plays. The municipal station featured "dance music" on Saturday nights, but there is no report of the type of music used for dancing. In addition, the municipal station also broadcast a lengthy "worker's program" twice a day, except Sundays. A typical item on the "worker's program" was a speech by a labor hero. For instance, there was one by Yang Hu-k'un entitled "My Experience of Participating in the Seventh All-China Conference of the Federation of Labor Unions."[49] To entertain the workers, the program carried "live" broadcasts direct from the theaters on Saturday nights.

Like the content of the press in this region, the radio programs in 1953 also laid heavy stress on "economic reconstruction." Even the children's programs devoted considerable time to such a propaganda item as "My Father Has Become a Model Laborer," broadcast by Chou Ting-kuo, member of the Communist Young Pioneers.[50] Fairy tales and folk tales of both oriental and occidental origins were generally so

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[49] Ibid., June 3, 1953, p. 3.

[50] Ibid., June 5, 1953, p. 3.

207 208 doctored as to carry the message of "how to behave like good children of Chairman Mao Tse-tung," or "how to help our parents to construct a socialist China." No commercials or "soap operas" were allowed on any program in this region.

The program of the Szechwan People's Broadcasting Station, inaugurated on October 1, 1952, was arranged in the same pattern. One interesting item was the "propaganda officer's"[51] hour, which provided the official propaganda personnel a radio forum to clarify the political issues of the day. The Szechwan station operated on 980 and 1,350 kilocycles.

C. Application and Effectiveness of Radio as a Propaganda Medium

The Communists in Southwest China claim that their radio networks, with minor shortcomings noted, have been a success. To evaluate this claim, it is necessary to take into consideration the following observations:

1. The control of radio broadcasting in this region has been complete. Since there were not as many independent stations in this region as in East China at the time of Communist occupation, the problem of reorganizing the stations in Southwest China was a relatively simple one. However, since every step from broadcasting to receiving is directly and closely supervised by the government and the Party, the entire system could easily be

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[51] New China Daily, Chungking, October 2, 1952, p. 3.

207 brought under effective control. However, the
208 first sign of anxiety was visible at the First National Radiobroadcast Workers' Conference held in Peking from December 1 to 11, 1952. Among the dangerous trends pointed out at the conference were the following: (a) the editorial departments of radio stations failed to establish a close tie with the masses; (b) the issues raised in the programs did not sufficiently reflect life in reality; (c) there were wide gaps in overall planning and technical guidance.[52] To remedy the situation, the conference concluded, more regimentation and centralization were needed in radio work. Hence, there seems to be little possibility for any local station to use its own initiative; if it tried, it would be accused of "deviation" and subject to severe penalties.

2. Lack of facilities remains a stumbling block to expansion of radio work. In addition to such measures as "wire broadcasting station," radio news bulletins, blackboard and wall newspapers, the Communist in Southwest China have been following the nation-wide practice of sending mobile radio teams to the countryside. These mobile teams carry radio sets with them and, upon reaching a village, organize listening groups to hear some of the special programs. Such a measure has proven effective when the Communists have a special campaign to carry out. In

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[52] Chin Ta-k'ai, op. cit., pp. 10-12.

207 the cities, similar listening groups are also 208 organized to support any campaign. During the "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" Movement, "good results" were reported in Chungking and its vicinity. One admitted drawback was that these listening groups would break up as soon as the special campaign was over. Better organization is needed if any lasting effect is to be expected of the propaganda, according to report.

3. The Communists in Southwest China assign only trusted Party members to key positions in the radio network, but there are apparently not enough well-trained personnel (technical and otherwise) to meet the need. As a result, each provincial broadcasting station has been conducting its own personnel training program. While much may have already been done to improve them, these training programs, begun in 1950-51, leave much to be desired. Many of the radio receiving officers are given only two months of training. During such a short period, these candidates are supposed to "elevate the level of their political understanding and formulate a new revolutionary outlook on life." Actually, some of the trained receiving officers have failed even to acquaint themselves with standard Mandarin pronunciation and intonation. This has resulted in their inability to monitor correctly the messages broadcast from Peking or from provincial stations. Radio technicians are, in most cases, given a six-month training course. Their doubtful competence, plus the shortage of radio parts, has subsequently caused many receiving stations to stop operation.

207 208 4. One success of the Communist radio program is to be found among the students, particularly among the younger ones. At school, radio listening, like newspaper reading, has been made part of the regular curriculum. With Communist Youth Corps members acting as leaders, daily news items are discussed and analyzed with a view to guiding the thinking of the students in the direction of favoring the Communist regime. When the fall of Seoul was broadcast in 1951, receiving officers were directed to explain the setback as a strategic necessity, not as a sign of defeat, lest the students become skeptical of the Communist slogan, "The U. S. is but a paper tiger." There is evidence that most of the students are quite willing to accept such Communist propaganda and are enthusiastic about their Communist leaders.

5. The national hookup programs to support propaganda campaigns are probably the most effective broadcasts. Co-ordinated with the press, these radio programs are given advance notice and the masses are psychologically prepared for them. During the land reform, this technique was employed to agitate the people to rise against the landlords. During the "Resist-America-Aid-Korea" and the subsequent "Germ Warfare" campaigns, students and soldiers were encouraged to tell over the radio their sentiments toward "American warmongers." When the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns were being promoted, citizens were urged to report on "corrupt officials" and inefficiency in government agencies. According to Communist statistics, from March 1

207 to May 31, 1951, the forty-nine People's broad-
208 casting stations throughout Mainland China organized 389 such national or regional hookup broadcasts. Over 36,000,000 people were said to have listened to the programs and the stations received 186,000 letters, telegrams, and telephone calls as evidence of favorable response.[53] Photographs are available in Communist publications, showing old peasant women crying under a loud speaker which is supposedly relaying a live broadcast of how a "People's enemy" is brought before a mass trial, or a youth shouting in response to the radio's call for additional manpower to suppress counterrevolutionaries, or a young country girl beaming broadly upon hearing the news of the promulgation of the new marriage law. These pictures, of course, could be other than what the captions claim. But there is no denying that the Communists have resorted to every conceivable means of mass persuasion and that radio is being fully exploited in Communist China for propaganda purposes.

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[53] Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Peking, October 1951, (no pagination).

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IV. STAGE AND SCREEN

536 The stage and screen are effective media for bringing messages to the illiterate and semi-literate. The Communists realize this and have been fully exploiting the possibilities of both forms of mass communication.

A. Stage

1. Control

The main goal of the Communist control of the stage is the consolidation of existing facilities and indoctrination of existing personnel. This has been pursued by officials in charge of dramatics in Southwest China since 1950. The system of control starts with both professional and amateur dramatic groups. Professional actors, playwrights, and stage workers have their respective associations under the direction of a provincial federation. In larger cities, artists are organized in a similar manner. Amateur dramatic groups are encouraged and aided by the association to which they belong. Before the abolition of the Greater Regional governments, the provincial federation took orders from regional authorities, but now it works with provincial Party propaganda agencies and receives direction from the Cultural and Information administrations under the State Council in Peking. The central Drama Reform Bureau under the Cultural Administration directly and exclusively interprets the broad policies laid down by the Party. Its interpretation is passed down through a chain of control to the region, where the Cultural and Educational Commission puts it into practice.

2. Development

To expand stage activities, the Cultural and Educational Commission of this region has been promoting the organization of dramatic groups and encouraging professional actors to join the latter. By September 1952, about 50,000 stage workers were registered and 158 troupes organized.[54] The department of dramatics in the Southwest People's College of Arts was the center of the new drama movement until January 1, 1953 when the department was combined with the Experimental Drama Society to form the Southwest People's Art and Drama Academy, which now is playing a leading role in dramatics in Southwest China. When academy was founded, Li Ch'ang-lu, vice-chairman of the Cultural and Educational Commission, exhorted the members of the academy to "study the thoughts and theories of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung." In addition, they were told to retain "the cultural heritage" of the people of Southwest China so that local color and characteristics of southwestern drama could be preserved and further developed.[55] Li sounded the keynote for the future development of drama in this region.

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[54] New China Daily, Chungking, September 30, 1952, p. 3.

[55] New China Daily, Chungking, Jan. 3, 1953, p. 3.

Scattered statistics indicate that the development of dramatics in this region had an enthusiastic start in 1950. In the city of Chungking alone, more than ten "revised traditional operas" were staged in the first half of 1950, with a total audience of about 200,000. The official plan called for revision of 60 old scripts during the remainder of that year.[56]

The traditional Szechwan opera, differing from Peking opera in musical and lyrical styles, drew national attention when in September 1952 a selected group of actors visited Peking and participated in the national dramatic exhibition. Veteran Szechwan opera singers such as Chia P'ei-chih returned from Peking after the exhibition performance beaming with pride and optimism because he was among those who received awards. He published in the New China Daily his observations on the future of Szechwan opera as follows: (a) the People's Government was definitely supporting and helping traditional Szechwan opera and its actors; (b) in the past "feudalistic" influences and "reactionary" suppression caused the opera to distort its true beauty and deal with superstitious elements, but now the time had come to remove these stumbling blocks so that the laboring masses and their heroes could be naturally represented; (c) the success scored in Peking in September 1952 by Szechwan opera was made possible by the fact that the works performed had been revised in accordance with the new principle

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[56] Compendium of Gov't Reports, p. 1002.

536 of dramatic arts.[57] The remarks of this old actor, with over twenty years of stage experience in Southwest China, point out clearly the direction in which local traditional drama is to be developed.

The non-musical stage-play was quite popular in Southwest China during the War of Resistance against Japan. Possibly because of their political ideas such plays are no longer popular. In January 1953, only one play -- "Confronting New Things and People" -- was advertised in Chungking. New variety shows dealing with short subjects such as "Sing for the Erh-lang Mountain," and "Kill the American Wolf," are performed more often than plays. Many familiar traditional Szechwan operas have been performed, but undoubtedly they have been revised by the Communists. This situation is different from that in North or East China, where the non-musical stage-play continued to hold the interest of the stage as late as 1953.

533 Song and dance are extensively used both on and off the stage. Their versatility as media of information and propaganda has long been recognized by the Communists. As early as 1950, the 700 musicians in Chungking were organized into groups, and by July of that year had already been to 106 factories to teach the workers to sing "new" songs.[58] Music and dance

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[57] New China Daily, Chungking, January 27, 1953, p. 3.

[58] Compendium of Gov't Reports, p.1002.

533 numbers arranged to depict a political theme are frequently presented at the cultural centers and by propaganda teams traveling in the countryside. (For more discussion on song and dance, see chapter on Artistic and Literary Expression).

B. Motion Pictures

1. Control

546 So far there has been no indication that any motion picture has been or is being made in Southwest China, except perhaps some newsreels photographed by movie teams attached to the "Liberation Army." Thus the problem of control in this region is reduced simply to that of supervising the distribution and showing of films. More remote from sources of American and other Western motion picture supply, even the question of censorship will automatically be taken care of as soon as distribution is centralized. Early in 1950, the Southwest China branch of the China Motion Picture Distribution Company was in operation. It monopolizes distribution and is directly controlled by its headquarters in Peking.

Responsible for the supervision of the showing of motion pictures in this region are the provincial cultural and education commissions. They are also in charge of organization and the assignment of mobile motion picture teams to tour the countryside.

2. Development

In July 1950, the Southwest China branch of the China Motion Picture Distribution Company reported that it had already handled 53 Russian films and 41 Chinese films since the beginning of that year. At that time, motion picture theater-goers in the Southwest Region still favored Chinese films. The Russian films only drew a total of 446,000 people while Chinese pictures drew 837,000 for their total. In January 1953, the distribution system was further consolidated and most of the theaters in larger cities were showing the same films either simultaneously or by rotation. The quota for each was determined and announced in advance. The following is a sample of the types of films that the people in Chungking saw in motion picture theaters in 1953:

Table 12. Motion Pictures Shown in Chungking Theaters (Jan-Feb 1953) */

Type of Film	Number
Russian	12
Newsreels	4
Historical	1
People's Liberation Army documentary	1
Reconstruction of China	2
Revolutionary stories	4
Cartoon	1
Total	25

*/ Compiled from advertisements in New China Daily, *Chungking, January and* February 1953 issues.

546 The Russian films dealt mostly with the October Revolution and key personalities of the Soviet revolutionary war. The newsreels included one entitled "We Are Opposed to Germ Warfare," and "Long Live Peace," which depicts the Communist-inspired Peace Conference of Asian and Pacific Nations held in Peking in the fall of 1952. The historical film dealt with the pacifism of Mo Tzu (Mo Ti), an ancient Chinese philosopher. The economic achivement in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia was the subject matter of the films on reconstruction. Films dealing with revolutionary stories depicted the suppression of an anti-Communist secret society, I-kuan Tao, and the change in pastoral life in Northwest China. One of these films, under the title "The Flame of Wrath," was actually filmed in Northeast China.

Admission to a motion picture theater in the city was JMP$2,000, or about the price of two and a half pounds of rice. Motion picture theaters in the rural areas charged only JMP $1,500 for admission. These rates were fixed by the government.

As to the newsreels shown in rural areas, the Communist motion picture producing industry has turned out an ample supply of them. Government authorities pay specific attention to the motion picture teams visiting the factories and mining areas. Regarding this, the central Cultural Administration at Peking on June 8, 1954 issued a special directive ordering local governments to "supervise motion picture distribution agencies by adequately supplying these mobile

546 teams with films."[59] By May 1952, the thirty-nine teams operated by the cultural and educational organizations in this region had given shows to 17,329,537 people. According to Communist official announcements, these figures did not include the teams attached to the Army or organized by labor unions. It has also been reported that in the cities of Southwest China, 8,799,704 people saw motion pictures in 1950, and 20,522,438 in 1951. If these statistics are reliable, then the Communist goal of enabling every inhabitant in Southwest China to see at least one motion picture show a year would be within the range of achievement.[60] (The population of Southwest China in 1950-1951 was about 75,000,000.)

Promotion of Russian films has been made an official task for the distributors in this region as a result of the relative scarcity of native films. The literary purges that have been going on in North and East China are exerting a restrictive influence on script writers. Consequently, the film production industry has not been able to make enough movies, and producers have to resort to writing titles and dialogue in Chinese for foreign films already approved by the government. Over 50 films made in countries with in the Soviet orbit, with titles and dialogue written in Chinese, were distributed throughout Mainland China in 1952.[61]

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[59] Jen-min Shou-ts'e, [People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 540.

[60] New China Daily, Chungking, May 21, 1952, p. 3.

[61] Ibid., January 16, 1953, p. 3.

546 In 1954, the Shanghai Motion Picture Producing Company, in collaboration with the Northeast Motion Picture Producing Company, wrote the titles and dialogue in Chinese for 40 foreign films, including a few non-Communist ones such as "The Bicycle Thief," made in Italy, and some "progressive" pictures from Japan.[62] Meanwhile a Japanese journalist reported upon his return to his country from a visit to Red China in 1953 that the average motion picture theater in large Chinese cities had to have about eight films a month, that the government could only supply one or two, and that the rest came from the Soviet Union.[63] In October 1953, a "Russian Motion Picture Week" was observed in Southwest China commemorating the 36th anniversary of the October Revolution. During that week in Chengtu, Chungking and Kunming, over 1,413,000 people saw a Russian motion picture.[64]

All this points up an acute shortage of native films in Southwest China.

C. Lantern Slides and Phonograph Records

Despite physical limitations, officials in

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[62] Enlightenment Daily, Peking, April 6, 1954, p. 2.

[63] Chao Ts'ung, "I-nien-lai Chung-kung Ti Wen-hua Kung-tso" ["The Chinese Communist Cultural Work during the Past Year"] , Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly] , Hong Kong, January 4, 1954, p. 36.

[64] China Weekly, No. 62, March 8, 1954, p. 22.

546 Southwest China in charge of mass communication and propaganda have been stressing the importance of using audio-visual aids. The program to develop lantern slides for public information is tied in with the expansion of libraries and cultural centers which have already been mentioned.

Chairman Ch'u T'u-nan of the Cultural and Educational Commission for Southwest China was proud to point out in September 1953 that a total of 845 projectors (for slides) had been acquired, averaging two to each hsien in this region. The slides stocked at the cultural centers and libraries were divided into the following categories:

Table 13. Lantern Slides in Southwest China (1952) */

Category	Percentage
Political	50.8
Agricultural	23.7
Industrial	7.0
Health and Sanitation	10.0
Popular Science	3.7
Others	4.8

*/ New China Daily, Chungking, September 30, 1952, p. 3.

Table 13 shows that in providing the public with lantern slides, the first and foremost emphasis is on political indoctrination. Agricultural and public health subjects come next, because Southwest China is predominantly agrarian and the people's knowledge of sanitation is particularly lacking. Besides organizing shows at the cultural centers or libraries, mobile motion picture teams and propaganda groups also make use of slides and projectors. When Chairman Ch'u claimed that the cultural centers in the region had given over 9,000,000 people political education and enrolled 1,700,000 illiterates in reading classes,[65] he undoubtedly included those who had been show motion pictures and lantern slides as well.

Slides were extensively used in connection with educational campaigns on health and sanitation conducted in the Tibetan Nationality Minority area in northwestern Szechwan Province early in 1953.[66] It was found that where the Chinese language was not spoken, drawings and photographs were satisfactory media of communication.

It is not known whether facilities exist in Southwest China for the manufacture of lantern slides on a large scale, but in 1953 such equipment was advertised for sale in the New China Daily of Chungking. Slides on maternity hygiene, public health, educational subjects, and current events were available in the market at that time. A set of 36 slides was sold for JMP$130,000 (about US $26, official rate) which was equivalent to the price of 200 pounds of rice.[67] 546

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[65] New China Daily, Chungking, September 30, 1952, p. 3.

[66] New China Daily, Chungking, January 24, 1953, p. 3.

Phonograph records are used at the cultural centers and recreational clubs, but not as extensively as lantern slides and radio sets. They were also available in Chungking in 1953 for JMP$16,000 (about US $3.20) each, or about the price of 23 pounds of rice.

V. MASS ORGANIZATIONS AS MEDIA OF PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA

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The Communists are fond of using the word "network" for activities pertaining to public information and propaganda. Already discussed in this study are the news-gathering network, radio network, library and book distribution network, and motion picture showing and cultural center network. Included in the Communist term of "cultural network", however, are many mass organizations contributing to the dissemination of public information, education, and propaganda.[68]

One of these organizations is the Sino-Russian Friendship Association. Established on October 5, 1949, in Peking, it expanded rapidly and by February 1952 had 64,200 large and small branches

[next page for 67. and 68.]

575 with a total membership of 23,000,000.[69] Under
208 the direction of Liu Shao-ch'i (chi), whose position in the party hierarchy is said to be only next to that of Mao Tse-tung, this association, through its omnipresent branches, has been organizing, indoctrinating, and propagandizing people of all professions. It holds small group gatherings in which Soviet theories and practices are presented, discussed, and analyzed, while its members and their friends are urged to emulate their Soviet comrades. Whenever there is a national propaganda campaign, the association mobilizes all its branches to give concerted support to the effort.

Since detailed discussion on mass organizations in China is presented in a separate chapter in this handbook, no attempt is made here to mention the names of all the major ones and to discuss their activities. Suffice it to say that these organizations all have their own "cultural departments" which in reality are information and propaganda units. Generally speaking, the "cultural network" of an average-size hsien may easily consist of as many as 4,000 units with more than 30,000

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67. Ibid., January 17, 1953, p. 3.

68. A list of 96 such national mass organizations is found in People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 7-8.

69. People's Handbook, 1952, p. 258.

575 people actively participating.[70] Although these
208 statistics may not be true of many of the sparsely populated hsien in Southwest China, the scope of the Communist public information program and the effectiveness of the Communist propaganda machine is not to be underestimated.

V. PERSONAL CONTACT

208 Any study of public information and propaganda in Communist China would be sadly incomplete if the important part played by personal contact were ignored. Personal contact actually has been an effective tool in the dissemination of public information and propaganda in a country like China where a preponderant percentage of the population is illiterate.

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on January 1, 1951 issued a directive on the "Establishment of a Propaganda Network Aimed at the Masses." Among other things the directive pointed out that: (1) In the past propaganda work had been neglected, and no permanent personnel had been assigned to conduct person-to-person propaganda to counteract rumors and clarify government policies. (2) All Party branches from that day on would assign propaganda officers, and all guiding agencies in the Party would appoint reporting officers, while enthusiastic activists, although non-Party members, might also be appointed as propaganda officers. (3) Under the direction of the Party, propaganda officers would conduct propaganda by means of

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[70] Chao Ts'ung, op. cit., p. 36.

708 personal contact and report the people's reactions and responses to the proper authorities. (4) Reporting officers were required to make political reports to mass meetings at least once every two months, and their reports had to be first cleared by Party authorities.[71]

Execution of the above directive in Southwest China resulted in the registration of 85,000 propaganda officers by December 1951.[72] A different Communist source claimed that by the end of November 1951, incomplete surveys showed that there were already 2,086 reporting officers and 86,349 propaganda officers in this region.[73] By September 1952 the number of propaganda officers had increased to 158,000.[74] In the summer of 1953, Sezchwan Province alone reported that there were altogether 180,000 propaganda officers at work.[75] At about the same time, Communist authorities began to strengthen

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71. Chien-li Hsüan-ch'uan-wang [Establish Propaganda Network], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, pp. 1-6.

72. People's Handbook 1952, pp. 436-437.

73. New China Daily, Chungking, December 23, 1951.

74. Chin Ta-k'ai "Chung-kung Hsuan-ch'uan-wang Ti Fa-chan Chi Ch'i P'o-ch'an" ["The Development and Bankruptcy of the Chinese Communist Propaganda Network"], China Weekly, No. 70, May 3, 1954, p. 11.

75. People's Daily, Peking, May 29, 1953, p. 1.

the system of personal propaganda by establishing what might be described as "coaching stations" for propaganda officers. At these stations propaganda officers met twice a month, each session lasting about two hours. With the help of experienced coaches, the propaganda officers received on-the-spot instruction on how to disseminate propaganda and how to make their argument convincing to the people. Unfortunately, there is no information available on the exact number of such coaching stations in this region.

Anti-Communist sources claim that the establishment of such "coaching stations" is evidence of the collapse of the Communist person-to-person propaganda system.[76] Communist reports, however, maintain that propaganda and reporting officers have come to be regarded by the people as "information bureaus" that know all the answers. They are also being referred to as "thought doctors," and "messengers of Chairman Mao Tse-tung." If these appellations really reflect the high esteem that the people have for these propaganda agents, then the Communist claim that personal contact "has exerted decisive influence on the masses in the campaigns to suppress counter-revolutionaries, carry out land reform, resist America and aid Korea, and increase production" is perhaps not entirely unreliable.[77]

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[76] Chin Ta-k'ai, op. cit., p. 12.

[77] People's Handbook 1952, pp. 436-437.

208 The significance of the part played by personal contact in the Communist propaganda scheme is well expressed in an editorial of the People's Daily. The Party has been relying on separate propaganda campaigns to achieve the goals, the editorial said. At first, Party members thought that personal contact was essential to the successful dissemination of propaganda. Now everybody admits that "propaganda officers are trail-blazers without whom nothing can be undertaken."[78]

VII. CONCLUSION

A. The Massiveness of the System

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666 The Chinese Communist propaganda machine makes use of all types of media which are co-ordinated to function effectively. Once a decision is made by the top members of the Party hierarchy, it will be transmitted to Party and government agencies at lower levels for execution. Then a sort of chain reaction will begin. Take the 1954 general election, for instance. The decision was made in Peking in early 1953. By May all the provinces had already organized special committees

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[78] People's Daily, Peking, 1953, p. 1.

208 to carry it out. Meanwhile from Peking came 666 detailed instructions embodied in the General Election Handbook, of which 1,380,000 copies were distributed throughout the country. Discussions on the forthcoming election filled the pages of the press and consumed the bulk of radio time of all the major broadcasting stations. Provincial authorities further printed thousands of pamphlets for distribution. The Shantung provincial branch of the New China Bookstore alone handled more than 16,000 copies of these pamphlets in the first half of May 1953. By June all the propaganda officers were mobilized, briefed on the subject, and assigned to work. In Szechwan Province, 180,000 propaganda officers worked feverishly. More than 400 lantern slide teams took to the back roads and side roads of the province; about 440 cultural centers staged co-ordinated programs.[79] Every unit of the public information and propaganda system was put to work. It was claimed that, mainly on the basis of this immense propaganda campaign, the turnout of the election was close to 90 per cent of the nation's total eligible voters. Such a claim might have been exaggerated, but the effectiveness of such an intense campaign 208 should not be totally discredited. After all, during China's War of Resistance against Japan, the propaganda teams organized by the Nationalists succeeded, in 1938-40 at least, in making the villagers of western Szechwan aware of the national leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and the grave situation

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[79] People's Daily, Peking, May 29, 1953, p. 1.

created by the war that was threatening the very life of their own country.

B. The Thoroughness of Operation

Western journalists who visited the Communist areas during the brief lulls in the Nationalist-Communist war were surprised to find that the grade school children were quite familiar with Communist political jargon. Such an achievement is perhaps to be accounted for by the thoroughness of Communist indoctrination and propaganda. As soon as a child is old enough to be taught, he is subject to persistent Communist indoctrination. The first words he learns in grade school are "the Chinese Communist Party" and from then on he is taught to live for and think in terms of Communism. He would be an exceptional person if he could escape from becoming a devout Communist upon reaching adulthood. Perhaps occasionally from the older generation he will detect opinions or behavior at variance with Communist standards, but in Communist China the old and wise are dying out, and in twenty years they will be replaced by the new generation which has been thoroughly trained in Communist concepts and practices. It is the new generation that will run the country.

C. Prospects of Success or Failure of Communist Public Information and Propaganda

Are the people in Southwest China convinced by the Communists now? In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems that the majority of the

208 people are willing to go along with their Communist leaders, or, for that matter, with any leader who has brought about a measure of order and stability to their community after so many years of chaos. As to the remainder of the population, it is difficult to gauge their feelings accurately, since so few Chinese have escaped from the Mainland to reveal their sentiments to the outside world. But if from this region there had been such refugees, it would still be risky for us to rely completely on their words for the measure of popular reaction in Southwest China to Communist propaganda. After all, refugees' stories, as has been proven before, usually are highly subjective and often tend to convert individual experiences into questionable generalizations.

It is also difficult to say how much counter-propaganda, if a way is found to bring it to Southwest China, will be enough to offset the Communist balance there. However, there is at least one danger that will confront the Communists in the future. After the masses have been taught to read and write, they are likely to become curious about the outside world and want to know more about it. The people in the Soviet Union now seem to be curious about the West after 38 years of Communist indoctrination and propaganda and total blackout of outside news.[80] Communist China is traveling on the path that the Soviet Union has trod. It is only reasonable to assume that the Chinese people

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[80] "Mr. Kleiner's Russia," Newsweek, September 5, 1955, p. 17.

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208 will someday demand the right to satisfy their curiosity about the outside world, news of which has been denied them for so long.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 2h, Political Background

KEY PERSONALITIES

647 Certain special problems have given the Communist regime in Southwest China distinctive characteristics which become evident when we study the backgrounds, careers, and present administrative functions of fifty key personalities in this region.

The first special aspect which we note has to do with the significant number of senior leaders in the regional military administration. The interrelation between military and political control appears to be much closer than in other regions of China -- a situation which is due not only to the fact that Southwest China was the last area to be brought under Communist control but also to the circumstance that in this region Kuomintang and anti-Communist guerrilla activities have given the Communists the most trouble. Thus we find that the key men -- senior officials and Communist Party Central Committee members -- are military leaders, officials of the military districts and the 2nd Field Army rather than members of the provincial People's governments in the region. In fact, the relative

647 unimportance of many of even the top-level provincial administrators is striking. Presumably this imbalance is gradually being rectified as administrative control becomes more secure and Party organizations more thoroughly entrenched.

A second special aspect of the Southwest China administrators as a group results from the large number of national minority groups in the region. These groups vary considerably in size and importance, and it is the avowed policy of the People's Republic to accord them equal and non-discriminatory treatment. We find, therefore, a certain number of administrators who come from these minority groups. We would logically expect to find these men on the Committee on Nationalities of the National People's Congress, and in fact most of them are. But on the other hand, it is worth noting that an almost equal number of administrators from Southwest China who have a place on this committee are not members of minority groups. Presumably this too will be changed as soon as more leaders from minor nationalities have been suitably trained by the Communists.

In addition to these special characteristics, we find other features which are more typical of the Communist administrative structure in

647 other regions of China: a considerable overlapping of personnel in some key positions, apparently only nominal authority among the incumbents of most of the lesser positions, a calculated distribution of Communist Party personnel, and the presence of several former Kuomintang leaders in positions of considerable administrative importance who are, nevertheless, inevitably outranked by Communist officials.

I. SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS HELD

This survey is concerned with fifty men who, with three exceptions, hold key regional and provincial posts in Southwest China. The three exceptions -- Ch'u T'u-nan, Lung Yün, and Hsiung K'o-wu -- have in the past held important administrative positions in Southwest China, but our data on their present positions notes only jobs on the national level. The remaining incumbents occupy the positions of commander of military districts (regional and provincial), political commissar of military districts (regional and provincial), commander and political commissar of the 2nd Field Army, governor and deputy-governor of provincial People's governments, provincial committee member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, president of provincial People's higher courts, and secretary of provincial and regional committees of the New Democratic Youth Corps (NDYC).

647 We do not have enough significant data on the backgrounds, careers, or present status of sixteen of these men to include them in this analysis. We can simply record their functions in the administrative structure: five are NDYC officials (a secretary in each province and a secretary for the region of Southwest China); four presidents of People's higher courts (one in each province); and seven deputy-governors (one each in Szechwan and Kweichow, two in Sikang, and three in Yunnan).

The remaining 34 incumbents, then, include 13 deputy-governors (two in Yunnan, three in Kweichow, and four each in Szechwan and Kweichow); four provincial committee members of the Chinese People's P.C.C. (one in Kweichow, three in Szechwan); four commanders of provincial military districts (one for each province); three political commissars of provincial military districts (the political commissar for Kweichow is not known); four governors (one in each province); and the six men who are commanders, deputy-commanders, political commissars, and deputy political commissars of the Southwest China military district and the 2nd Field Army.

II. INCUMBENTS HOLDING A SINGLE POSITION

647 Four of these 34 men (in addition to the 16 already noted, about whom we have no further information) hold only a single administrative position. Two are deputy-governors: Kung Tzu-chih, a former member of the Yunnan Provincial Government, who is now a deputy-governor of the Yunnan Provincial People's Government, and Jen Pai-ko, a deputy-governor of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government, who has been prominent in the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association since 1949 but who apparently holds no other offices at present.

The other two men who hold only one position are the governors of the Yunnan and Kweichow provincial People's governments. Kuo Ying-ch'iu, of Yunnan, was formerly a director of the Department of Political Affairs attached to the People's Liberation Army (1949), the deputy-director of the South Szechwan People's Government (1949-52) and the vice-chairman of the Yunnan Provincial People's Government (1952-54), but according to our data he holds no other administrative, military, or Party position at this time. Chou Lin, the governor of Kweichow, was formerly on the Southwest China Military and Political Committee and the Southwest China Administrative Committee

647 (in each case, simply as a member) and was a vice-chairman of the Kweichow Provincial People's Government. No other information on him is available.

We note that neither of these governors is known to hold a top Party position in his province. These posts are held by the political commissar of the Yunnan Provincial Military District (Hsieh Fu-chih) and the chairman of the Kweichow Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C. (Shen Yün-p'u), who is, incidentally, one of the few non-military Party leaders in the region. The apparent lack of importance attached to the position of governor in these instances may, of course, be due to a lack of complete information, but to the extent that it represents a real situation, it is undoubtedly a result of a necessary emphasis on the military organization in the region.

III. INCUMBENTS HOLDING TWO POSITIONS

Eleven men each hold two administrative positions. In nine of these cases, the second position is that of delegate to the First National People's Congress. Five such men are deputy-governors: one in Sikang, one in Szechwan, and three in Kweichow. Two others also hold provincial positions in addition to their function

647 as delegates to the 1st NPC: Li Hsiao-t'ing, vice-chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and Li Ta-chang, governor of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government. Li Hsiao-t'ing was a member of the Revolutionary League of Dr. Sun Yat-sen from 1905 to 1913, but no details of his later career are known until 1950, when he was a member of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, chairman of the People's Control Committee of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, and member of the Standing Committee of the Szechwan-Sikang Provisional Committee of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee. Li Ta-chang was director of the Department of Propaganda of the T'ai-hang Sub-bureau of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC during the Sino-Japanese War, and he has since held other Party and provincial positions, but at present he has, according to our data, no functions other than as governor of Szechwan and delegate to the 1st NPC

The two remaining men in this group of delegates to the 1st NPC are Ch'u T'u-nan and Hsiung K'o-wu. Both hold national rather than regional or provincial positions: Ch'u is a member of the Standing Committee of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., Hsiung is a member of the Standing

647 Committee of the 1st NPC.

The last two men who hold only two positions are distinguished by their status as reserve members of the Central Committee of the CPC: Sung Jen-ch'iung and Ch'en Keng. Both are members of the National Defense Council, Sung is deputy political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, and Ch'en is commander of the Yunnan Provincial Military District. Because of the importance of their regional and national posts as well as their Party rank, these two men are included below in the group of administrators with top status.

IV. INCUMBENTS HOLDING THREE POSITIONS

Eight men each hold three positions. Four of these are almost identical: the three positions consist of delegate to the 1st NPC, membership on the Committee on Nationalities of the 1st NPC and deputy-governor. The only exception in this group is Shen Yün-p'u, who is not a deputy-governor but chairman of the Kweichow Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's PC.C. and a member of the Kweichow Provincial Committee of the CPC.

The other four incumbents holding three positions include a former Kuomintang leader, Teng Hsi-hou, who is now deputy-governor in Szechwan, a delegate to the 1st NPC and a member of the National Defense Council; Ho Ping-yen, who is commander of the Szechwan Provincial Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, and a member of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government; Yang Yung, commander of the Kweichow Provincial Military District, member of the National Defense Council, and Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in Korea (1955); and Wang Wei-chou, a reserve member of the Central Committee of the CPC, who is deputy-commander of the Southwest China Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, and a member of the Standing Committee of the 1st NPC.

Because of the number and nature of their multiple positions, these four men are included in the group of key administrators discussed below. Shen Yün-p'u is also included because of his Party position and his occupancy of the important position of chairman of the Kweichow Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

The true status of the other three men in this category is more difficult to appraise.

647 Two of the positions they hold are of lesser authority: delegate to the 1st NPC and deputy-governor. Furthermore, as we shall see, their positions on the Committee on Nationalities may give them little more than prestige. They should be noted, however, as persons who may carry considerable administrative weight, at least in their own nationality districts, and perhaps, ultimately on a national level. They are Kuo-chi-mu-ku (a member of the Yi minority from Sikang); Shargur Dobdeng (or Hsia-k'o Tiao-teng), a Tibetan from Sikang; and Sana-rygas-shes, also a Tibetan from Sikang. The first two are both former vice-chairmen of the Sikang Provincial People's Government; Shargur Dobdeng was also a member of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, a member of the Committee on Nationalities Affairs of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, and a member of the Southwest China Administrative Committee.

We have considerably more information on Sana-rygas-shes, a man whose colorful career suggests that in time he may become a figure of some significance. When the Red Army reached Tan-pa hsien in 1934, Sana-rygas-shes, then seventeen, co-operated with other Tibetans in Tan-pa hsien in organizing the Tan-pa United Government. He later served as director of the Department of Youth Affairs in the same

647 government. He subsequently became political commissar of the Tan-pa Detachment of the Red Army and, during World War II, he studied at the School of Nationalities in Yenan. After the war, he was active in the organization of Mongolian guerrilla forces in Southern Suiyan Province. Since 1949 he has been an active and prominent participant in the Communist administration; he was a delegate to the 1st Chinese People's P.C.C., a member of the Commission on Nationalities Affairs of the Government Administrative Council, chairman of the Tibetan Nationality Autonomous District of Sikang, member and vice-chairman of the Committee on Nationalities Affairs of the Southwest China Military and Political Committee, and member of the Southwest China Administrative Committee.

Although neither Sana-rygas-shes nor the other two minorities representatives discussed above appear to carry, at the present time, senior status among the group of key administrators, their status within their own groups and, as the Communists' nationalities policy becomes more fully implemented, their potential importance makes them worthy of special notice.

V. INCUMBENTS HOLDING FOUR POSITIONS

647 Five men each hold four positions, and by virtue of both the number and nature of these multiple posts these men may all be included in the group of key officials in the region.

Two men are Party officials: Chang Chi-ch'un, a reserve member of the Central Committee of the CPC and secretary of the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee, is also deputy political commissar of the 2nd Field Army, deputy political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, and member of the Standing Committee of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.; Hsieh Fu-chih, secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the CPC, is political commissar of the Yunnan Provincial Military District, member of the Yunnan Provincial People's Government, delegate to the 1st NPC, and member of the Committee on Nationalities of the 1st NPC.

Two others are former Kuomintang members who joined the Communists in the late 1940s: Lung Yün, who is now delegate to the 1st NPC, member of the Standing Committee of 1st NPC, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, and member of the Standing Committee of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese

647 People's P.C.C.; and Chang Ch'ung, an Yi military leader under the Nationalist Government, who is now deputy-governor of Yunnan, delegate to the 1st NPC, member of the Committee on Nationalities of the 1st NPC, and member of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

The fifth man is Yen Hung-yen, whose career is known to us only since 1950, and who is currently deputy-governor of Szechwan, deputy political commissar of the Szechwan Provincial Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, and member of the National Defense Council.

VI. INCUMBENTS HOLDING MORE THAN FOUR POSITIONS

The remaining six men hold a total of 32 positions. They are identified below and their Party and administrative functions noted. An analysis of their special characteristics and their relation to the group of senior officials as well as to the region as a whole will follow.

Liu Wen-hui is a former military leader who is now delegate to the 1st NPC, member of the Committee on the Budget of the NPC, member of the National Defense Council, member of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese P.C.C., and vice-chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

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647 Li Ching-ch'üan, whose early background we do not know, is deputy-political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, political commissar of the Szechwan Provincial Military District, member of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., member of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government, and chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

Liao Chih-kao, secretary of the Sikang Provincial Committee of the CPC, is currently governor of Sikang, commander and political commissar of the Sikang Provincial Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, and member of the Committee on Nationalities of the NPC.

Ho Lung, who is a member of the Central Committee of the CPC, is commander of the Southwest China Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, deputy premier of the State Council, and chairman of the Commission on Athletics of the State Council.

Liu Po-ch'eng, veteran Party military leader, is commander of the 2nd Field Army, delegate to the 1st NPC, member of the Standing Committee of the 1st NPC, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, and director of the Department of Military Training of the National Defense Council.

647 Teng Hsiao-p'ing, top Party official for Southwest China, is also political commissar of the 2nd Field Army, political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, delegate to the 1st NPC, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, deputy premier of the State Council, member of the Standing Committee of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and a member of the Central Election Committee.

VII. CHARACTERISTICS OF SENIOR LEADERS AS A GROUP

On the basis of the foregoing survey, we can select the 19 men who, because of the multiplicity of their positions, the relatively superior authority granted them by their various functions or their status in the Communist Party, constitute the top echelon of Southwest China's leadership. Even within this group, of course, we can observe the typical Communist pyramidal power structure: a very small number of senior Communist Party officials hold key positions both regionally and nationally and may be assumed to wield ultimate control. From the regional point of view, however, the group may be taken as a whole, and certain specific characteristics of the administrative structure of Southwest China noted.

647 Eleven of the 19 men are ranking Communist Party members (Li Ta-chang is included in this group because of his past Party status, although his present rank in the Party is not known.)

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Liu Po-ch'eng, and Ho Lung are members of the Central Committee, and clearly constitute the core of Party control in the region. Wang Wei-chou, Sung Jen-ch'iung, Chang Chi-ch'un, and Ch'en Keng are reserve members of the Central Committee. Liao Chih-kao, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Shen Yün-p'u are officials on provincial committees of the CPC.

Five of these men have been Party leaders since the 1920s: Teng, Liu, Ho, Wang, and Ch'en. All participated in Communist uprisings in 1927 and all but Wang are known to have made the "Long March." Two others, Sung and Li, have been active at least since the 1930s. We have data on the remaining four only since 1949.

Four of the five veteran leaders -- that is, the men who have been active since the 1920s -- are military men. Liu Po-ch'eng is a Moscow-trained former Red Army Chief of Staff and former commander of the Central China People's Liberation Army. Ho Lung, who began his career as a bandit leader, rose to the rank of

647 commander of the Shansi-Suiyuan People's Liberation Army before taking his present post of commander of the Southwest China Military District. Wang Wei-chou, a veteran of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (1927-36) was commander of the Communist garrison forces in East Kansu during World War II. Ch'en Keng began his military career in 1916 at the age of twelve as a private in the army of General Lu Te-p'ing and served in the Communist army from 1928 on, rising to the rank of commander of the 4th Army Corps of the 2nd Field Army of the People's Liberation Army.

It is noteworthy that five of the remaining Communist officials are closely connected with the military administration. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who holds the top Party position in the region, was for fifteen years political commissar attached to Communist military forces and is now political commissar of the 2nd Field Army as well as of the Southwest China Military District and, on the national level, a vice-chairman of the National Defense Council. Sung Jen-ch'iung, National Defense Council member and deputy political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, is the right-hand man of General Liu Po-ch'eng. According to our data, he first became prominent in 1937 as the director of the Department of Political Affairs of the 29th Division of the 18th Group Army (the same

647 division which Liu commanded and to which Teng was attached from 1937 to 1946), and he is also a former commander of the Central Hopei Military District and deputy director of the Nanking Military Control Committee. Chang Chi-ch'un, Liao Chih-kao, and Hsieh Fu-chih are also associated with the military administration; they are political commissars of the 2nd Field Army, the Sikang, and the Yunnan provincial military districts, respectively.

All but two of these eleven key Communist Party leaders, then, have past careers -- as far as we know them -- and current positions that are essentially military. Li Ta-chang, the governor of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government, was director of the Department of Propaganda of the T'ai-hang Sub-bureau of the North China Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC during the Sino-Japanese war and held the same position on the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC from 1945 to 1949. He was subsequently director of the South Szechwan People's Government, member of the Southwest China M.P.C., vice-chairman of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government and member of the Southwest China Administrative Committee. Shen Yün-p'u also has a non-military background: according to our information he was a member of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Southwest China M.P.C. from 1949 to 1952 and

647 vice-chairman of the Kweichow Provincial People's Government in 1954.

The preponderance of military officials is a reflection of the difficulties encountered in subduing and integrating Southwest China, and is a characteristic which we might expect to be increasingly modified, as it has been in other regions of China. It is a characteristic which is further accentuated, however, by the inclusion of four former Kuomintang military leaders in this group of senior officials.

Lung Yün is a veteran Kuomintang military leader who reached the post of president of the Military Advisory Council of the Nationalist Government before going over to the Communists in 1949. Chang Ch'ung, a former bandit leader who served in the Yunnan Army from 1917 on, defected to the Communists after he and the forces he commanded were dispatched to Manchuria by Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Communists. Teng Hsi-hou served for many years in the Szechwan provincial army and, by 1924, held the rank of three-star general. After leading forces against the Japanese in Shansi, Shantung, and northern Kiangsu, Teng was appointed director of the Szechwan-Sikang Pacification Headquarters, a position which he held until he went over to the Communists in 1949. Liu Wen-hui also served in the Szechwan Army until he became chairman of the Szechwan

647 Provincial Government in 1929; he was subsequently appointed deputy director of the Szechwan-Sikang Pacification Headquarters.

We note that four of the 15 men discussed so far -- Liao Chih-kao, Hsieh Fu-chih, Shen Yün-p'u, and Chang Ch'ung -- are members of the Committee on Nationalities of the 1st NPC. Of this group only Chang Ch'ung is known to be a member of a national minority: he comes from an Yi family in Lu-hsi, Yunnan Province. The other three are Chinese, as far as we know, and Party officials. We might question, therefore the real weight of minority-group membership on the Committee on Nationalities. Although the proportion of Chinese members to minority members may change as more leaders from the lesser national groups are trained, the fact that the three Chinese members are also officials in the Communist Party suggests that the representation of the minorities is little more than a formal gesture.

The remaining four men in this key group of 19 do not appear to fit any of the main categories suggested above; they are not Communist Party members, Kuomintang veterans, or members of the Committee on Nationalities. On the other hand, tjwo are military men and two are political commissars of military districts. Whether they rise or fall in the Communist hierarchy may well be determined by

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647 how thorough a transformation is made from a military to a civilian administration and, of course, by what kind of Party status they achieve. None is known to have status in the Party at present.

Yang Yung's military career is known since 1937, when he was a regimental commander in the 8th Route Army. He rose to the rank of commander of the Air Forces of the Southwest Military District (1952-54) before becoming deputy commander, and then commander, of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in Korea. He retains the post of commander of the Kweichow Provincial Military District and member of the National Defense Council.

The career of Ho Ping-yen, commander of the 18th Army Corps and the Szechwan Provincial Military District, is known since 1949, when he was deputy commander of the Chinghai Provincial District. In addition we know that he is also a former member of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government and of the Southwest China M.P.C.

Yen Hung-yen is first noted as director of the department of political affairs of an army corps sometime prior to 1950, when he became director of the East Szechwan People's Government. He held other non-military positions in

647 Szechwan and is now a member of the National Defense Council as well as deputy political commissar and deputy governor in Szechwan.

Li Ching-ch'üan, first noted as director of the West Szechwan People's Government (1950-52), subsequently became chairman of the Szechwan Provincial People's Government (1952-54). He is still a member of the same government, and his other positions carry considerable authority: deputy political commissar of the Southwest China Military District, political commissar of the Szechwan Provincial Military District, chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C., and member of the 2nd National Committee of the Chinese People's P.C.C.

These four men may be among the candidates for top rank in the Communist administration. In any case, their present status warrants their inclusion in the group of key administrators at this time.

The general conclusion of this survey must emphasize the state of transition in Southwest China. Its relatively recent date of conquest and the nature and extent of the various resistance forces have resulted in the military structure of the administration. As more Party cadres are trained and more nationalities representatives prepared for leadership, we will

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647 find changes in the administrative personnel emerging. Present conclusions based on the nature of the leadership of Southwest China may be invalid in a very short time, but the techniques and structure of control which they reveal appear to be constant features of the Chinese Communist administration.

000For the sake of brevity, certain abbeviations have been used in the biographical sketches which follow.

A-C Fl -- All China Federation of Literature
A-C FDY -- All-China Federation of Democratic Youth
A-C. FDW -- All-China Federation of Democratic Women
Centr. Com. of CPC -- Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
C.A.P.D. -- China Association for Promotion of Democracy
CPC -- Communist Party of China
Chinese People's P.C.C. -- Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
D.L -- Democratic League
Exec. Com. -- Executive Committee
JCRR -- Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction
KMT -- Kuomintang
NPC -- National People's Congress
NCNA -- New China News Agency
NDYC -- New Democratic Youth Corps
P.A. -- Peasants' Association
prep. -- preparatory
R.C. of KMT -- Revolutionary Committee of Kuomintang
Southwest China A.C. -- Southwest China Administrative Committee
Southwest China M.P.C. -- Southwest China Military and Political Committee
WDP -- Workers' Democratic Party

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF KEY PERSONALITIES IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

000 CHANG CHI-CH'UN

Origin: b., Hunan Province.

Background: mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); Chm. of Commission on Land Reform of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Dep.-Sec. of Southwest Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); Dep.-Pol. Commissar of 2d Field Army (1949-); Dep.-Pol. Commissar of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-).

CHANG CH'UNG

Origin: decendant of an I family in Lu-hsi hsien, Yunnan Province.

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000 **Background:** once a bandit leader in Yunnan; from 1917 served in Yunnan Army, first as company comdr. and, in 1937, as army comdr.; after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Chang's forces were dispatched from Yunnan to East China to take part in fighting; at time of V-J Day Chang's forces were under command of Gen. Lu Han; in 1946 Chang's forces were dispatched to Manchuria by Chiang Kai-shek to fight Communist forces there; subsequently, Chang defected to Communists and was appointed V-C. of Sungkiang Provincial People's Govt.; V-C. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of same conf. (1949-54); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of same conf. (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Nationalities of Govt. A.C. (1950-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. and V-C. of Commission on Nationalities of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

ovv **CHANG WEI-CHIUNG**

Origin: b., Sikang Province.

Background: Sec.-Gen. of Sikang Provincial Govt. under former KMT regime; V-C. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54).

Current Career: chm. of Sikang Provincial Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CHAO FANG

Current Career: Pres. of Szechwan People's High Court (1955-).

CHOU LIN

Origin: b., Kweichow Province.

Background: mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan., 1953-54); V-C. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1952-54).

1:Stanford U., S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China AF16
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020 Current Career: Gov. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'EN KENG

Origin: b., 1904, Hsiang-t'an hsien, Hunan Province.

Background: son of a landlord; left home at age twelve and joined army of Gen. Lu Te-p'ing as private; joined Communist Youth Corps in 1922; entered Whampao Milit. Acad. in 1923; graduate, 1924; taught fourth class of same acad. (1925); studied milit. science in Moscow (1926); on return to China took part in Nanchang, Hai-feng, and Lu-feng uprisings (1927); engaged in underground activities in Shanghai (1927-28); later went to Soviet dist. in Anhwei-Hopei-Honan border region and served in Communist army under Gen. Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien; returned to Shanghai in 1932 and was arrested by KMT authorities; brought to Nanking and resisted pressure by Chiang Kai-shek to repudiate Communism; escaped from Nanking and entered Soviet district again; served as Chancellor of Red Army Acad. for one year (1934); led students of Red Army Acad. during "Long March"; Comdr. of 1st Division of 1st Group Army of Red Army (1935-37); after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937, 000 served as Brigade Comdr. of 115th Division of 18th Group Army; founder of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region milit. base; crossed Yellow River in 1946 and joined forces with Gen. Chao Shou-shan in Honan-Hopei-Shansi Border Region; Comdr. of 4th Army Corps of 2d Field Army of People's Liberation Army and "liberated" Honan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, and Yunnan (1949-50); Chm. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); Dir. of Yunnan Milit. Control Com. (1949-54).

Current Career: reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Comdr. of Yunnan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-).

CHOU SU-YUAN

Origin: b., Kweichow Province.

Background: mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54); mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1952-54); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

000 Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

CH'U T'U-NAN

Origin: b., 1899, Wen-shan *hsien*, Yunnan Province

Background: graduate of Peking Higher Normal School; attracted by socialist ideas; joined Society for Study of Labor Problems (1919); taught at Yunnan Middle School in Kunming (1923-28); forced to leave Kunming because of leftist tendencies (1928); taught school in Harbin, imprisoned by local authorities (1928); released in 1931 and taught various middle schools and universities in Peiping, Shantung, Honan, and Shanghai (1931-36); Chm. of Dept. of History of Yunnan Univ. (1937-46); active in movement for democratic govt. (World War II); prof. at Shanghai College of Commerce (1946-48); prof. at Peking Normal Univ. (1949); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of same conf. (1949-54); Chm. of Southwest China Provisional Com. of Democratic League of China (1949-?); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); Chm. of Commission on Cultural and Educational

OVU Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); dir. of Dept. of Cultural Affairs and Education of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of executive council of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan., 1953-); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: mem. of standing com. of Central Com. of Democratic League of China (1945-); mem. of executive council of Chinese Historical Assoc (1953-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of standing com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); Chm. of Chinese People's Assoc. for International Cultural Relations (1954-).

CHUNG T'I-CH'IEN

Origin: b., 1889, Szechwan Province.

Background: graduate of Szechwan Milit. Acad. and graduate of Tokyo Milit. Acad.; upon return from Japan, served under Gen. Liu Tsung-hou; in 1936 promoted to division comdr.; Mayor of Chengtu (1928); Chm. of Preparatory Com. of Szechwan Provincial Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1949-?); Dep.-Dir. of West Szechwan People's Govt.

000(1950-52); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (Aug. 1952-54); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HO LUNG

Origin: b 1895, Sang-chih hsien, Hunan Province.

Background: Comdr. of 1st Division of 9th Army of Northern Expenditionary Forces (1926); took part in Nanchang Uprising and shortly joined CPC (1927); Comdr. of 2d Group Army of Red Army (prior to "Long March"); took part in "Long March" (1935-36); Comdr. of 120th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-45); engaged in guerrilla warfare in Shansi, Suiyuan, and Honan (sometime during World War II); Garrison Comdr. of Yenan (during later period of World War II); Comdr. of Shansi-Suiyuan People's Liberation Army (1946-49); del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1949-54); del. to Second Natl. Congress ow of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: Comdr. of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1949-); mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Dep.-Premier of State Council (1954-); Chm. of Commission of Physical Education of State Council (1954-). For more information see handbook on China as a whole.

HO PING-YEN

Origin: b., Hopei Province.

Background: Dep.-Comdr. of Chinghai Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-52); mem. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (Aug. 1952-54); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Comdr. of 18th Army Corps and Szechwan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1952-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

000HSIEH FU-CHIH

Origin: b., Hupeh Province.

Background: Pol. Commissar of East Szechwan Milit. Dist. (1949-52); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Yunnan Provincial Com. of CPC (1952-); Pol. Commissar of Yunnan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1952-); del. to lst NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of lst NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

HSIUNG K'O-WU

Origin: b., 1881, Ching-ching *hsien,* Szechwan Province.

Background: graduate of Tokyo Milit. Acad.; mem. of Revolutionary League of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1905-13); took part in Canton Uprising (March 29, 1911); Milit. Gov. of Szechwan (1912-13); revolted against Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1913; imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek in 1925 because of personal discord; mem. of Natl. Govt. Council (1927); took part in Hu Han-min's anti-Chiang Kai-shek movement

000 in 1931; mem. of 4th Central Exec. Com. of KMT (1931-35); mem. of 5th Central Control Com. of KMT (1935-45); mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1951-54); V-C. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

HSÜ CHIEN-SHENG

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

JEN PAI-KO

Background: mem. of First Exec. Council of Sino-Soviet Assoc. (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. and Dep.-Dir. of Dept. of Cultural and Educational Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52).

Current Career: del. to Second Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc.

000(1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

K'ANG NAI-ERH

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

KOU HSING-TS'AI

Background: mem. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52).

Current Career: Pres. of Yunnan People's High Court (1955-).

KUNG TZU-CHIH

Origin: b., 1895, Yunnan Province.

Background: graduate of Peking Univ.; sometime prof. of Yunnan Higher Normal School; mem. of Yunnan Provincial Govt. and dir. of Dept. of Education of same govt. (1929-?); mem. of Yunnan Provincial Com. on Financial Adjustment (1930); Sec.-Gen. of Yunnan Provincial Govt. (World War II); mem. of

Preparatory Com. of Yunnan Provincial Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1950-?); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan 1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

KUO CH'AO

Background: mem. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Kweichow Provincial Com. of NDYC (1949-).

KUO-CHI-MU-KU

Origin: decendant of an I family in Sikang Province.

Background: V-C. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1952-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

000 **KUO YING-CH'IU**

Origin: b., Shantung Province.

Background: dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of army corps of People's Liberation Army (1949); Dep.-Dir. of South Szechwan People's Govt. (1949-52); V-C. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1952-54).

Current Career: Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LI CHING-CH'ÜAN

Origin: b., Kiangsi Province.

Background: Dir. of West Szechwan People's Govt. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52; Chm. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (Aug. 1952-54); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: Dep.-Pol. Commissar of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1950-). Pol. Commissar of Szechwan Provincial Milit. Dist. (1952-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-); Chm. of Szechwan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

000 LI HSIAO-T'ING

Origin: b., Szechwan Province.

Background: mem. of Revolutionary League of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1905-13); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. and Chm. of People's Control Com. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Standing Com. of Szechwan-Sikang Provisional Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1950-?); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Szechwan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

LI SHUN-KENG

Background: mem. of People's Control Com. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1952-54).

Current Career: Secretary of Szechwan Provincial Com. of NDYC (1952-).

LI TA-CHANG

Origin: b., Szechwan Province.

000 **Background:** dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of T'ai-hang Sub-bureau of North China Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (during Sino-Japanese War); Dep.-Dir. of Dept. of Propaganda of the Northeast Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-49); Dir. of South Szechwan People's Govt. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (Aug. 1952-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-); Gov. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIANG WEN-YING

Background: mem. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54).

Current Career: Sec. of Sikang Provincial Com. of NDYC (1949-).

LIAO CHIH-KAO

Origin: b., Sikang Province.

Background: Chm. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Southwest

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China M.P.C. (1950-52).

Current Career: Sec. of Sikang Provincial Com. of CPC (1949-); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-); Comdr. and Pol. Commissar of Sikang Provincial Milit. Dist.; del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIU CH'ANG-CHIEN

Current Career: Pres. of Sikang People's High Court (1955-).

LIU CH'U-YÜAN

Background: mem. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1950-54).

Current Career: Secretary of Yunnan Provincial Com. of NDYC (1950-); mem. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIU MIN-HUI

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

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LIU PO-CH'ENG

Origin: b., 1900, Szechwan Province.

Background: joined CPC in 1926; later served as KMT representative at headquarters of Gen. Yang Sheng; special commissioner of CPC in Hupei Province (1926); engaged in underground activities on behalf of Northern Expeditionary Forces in western Hupei (1926); took part in Nanchang Uprising (1927); studied at Red Army Milit. Acad. in Moscow (1928-30); served as staff mem. of Central Revolutionary Milit. Council of CPC (1930); entered Soviet district in Kiangsi and took charge of training of newly recruited soldiers for Red ARmy (1931); Chief-of-Staff of Red Army (1932-?); took part in "Long March"; Comdr. of 129th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-46); Comdr. of T'ai-hang Shan Milit. Dist. and Comdr. of Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region Milit. Dist. (World War II); Comdr. of Central China People's Liberation Army (1946-49); Chm. of Nanking Milit. Control Com. (1949); "liberated" Southwest in 1949-50; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central Pwople's Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1949-54); Chm. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1949-52); Dep.-Sec. of Southwest Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-54); del. to 2d Natl.

Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

Current Career: Comdr. of 2d Field Army (1949-); mem. of Central Com. of CPC (1945-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Dir. of Directorate of Milit. Training of Natl. Defense Council (1954-). For more information see handbook on China as a whole.

LIU TAI-FENG

Origin: b., Shansi Province.

Background: mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. and V-C. of Commission on Finance and Economic Affairs of Southwest M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-).

Current Career: Dep. Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

LIU WEN-HUI

Origin: b., 1892, Ta-i hsien, Szechwan Province.

000 **Background:** graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad.; served in Szechwan army after graduation, and by 1926 became Comdr. of 24th Army; Comdr. of Szechwan-Sikang Frontier Garrison Forces (1927); Chm. of Szechwan Provincial Govt. (1929); Chm. of Sikang Provincial Govt. (1934-48); mem. of 6th Central Exec. Com. of KMT and Chm. of Sikang Provincial Com. of KMT (1945-48); Dep.-Dir. of Szechwan-Sikang Pacification Headquarters (1945-49); mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1951-54); V-C. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Budget (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); mem. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); V-C. of Szechwan Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

LU HAN

Origin: b., 1891, Chao-t'ung *hsien*, Yunnan Province.

Background: graduate of Yunnan Milit. Acad.; sworn brother of Gen. Lung Yün; served under Gen. Lung until end of World War

OVO II; during World War II served first as Comdr. of 60th Army, then Comdr. of 30th Group Army, and finally Comdr. of 1st Front; after V-J Day, accepted surrender of Japanese forces in northern Indo-China; later appointed Chm of Yunnan Provincial Govt. (1946-49); defected to Communist regime in 1949; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. and mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of same conf. (1949-54); Chm. of Yunnan M.P.C. (1949-54).

Current Career: V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Bills of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-).

LUNG YÜN

Origin: b., 1887, in Chao-t'ung *hsien,* Yunnan Province.

Background: graduate of Yunnan Milit. Acad.; Comdr. of 5th Army of Gen. T'ang Chi-yao (1924-26); collaborated with Gen. Hu Jao-yü in overthrowing Gen. T'ang Chi-yao's dictatorship in Yunnan (1927); mem. of Yunnan Provincial Govt. (1927); joined ranks of Northern Expeditionary Forces in 1928 and

OVV appointed Chm. of Yunnan Provincial Govt. (1928-45); mem. of Milit. Council of Natl. Govt. in Nanking (1928-?); reserve mem. of 4th Centr. Exec. Com. of KMT (1931-35); mem. of 5th Centr. Control Com. of KMT (1935-45); Dir. of Yunnan-Kweichow Pacification Headquarters (1937-45); Pres. of Milit. Advisory Council of Natl. Govt. (1945-48); defected to Communists 1949; del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Council (1949-54); V-C. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); mem. of Standing Com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-). For more information, see handbook on China as a whole.

OU PAI-CH'UAN

Origin: decendant of a Miao family in Kweichow Province.

Background: mem. of Commission on Nationalities of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

000 Current Career: mem. of Kweichow Provincial Com. of KMT Revolutionary Com. (1950-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

PAI JEN

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

SANA-RYGAS-SHES

Origin: b., 1917, Tan-pa hsien, Sikang Province; a Tibetan.

Background: when Red Army reached Tan-pa hsien in 1934, co-operated with other Tibetans in Tan-pa hsien in organizing Tan-pa United Govt. and later served as Dir. of Dept. of Youth Affairs of same govt.; when Red Army was marching from Sikang to Shensi, served as Pol. Commissar of Tan-pa Detachment of that army; studied at School of Nationalities in Yenan (World War II); after V-J Day, went to I-k'o-chao League (in Southern Suiyuan Province) to organize Mongolian guerrilla forces and fought against forces of Gen. Hu Tsung-nan and Gen. Ma Hung-k'uei;

000 del. to Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Commission on Nationalities of Central Govt. A.C. (1949-54); Chm. of Tibetan Nationality Autonomous District of Sikang (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. and V-C. of Commission on Nationalities of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

SHARGUR DOBDENG (or Hsia-k'o Tiao-teng)

Origin: a Tibetan, b., Sikang Province.

Background: V-C. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Commission on Nationalities of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Sikang Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

000 **SHEN YÜN-P'U**

Background: mem. of Commission on Cultural and Educational Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1949-52); V-C. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1954).

Current Career: Dep.-Sec. of Kweichow Provincial Com. of CPC (1954-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Com. on Nationalities of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); Chm. of Kweichow Provincial Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1955-).

SUNG JEN-CH'ING

Origin: b., Hunan Province.

Background: right-hand man of Gen. Liu Po-ch'eng; Dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of 129th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-?); Dir. of South Hopei People's Govt. (1938-?); studied at Central Party School (1943); Comdr. of Central Hopei Milit. Dist. (1946-48); Dep.-Dir. of Nanking Milit. Control Com. (1949); V-C. of Yunnan M.P.C. (1950-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950- July, 1952); V-C. of same com. (July, 1952-Jan., 1953); mem. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); del. to 2d Natl. Congress of Sino-Soviet Friendship Assoc. (1954).

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000 **Current Career:** reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Dep.-Pol. Commissar of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1949-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-).

TENG HSI-HOU

Origin: b. 1889 in Ying-shan, Szechwan Province.

Background: graduate of Pao-ting Milit. Acad.; served in Szechwan Provincial Army as company comdr., regiment comdr., brigade comdr., and division comdr.; in 1924 given rank of three-star general by Peking Govt. and appointed Gov. of Szechwan Province; in 1926 appointed by Chiang Kai-shek Comdr. of 28th Army, mem. of Milit Council of Natl. Govt., and Commander-in-Chief of 14th Route Army; Comdr. of 45th Army (1934-?); Comdr. of First Bandit Suppression District of Szechwan (1934); Comdr. of 6th Route Army (1936); after outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, asked Natl. Govt. in Nanking to permit his forces to fight Japanese; shortly appointed Comdr. of 4th Army Corps; subsequently, promoted to Comdr. of 22nd Group Army; meanwile, Teng's forces fought battles against Japanese in Shansi, Shantung, and Northern Kiangsu; in 1938 appointed Dir. of vvv Szechwan-Sikang Pacification Headquarters (1938-48); Acting Chm. of Szechwan Provincial Gpvt. (1946-47); went over to Communists in 1949; mem. of Southwest China M.P.C.; mem. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of same committee, and Dir. of Dept. of Water Conservation of same committee (1950-52); V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: del. to 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Dep.-Gov. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

TENG HSIAO-P'ING

Origin: b., Chia-ting *hsien*, Szechwan Province.

Background: joined CPC while studying in France; took part in Communist movement (1925-27); took part in "Long March" (1935-36); Pol. Commissar of 129th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-46); Dir. of Dept. of Pol. Affairs of Central Revolutionary Milit. Com. of CPC (1942-46); Pol. Commissar of Central China People's Liberation Army (1946-49); mem. of 1st Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1949-54); mem. of Central People's

000Govt. Council (1949-54); mem. of People's Revolutionary Milit. Com. (1949-54); V-C. of Southwest M.P.C. and Chm. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54); Minister of Finance (Aug. 1953-54).

Current Career: mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Sec. of Southwest Bureau of Centr. Com. of CPC (1949-); Pol. Commissar of 2d Field Army (1949-); Pol. Commissar of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC (Sept., 1954-); V-C. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Dep.-Premier of State Council (1954-); Sec. Gen. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1953-); mem. of Standing Com. of 2d Natl. Com. of Chinese People's P.C.C. (1954-); mem. of Centr. Election Com. (1953-); mem. of Pol. Bureau of CPC (1955-).

WANG WEI-CHOU

Origin: b. in K'ai-hsien, Szechwan Province; decedant of landlord.

Background: collaboraged with Wu Yü-chang in staging Kuang-han Uprising (1927); worked with Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (1927-36); Comdr. of Communist garrison

000 forces in East Kansu (World War II); Communist representative in Chungking (1946-47); Comdr. of Sian Milit. Dist. (1949); V-C. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); Chm. of Commission on Pol. and Legal Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); Chm. of Commission on Nationalities of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); V-C. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-54).

Current Career: reserve mem. of Centr. Com. of CPC (1945-); Dep.-Comdr. of Southwest China Milit. Dist. (1949-); del. to 1st NPC and mem. of Standing Com. of 1st NPC (Sept. 1954-).

WANG YÜ-HUI

Current Career: Sec. of Southwest China Com. of NDYC (1949-); mem. of Standing Com. of Centr. Com. of NDYC (1934-).

WU SHIH

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

000 **WU TSO-MIN**

Background: mem. of Commission on Financial and Economic Affairs of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52).

Current Career: Dep.-Gov. of Yunnan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

YANG YUNG

Background: a regiment comdr. of 8th Route Army (1937); Comdr. of 3rd Brigade of 115 th Division of 18th Group Army (1937-40); Dep.-Comdr. of Hopei-Shantung-Honan Milit. Dist. (1941-?); Chm. of Kweichow Provincial People's Govt. (1949-54); Comdr. of 5th Army Corps of People's Liberation Army (1949-54); mem. of Southwest China M.P.C. (1950-52); mem. of Southwest China A.C. (Jan. 1953-43); Comdr. of Air Forces of Southwest Milit. Dist. (1952-54); Dep.-Comdr. of Chinese People's Volunteer Army in Korea (1954-).

Current Career: Comdr. of Kweichow Provincial Milit. Dist. (1949-); mem. of Natl. Defense Council (1954-); Comdr. of Chinese People's Volunteer Army in Korea (1955-).

000 **YEH KU-LIN**

Current Career: Pres. of Kweichow People's High Court (1955-).

YÜ CHI-T'ANG

Background: Dep.-Dir. of East Szechwan People's Govt. (1950-52); V-C. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (Aug. 1952-54).

Current Career: Dep-Gov. of Szechwan Provincial People's Govt. (1955-).

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
SOUTHWEST CHINA
RICE DISTRIBUTION
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36
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20
A
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PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
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[facing p. 745(a)]


SOUTHWEST CHINA
WHEAT
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PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
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[facing p. 745 (b)]

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
SOUTHWEST CHINA
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PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
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100
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[facing p. 745 (c)]

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
SOUTHWEST CHINA
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PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
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[facing p. 745 (d)]

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 3a, Economic Background

AGRICULTURE

I. INTRODUCTION

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The Southwest China region is formed of four provinces - Szechwan, called "the heavenly kingdom"; Sikang, an area of awesome mountains and dense forests; Yunnan, home of many different brother nationalities; and Kweichow, the settlement of the Miaos. The topography varies considerably, the climate is as variable, and crops are raised in abundance. The Red Basin in Szechwan, watered by the Yangtze and its tributaries, is especially fertile, and the Chengtu plain is one of the most famous rice producing areas in China. In addition to being the richest province for grain production in Southwest China, Szechwan also produces large quantities of cotton, tung oil, sugar cane, silk, rapeseed, and fruit.

II. CULTIVATED LAND AND RURAL POPULATION

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The total population of Southwest China is a little over 98 million,[1] according to a

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[1] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Nov. 1, 1954, p. 1.

162 census completed by the Communists in June 1953. If we assume the ratio of rural and urban populations to be 87 to 13, the rural population in the Southwest Region in 1953 was approximately 85 million.[2] A comparison 311 of the rural population and the total amount of cultivated land in this region in the years 1946 and 1953 is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Cultivated Land and Rural Population of Southwest China*

Unit = 1,000. S = shih-mou. A = acres.

Province	Year	Cultivated Land	Rural Population	Farm Households	Shih-mou (acres) per Household	Shih-mou (acres) per Capita
Szechwan	1946	151,437 S (25,239 A)	38,957	6,352	23.8 S (3.9 A)	3.9 S (0.6 A)
	1953	151,674 S (25,279 A)	54,204	8,930	16.9 S (2.8 A)	2.8 S (0.5 A)
Sikang	1946	4,011 S (668 A)	1,668	278	14.5 S (2.4 A)	2.4 S (0.4 A)
	1953	4,111 S (685 A)	2,942	485	8.5 S (1.4 A)	1.4 S (0.2 A)
Yunnan	1946	26,215 S (4,369 A)	7,169	1,384	18.9 S (3.2 A)	3.7 S (0.6 A)
	1953	26,375 S (4,396 A)	15,201	3,005	8.7 S (1.5 A)	1.7 S (0.3 A)
Kweichow	1946	23,173 S (3,862 A)	6,182	1,193	19.4 S (3.2 A)	3.7 S (0.6 A)
	1953	23,273 S (3,879 A)	13,082	2,586	9.0 S (1.5 A)	1.8 S (0.3 A)
		Total	Total	Total	Average	Average
	1946	204,836 S (34,138 A)	53,976	9,207	19.1 S (3.2 A)	3.4 S (0.6 A)
	1953	205,433 S (34,239 A)	85,429	15,006	10.8 S (1.8 A)	1.9 S (0.3 A)

* For 1946 data, Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China, Nanking, 1948, pp. 70-71. For 1953 data, Communist census of 1953 and Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Fen-sheng Ti-t'u [Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces], Shanghai, 1953, pp. 42-46.

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[2] Ibid.

311 In 1955, the lowest average land holding per farm household was 8.5 shih-mou (1.4 acres) in Sikang Province; the highest average land holding per farm household was 16.9 shih-mou (2.8 acres) in Szechwan Province. The average for Szechwan is 12 per cent higher than the national average.[3]

III. LAND REFORM

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565 The Land Reform Movement, as it affected the Southwest China region, had been partially completed in September 1951. Approximately 37 million inhabitants, in an area which included 172 hsien and 8 municipalities, had been subjected to "land reform."[4] The Communist regime had organized "poor peasants" and "farmhands" to unite with "middle peasants" in order to nullify the power of "rich peasants" and to abolish the "landlord system." The Land Reform Movement continued on to 1953. In the spring of that year, of the approximately 85 million persons who made up the rural population of the Southwest Region less than 2.2 million inhabitants had not yet experienced "land reform."[5] In spite of the vast scale on which

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[3] Mao Tse-tung's report, "The Collectivization Movement," Hua-ch'iao Jih-pao [China Daily News], New York, Oct. 28, 1955.

[4] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Nov. 21, 1951.

[5] Ibid., Dec, 13, 1952.

423 565 the program had been conducted, the Communist cadres were ordered to complete a "re-examination" of the success of the Land Reform Movement.

According to statistics on the redistribution of land in northern Szechwan Province, "poor peasants" and "farm hands" were given approximately 85 per cent of the average land holding for all classes of peasants and "middle peasants" received 29 per cent more than average.[6] Although all lands rented to tenants by "rich peasants" were confiscated, "rich peasants" were allowed to retain the amount of land they were able to cultivate with or without the help of "farm hands." At the end of the Land Reform Movement, the "rich peasants" still maintained an average land holding approximately 58 per cent higher than the general average for all classes of peasants.[7]

By the end of 1952, approximately 102,241,000 shih-mou (17,068,333 acres) of land, 204,830,000 heads of cattle, 10,241,500 tons of grain, 10,241,000 farm implements, and 663,100 farm buildings were estimated to have been confiscated in the Southwest China region.[8]

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6. Ibid., Nov. 21, 1951.
7. Ibid.
8. see next p.

000 Southwest China region.[8]

IV. "COLLECTIVIZATION"

474 "Co-operativization" was the first step of the movement toward "collectivization" in China. In December 15, 1951, the Communist Party of China determined to organize agricultural producers' co-operatives throughout the rural areas. The formal promulgation of the order was not issued until December 16, 1953, by which time approximately 14,000 producers' co-operatives had been organized by Communist cadres.[9] Mutual-aid teams flourished. In the spring of 1954, there were 100,000 producers' co-operatives; in the summer of 1955, there were an estimated 650,000 producers' co-operatives throughout Mainland China.[10]

The campaign for the introduction of producers' co-operatives was intensified following Mao Tse-tung's report to a conference of secretaries of provincial, city, and area

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8. Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], Hong Kong, March 9, 1953, p. 12.

9. China Daily News, New York, Oct. 27, 1955.

10. New China News Agency Bulletin, London, Oct. 19, 1955, p. 3.

474 Party committees on July 31, 1955, calling for the acceleration of the "co-operativization" movement in all regions. At the 6th Plenary Session[11] of the 7th Central Committee of the Communist Party, it was resolved that 1,300,000 producers' co-operatives would be organized before the "spring plowing" in 1956. As the result of the vigorous efforts of the cadres, some 1,240,000 co-operatives had been organized by November 1955. Of this number, a phenomenal number (590,000 co-operatives) were organized between August and November of that year.[12] The exact number of co-operatives in the Southwest China region has not been reported. However, if we estimate the possible number on the basis of the ratio between the region's rural population and the rural population in the country as a whole, at least 165,000 producers' co-operatives must have been organized in Southwest China before the end of 1955.

475 No current statistics are avilable on the total number of state-owned and state-operated farms in Southwest China. However,

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[11] Ibid.

[12] China Daily News, Nov. 24, 1955.

475 according to an incomplete report made in 1952, there were approximately 200 state farms of varying sizes in Southwest China.[13]

V. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

A. Production of Grain

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433 Szechwan Province produces more grain than other provinces in the Southwest China region. The entire region produces approximately 17 per cent of the grain produced in China as a whole; Szechwan Province alone produces 10 per cent of the country's grain; the other three provinces together produce only 7 per cent of the total for the entire country.

The western Szechwan plains, irrigated by the 2,000-year-old Tu-chiang Yen Reservoir, is considered one of the richest granaries in China.[14] The province of

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[13] Kung-fei T'u-kai Pen-chih Chi Ch'i Yen-pien [Land Reform and Its Development in Communist China], Taipei, 6th Section, Central Reform Committee, Nationalist Party, 1952, p. 63.

[14] China Daily News, Aug. 31, 1955.

243 Szechwan was expected to produce approximately 433 375,000,000 shih-piculs (20,625,000 tons) of grain in 1955, an increase of 23.5 per cent over the amount produced in 1949.

Prior to 1952, Kweichow Province was not self-sufficient in its production of grain. It had the reputation of being a province in which the people were forced to live from hand to mouth. In 1953, for the first time in the history of the province, the harvest of grain was enough to meet the demand of the local population.[15] The output of grain in Kweichow in 1954 and 1955 was higher than in 1953. During July-August 1955, approximately 807,400 shih-piculs (44,407 tons) of grain were "exported" from the province.[16] In the "crop year" (July to June) 1954-55, approximately 4.7 million shih-piculs (258,500 tons) of grain were exported from Kweichow Province.[17]

Grain production in Yunnan Province increased after the adaptation of improved techniques and the introduction of more modern farm implements. In spite of a period of drought in 1953 and floods in 1954,

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[15] New China News Agency, Kweiyang, Aug. 26, 1955.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

243 the plan for grain production was overfulfulled,
433 according to Communist reports.[18]

Table 2 shows the progress of grain production in the Southwest China region.

Table 2. Grain Production in Southwest China

Unit: million. S = shih-piculs. T = tons.

Grains	1949 *	1951 *	1952 #	1953 x	1954 x	1955 y
Rice	135,000 S (7,425 T)	167,040 S (9,187 T)	291,200 S (16,016 T)	293,832 S (16,162 T)	301,840 S (16,601 T)	320,544 S (17,630 T)
Wheat	56,250 S (3,094 T)	69,600 S (3,828 T)	45,240 S (2,488 T)	45,649 S (2,510 T)	46,893 S (2,579 T)	49,799 S (2,739 T)
Soybeans	11,250 S (618 T)	13,920 S (766 T)	11,960 S (658 T)	12,068 S (663 T)	12,937 S (681 T)	13,165 S (724 T)
Tubers	60,000 S (3,300 T)	74,240 S (4,083 T)	20,800 S (1,144 T)	20,988 S (1,154 T)	21,560 S (1 ,187 T)	22,896 S (1,250 T)
Others z	112,500 S (6,188 T)	139,200 S (7,656 T)	150,800 S (8,294 T)	152,163 S (8,369 T)	156,310 S (8, 597 T)	165,996 S (9,130 T)
Total	375,000 S (20,625 T)	464,000 S (25,520 T)	520,000 S (28,600 T)	524,700 S (28,858 T)	539,000 S (29,645 T)	572,400 S (31,482 T)

* Economic Year Book 1952, Hong Kong, Economic Bulletin, 1952, pp. 37-38. The production data of various crops were estimated according to percentage distribution in 1946.

# Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, March 10, 1953, p. 12.

x China Daily News, New York, August 4, 1955, Ch'en Yün's report to the National People's Congress on July 21, 1955, and Nov. 24, 1955. The data of various crops were calculated according to the percentage distribution in 1952.

y Based on Li Hsien-nien's Budget Report of 1955, New China News Agency, Peking, July 28, 1955. The data of various crops were calculated according to the percentage distribution in 1952.

z Including millet, corn, kaoliang, barley, oats, broad beans, and peas.

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[18] Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, June 13-14, 1955.

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In analyzing the above table, it will be noticed that grain production in Southwest China has shown a consistent increase since 1949. If 1949's output is taken as 100, the index of grain production increased to 124 in 1951, 139 in 1952, 143 in 1953, 145 in 1954, and 153 in 1955.

In terms of acreage planted in various food crops in 1946, rice led in the Southwest Region by 7.4 million shih-mou (1.2 million acres), constituting about 34 per cent of the total grain acreage. Table 3 shows the total acreage of various grain crops in three of the four provinces in the Southwest Region:

Table 3. The Acreage of Grains in Southwest China 1946*

(Unit - 1,000. S = shih-mou. A = acres.)

Crops	Szechwan	Yunnan	Kweichow
Rice	30,259 S (5,043 A)	10,317 S (1,719 A)	7,436 S (1,239 A)
Wheat	24,887 S (4,148 A)	5,864 S (977 A)	4,672 S (779 A)
Barley	12,476 S (2,079 A)	2,508 S (418 A)	3,372 S (562 A)
Other Grains#	37,546 S (6,258 A)	11,623 S (1,937 A)	5,909 S (985 A)
Tubers	9,276 S (1,546 A)	369 S (62 A)	406 S (68 A)
Total	114,444 S (19,074 A)	30,681 S (5,113 A)	21,795 S (3,633 A)

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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* Director of Budgets, *The Statistical Year Book of the Republic of China,* Nanking, 1948, pp. 73-74. Figures on the acreage of grains in Sikang Province are not available.

# including millet, corn, kaoliang, oats, peas, and broad beans.

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Table 4. Grain Supply in Southwest China, 1954

(Unit = Million tons)

Grains	Gross Production#	Supply After Provision for Seeds, Fodder and Waste		Supply After Milling		Total Net Supply After Converting into Rice-Equivalent	
		Conversion Standard*	Quantity	Conversion Standard*	Quantity	Conversion Standard^y	Quantity
Rice	16,601	92.01	15,275	92^x	14,053	1.00	14,053
Wheat	2,579	86.47	2,230	80	1,784	1.02	1,820
Soyabeans	681	81.94	558	100	558	0.99	552
Tubers	1,187	64.00	760	100	760	0.28	213
Others^z	8,597	76.80	6,602	89	5,876	1.00	5,876
Total	29,645		25,425		23,031		22,514

* FAO Balance Sheet for 1933-37, compiled from FAO World Food Survey, Food Balance Sheet for China, 1931-37.

# See Table 2.

x The Chinese Communist milling standard for rice is 92, and this figure is used for the present calculation.

y Derived from the quantity of calories of different grains and tubers using the conversion standard of FAO, 3,430 calories = one kilogram (2.2 pounds) of rice as our basis of calculation.

z Including corn, millet, kaoliang, barley, oats, broad beans, and peas.

[facing p. 757]

B. The Adequacy of Grain Supply

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433 One of the most important problems involved in the production of grain in Southwest China is the need to determine the adequacy of supply as it meets or fails to meet the local demand for grain. In order to estimate supply and demand, the following procedure was adopted: (1) data on the gross production of various grains in 1954 were used as the basis for calculation; (2) allowance and deductions were made to provide for the amounts necessary to provide seeds for re-sowing, the amounts necessary as fodder, and the amounts considered waste; (3) allowance was made for the varying losses of the several types of grain during the milling process; (4) all unhusked grains were reduced to milled products suitable for human consumption; it was then necessary to convert all grains other than rice into "rice-equivalents," according to the accepted standard; and (5) in determining the total demand for grain, the actual population, regradless of age or sex, was figured in terms of the equivalent number of "adult males."

The process for conversion of grain into "rice-equivalents" is shown in Table 4. The process for conversion of the population of the provinces of the Southwest Region into equivalent "adult males" is shown in Table 5.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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Table 5. Population in Terms of Equivalent "Adult Males"*

Province	Population	Population in Equivalent "Adult Males"
Szechwan	62,303,999	51,089,279
Sikang	3,381,064	2,772,473
Yunnan	17,472,737	14,327,644
Kweichow	15,037,310	12,330,594
Total	98,195,110	80,519,990

* In making this conversion, the co-efficient of 0.82 is used. It represents the mean between 0.76 derived by C. M. Chiao in his work, China's Food and Population, Shanghai, 1937, and 0.88 worked out by T. H. Shen in his book, Agricultural Resources of China, New York, 1951.

243
433 Using the statistics in Tables 4 and 5 as a basis for calculation, the total supply of grain -- in terms of rice-equivalents -- available for human consumption in 1954 in Southwest China was 22.5 million tons (20.46 million metric tons). If we use as the basis for estimate the Wu formula[19] of 217 metric tons of milled "rice-equivalent" grain for every 1,000 "adult males" per year, the total amount required to feed 80.52 million "adult males" in Southwest China was 17.47 million metric tons, leaving a surplus of almost 3 million metric tons (3.3 million tons) of "rice-equivalent" grain for export to other regions.

C. Cotton Production

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433 During a six-year period ending in 1955, cotton production in the Southwest China region showed a considerable growth, although some ups and downs were noted during the period. Data on cotton production in the region are given in Table 6.

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[19] Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 165.

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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Table 6. Cotton Production in Southwest China*

(Unit = 1,000. S = shih-piculs. B = Bales)

Province	1949	1952	1953	1954	1955
Szechwan	192 S (44 B)#	557 S (127 B)	508 S (116 B)	518 S (118 B)	622 S (142 B)
Yunnan Kweichow	48 S (11 B)	139 S (32 B)	127 S (29 B)	130 S (30 B)	155 S (36 B)
Total	240 S (55 B)	696 S (159 B)	635 S (145 B)	648 S (148 B)	777 S 178 B)

* Estimated and compiled from the following sources: Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, Oct. 1, 1954, No. 387, p. 4; Hsin Chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Kuang-ming jih-pao she, July 16, 1950, p. 30; May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53; Li Hsien-nien's Budget Report of 1955, New China News Agency, Peking, July 8, 1955; People's Handbook 1955,

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China

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Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 511. The production data for Sikang Province is not available.

# Bale = 480 pounds.

[redacted]

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248 It will be noted that the production of
433 cotton in Southwest China has increased since 1949. Using 1949 as the base year (100), production was 289 in 1952, 263 in 1953, 269 in 1954, and 323 in 1955. The fall in cotton production in 1953 was probably caused by the government ruling which lowered the price ratio of cotton and grain in that year. Production increased in 1954 but was still below the 1952 level, although the price ratio of the two commodities had been adjusted to encourage production. The Communist regime set a production target for 1955 approximately 20 per cent above the output for 1954, and in view of the more favorable climatic conditions prevailing during 1955 it is possible that the goal was attained.

The greatest amount of acreage planted in cotton was reached in 1952. When the price of cotton was lowered in 1953, less land was planted in cotton in subsequent years. Estimated cotton acreage in Szechwan Province and in the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow (combined) are shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Cotton Acreage in Southwest China*

(Unit = 1,000. S = shih-mou. A = acres.)

Province	1949	1952	1953	1954	1955
Szechwan	326 S (42.3 A)	911 S (151.8 A)	592 S (98.7 A)	604 S (100.7 A)	725 S (120.8 A)
Yunnan Kweichow	60 S (10.0 A)	168 S (28.0 A)	109 S (18.2 A)	111 S (18.5 A)	133 S (22.2 A)
Total	386 S (64.3 A)	1,079 S (179.8 A)	701 S (116.9 A)	715 S (119.2 A)	858 S (143.0 A)

* Estimated and compiled from the following sources: New Construction, Peking, July 11, 1950, p. 30; May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53; People's Daily, July 24, 1955; Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, Sept. 13, 1954, p. 4; Oct. 1, 1954. Figures on the cotton acreage of Sikang Province are not available.

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China
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435 The price of cotton in ratio to the price of various grains is shown in Table 8.

Table 8. The Ratio of Cotton Prices Relative to Grains*
(In weight-units of grain to one unit of cotton lint 7/8" grade)

Region	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955
Wheat	7.0	8.0	7.5-8.5	6.25-7.5	6.75-8.0	6.75-8.0
Millet	8.0	8.5	8.0-9.5	6.75-8.0	7.5-8.25	7.5-8.25
Rice	6.5	8.5	8.0-9.0	6.75-8.0	7.25-8.25	7.25-8.25

* Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, 1950, p. 574; Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, May 28, 1953, p. 21; New China News Agency, March 3, 1954.

248
433 Most sections of the Southwest provinces are rice-producing regions. As will be noted in Tables 7 and 8, in 1953 and in 1954 parity prices were lower than in 1952; the total acreage under cultivation in these years dropped correspondingly. Thus changes in parity price are reflected by changes in the amount of acreage devoted to cotton in any given year.

To publicize a "bumper harvest" campaign, the Communist regime bestowed the title of "model producer" on any farmer who was able to report an increased yield of cotton per unit of land. In most cases, the yield had been increased by the application of modern farming techniques -- careful irrigation, the use of chemical fertilizers, improved farm implements, the planting of two or three crops a year, careful selection of seeds, and more efficient methods of cultivation. Of course, isolated cases of increased yields would not appreciably alter the average yield. What increases there have been in Southwest China since 1949 are indicated in Table 9.

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Table 9. Average Cotton Yield in Southwest China*
(Unit: C = catties per shih-mou. P = Pounds per acre)

Province	1949	1952	1953	1954	1955
Szechwan	22.1 C (145.7 P)	30.8 C (203.3 P)	36.0 C (237.6 P)	37.8 C (249.5 P)	37.8 C (249.5 P)
Yunnan Kweichow	23.0 C (152.0 P)	30.8 C (203.3 P)	36.0 C (237.8 P)	37.9 C (249.9 P)	37.9 C (249.9 P)

* Estimated from the following sources: Hua-Shu, "Chung-kuo Ti Mien-hua Sheng-ch'an Wen-t'i" ["The Chinese Cotton Production Problem"], Hsin Chien-she [New Construction], Peking, Kuang-ming Jih-pao she, May 3, 1955, pp. 47-53; People's Daily, Peking, Jan. 27, 1950; Survey of China Mainland Press, Aug. 17, 1954, p. 29. The cotton yield per unit of land in Sikang Province is not available.

248 433 If we use 1949 as the base year (100), the average yield per unit of land was 134 in 1952, 156 in 1953, and 164 in 1954 and 1955.

D. Other Agricultural Products

244 433 Southwest China's production of edible oil (excluding soybean oil) surpasses the majority of regions in China, and the output of oil from rapeseeds ranks first on the Mainland. It was estimated that the total production of rapeseed oil in Szechwan Province alone amounted to 108,000 metric tons (118,800 tons) in 1955, an increase of 28 per cent over the amount produced in the preceding year.[20]

249 245 433 In addition to the production of rapeseed, Szechwan Province is also the chief producer of sugar cane and oranges. Tremendous quantities of sugar cane are grown on the plains of Chengtu; the output of sugar cane in 1955 was 1,180,000 tons more than the output in 1949, according to one report.[21] 245 433 The oranges and tangerines grown in Szechwan fill all local needs and are exported to other parts of China as well as to the Soviet Union

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[20] China Daily News, New York, Aug. 31, 1955.

[21] Wen-hui Pao [Wen-hui Daily], Hong Kong, July 25, 1955.

433
245 and her satellites. According to one estimate,
[439] the annual export of fruit from Szechwan brings to China in return 4,000 tons of steel products.[22]

241 Szechwan Province also produces raw
433 silk, ramie, herb medicines, hogs, and over
245 400 different "native products," of which at least 40 are for export.[23] The leading export is tung oil, of which Szechwan produces an amount second only to that produced in Hunan Province in the Central-South Region. The prewar average production of tung oil was estimated to have been 1,000,000 shih-piculs (55,000 tons), and in 1947 this amount had been increased to 1,292,372 shih-piculs (71,080 tons).[24]

245 The principal special products of Yunnan
433 Province are tea, herb medicines, and oil-bearing crops such as rapeseeds and peanuts. "P'u-erh" tea and the ball of compressed green tea leaves known as "T'o-ch'a", produced in Yunnan, are popular throughout China.[25].

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[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ma Chi, Chung-kuo Ti Shen-lin [China's Forestry], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1952, p. 45.

[25] China Daily News, New York, Aug. 15, 1955.

245 433 The Communists have ordered the increased production of tea. The production target set for Yunnan in 1955 was approximately 48 per cent higher than the output in 1954, which in turn was 21 per cent above the amount produced in the preceding year.[26]

According to a radio report from Peking, the province of Yunnan has been designated as one of the major coffee growing districts in Communist China. The region abounds with wild coffee plants; the Communists propose that in the spring of 1956 millions of coffee plant seedlings be transplanted and cultivated.[27] The first harvest is expected in three years' time, and plants for processing coffee beans are to be built.[28]

241 433 Kweichow Province has comparatively poor agricultural resources. With the exception of grain, this area does not produce a significant quantity of any important commodity. The output of tung oil and tobacco amounts to about 450,000 shih-piculs (24,750 tons) per year.[29] 273 433 "Mao-t'ai" wine, which resembles dry gin, has reportedly gained an international reputation and has become one of the leading exports from the province of Kweichow.

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[26] *New China News Agency*, Kunming, April 6, 1955.

[27] *Examiner*, San Francisco, Nov. 6, 1955, p. 9.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *China Daily News*, New York, August 16, 1955.

000 exports from the province of Kweichow.[30]

241 Sikang Province, with a population a
313 little over three million, is a comparatively
433 undeveloped area. Its principal products, in addition to grain, are herb medicines and lumber. Sikang is considered one of the chief lumber centers in China. In the regions of the Ch'ing-i River, the Ta-tu River, the Ya-lung River, and the Sikang-Tibet plateau there are forests over 500 years old.[31] Lumber production[32] in Sikang in 1954 was reported to be 34 times that of 1950. However, since transportation facilities have not yet been fully developed, and lumber resources of Sikang Province cannot be fully utilized.

VI. WATER CONSERVATION AND IRRIGATION

312 The most renowned irrigation system in Southwest China is the Tu-chiang Yen (Tu-chiang Irrigation Works) in Szechwan Province. It was built in 250 B.C. by order of Li Ping, governor of Shu (Szechwan) during the Ch'in Dynasty. Li was an able administrator and

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[30] Ibid.

[31] People's Daily, Peking, Oct. 21, 1954.

[32] Ibid.

312 and engineer who understood the value of water conservation and irrigation.[33] A large area of land under his control was flooded each year and a series of natural calamities had brought his people close to starvation. After an extensive investigation of the causes of the floods, he and his son planned the irrigation system which harnessed the rivers and dammed the flood waters so that they might be used with profit.[34] The entire system constructed over 2,000 years ago, is in service today. It can irrigate half a million acres of land in 14 hsien within the Chengtu plains region.[35] Chi Yung's Water Conservation and Irrigation in Ancient China gives an interesting account of the development of the system. Minor repairs are made each year and major repairs every five years.[36]

Many smaller irrigation projects are undertaken each year in order to extend the amount of land under cultivation, and in consequence agricultural production has

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[33] Chi Yung, Chung-kuo Ku-tai Ti Shui-li [Water Conservation and Irrigation in Ancient China], Shanghai, 1955, p. 27.

[34] Ibid., pp. 28-29.

[35] People's China, Peking, Sept. 1, 1954, No. 17, p. 18.

[36] Ta-kung Daily, Hong Kong, June 24, 1955.

312 steadily increased throughout the provinces of the Southwest Region.

VII. CONCLUSION

241 433 The Communist regime has given special attention to the intensive development of the agricultural resources of the Southwest Region. In Southwest China, the province of Szechwan plays the most important role in the production of grains and commercial crops. Since 1953, even the provinces of Yunnan and Kweichow, where the supply of foodstuffs has been generally inadequate, are asserted to have become more or less self-sufficient. Surplus grain from Szechwan is available in cases of emergency elsewhere in China, and the province is relied upon to make up the grain deficits of other regions. Southwest China also produces in abundance a number of commodities suitable for export, including tung oil, tea, silk, canned meats, wine, and fruit.

474 The movement to extend the authority of agricultural producers' co-operatives throughout the rural districts of Mainland China has accelerated since the promulgation of the "Resolution on Co-operativization" in November 1955. Since the principle of "mutual-aid" is counter to traditional Chinese practice, it will doubtlessly meet strong resistance among the peasants as soon as the cadres relax their

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474 rigorous campaigns. The extraordinary development of nearly 600,000 producers' co-operatives in a single three-month period in 1955 may suggest the degree of coercion necessary to establish this record. Surely the burden imposed upon the rural masses demands an adjustment few of the peasants will be able to make. And it seems likely that many of these co-operatives may be little more than "paper claims" or so poorly organized that they will soon be considered a hindrance to the present regime.

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

SOUTHWEST CHINA

METALLIC ORES

96
100
104
108
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
1. Gold
2. Silver
3. Copper
4. Iron
5. Tin
6. Aluminium
7. Zinc
8. Manganese
9. Lead
10. Mercury
11. Antimony
12. Tungsten
13. Molybdenum
14. Nickel
PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
0
100
200

[facing p. 774 (a)]


SOUTHWEST CHINA
NON-METALLIC ORES
96
100
104
108
36
32
28
24
20
A
B
C
1. Coal
2. Petroleum
3. Natural Gas
4. Phosporous
5. Sulphate
6. Potassium Nitrate
7. Rock Salt
8. Mica
9. Asbestos
10. Graphite
11. Fluor - spar
12. Barites
13. Magnesite
14. Gypsum
PROVINCES
A- Szechwan
B- Kweichow
C- Yunnan
Scale in Miles
0
100
200

[facing p. 774(b)]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3b,
Economic Background

INDUSTRIES

316 The industries of Southwest China fall into two major groups -- mining and manufacturing. Among the mining enterprises, the largest are those dealing with the production of tin, iron, coal, and copper. The tin production of Yunnan has been one of the main sources of supply for China and the world market. A major part of the nation's copper comes from Yunnan, Kweichow, and Sikang. Despite rapid growth during World War II, manufacturing industries in Southwest China has been relatively unimportant in comparison with those in Manchuria and some other sections of China.

I. MINING RESOURCES

A. Production of Tin

During the period, 1935-39, approximately 10,000 metric tons of tin were produced in China each year, equivalent to 5.5 to 7.8 per cent of the total production of the world, excluding Russia. During 1940-41, the world production of tin was maintained at a high level because of the demands of war, but the production of

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316 tin in China dwindled steadily when the war engulfed the mining regions. Output was as low as 2,000 metric tons in 1944 and 1945. During 1947-49, China's rate of production rose to 4,000 tons a year, but in terms of expanding world production the relative importance of China's tin production declined. During the period 1941-53, it amounted to less than 4 per cent of the world total.

Most of China's tin is produced in the Ko-chiu area of Yunnan Province. In some places, modern mining methods are used, but ore dug by outdated methods still constitutes an important part of China's tin production. Before the Communists seized control of the China Mainland, a portion of the tin produced in Yunnan was processed by a local refinery before export to world markets.[1]

Under their regime, the Communists reported, annual tin production on the China Mainland increased from 4,000 metric tons in 1950 to 6,400 metric tons in 1953. The major expansion occurred in Yunnan Province. But

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[1] Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1945, New York, Macmillan Co., 1947, p. 394.

316 similar increases in production were taking place elsewhere in the world. Today, China accounts for less than 3 per cent of the world's total production of tin.[2]

B. Iron and Steel Production

Most of the iron and steel produced in Southwest China comes from the province of Szechwan and, more particularly, the Chungking area. Kweichow and Yunnan have produced some iron, but the amount is insignificant in comparison with the amount originating in Szechwan.

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[2] See Table 1 in the chapter on Foreign Trade.

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Table 1. Iron and Steel Production in Southwest China

Year	Iron Ore		Pig Iron		Steel
	Province*	Free China#	Province*	Free China x	Free China#
1934		Unknown		Unknown	Unknown
Szechwan	60,000		20,000		
Kweichow	300		75		
Yunnan	1,500		500		
Total	61,800		20,575		
1939	Unknown	41,466	Unknown	Unknown	12,000
1940		55,182			1,500
1941		62,836			2,011
1942		77,497			3,000
1943		70,000			6,800
1944		40,134			13,361

* Chinese Yearbook, 1944-1945, p. 656.

# Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1947, pp. 28-29.

x China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 391.

316 1. Iron Ore. Before World War II, virtually all of the iron ore produced in the southwestern provinces came from antiquated native mines. It has been estimated that in 1934 the native mines in Szechwan produced about 60,000 metric tons of iron ore, those in Yunnan about 1,500 tons, and those in Kweichow about 300 tons.[3] The output in Szechwan Province was surpassed only by that of Shansi Province in the North China Region, where, if the production of modern mines is excluded, the greatest amount of iron ore in China is mined. During the prewar years, Central China and Manchuria were the only regions where large-scale modern iron and steel plants were in operation.

327 2. Pig Iron. In 1934, the pig iron production of Szechwan amounted to 20,000 metric tons, that of Yunnan to 500 metric tons, and that of Kweichow to 75 metric tons. During the war years, plant facilities in the southwestern provinces were modernized, and pig iron production (largely in Szechwan) rose to approximately 30,000 metric tons

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[3] The Council of International Affairs (Chungking), The Chinese Yearbook, 1944-1945, Shanghai, Chicago Daily Tribune Publishing Co., 1946, p. 656; Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1947, Nanking, Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan, 1948, pp. 28-29.

327 in 1942 and 32,800 metric tons in 1943. (See Table 1).

3. Steel. Available statistics indicate that in the prewar years Southwest China produced an average of 1,200-1,500 metric tons of steel. In 1942, the output increased to 3,800 metric tons, and in 1943 exceeded 9,000 tons. Government-operated steel mills had been expanded under the control of the National Resources Commission, and some privately owned mills in the region had participated in the growth. The following table shows the respective growth of facilities for iron and steel production in China as a whole in the period 1942-43.

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Table 2. Production of Iron and Steel*

Ownership	Pig Iron 1942	Pig Iron 1943	Steel 1942	Steel 1943
Government-owned	14,032	23,617	1,516	4,499
Privately owned	15,983	9,200	2,300	4,548
Total	30,015	32,817	3,816	9,047

* China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 391. Although the figures in this table do not tally with those reported in the Chinese Yearbook, 1944-1945 and the Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1947, used as sources for Table 1, they may offer some idea of the proportionate increase in privately owned and government-owned mills.

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327 Despite expansion, the absolute gain in steel production in these provinces remains insignificant in comparison with the growth of production in Manchuria. There are no figures available on iron and steel production in Southwest China since 1946, but any substantial expansion is unlikely. Plants in the Southwest Region are less efficiently operated and less favorably located than plants in other regions, and it seems probable that the Communists have concentrated upon the expansion of the best of the plants rather than those hastily constructed during the war years.

Comprehensive information on industrial production in Southwest China under the Communist regime is not available. However, the Communist press announced in 1954 that the capacity of the iron and steel works at Chungking had been increased from 15,000 metric tons in 1949 to 89,000 metric tons in 1952.[4] The Communists also reported that two new open-hearth furnaces, with scales second only to those of the Anshan Steel Works in Manchuria, began trial operations in 1954, and an existing furnace was to be repaired the same year. The Chungking mill turns out both

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[4] The New China News Agency, Chungking, October 2, 1954.

327 standard and narrow gauge rails for the construction and repair of railroads in the Southwest Region.

C. Production of Coal

316 In terms of the coal resources of the
135 entire country, reserves and production in Southwest China are small (See Table 3).

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Table 3. China's Coal Production
(in 1,000 metric tons)

	1934		1946	
East China	1,619	(4.7%)	1,160	(6.8%)
South China	501	(1.5)	130	(0.8)
Southwest China	863	(2.6)	2,310	(13.5)
North China	16,876	(49.4)	7,177	(41.8)
Northwest China	487	(1.5)	1,409	(8.2)
Northeast China (Manchuria)	12,000	(35.0)	4,182	(24.4)
Central China	1,828	(5.4)	790	(4.6)

* Chinese Yearbook, 1944-1945, p. 684; The Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1948; and China Handbook, 1937-1945, pp. 398-90.

[redacted]
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316 Szechwan Province has the largest known coal
135 reserve in the region, and Sikang the smallest. Geological data on coal reserves in Sikang are incomplete. Szechwan leads the provinces of the Southwest Region in the production of bituminous coal (See Table 4).

Table 4. Estimated Coal Reserve in Southwest China*
(in million metric tons)

Province	Anthracite	Bituminous	Lignite	Total	Per cent of National Total
Szechwan	293	3,540	-	3,833	1.46%
Yunnan	77	1,542	694	2,313	.88
Kweichow	822	1,696	-	2,518	.96
Sikang	3	501	27	531	.20
Total - Southwest China				9,195	3.51%
- China, including Manchuria	45,281	216,021	4,012	265,314	100.00%

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* Based on data published in China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 389.

D. Production of Copper

135 Copper deposits are found in most of the provinces in China, but Southwest China has the greatest share of the nation's total reserve. According to studies made by the National Geological Survey of China in the 1940's, the estimate copper reserves and their geographical distribution are as follows:

Table 5. China's Estimated Copper Reserves* (in thousand metric tons)

Region	Province	Reserve
Southwest	Yunnan	270
	Sikang	261
	Szechwan	27
	Kweichow	178
Central-South	Hupeh	18
	Hunan (with Fukien)	200
North	Shansi	4
Northeast	Liaoning	5
Total		964

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* China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 393. Difference between total and sum of individual figures results when figures are founded to nearest whole number.

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328 Yunnan, Szechwan, and Sikang are centers of China's copper production. During the 1940s, several modern copper refineries using the electrolytic process were operating in Southwest China. They treated ore mined in the region and refined it to a product of 99.95 per cent purity. China's copper production during 1938-45, accounted for largely by the Southwest Region, was as follows:

Table 6. China's Production of Copper* (in metric tons)

Year	Production
1938	477
1939	1,886
1940	2,318
1941	1,591
1942	1,266
1943	500
1944	930
1945	1,179

* Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1947, pp. 28-29.

E. Production of Antimony

135 Another important mineral resource in the Southwest Region is antimony, of which

135 China has been the largest producer in the world. As shown in Table 7, about 14.7 per cent of China's total antimony reserve is in the Southwest Region, and 13.4 per cent of China's total antimony reserve is in the province of Kweichow.

Table 7. China's Estimated Antimony Reserves* (in metric tons)

Province	Reserves	
	Tonnage	Per cent of National Total
Szechwan	-	-
Yunnan	48,000	1.26
Kweichow	509,790	13.41
Sikang	-	-
Total -Southwest China	557,790	14.67
- China	3,802,850	100.00

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* China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 394.

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II. MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

433 Despite the program of expansion during World War II, industrial development in Southwest China is minor compared to that in the maritime provinces (See Table 9).[1]

433
178 Before 1940, there were few modern factories in the Southwest. After the removal of the Nationalist Government to Chungking, an attempt was made to expand industrial production in the Southwest provinces to meet China's wartime needs and lessen the threat of inflation to the economy of Free China. Although the result fell short of the intended objective, a comparatively substantial increase in industrial production occurred in the provinces of the Southwest Region. The government itself owned many industries and offered subsidies to private enterprises. Continued price increases as a result of inflation and the lack of outside competition as a result of wartime blockade encouraged further expansion. After the war ended, many so-called "extra-marginal" firms went bankrupt. Some government enterprises were abandoned in order that personnel could be transferred to more efficient plants as they became available in other sections of the country, particularly in Manchuria and Formosa. Because of these changes, it is possible that industrial production in Southwest China decreased during the postwar years.

[1] [Table 9 is missing-- Analyst]

433 Comprehensive information concerning production in Southwest China under Communist domination is not available. The following statistics, released by a Communist-controlled newspaper in Chungking, are probably unreliable but offer an indication of the relative emphasis placed on various industries by the Communist regime.

Table 8. Index of Industrial Production* in Southwest China

Industry	Production Index (pre-1949 peak = 100)
Electric power	116
Steel ingots	700
Steel rails	380
Cast iron	353
Cement	190
Caustic soda	863
Cotton yarn	168
Cotton cloth	183
Paper	429
Salt	147
Wheat flour	227
Matches	272
Cigarettes	150

* Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Sept. 29, 1942, p. 1.

433 These production indices should be read with caution; because of unusually low production in the base period (pre-1949 peak), a small increment in the absolute volume of production in a later year will appear as a sharp increase in the production index.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 3c,
Economic Background

BUDGET AND TAXATION

I. THE NATIONAL FISCAL SYSTEM

652 Since Communist China is a unitary state, its fiscal policy is national in scope and has relatively few regional variations. Accordingly, unless otherwise indicated, what is said here of one region is often equally true in the other regions.

From the data shown in the tabulation below, certain facts are obvious.

1. During 1950-54, the revenue derived from the profit of government enterprises rose steadily from 12.76 per cent of the total government receipt in 1950 to 36.47 per cent in 1954. Moreover, profit is not the only contribution that government enterprises made to the government treasury. In the course of these years, they also contributed an increasingly large share of taxes which the People's Republic of China (the Communist government) imposed upon industries and trade. This tendency is clearly shown in the following statistics.

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SOURCES OF GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS */

Year	Government-owned Enterprises	Government-participating Enterprises	(combined)	Co-operatives	Farmers	Private Industries and Trade
1950	-	-	34.08	-	29.63	32.93
1951	-	-	49.35	-	18.17	28.66
1952	-	-	56.33	-	17.08	22.36
1953	-	-	59.79	-	14.56	17.02
1954	65.24	3.65	-	1.66	14.23	13.34
1955	69.47	3.65	-	1.98	11.76	10.70

*/[In percentage of the total annual receipt of the current year.] Economic Weekly, Feb. 26, 1953, p. 17; People's Daily, June 18, 1954; July 10, 1955. The figures for 1955 are budgetary estimates.

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1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF16

[redacted]

652 Unlike the usual concept used in Western countries, the profits of government-owned concerns and enterprises in which the government participates as listed in fiscal reports of the Communist government include allowances for depreciation of assets, which according to Western practice should not be included in net profit. At the same time, all the outlays of government enterprises for improvement and replacement are listed as government expenditures for economic construction. The procedure used by the Chinese Communists means, therefore, a substantial increase in both government receipts from its enterprises and outlays for economic construction.

2. During the five-year period ending 1954, the relative importance of the agricultural tax has been substantially reduced. In 1950, it accounted for 28.01 per cent of the total government expenditure. In 1954, the percentage declined to 13.33 per cent. The decrease was due to the rapid expansion of receipts from other sources (particularly profits from government enterprises and urban taxes) rather than to the reduction in the agricultural tax itself. This development therefore should be interpreted to mean that the tax on rural economy has not been reduced; it reflects merely that the increase of the agricultural tax has not been as rapid as the increase of other government receipts.

3. Similarly, the fact that the ratio of the taxes on industry and trade to the total government expenditure remained almost constant during these years should not be interpreted to mean a constant tax burden imposed on these sectors of the Chinese economy. In absolute terms, their contributions have continually increased in order to meet the ever-expanding expenditure of the government.

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As a whole, the fiscal policy of the Communist government has been more unfavorable to industry and trade than to agriculture. During the five-year period under consideration, private enterprise in industry and trade not only has had to bear a great burden of the increasing expenditure of the government, but also has been forced to accept stiff competition from government enterprises which, according to the Communist policy, will ultimately monopolize all the important trade and industries in the country. 652

On the expenditure side, military outlay constituted 41.5 per cent of total government expenditure in 1950 and 1951, respectively. After 1952, because of the truce in Korea, the relative importance of the military outlay has been substantially reduced. In 1954, it was only 21.1 per cent of the year's total expenditure. The outlay for economic construction has become the leading item on the debit side of the government account. 652 659

In making these comparisons, several observations should be noted. First, the military expenditures as listed in the records of the Communist government do not indude salaries and maintenance of military personnel, which are classified as government administrative expenses. Military outlays listed in the budgets of the Nationalist Government, on the other hand, consisted mainly of such salary and maintenance payments. If the definition of military expenditure were broadened to include such outlays, and if one-half of the administrative expenses listed in the Communist budget were for the payment of military personnel and administration, then the military expenditure of the Communist government would have been tabulated here for the years 1950-52.

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Year	Ratio of Military Expenditure to Total Gov't Expenditure
1950	51.11
1951	49.83
1952	32.15
1953	29.45 (budget estimate)
1954	30.06
1955	32.98 (budget estimate)

In the fiscal report for 1953 the military and government administration expenditures were listed as a single item. It is rather difficult to separate the military from the non-military outlays on the basis mentioned above. For this reason, the budgetary estimates, where these outlays were separately listed, were used in this tabulation.

A second point which should be noted concerning the military expenditure of the Communist government is that a part of its expenditure for economic construction might well be considered military rather than economic. In the budget of the Nationalist Government, for example, outlays for development of aircraft-manufacturing industries, ammunition industries, and so forth were usually classified as military expenses, whereas they would probably be considered as economic outlay in the Communists' report.

A third point to be noted is that, if the depreciation charges and outlays for maintenance and replacement in government enterprises were excluded from government receipt and expenditure, as should normally be the case, the relative importance of military expenditure for the years under consideration would have been much greater than those shown in the fiscal reports.

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Even allowing for these adjustments, the fact that government outlays for economic, social, and educational purposes has been substantially increased under the Communist regime is obvious when compared with the conditions under the Nationalist Government. Whether these expenditures have actually contributed to improving the economic and social welfare of the people is, of course, another question entirely.

EXPENDITURES AND RECEIPTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA */

(Per cent)

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954
Expenditures					
Military	41.50	42.52	26.23	--	24.19
Government administration	19.21	14.71	11.83	44.62	11.74
Other	2.64	2.01	3.49		
Economic construction	25.51	29.50	44.79	40.38	52.07
Cultural construction	11.11	11.26	13.66	15.00	12.00
Receipts					
Agricultural tax	28.01	18.24	15.69	14.90	13.33
Taxes:industry & commerce	43.84	49.16	42.28	43.43	36.46
Receipts from gov't enterprises	12.76	25.64	28.55	35.40	40.49
Income: credit and insurance	4.87	4.79	1.53	3.00	1.26
Other	--	--	--	14.41	--

*/ Compiled on basis of actual government outlays and receipts as given in fiscal reports of People's Republic of China.

[redacted]

In the discussion that follows, we shall examine at length some phases of Communist China's fiscal policy during the first five years of occupation of Mainland China. They include the agricultural tax, the taxation on commerce and industry, and government bonds. As will be seen, the revenues discussed are all recurrent in nature. No attempt is made to study such non-recurrent levies as those imposed during the Five-Anti Campaign. Because of the nature of these impositions, it is not likely that these measures can be successfully repeated in the near future. 652

II. URBAN TAXATION

In Communist China, the core of urban taxation has consisted of the business tax, the tax on business income, and the commodity taxes. 651

None of the trio is new in China. Under the Nationalist Government, the business tax was collected as a local tax, the tax on business income was a part of the income tax system, and the commodity tax constituted one of the main revenues of the Nationalist Government.

Under the Communist government, all these taxes were drastically reorganized, apparently under the influence of the Russian tax system. From 1949 to date, the system of urban taxation has already undergone several important changes. Its history which may be divided into two stages, covers the period from January 1950 to December 1952.

During the first period, the industrial and commercial tax constituted the greater part of urban taxation.

651 The tax was a composite levy consisting of an impost based on gross turnover and another on net taxable income. The "business tax" was collected on the basis of a proportional rate schedule. While the tax rates remained constant regardless of how the amount of the tax base changed, they varied according to the nature of the business or industry. The rates on manufacturing industries, for instance, were in general higher than those on undertakings which consisted only of sales of services (such as public utilities, professional services, hotel services, insurance, banking, etc.). For undertakings deriving their income in the form of commission (such as trade agents, etc.), the rates of business tax were much higher than for any of the other types of businesses mentioned heretofore.

In addition, the tax rates varied according to the nature of the commodity produced or handled by the taxpayers. Those who deal in such commodities as are essential to the national economy are liable to a lighter tax than those who are associated with the production of cigarettes, for instance. The business tax rate on the production such non-essential commodities, for example, was much higher than the rate applicable to the iron and steel industry.

The characteristics of the income tax system, which was used early in the Communist regime and is still in effect, may be summarized as follows.

1. Like the system in Soviet Russia, the income tax system in Communist China consists of a series of

income taxes applicable to different types of income. Besides the agricultural tax, which may be considered as an income tax on agricultural income, there are income taxes on business profit derived from the earnings of business enterprises and on interest derived from bank deposits. Wages and salaries, however, are not subject to tax. Because of the disappearance of landlords, under the Communist system, the tax on rent income is non-existent in the tax system of Communist China's regime.

2. Like the Soviet system, there is more differentiation in the Chinese income tax than in the system commonly used in the West. There is, for instance, the differentiation in favor of military or industrial heroes, and of earnings from industries against earning from commercial undertakings (particularly those derived from services, such as commissions., etc.).

3. The progressive rates used in the Chinese income tax are applied on the entire taxable income rather than progressively by income brackets.

4. Inventory valuation for income-tax purposes is computed on the basis of the historical cost. This apparently means an unduly heavy tax burden on taxpayers at the time of rising prices.

5. Depreciation charges are computed on the basis of either the straight-line method or the method of constant percentage. In either case, the income tax will mean, under the condition of rising prices, a tax to be paid out of capital as well as current income rather than a genuine tax on income.

After December 31, 1952, the "tax on commodity

[redacted]

651 circulation," or the turnover tax, was introduced. This new tax is a composite levy consisting of parts of former commodity and business taxes. In many represpects, it is also reminiscent of the turnover tax in the USSR. The introduction of the turnover tax brought changes in the system of urban taxation in Communist China. In the place of former commodity and business taxes, the turnover tax is applicable to the following 22 commodities: rolled tobacco, tobacco leaf, wine, wheat flour, furs and hides, cotton yarn, matches, phonograph records, acid, salt, chemical fertilizers, paper, newsprint, rubber tires, cork, cement, glass plates, metal and metal products, pig iron, coke and its products, and mineral oils and their products. After paying the turnover tax, producers and dealers in these commodities will be subject to no other commodity or business taxes so long as they circulate within the national boundaries of China. The exemption, however, does not apply to the custom duties if they are to be exported or to the income taxes to which such producers or dealers are liable. Nor would the payment of a commodity tax on raw materials exempt a product manufactured of such material from commodity tax, if the product itself were a taxable commodity.

Instead of the payment of tax as a product leaves its factory or additional taxation as each business transaction occurred, as was the case of the old commodity tax, the collection procedure of the turnover tax varies according to the nature of the commodity subject to tax. In the case where the sales are to be handled by a government agent, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity is sold or transferred from its producers to such a sales agent. In the case where the sales are done

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by the manufacturer's own agent, the tax is payable at the first sale of the commodity at the wholesale level, or its transfer from producer to the sales agent. In the case where the sale of product is handled by neither a government agent nor that of its producer, but by the producer himself, the tax is payable at the time when the product leaves the hand of its producer. In the case where the taxable product is not for sale, but for further processing or use in some other departments of the producing factory, the turnover tax is payable when the commodity leaves the producing department. In the case of forestry products, the tax is paid by the purchasers at the time when the products are being shipped from their point of origin. In the case of an imported commodity, the turnover tax is collectible by the customs together with customs duties at the point of importation. In the case of an export commodity, the tax is collectible at the time of export. 651

Which of the above-mentioned procedures of collection is applicable to a given commodity is to be decided by the government and not by the taxpayer himself.

Since the turnover tax is to displace both the commodity and business taxes, its rates are higher than those of either of these old taxes. The turnover tax rate on wheat flour has been raised to 10 per cent as against a rate of 3 per cent according to the old commodity tax. The new rate applicable to cotton yarn is 22 per cent as compared to 12 per cent charged in the old commodity tax. With the exception of the turnover tax on beer, which is a

[redacted]

651 specific levy, the leavy on all other commodities is collectible on an ad valorem basis.

Many changes other than those mentioned above were made in the business taxation following the institution of the turnover tax. Among such changes, the following changes are probably the most important.

Under the new regulations, all the commodities produced within the country and not subject to commodities or turnover tax as previously explained are liable to three business taxes -- one at the level of production, one at the wholesale level, and another at the retail level. All those subject to commodity or turnover tax are liable to two business taxes at the wholesale and retail levels. These regulations will be applied regardless of whether a commodity transaction is an inter-firm sale or an intra-firm transfer. As a result of these modifications, all the advantages of vertical combination, which were ample under the old system, are eliminated.

Before the tax reform in 1952, all the business taxes at manufacturing, wholesale, and retail levels were payable after the completion of the business transaction. After 1952, the business tax became applicable only to the transactions of those commodities to which the new turnover tax does not apply. But, instead of collecting the tax after the completion of transactions, producers of such commodities are required, in addition to their own tax liabilities, to advance the tax payable by wholesale dealers to whom the products are sold.

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Such advances are later to be repaid by the wholesale dealers to the producers. Thus, under the new law the business tax on wholesale dealers becomes collectible before rather than after the relevant business transactions are effected.[1]

In the case of the commodities subject to turnover taxation, all the business taxes on retailers, under a similar arrangement, are to be advanced by wholesale dealers. The turnover tax and the changes in business tax therefore not only result in speeding up the collection of business tax, but also, through the concentration of tax collection at production and wholesale levels, reduce substantially the cost of tax administration.

The stamp tax and all surtaxes attached to the business tax under the old system merged under the new regulation with the business tax. Under the new system, the rates of business tax fall into three categories. They are, those applicable to industries, those for commercial undertakings, and those applicable to incomes derived from sales of personal services. For the cases where the old rates fell within the range of 1 to 3 per cent, a new rate of 5 per cent is used. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 4 to 6 per cent, an additional 1 per cent is added in the new rate schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 8 to 10 per cent, an additional 2 per cent is added to form the new schedule. For the cases where the old rates ranged from 12 to 15 per cent, a flat rate of 15 per cent is used.

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[1] Cheng Chu-yüan Chung-kung Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Hsin Tung-hsiang [The New Tendencies of Chinese Communists' Financial and Economic Policies], Hong Kong, 1953, pp. 73-77.

651 Besides the institution of the turnover tax and the changes in business tax mentioned above, there are also important modifications in the system of commodity tax. Among these are the following adjustments.

Twenty-two of the commodities formerly subject to commodity tax are under the new regulations subject to the turnover tax.

Fifteen new items are included in the modified system of commodity tax; among these new commodities, the most important item is foodstuffs. In the place of the old transaction tax, under the new system the foodstuffs are subject to a commodity tax. This adjustment contributed substantially to widening the basis of the commodity tax,

Several silk textile products which were formerly subject to commodity tax are now exempt from the tax. In addition, several other minor adjustments in commodity classifications have also been made with a vew to simplifying tax administration.

In the place of market price, commodity taxes under the new system are assessed on the basis of the relevant wholesale prices as quoted by government sales agent. For the commodities for which government quotations are not available, the market price is used as the basis of the tax assessment. Under the old system, the commodity tax was assessed by the means of the following formulas:

$$\frac{\text{Market price}}{1 - \text{Tax rate}} = \text{Price subject to tax}$$

The price subject to tax X Tax rate = Amount of tax.

The purpose of using these formulas was to avoid the inclusion of the tax in the price upon which the commodity tax rate is to be applied. Under the new system, the commodity tax rate is applicable directly to the price quoted by government enterprise, and the price includes the cost of tax. The commodity tax assessed on this basis is apparently higher than that which was derived from the old formula.

Other important changes in the system of urban taxation effected the end of 1952 are as follows:

1. A part of stamp duties were transferred to be collected as turnover tax, commodity tax, or the tax on butchery.

2. The business taxes and stamp tax payable by butchers merged under the new system with the butchery tax.

3. The transaction tax on foodstuffs are being collected in a new system of commodity tax. The transactions tax on cotton was combined under the new system with the turnover tax on textile products.

4. All the levies on real estate merged into one tax on real estate. It is clear that one of the objectives for tax reform in 1952 was to transfer, wherever it was feasible, all the old taxes on gross business receipts, the commodity taxes, the transaction taxes, stamp duties, and so forth, into the newly instituted system of turnover tax. In the cases where such transfers are not practical, these levies are collected as much as possible under the system of commodity taxes. Only in the case where neither transfer is feasible do the old taxes on business or turnover continue to exist. Whenever conditions

65/permit, the regular tax and surtaxes imposed by local authorities are consolidated into one single tax. In the case of turnover tax, collections are made, as far as it is administratively feasible, at the wholesale level or at the time when the taxable commodity leaves the hands of its producer. The main purpose for effecting successful reforms is to reduce the cost of tax collection and to improve the efficiency of its administration.

There is little change in the system of income tax.

III. AGRICULTURAL TAXATION

In Southwest China, the system of agricultural tax is rather simple in comparison with that used in East China. Since no part of Southwest China has been considered a so-called "old liberated" area, only the agricultural tax designed for "newly liberated" areas with and without land reform.

In the areas where the land reform campaign has already been completed, the features of the tax system may be summarized in the following manner.

1. All the agriculture taxes have been collected in kind.

2. The tax has been assessed on the basis of so-called normal production, regardless of what the actual production is. This system not only greatly simplifies the tax administration, but also

stabilizes the government revenue from agricultural tax regardless of actuall production. It relieves the government from the possible adverse effects upon its revenue of year-to-year fluctuations in agricultural production, and leaves that burden to farmers.

3. The progressive tax rates are applicable in cases where the production, reckoned in terms of the land's main crop, exceeds an average of 150 kilograms per capita. The amount per capita production is determined by dividing the total production of the entire household by the number of recognized farm hands in the household. The rates applicable to forty separate income brackets range from 3 per cent on an annual production of from 150 to 190 kilograms per head to 42 per cent on the annual production exceeding 3,410 kilograms per capita.

Besides the variation based on production, the tax rates vary also on the basis of the following factors: (1) the production of a landowner who tills his own land, with or without employing assistance, will be counted toward taxable income at par; (2) the production of a farmer who does not own his land is taxed on the basis of 80 per cent of his actual production. On the other hand, a landowner who does not till his own land but derives an income from leasing it to others has to pay a tax on the basis of 120 per cent of the actual production; and veterans, Party workers, and all those "making special contribution to the country" may be counted as farm hands in reckoning per capita production, even though they do not actually work on farms.

The general features of the system of agricul-

65/ tax applicable to the newly liberated areas without land reform are very similar to those used in the areas with land reform. There are, however, important differences between the rate structures used in the two types of agriculture tax. First, the rates for the area with land reform ranged from 7 to 30 per cent as against 3 to 42 per cent in the case of the other system. Secondly, the proportional rate of 30 per cent becomes effective when the per capita production, reckoned in terms of the main crop produced on the land subject to tax, exceeds 1,950 kilograms a year. In the system for the areas without land reform, the proportional rate of 42 per cent is used for production exceeding 3,410 kilograms. In both cases, an initial exemption of 150 kilograms is used. In other words, the income range within which the progressive rates are operative is much shorter in the area with land reform than those without land reform. Thirdly, the agricultural tax rates for the areas with land reform would be higher than the corresponding rates for the areas without land reform if the per capita production were lower than 1,000 kilograms. The reverse is true of the cases where the per capita production exceeds 1,000 kilograms.

It is clear from previous comparisons that, after the completion of the land reform campaign, both the range and the degree of progression of the agricultural tax have been reduced as compared with the rate schedule applicable to the areas without land reform. One possible argument for adopting this policy is that, by reducing the rate of increase of the tax, agricultural production may be encouraged. Another possible explanation is that, after the completion of land reform, the inequality in the distribution of farm income tends to disappear. For this reason, it becomes feasible to reduce the rate of increase so that tax administration may be simplified.

Whatever the reason may be, the fact is that, as a result of land reform, low-income farmers tend to pay a higher tax and high-income farmers a lower tax.

Similar to the experience in other regions, in the Southwest Region the most common difficulties that have been encountered in implementing the agricultural tax include the following:

1. The lack of reliable production statistics and other relevant production data concerning agricultural production makes it necessary to have recourse at times to such arbitrary measures as "democratic assessment," which means simply an assessment on the basis of the opinion of a specially appointed committee consisting of persons supposed to be familiar with the financial condition of the taxpayer. More often than not, such assessment has little or no bearing upon the ability of the taxpayer to pay the tax.

2. Difficulties arising from the lack of reliable statistical data, of course, will gradually decrease as more information concerning rural economy is assembled and the various "norms" of taxation are established.

3. Another important difficulty encountered in implementing the agricultural tax arises from the system of collection-in-kind. Reports from China seem to indicate that this system of tax collection has caused a great hardship among the taxpayers,

651 for under the system they have to bear not only the tax but also the cost involved in transporting the tax-in-kind to designated points where the commodities are assembled by the government.

4. The agricultural tax is assessed on the basis of the gross income, taking little or not account of the cost involved in production. The system, if strictly enforced, will necessarily result in discouraging such improvements as the use of chemical fertilizers, the use of irrigation system, etc. Chemical fertilizers have been more commonly used in many parts of Central-South China than in other parts of the country. Failure to allow for such costs of production in the tax system will necessarily mean a discouragement to those who are making such improvements in their production.

5. In assessing the agricultural tax both for the regions with land reform and for the areas without land reform, the tax rates progress on the basis of the total income rather than by bracket. This could mean in some cases a payment of more tax by a taxpayer with less income than by one with more income.

IV. GOVERNMENT BONDS

652 This quota is equivalent to less than one-sixth of the subscriptions of East China, or less than one-half of the subscriptions of North China. In 1950, Victory Bonds valued at 100 million fen (one fen or unit was worth approximately US$.75) were issued; 7 per cent were allocated for subscription in Southwest China.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3d,
Economic Background

BANKING AND CURRENCY

I. BANKING DEVELOPMENT

A. Pre-Communist System

453 Banking was less developed in the Southwest Region than elsewhere in China proper at the outbreak of the war of resistance against Japan in 1937. This situation was in part due to the lack of industrial development in the region, and in part the result of chaotic conditions engendered by warlord rule. The unpredictable and inefficient handling of local finance and issues of paper currency had precluded the local development of modern banking or the extension into the region of the modern banking facilities of established firms in Shanghai.

There were a few locally registered commercial banks in Chungking, Szechwan Province. Only one of them, the Young Brothers Banking Corporation, employed modern practices and relied little on warlord capital. The rest of the concerns depended almost completely for their capital on the warlords and made but slight contribution to the development of modern banking. In addition, Szechwan Province had a provincial

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453 bank and a number of native banks. In Kweichow and Yunnan provinces there were hardly any locally registered commercial banks, nor any branches of modern banks with headquarters in other cities; there were only a provincial bank and a few native banks in each province.

When the Nationalist Government moved its capital to Chungking in 1938, the head offices of the Central Bank of China and the Farmers Bank were also transferred there. The Bank of China and the Bank of Communications followed soon afterward. Branches of these four government banks were opened in the major cities of Szechwan, and the modern commercial banks of Shanghai also established branches at Chungking. The opening of a highway connecting Southwest China and Central-South China made Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow Province, the hub of transportation in Southwest China and also encouraged banks to open branches along the highway in Kweichow. After the Japanese army cut the Canton-Hankow railway linking Nationalist China with Hong Kong, Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province, became the terminus of the only communication lines between Free China and the outside world, viz., the Yunnan-Indochina Railway and the Burma Road. As a result, branches of government and modern commercial banks

453 were rapidly established in Kunming. Thus, an unprecedented banking boom took place in Southwest China which vastly expanded all banking facilities. At the end of the war, there were 866 banks (including head offices and branches) in Szechwan, 149 in Yunnan, 91 in Kweichow, and 44 in Sikang.

With the surrender of Japan, the Nationalist Government re-established its capital at Nanking, the head offices of the government banks returned to Shanghai, and much of the war-inspired industrial and commercial activity in the Southwest Region was discontinued. What business remained was insufficient to support the expanded banking facilities in the region. The Shanghai banks recalled their funds, and private capital migrated to Shanghai, where increasing inflation provided a wider scope for speculative activities. Most of the local commercial banks in Szechwan and Yunnan, partly owned by the warlords, encountered difficulties because their funds were tied up in local enterprises which were adversely affected by the end of the war. As a result, the banking structure in Southwest China was reduced to impotency before the arrival of the Communists.

B. Communist Transformation

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453 When the Communists took over Southwest

453 China, they closed the branches of the Central
652 Bank of China and the Farmers' Bank, and instituted rigid supervision over the branches of the Bank of China and Bank of Communications. The new regime also took over the provincial banks outright. The regulations governing private banks which had been enforced in other regions were put into effect; the stipulations regarding the banks' operations and interest rates, the amount of reserves to be kept with the People's Bank, and the periodic reports required were so harsh that few banks could survive. The banking shares owned by so-called "bureaucratic capitalists" and "reactionaries" were confiscated. Nearly all native banks and the minor locally registered commercial banks discontinued operations because of their inability to increase capital as required; a few locally registered commercial banks in Chungking and Kunming were liquidated after their shares had been confiscated by the government and their financial resources had proved inadequate.

In May 1951, the Young Brothers Banking Corporation and the Ho Chen Bank were "advised" to join the first system of eleven banks operated jointly by state and private enterprise with headquarters at Shanghai. Both the commercial banks were owned by Szechwen capital and did business within and outside

453 the province. The Ho Chen Bank was the
652 younger of the two institutions but had made great strides during the war. As a result of a Communist-induced merger of all private banks in December 1952, the names of Ho Chen and Young Brothers disappeared from the banking world.

Meanwhile, the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications were reorganized and placed under the control of the People's Bank. With the transformation of the modern commercial banks in Shanghai into one Joint State-Private Bank, their branches in Southwest China underwent similar changes.

Before the war, a branch of the Banque de l'Indochine in Kunming was the only foreign bank in Southwest China. It ceased operation soon after the Communists took over Yunnan. The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation had established an office in Chungking during the war but withdrew soon after its end. Therefore, the Communists were hardly confronted with a problem of eliminating foreign banking influence in the region.

Since Szechwan was the most fertile of the Southwest China provinces, it had a larger number of affluent landowners and a greater amount of outstanding rural credit.

453 extended by landowners than had Yunnan and
652 Kweichow. On the other hand, pawnshops in the latter two provinces did more business than their counterparts in Szechwan, which were often handicapped by inflation and the consequent need to charge excessive interest rates.

These two sources of credit were wiped out by the Communists: the Land Reform Movement eliminated the landlords; and the pawnshops closed because they could no longer obtain bank credit nor meet the increased capital requirements established by Communist regulations.

The fragile banking structure of Southwest China could offer little resistance to Communist designs, and it was completely transformed by the middle of 1951. As the old banking structure was liquidated, the new banking system in Southwest China was developed after the general pattern of the banking system of Communist China as a whole: monolithic and uniform. It now consists of branches of the following institutions: (1) People's Bank of China; (2) Bank of China; (3) Bank of Communications; (4) Chinese People's Construction Bank; (5) Agricultural Bank of China; (6) State-Private Joint Bank; (7) Chinese People's Insurance Company; and (8) credit co-operatives.

II. THE COMMUNIST BANKING SYSTEM

A. The People's Bank of China

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652 The People's Bank of China is the supreme financial organ in the country; all other banks operate under its control. A Southwest China regional office of the People's Bank was established at Chungking as the highest authority on monetary matters and administration; branch offices were maintained in each province. The regional office was abolished with the abandonment of the regional administrative system in September 1954; the branch offices in each province were placed under the direct control of the head office at Peking and charged with the responsibility for monetary affairs at the local level.

The number of branches, one in each provincial capital, was reduced from four to three after the province of Sikang was amalgamated with Szechwan Province in October 1955. Branch offices of the People's Bank in the Southwest Region are currently located at Chengtu, Kweiyang, and Kunming.

Under each branch office there are sub-branch offices in counties, cities, and towns.

453 There also are temporary units, called
452 central sub-branch offices, set up at political or communication centers to supervise sub-branch offices in the vicinity. A network of subordinate offices called agencies, sub-agencies and stations, has been established to serve main thoroughfares and residential sections in large cities and individual towns, populous villages, schools, factories, and military posts. These offices handle deposits, remittances, and the extension of rural credits.

According to incomplete statistics there are about 400 sub-branch offices and about forty central sub-branch offices in the three provinces of Southwest China, besides several thousand agencies and stations. The total number of subsidiary offices of the People's Bank was officially reported to be more than 19,000 in March 1955.

The branch offices perform the following functions.[1] (1) Adjust the circulation of currency; (2) Act as agents for the state treasury; (3) Accept current accounts and promote savings; (4) Extend credits to

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[1] *Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Tz'u-tien* [*Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics*]. Shanghai, Ch'un-ming Shu-tien, 1953, p. 8,013.

453 industry and commerce, both public and
652 private, either directly or through affiliated banks; (5) Handle clearings of bills and transfers of accounts, and facilitate remittances; (6) Extend rural credits either through their own agencies or through co-operatives; (7) Look after receipts and disbursements of foreign exchange handled by affiliated banks; and (8) Handle any other monetary matters within their jurisdictions.

Each branch office has departments to control currency, credit to public and private enterprises, rural credits, and the promotion of savings deposits and the expansion of credit co-operatives.

B. Bank of China

The Bank of China, established as a central bank in 1912, was reorganized in 1928 as a special institution with government participation for dealing with foreign trade. After the Communists overran China, the bank was allowed to continue its old status, and those of its directors who represented private interests retained their positions. At the same time, the general manager and the directors representing Nationalist Government interests were replaced by Communist appointees; one of the newly appointed directors,

453 the director-general of the People's Bank,
652 was concurrently nominated chairman of the board. At the first shareholders' meeting, held in November 1954 under the Communist regime, the old directors representing private interest who had left the Mainland were replaced by shareholders who were co-operating with the Communists. Hence, the Bank of China is fully controlled by the Communist government and is virtually a subsidiary of the People's Bank.

The Bank of China is entrusted by the People's Bank to:[2] (1) Administer the control of foreign exchange; (2) Handle foreign exchange, foreign securities, bills of exchange, and other commercial documents, payable or receivable in foreign exchange; (3) Extend credits, and accept deposits in connection with foreign trade; (4) Look after the accounts and clearings of foreign trade conducted by and through government organizations; and (5) Control overseas remittances.

Before 1937, the Bank of China had had only three branches in the Southwest Region,

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[2] Ching-chi Chou-pao [Economic Weekly], Shanghai, No. 31.

453 all in Szechwan. During the war the bank not
652 only increased its branches in Szechwan, but also opened a number of offices in Kweichow and Yunnan. The bank now has only two branches in Southwest China, both in Yunnan, one at Kunming and the other at Wan-ting on the Burma border.

The Communists found the Bank of China a valuable institution because of its solid reputation, core of trained personnel, and assets located in China and abroad. However, the Communist regime was able to control only 11 of the overseas branches -- in Hong Kong, London, Singapore, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi, Chittagong, Rangoon and Djakarta. The other eight branches -- in South Indochina, Cambodia, Thailand, Japan, the United States, Cuba and Australia -- are still under the control of the Bank of China in Formosa because those countries have not recognized Communist China.

C. Bank of Communications

The Bank of Communications, inaugurated in 1907 as a treasury agent of the Ministry of Posts and Communications, was reorganized in 1928 with the participation of government interests as a special institution to develop industry and internal trade. In June 1951,

453 after a short period of suspension ordered by
652 the Communists, the bank was allowed to resume business under its old status. Probably, this was done with the intent of facilitating Communist penetration of private industries through the bank's connections. Business was resumed only after Communists were appointed to the offices of chairman of the board and general manager, and after Nationalist Government directors were replaced by appointees of the new regime. At the shareholders meeting held in December 1954, the shareholders were "advised" to elect as directors representing private interests a slate of candidates drawn up by the Communists.

The Bank of Communications performs the following functions:[3] (1) Handles appropriations for basic government construction, and screen and approve applications for appropriations for such construction; (2) Organizes and lead long-term investment markets; (3) Controls ownership rights for public shares of enterprises operated by state-private joint interests; (4) Handles long-term credits.

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[3] Cheng Chu-yüan, Monetary Affairs of Communist China, Hong Kong, The Union Research Institute, 1954, p. 25.

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652 Since the establishment of the Chinese People's Construction Bank, it has been entrusted with the important function of handling appropriations for basic government construction. No investment markets could be created because any savable income the people might have was constantly drained by the government's frequent levies. The function of controlling ownership rights for public shares is [illegible] non-existent since in every joint state-private enterprise one or more Communist appointees participates in the management, assisted by Communist-controlled labor union members. Therefore, the duties of the Bank of Communications are confined to looking after long-term credits to state-private joint industry.

The Bank of Communications increased the number of its branches in Southwest China after resuming business. The important ones are: in Szechwan Province -- Chungking, Chengtu, Neikiang, Tzeliutsing, Luhsien, and Kikiang; in Kweichow Province -- Kweiyang, Tuyun, and Tuhsan; in Yunnan Province -- Kunming and Kokui.

D. Chinese People's Construction Bank

In order to facilitate progress of the Five-Year Plan and to overcome defects in

453 the appropriation of funds for capital
652 construction, the Chinese People's Construction Bank was established in October 1954 and entrusted with the following functions:[4] (1) To handle the funds of basic construction projects, either as provided by budget appropriations or as raised by the projects themselves; (2) Supply short-term credits, according to the governments' credit plan, to the contracting organizations undertaking work on projects; (3) Settle accounts and make returns in connection with the governments' appropriations for the projects; and (4) Supervise the use of funds appropriated or raised, the arrangement of payment to contracting organizations, and project matters related to finance, cost accounting, and investments.

As soon as the head office of the Chinese People's Construction Bank was installed in Peking, branch offices were set up in places where basic construction projects were underway. A part of the buildings of the People's Bank or of the Bank of Communications

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[4] New China News Agency release, Peking, Sept. 13, 1954.

453 were used as Construction Bank offices; a
652 number of staff members of the two older banks were switched to the new bank. In light of its functions and of the establishment of its branches in such a summary manner, the Chinese People's Construction Bank bears more resemblance to a government department than to a banking institution.

Less than three months after the Bank's establishment, a conference of managers of branches was held to review their work in appropriating and supervising funds for capital construction in 1954. Among the resolutions of this conference was an ambitious proposal. The Bank would supervise construction units and enterprises to fully develop the resources and potentials of each project, and would urge them to deliver profits, depreciations funds, and surplus revolving funds to upper levels on schedule.

E. Agricultural Bank of China

The Agricultural Bank of China was inaugurated on March 25, 1955. Rural finance until then had been handled entirely by the branch and subsidiary offices of the People's Bank in line with the policy of avoiding the duplication of banking services involving small

453 loans and deposits at the local level. As
652 early as May 1951, a departure from this policy was contemplated when a national rural finance conference decided an agricultural co-operative bank should be set up to handle rural finance exclusively. This decision was not implemented, however, because it was contradictory to the policy of the People's Bank. The revival of the idea of creating a special rural finance institution was the result of a new call for more "co-operativization" of agriculture, and of the rapid growth of the number of credit co-operatives.

The Agricultural Bank of China performs the following functions:[5] (1) Extends long-term and short-term credits to individual producers and to joint state-private operated agricultural, stock-raising, fishery, and producer mutual-aid and co-operative organizations; (2) Handles capital investments allocated in the state budget for agriculture, forestry, and water conservation; (3) Guides and helps the people's credit co-operative organizations; and (4) Provides savings deposit services for rural residents, producer mutual-aid and co-operative organizations, collective farms, and state agriculture and water conservation organs.

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[5] *Ibid.*, March 25, 1955.

[redacted]

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652 At present, the function of handling capital investments appropriated in the state budget will be retained by the People's Bank, according to an official statement. Moreover, there is no indication that the new bank will develop an extended branch network on the order of the Chinese People's Construction Bank. Therefore, the present function of the Agricultural Bank of China appears to be primarily the guidance and supervision of credit co-operatives and the promotion of savings deposits in rural areas; its organization is, in reality, similar to that of a department of the People's Bank, except that the Agricultural Bank has more responsibility and discretionary power.

F. Joint State-Private Bank

Soon after all banks in Shanghai had been transformed into joint state-private concerns and then grouped, with the exception of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank, into four joint management units, they were all "advised" to merge into one Joint State-Private Bank. It began operations on January 1, 1953. Only two Szechwan banks, the Young Brothers Banking Corporation and the Ho Chen Bank, were involved in the merger. The general managers of the two Szechwan banks were included on the 103-man boards of directors

453 of the joint bank and made two of its 27 managing
652 directors. The Chungking, Chengtu, and Kunming branches of the component banks in the merger were ordered amalgamated in each city into one branch of the Joint State-Private Bank; branches of the component banks in other cities of Southwest China were closed. The amalgamated branches in Chungking, Kunming, and Chengtu constitute three of the thirteen branches of the joint bank maintained throughout the country; the head office is located in Peking.

The chairman of the board and the chief manager of the bank are appointees of the People's Bank, which completely controls the Joint State-Private Bank. The Joint Bank is empowered to fulfill the following functions:[6] (1) Handle accounts of private enterprises; (2) Extend short-term credits to private enterprises, subject to the advice of the People's Bank; (3) Handle inland remittances and overseas Chinese remittances through the branches of component banks still operating in Hong Kong for the account of the Bank of China; and (4) Accept savings deposits for the account of the People's Bank.

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[6] Report of Shanghai Commercial Bank, Hong Kong.

453 652 The Hong Kong branches of the Young Brothers Banking Corporation and of the Ho Chen Bank are still allowed to operate. Other Hong Kong branches of the component banks which likewise continue to function are: Kincheng Banking Corporation, Yieh Yieh Commercial Bank, China and South Sea Bank, Sin Hwa Savings Bank, the China State Bank, the National Commercial Bank, and the National Industrial Bank. The desire of the Communists to maintain as many interests in Hong Kong as possible accounts for the continued operation of these branches, in spite of their handling only small deposits and remittances.

G. Credit Co-operatives

452 474 Credit co-operatives in rural areas have experienced tremendous growth since 1954. The number throughout the country increased from about 13,000 at the end of 1953 to 153,400 in June 1955.[7] According to Communist statistics, credit co-operatives exist in about 80 per cent of the more than 2,000 counties in the country and have a membership of nearly 100,000,000.

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[7] Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Oct. 6, 1955.

452 In October 1955, there were 6,100 474 credit co-operatives in Szechwan[8] and 5,691 in Yunnan.[9] The number in Kweichow was reported to be smaller, but no exact figures are available.

Two other types of credit co-operative organizations function on a lower level -- credit departments attached to supply-marketing co-operatives, and credit mutual-aid teams. The former have neither separate membership nor independent capital and depend for their operating funds on deposits or special funds appropriated by the co-operatives concerned. The latter consists of a group of farmers, each of whom subscribes an equal amount of capital for loans to group members. Credit is granted on the approval of subscribers and is redeemed in installments.

Although the publicized objectives of the Communists' promotion of credit co-operatives are to aid the peasants' financial needs for production and daily living and to

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[8] New China News Agency release, Chengtu, Oct. 11, 1955.

[9] Ibid., Kunming, Oct. 27, 1955.

452 eliminate exploitation by usurers, disinterested
474 observers have doubts as to how far such
means can or will go in meeting these problems.
The doubts arise principally because of the
government's frequently expressed desire to
utilize credit co-operatives to pool idle
capital in rural areas as government operating
funds, which appear to be almost non-existent.

H. Chinese People's Insurance Company

456 According to the Communists, the state-operated Chinese People's Insurance Company is considered as a component of the entire Communist financial system. It has the functions of organizing scattered funds for the industrialization of the state, and of establishing a centralized insurance fund to compensate losses from natural calamities or accidents sustained by individual policy holders or economic units. The Chinese People's Insurance Company was established on October 20, 1949, and simultaneously the elimination of privately owned and foreign-operated insurance firms was begun. Branch offices and subordinate offices of the Chinese People's Insurance Company were established throughout the country, and branches of the People's Bank and other bank were appointed agents of the state-operated insurance company.

456 Since 1950, the Chinese People's Insurance Company has handled the compulsory insurance of assets of state-owned enterprises and supply-marketing co-operatives above the county level and of persons traveling by rail, steamer, and aircraft. The company also has promoted life and private property insurance on a voluntary basis in urban centers. Insurance of livestock and farm crops has been encouraged in rural areas. Rates for various categories of insurance have been reduced, and the scope of coverage broadened. However frequent criticism of the company has been expressed concerning imprudent expansion, inexperienced personnel, and the arbitrary attitude displayed by the officers.

III. BANKING OPERATIONS

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452 The operation of these varied banking and financial organizations is integrated through their subordination to the single command of the People's Bank, and, in effect, they operate as a single body. During the development of the Communist monetary system, the emphasis of the whole banking operation appears to have shifted. At its inception, popularization of the People's Bank notes and the promotion of individual deposits were stressed; at a later stage, control of cash funds held by public organizations and centralization of credit extension were emphasized; recently,

453attention is being focused on attracting peasants'
452deposits. But the main objective of these different emphases is to subject all economic activity to state direction by controlling all cash funds held by organizations, firms, and individuals, and by completely controlling the distribution of credit.

A. Cash Control

Beginning in March 1950, control over revenue collections was enforced; all government agencies handling such funds are required to deposit them with the People's Bank or its authorized agencies. Similar control was soon extended over funds held by publicly operated enterprises, the armed forces, and co-operatives. These organizations are allowed to keep on hand only small, stipulated amounts of cash and are required to make all payments by check, except for wages, salaries, and the purchase of local products in rural areas.

After intensification of the Korean war in 1951, the increasing fluctuation of commodity prices and the revival of black-market financial dealings prompted the Communists to further tighten control over cash held by private firms and individuals. All persons engaged in business are required to deposit the day's net proceeds in their bank

453 accounts; all shops have to make their pur-
652 chase payments by check, and under no circumstances can cash be used. Checks received for the sale of goods have to be deposited in bank accounts; under no circumstances may these checks be used to buy other goods. All persons are required to bank their cash holdings in excess of PB$2,000,000 (about US$80.00);[10] all firms and individuals must use checks for transactions exceeding PB$100,000 (about US$4.00).

To prevent the use or retention of checks as substitutes for cash, "crossed checks" (checks so marked that they cannot be cashed, but only deposited to the account of the payee) are mandatory in transactions between public enterprises, and special checks in transactions between public and private enterprises. To preclude the acquisition of cash by transferring funds from one locality to another, such transactions can only be accomplished by the use of "crossed checks"; and the paying bank is responsible for validating the transfer.

A lucrative rate of interest of 5.4 per cent a year was paid on current accounts

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[10] Cheng, op. cit., p. 84.

453 opened by private enterprises or individuals
652 until October 3, 1955. On that date, it was reduced to 2.88 per cent to "implement the strict practice of economy".[11] Indeed cash control has been so effective that the inducement of high interest is no longer necessary to encourage the banking of excess cash.

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652 The People's Bank also vigorously encouraged saving. Many subordinate offices were established for this express purpose, and their officers visited residents in the vicinity to solicit deposits. In rural areas, quotas for increasing savings deposits were set for each county, which, in turn, fixed quotas for each village and household. After the enforcement of the state plan for the unified and compulsory purchase of grain, cotton, and oil-bearing crops, canvassing for rural savings by banks in conjunction with credit co-operatives was accentuated with the hope of absorbing the purchase proceeds into the bank. It is interesting to note that the People's Bank, at the time it issued the new currency in March 1955, provided in its Savings Deposits Regulations for maintaining secrecy concerning depositors and their funds. The bank

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[11] New China News Agency release, Peking, Oct. 3, 1955.

452 and its agencies became responsible for
652 guarding in closest secrecy the names, addresses, specimens of signatures and seals, amounts of deposits, identities of depositors, and particulars on the receipt or payment of money for savings depositors. This indicates the extent to which the Communists were prepared to go to induce deposits.

According to a Communist report, bank deposits in China's cities at the end of August 1955 amounted to more than 1,440 million yuan (over US$576 million) mostly in fixed deposits. There was no explanation as to whether the fixed deposits included savings deposits. The number of depositors in the seven major cities of Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Wuhan, Canton, Chungking, and Sian was reported to have been 4.8 times higher in the first six months of 1955 than in the same period of 1954.[12] One report shows that savings deposits in the third quarter of 1954 amounted to 610 billion yuan (old currency; about US$24.4 million) in Szechwan[13] and 216 billion yuan (old currency, about US$8.6 million) in Yunnan.[14] Per capita savings in Szechwan (population 62,303,999) amounted to

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[12] Ibid.,
[13] Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Oct. 19, 1954.
[14] Ibid., July 27, 1954.

452 US$0.40 and in Yunnan (population 17,472,737)
652 to US$0.50.

B. Credit Control

During the first years of Communist rule, when the power of granting credit was concentrated in the head office of the People's Bank at Peking, the Southwest China regional office of the bank had more power of decision on credit matters because it was remote from the financial and political capital; yet important matters had to be referred to the Financial and Economic Committee of the Greater Southwest Region Administration.

Since the adoption by the People's Bank, in 1953, of a decentralization policy on credit extension, followed by the abolition of the Greater Regional Administration in 1954, the branch office of the bank in each province has had the power and responsibility to extend credits. In applying for a loan, public enterprises and co-operatives are required to provide the branch office with a budget outlining credit needs and a plan estimating the extent to which the proposed project will increase production, raise labor productivity, and lower production costs. Credits are classified according to their duration (short, long, or seasonal) and use; borrowers are required to adhere to the terms expressed in the contract.

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652 The granting of credit to private enterprises is subject to the same requirements for furnishing a plan and a budget. Before the Communist takeover, a system of specialization in certain lines of business had been developed by each private bank; thus, one bank granted credits to textile enterprises, another to the metal industry, etc. When all private banks were merged into the Joint State-Private Bank, the latter was placed in charge of the extension of credits to private enterprises under the direction of the People's Bank. A system of joint application was promoted; enterprises in the same line of business were encouraged to apply jointly for credits, listing the financial requirements of each firm with an estimate of its production and demand for its output. This arrangement was intended to prevent "blind" competition in production and preclude the diversion of bank credit by one borrower to help another.

Extension and acceptance of credit between public enterprises and private firms were prohibited to eliminate commercial loans. Private enterprises have had to depend entirely on government banks for credit. Furthermore, an exorbitant rate of interest has been charged on credits to private enterprises: private industry paid 10.8 to 19.8 per cent annually, while private commerce was subject to rates of from 16.2 to 23.4 per cent. Though

453 652 the interest rate was reduced on October 3, 1955, it remained as high as 11.88 per cent for private industry and 16.2 per cent for private commerce,[15] double the rate charged for public industry and commerce.

The Communist regime's accession to control of rural credit through the instrument of the People's Bank seems to have been an easy task. The large-scale landlords and retail merchants, who had been the most important source of rural credit, particularly in Szechwan and Yunnan, were stripped of their wealth if not of their lives; the newly emerged rich peasants were drained of their limited funds by compulsory subscriptions to savings deposits, government bonds, and various patriotic drives. Moreover, the so-called fixed purchase of grains, cotton, and oil-bearing crops barred the peasants from accumulating any kind of savings which might be loaned.

452 652 The vigorous Communist drive to increase participation in credit co-operatives aims at utilizing the peasants' own funds for the extension and control of rural credits. This

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[15] New China News Agency release, Peking, Oct. 3, 1955.

452 objective is indicated in a directive issued on
652 September 12, 1955 by the head office of the People's Bank to its branches,[16] stating that branches must guide credit co-operatives in encouraging savings deposits for the use of rural credits in the coming year. The branches also were ordered to collect matured long-term credits prior to the start of government crop purchases. This directive indicates that the Communists use the withdrawal of rural credits as a weapon to force peasants to sell their products to the government.

In 1955, rural credit was extended at the following interest rates:[17]

Agricultural production co-operatives	7.2% per annum
Producer mutual-aid teams	9.0% per annum
Individual peasants	10.8% per annum
Very poor peasants	9.0% per annum

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[16] Peking broadcast, Sept. 12, 1955.

[17] New China News Agency release, Peking, Nov. 3, 1955.

IV. CURRENCY

A. Currency System

436 After the establishment of the People's
652 Bank of China in Shih-chia-chuang of Hopei Province on December 1, 1948, Jen-min-p'iao (People's Banknotes) were first issued. They have become the uniform currency of Communist China. They are the monetary unit for all tax payments, settlement of accounts, and computation of commodity prices. Circulation of all gold, silver, and foreign currencies has been prohibited. Since March 6, 1951, the circulation of Jen-min-p'iao has been restricted to Communist China only, and export of the notes forbidden.

The Jen-min-p'iao is not redeemable in any precious metal nor interchangeable with any foreign currency. No provision is made for limiting its issue. The Communists' rationalization of their monetary system evolved from a very primitive theory to a more advanced one. At an early stage, the Communists explained that the note issue was backed by foodstuffs and cloth. Later the regime claimed that "the increasing stability of the currency is borne out by the balance of the budget, by the balanced distribution of supplies, and by the balance of cash receipts

436 and expenditures." Recently the regime has
452 referred to other indicators of the currency's value --i.e., the balance of international payments and the resulting increase of foreign reserves. It would appear that the Communists discovered during the period of currency inflation the Chinese people's instinctive ability to distinguish between good and bad money and have had to find plausible monetary theories to quiet the people's anxiety.

The Communists have kept the amount of note issue strictly secret, yet the progress of inflation becomes evident in observing the increase of the notes' denominations. The Jen-min-p'iao was first issued in denominations of 1, 5 10, 20, 50 and 100 yuan. By the second half of 1949, the printing of notes was speeded up to cover huge government deficits. The small denomination notes were no longer found practical, and larger denominations of 200, 500 and 1,000 yuan were successively introduced. Between February and April 1950 an additional issue of 5,000 and 10,000 denomination notes was made. Finally the denomination was enlarged to 20,000 and 50,000 during 1953-54.

On March 1, 1955, a new kind of People's Banknotes in small denominations was issued,

436 and current People's Banknotes were called in.
652 The major denominations of the new currency are 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 yuan. The smaller denominations are 1, 2, and 5 fen (100 fen equal one yuan) and 1, 2, and 5 chiao (10 chiao equal one yuan). A new one-yuan note is equivalent to 10,000 yuan note of the old currency. All old banknotes outstanding in denominations above 5,000 yuan were to be exchanged at the People's Bank before the end of April 1955, and denominations of 5,000 and less not later than June 10, 1955.

A statement made by the vice-premier and concurrent finance minister of Communist China on the issue of the new currency is worth noting. He admitted for the first time that inflation existed under the Communist regime but, ironically, heralded the new banknote issue at the rate of 1 to 10,000 of the old notes as the cure for inflation. At the same time, he revealed the true objective of the new issue by adding that it would aid considerably in accounting for the possession and use of money in China.

Although the Bank of China quotes a foreign exchange rate for the Jen-min-p'iao, the quotation does not reflect the real value of the Chinese currency in international monetary terms. Frequent revisions were made in

436 the rate until May 1951, but since then few
652 changes have been announced. No exchange rate in terms of the American dollar have been quoted since the United States government enforced the embargo on trade with Communist China in 1950. Figures on the cross rate of the Hong Kong currency, quoted by the Communists at HK$2.34 per PB¥1, one People's Banknote is valued at US$0.385. Despite the fact that these evaluations have not been tested on the open market and that the old currency was subject to inflation, a responsible official of the People's Bank publicly announced that the new currency of China was one of the most stable in the world.[18]

B. Currency Control

The Communists found currency control in Southwest China more necessary than in other areas because the people in the region were more experienced in facing the problems of an unsound currency. For more than two decades after the establishment of the Republic in 1911, Szechwan warlords practiced all kinds of currency manipulation; they debased silver dollars, silver coins, and even copper coins, issued unbacked paper notes through local

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[18] Ibid., Peking, March 20, 1955.

436 banks and private armies, and repudiated the
652 redemption of banknotes issued against real reserves. These same practices were duplicated in Yunnan on a smaller scale. As a result, the people in these provinces were always alert to protect their interests whenever monetary inflation, debasement, or manipulation occurred. The warlords had not been able to derive much revenue from debased currency and inflated notes because the people refused to accept such money.

During the inflation under the Nationalist Government from 1938 to 1949, the people of the Southwest Region tried to exchange banknotes for gold and commodities. After the Communists took over Southwest China, a fair amount of scattered gold and silver holdings was reported uncovered in the course of liquidating the landlords and local "despots" and through extortionate fines during the Three-Anti and Five-Anti movements. Frequent exactions were made on the people to prevent them from turning their cash into goods. Southwest China was allocated 15 per cent of the 1950 Victory Bond series, amounting to a nationwide total of US$70 million;[19] assigned

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[19] Hsin Chung-kuo Ta-shih Chi-k'an [New China Events Quarterly], No. 4, Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1949, p. 127.

[redacted]
AF16

436 a quota in 1951 of 8.3 per cent of the US$220
662 million amunition contribution for the Korean conflict;[20] and required to contribute 16 per cent of the total of US$220 million collected throughout the country during 1950 and 1952 in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement.

In addition, Southwest China has been assigned a proportionate share of the Economic Construction Bonds amounting to US$250 million yearly since 1954. In 1954, 53.3 per cent of the issue was allocated to private industrial and commercial enterprises, the private partners of joint enterprises, and other city residents; 30 per cent to rural villages, and 16.6 per cent to workers, shop employees, working personnel of the government and public organs, and the cadres of the armed forces. In the 1955 allocation, the first category was reduced to 45% and the last category increased to 25%, the second category remaining the same.[21] An issue of Economic Construction Bonds for 1956 was announced in November 1955.

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[20] Ho Yü-wen, Chung-kung Ts'ai-cheng Chieh-p'ou [An Analysis of Communist China's Finance], Hong Kong, Asia Press, 1953, p. 74.

[21] Jin-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, Jan. 9, 1955.

436 652 According to an estimate[22] made by the Communists in 1955, workers were required to pledge a little more than 7 _yuan_ per head (about US$2.70) for their subscription to the Economic Construction Bonds, and the peasants, excluding those in calamity-stricken areas, were required to pledge an average of 0.4 _yuan_.

Since the government began the enforced purchase of grains, cotton, and oil-bearing crops, hardly any staple commodities have been left for the people to hoard, and the bond subscriptions have consumed what little cash might have been available for saving. In view of the past ingenuity of the people in the Southwest Region to defend themselves against inflation, it remains to be seen whether currency control will remain effective, and if so, how it will influence incentives for agricultural and industrial production.

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[22] _Ibid._

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China AF16

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
96
Yüshu
32
Ch'angtu
Mekong R.
Salween R.
INDIA
28

[facing p. 850(a)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF 16 SW China AF 16


100
Ya-lung R.
ngtu
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Yangtze R.
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[facing p. 850 (b)]

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
104
Kuang
Chengtu
Chia-ling R.
Ya-an
Lu-ting
O-mei
Tzu-kung
Nei-chiang
Han-yüan
Hsi-ch'ang
Lu-chou
San
I-pin
Yangtze R.
Pi-chieh
Wei-ning
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[facing p. 260 (c)]

1: Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF16 SW China AF16

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
108
32
28
Kuang-yüan
Wanhsien
Chia-ling R.
i-chiang
Chungking
(Major Industrial Center)
Ch'i-chiang
j-chou
San-ch'i
Kan-shui-ch'ang
Tsun-i
i-chieh
Kweiyang

[facing p. 850(d)]

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

SOUTHWEST CHINA
POLITICAL AND TRANSPORTATION

BURMA
Teng-ch'ung
24
96
International Boundary
Regional Boundary
Provincial Boundary
Highways
Old Railroads
Newly Constructed Railroads
Proposed Railroads
Established Waterways
Under Constrution
Scale in Miles
0
50
100
150
200

[facing p. 250(e)]


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[facing p. 850(?)]

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
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Kunming
Shih-p'ing
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[facing p. 850(g)]

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
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[facing p. 250(h)]

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3e, Economic Background

TRANSPORTATION AND DOMESTIC TRADE

489 For generations, Southwest China has lacked good transportation facilities. Before the founding of the Republic in 1911, not a single railroad was in operation in this area; nor were there many wide roads. The chief means of transportation at that time were the inland waterways and a limited number of country roads. The idea of building a modern railway in Szechwan was initiated by Chang Chih-tung in the last year of the reign of the Emperor Kuang-hsü of the Ch'ing dynasty,[1] but the plan failed. Extensive railway building was not started in the Southwest Region until 1936, just prior to the war of resistance against Japan. During the war, the Nationalist Government accomplished a great deal in both railway and highway construction in Southwest

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[1] Wang Chih-fen, Ch'eng Yü T'ieh-lu [Chengtu-Chungking Railway], Shanghai, Hsin chih-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1954, pp. 14-15.

(Table 1 faces p. 851)

Table 1. The Railway Lines of Southwest China, 1959[*]
(Unit: Km = kilometers, Mi = miles.)

Name	Terminals	Length
The Chungching Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Chungking-Chengtu Line	Chengtu to Chungking	505 Km. (313 Mi.)
Szechwan-Kweichow Line	Chungking to Kweiyang	130 Km.[#] (80 Mi.)
	Total	635 Km. (393 Mi.)
The Kunming Railway Administration		
Trunk Lines		
Yunnan-Indo-China Line	Kunming to Hok'ou	465 Km. (291 Mi.)
Chengtu-Kunming Line	Kunming to Neichiang	174 Km.[x] (109 Mi.)
Yunnan-Burma Line	Kunming to Kunnung	35 Km.[y] (22 Mi.)
Branches		
Pisechai Shihp'ing Line	Pisechai to Shihp'ing	144 Km. (90 Mi.)
Chichieh-Kochiu Line	Chichieh to Kochiu	34 Km. (21 Mi.)
	Total	852 Km. (533 Mi.)
The Second Bureau of Railway Works		
Paochi-Chengtu Line	Paochi to Chengtu	496 Km.[z] (285 Mi.)
	Grand Total	1,772 Km. (1,211 Mi.)

[*] Ling Hung-hsün, *Chung-kuo T'ieh-lu Kai-lun* [*General Survey of China's Railways*], Taipei, 1950, pp. 32-33. Ito Toshio, *Chukyo tetsudo no genjo* [*The Present Conditions of the Chinese Communist Railways*], Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1954, pp. 24-25, and 53.

[#] The complete line is 320 kilometers (200 miles) and at present it covers only the completed section between Chiang-chin and Kan-shui-ch'ang.

[x] Covers the already completed section between Kunming and Chan-i, but the total length of the entire line is 810 kilometers (506 miles).

[y] Covers the already completed section between Kunming and An-ning, but the total length of the line is 860 kilometers (537 miles).

[z] Covers the already completed section between Chengtu and Lüeh-yang, but the total length of the line is 672 kilometers (420 miles).

[facing p. 851]

489 China in spite of the numerous difficulties encountered. After the "liberation," the Communists, in addition to the rehabilitation of existing railways and highways, began to build new ones. In addition, some improvements have been made in inland water transport and aviation. Consequently, Southwest China is now able to ship its surplus grain to regions where grain production is inadequate.

I. RAILWAY REHABILITATION AND CONSTRUCTION

496 Since the Communists came to power in 1949, efforts have been made to restore and expand the railway network in Northwest and Southwest China. The railways which are now (1956) in operation in Southwest China are shown in Table 1.

499 Over one-third of the total construction work of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway had been completed by the Nationalists before 1949; the Communists finished the railway in June 1952.[2] According to the Communists, they built 15 new tunnels, 28 large bridges, 189 small bridges, 446 culverts, and about two-thirds of the road foundation.[3] About 35,230 tons of steel rails and 1,250,000 railway ties were needed.[4] Most of the steel rails were supplied by the iron and steel plant at Chungking.[5] The supply of railroad ties presented serious problem but a sifficient amount of timber was collected when the Communists announced that peasants would be allowed to pay land tax in timber instead of grain.[6]

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661 When the Chengtu-Chungking Railway was under construction, a great number of charges of waste and corruption were brought against officials. In Chiu-lung-p'o, Communist

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[2] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an [China Weekly], Hong Kong, July 11, 1955, p. 13.

[3] Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily], Hong Kong, July 12, 1950, July 4, 1951.

[4] Wang Chih-fen, op. cit., p. 25.

[5] Chao Yung-seen, Railways in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1955, pp. 23-24.

[6] Ibid.

499 cadres were charged with stealing ¥1,000
661 million ($40,000).[7]

Many bridges collapsed and had to be rebuilt because material of poor quality had been used.[8] Some Communists cadres could not be trusted to inspect the quality of work done, and others were willing to approve poor work if the contractors paid them a bonus or offered bribes.[9]

497 In July 1952 the Chengtu-Chungking Railway was open to traffic.[10] This railroad, which runs through the richest farmlands of Szechwan, brought new economic prosperity to the province. With the low-cost transportation, the region can sell rice, sugar, salt, and coal in many markets. Principal native products (hemp, vegetable oil, tobacco, and herb medicine) of Western Szechwan are shipped in large quantities from Chengtu to Chungking by rail and thence down the Yangtze River to Central-South and East China.[11]

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[7] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Feb. 22, 1952.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] China Weekly, Hong Kong, July 11, 1955.

[11] People's China, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, July 16, 1953, p. 29.

497 During the first year of operation, over 1,200,000 tons of freight and nearly 2,500,000 passengers were shipped by way of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway.[12] The business turnover of Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan, was 12 per cent higher in May 1952 than in May of the preceding year.[13] An express train from Chungking to Chengtu took 16 hours in July 1953, five hours less than in 1952. Freight tonnage increased by 277.4 per cent and the number of passengers by 118.7 per cent in less than a year.[14] The Communists estimated that over 33 per cent more freight would be carried by the Chengtu-Chungking Railway in 1955 than in 1952 according to one report.[15]

499 Another important railway (the Pao-chi--Chengtu Railway) to link the Southwest with the Northwest is now (1956) under construction. Construction began on July 1, 1953, and the entire line is to be completed in August 1957, the last year of the first Five-Year Plan.[16]

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] New China News Agency, Chungking, June 20, 1955.

[16] People's Handbook, Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 525.

499 But the Communists now expect to complete the line eight months ahead of the original schedule.[17] At the southern terminal, Chengtu, the line will connect with the Chengtu-Chungking Railway, at the northern terminal, Pao-chi, an important industrial center of Northwest China, it will connect with the Lunghai Railroad, which runs from Lanchow in Kansu Province to the port of Lien-yün-kang on the East China coast. The construction of the southern section of the railway, from Chengtu to Lüeh-yang, called for twice as many tunnels as were built for the entire Chengtu-Chungking Railway. The Pa-miao-kou Tunnel is one of the longest in the country.[18] According to Communist plans, the southern section of the Pao-chi--Chengtu Railway, including the laying of rails to Kuang-yüan, 345 kilometers from Chengtu, will be completed in 1954, as will approximately 40 per cent of the roadbed for the section from Kuang-yüan to Lüeh-yang.[19] The target for 1955 was the completion of track-laying between Kuang-yuan and Lüeh-yang.[20]

Work on the northern section has been much more difficult and hazardous because

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[17] New China News Agency, Peking, July 5, 1955.

[18] Ta-kung Daily, Hong Kong, July 4, 1955.

[19] Ibid.

[20] New China News Agency, Peking, July 8, 1955.

499 the railway must pass through innumerable mountains and bridge many deep ravines. About 35 per cent of the roadbeds have to be built on solid rock.[21] Over 30 per cent of the rails had to be laid in tunnels on the section from Pao-chi to Ch'in-ling.[22] In 1955, five tunnels were completed on the northern section and the largest Ch'in-ling tunnel was finished.[23]

496 The section between Chungking and Kan-shui-ch'ang on the Szechwan-Kweichow Railway was completed by the Nationalist regime. Connection with the Chengtu-Chungking Railway has facilitated the shipment of grains, tung oil, and minerals from Chi-chiang and a few other points in Kweichow to Chungking.[24] The original narrow-guage rails have been changed to standard-guage.[25]

The Chengtu-Kunming Railway starts in Nei-chiang on the Chengtu-Chungking Line, passes through Tzu-liu-ching (Tzu-kung), and runs along the Chin-sha River and the Hsiao River to reach Kunming, a total distance of 810 kilometers.[26] The route was

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22. Ibid.
23. Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, Dec. 24, 1953.
24. Wen-hui Daily, Hong Kong, June 25, 1955.
25. Ibid.
26. Chao Yung-seen, op. cit., p. 20.

496 surveyed in 1953 by the Communists, who made its construction a part of the first Five-Year Plan.[27] The section from Kunming to Chan-i completed by the Nationalists has already been opened to traffic.[28] This line is of little economic value, because it runs through the poorer districts of the Chin-sha River valley. However, since it is the shortest route between Chungking and Kunming, it would be of military value in case of war.

The Chengtu-Kunming Railway will be connected with the French-built Yunnan-Indochina Railway at the border. Because the section between Ho-k'ou and Pi-se-chai was destroyed by the Chinese Nationalist Army when the Japanese landed in Indochina in the autumn of 1940, the Communists have had to[29] rebuild this section. It was reported in 1953 that the Communists had begun to extend the Pi-se-chia--Shih-p'ing line through Yüan-chiang and Mo-chiang to reach P'u-erh near the border of Laos.[30]

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[27] New China News Agency, Chungking, Aug. 18, 1953.

[28] Ling, Hung-hsün, op. cit., p. 33.

[29] Chao Yung-seen, op. cit., p. 22.

[30] Ibid.

499 The Chinese Nationalist Government began to build the Yunnan-Burma Railway in the spring of 1941 under an agreement between China, the United States, and Great Britain. In 1942, following the occupation of Rangoon by the Japanese, the work was stop. Only the short section between Kunming and An-ning (35 kilometers (22 mi.)) and about 50 per cent of the earth and stone work of the 550-kilometer section between Wu-chia-chai and Hsiang-yün had been completed.[31]

498 There are two large railway plants in Southwest China -- the Chungking Railway Plant and the Kunming Railway Plant. They are not as well-equipped as those in Central-South, East, and North China, where freight and passenger cars and locomotives have been manufactured.[32]

497 The railroads in Communist China are managed in accordance with the "advanced experience" of Soviet Russia. The most

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31. Chin Shih-hsüan, T'ieh-lu Yü K'ang-chen Chi Chien-she [Railways and War and Reconstruction], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1947, pp. 107-108.

32. Chinese Communist Problems, Hong Kong, Freedom Press, Series No. 1, 1954, pp. 75-76.

497 important measures adopted by Communist China are as follows:

A. The "Economic Calculation System"

Stocks of supplies in each of the railway administration's warehouses are checked in order to determine the amount of working capital needed. The next step is to determine the cost of material resources and manpower; the amount of work required for a particular job must be calcualted carefully in order to determine whether each worker has enough to keep him busy eight hours a day.[33] The economical use of material is another important part of this system. To save on coal, the Chinese Communists have adopted Soviet Russia's "One-two-three" method -- for every "one" kilometer a locomotive runs, coal is added "two times, "three shovelfuls at a time. Anti-rust preservative is used in

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[33] People's Daily, Peking, Dec. 16, 1952.

497 the boiler to soften the water, dissolve the dirt, and prevent rust.[34] The quota system is intended to prevent excessive use of materials. But in actual practice, this problem has not been solved. For instance, the amount of material required for any job will depend upon a number of factors -- such as the quality of the material, the skill of the workers, and the detailed specifications for any particular job. Therefore, a quota cannot very well be fixed in advance.

B. The Full Carload Movement

Because of a shortage of locomotives and rolling stock, the Communist government is enforcing the "Full-carload Movement" in all regions. The so-called "Yang Mao-lin loading method" is considered the model.[35]

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[34] This method is considered out of date in the Western nations. In Western nations, super-heater has been adopted. A saving of about 15 per cent resulted. Experiments with eight-wheeled freight locomotives also resulted in a saving of 25 per cent in fuel consumption. See Chao Yung-seen, Railways in Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1955, pp. 51-52.

[35] Yang Mao-lin was originally a head weigher in the railway station at Harbin.

497 Cargo is divided into various classes according to the shape and the nature of the content; markers are pinned on the packages. Workers are supplied with lists showing the loading order, and they load the marked packages into the freight cars which bear the same marked flag shown on the packages. This is also called the "matching-flag loading method."[36]

C. The Over-Haulage Movement

The overhaulage system was first devised by Cheng Hsi-k'un, an engine drive who had practiced this method as early as 1949 in order to haul 60 tons more than official capacity. When an overloaded train approached an upgrade, Cheng accelerated the locomotive and sprayed sand on the rails. To stop an overloaded train speed was reduced long beforehand and brakes applied twice.[37] Cheng's method proved so efficient that it was adopted to carry military supplies to North Korea.

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36. Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, May 27, 1952.

37. Chieh-fang Jih-pao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, July 6, 1952.

497 At the beginning of the present regime, the Communists encouraged locomotive engineers to make utmost use of their rolling stock. Each loaded train was expected to cover 500 kilometers (312 mi.) every 24 hours. In order to achieve this objective, it was necessary to increase speed and shorten the time lost in car-switching, checking and assembling at stations, and loading and unloading at terminals. The so-called "li Hsi-kuei Train Switching Method" and the "Sun Feng-chi Simultaneous Checking and Repairing Method" were established on all national railways.[38]

D. The Planned Transport

The basic principle of "planned transport" is to make use of all available railway facilities to transport cargoes and to reduce "empty hauls" to the minimum. The promulgation of tentative regulations concerning the regional balancing of production and marketing of coal and its reasonable transport in 1953 incorporates this measure.[39] The country is divided into thirteen coal producing areas, comprising

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[38] Kung-jen Jih-pao [Worker's Daily], Peking, Dec. 19, 1952.

[39] China Weekly, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, pp. 24-25.

497 45 state-operated and joint state-operated and joint state-and-private coal mines. The distribution, supply, and transport of coal are completely under government control. The direction of flow and the regions in which coal is to be marketed are fixed for each mine in order to avoid waste of transportation facilities.[40]

E. Railway Rates

The Chinese Communists re-classified railway freight into thirty classes instead of the five existing prior to their conquest of the Mainland. Railway rates have been adjusted five times. The most recent readjustment of rates was announced in June 1955, when the general level of freight rates was lowered.[41] Items related directly or indirectly to production cost less to ship; those meant for domestic consumption are shipped at higher rates. The rates assigned to the former were usually borne by state industrial enterprises while those assigned to the latter were paid by consumers.[42]

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[40] Ibid., p. 25.

[41] Ibid., Aug. 8, 1955, p. 13.

[42] Ibid.

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[facing p. 864]

Table 2. The National Highways of Southwest China*
(Unit: Km = kilometers. Mi. = miles.)

Highway	Terminals	Route (principal Southwestern cities)	Length
Basic No. 1	Shanghai to Lhasa	Chungking, Neichiang, Chengtu, K'angtung	5, 221 Km. (3, 263 Mi.)
Basic No. 4	Wanting to Ch'engte	Tali, Kunming, Chani, Chungking	4, 615 Km. (2, 884 Mi.)
Longitudinal No. 4	Chanchiang to Pailingmiao	Kweiyang, T'ungtzu, Chungking	3, 614 Km. (2, 259 Mi.)
Longitudinal No. 5	Talo to Shanpa	Kunming, Hsich'ang, Yaan, Chengtu	3, 621 Km. (2, 263 Mi.)
Lateral No. 2	Shanghai to Tientshengch'iao	Yüp'ing, Lungli, Kweiyang, Anshun	2, 782 Km. (1, 738 Mi.)
		Total	19, 853 Km. (12, 407 Mi.)

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* Kuo-tao Wang [The National Highway Network], Nanking, Hsing-cheng-yüan, Hsin-wen-chü, pp. 2-50.

497 Passenger rates were increased from 20 to 30 per cent. Higher rates were charged for exceedingly long or exceedingly short hauls of certain commodities in order to eliminate unnecessary use of transportation facilities.[43]

II. HIGHWAY ROUTES

491 The exact mileage of the highway network in the Southwest region is difficult to determine. The figures given in provincial reports do not agree with those given in the national report. No distinction is made between provincial roads and couty roads, nor is there any consistency in the various records concerning the completion of new roads or when such road are open or closed to traffic.

In this study, all the major national highways which pass through Southwest China are discussed as are principal provincial or interprovincial highways connecting the important cities and towns of the region. Major national, interprovincial, and provincial highways of the region are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

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[43] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

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Table 3. Interprovincial and Provincial Highways in Southwest China[*]

(Unit: Km. = kilometer. Mi. = miles.)

HIGHWAY	TERMINALS	LENGTH
Sinkiang-Tibet Line	Yaan-Lhasa	2255 Km. (1409 Mi.)
Chengtu-Apa Line	Chength-Apa	507 Km. (317 Mi.)
Chinghai-Sikang Line	Hsiehwu-Taot'angho	673 Km. (421 Mi.)
Szechwan-Shansi Line	Chengtu-Paochi	770 Km. (481 Mi.)
Sikang-Yunnan Line	Put'ien-Huili	433 Km. (271 Mi.)
Kunming-Talo Line	Kunming-Talo	-------
Yunnan-Kweichow Line	Kunming-Kweiyang	659 Km. (412 Mi.)
Szechwan-Yunnan (W.) Line	Chennan-Chinshaho	243 Km. (152 Mi.)
Szechwan-Yunnan (E.) Line	T'ienshengch'iao-Ch'ihshuiho	512 Km. (320 Mi.)
Szechwan-Kweichow Line	Sanch'iao-Ch'ungch'iho	306 Km. (191 Mi.)
Kweichow-Kwangsi (E.) Line	Kweiyang-Liuchai	300 Km. (187 Mi.)
Kweichow-Kwangsi (W.) Line	Hotsuling-Patu	266 Km. (166 Mi.)
Szechwan-Sikang Line	Chengtu-K'angting	333 Km. (208 Mi.)
Chengtu-Chungking Line	Chengtu-Chungking	413 Km. (258 Mi.)
Chungking-Wanyüan Line	Chungking-Wanyüan	417 Km. (261 Mi.)
Ch'ienchiang-Sanchiaop'ing Line	Ch'ienchiang-Sanchiaop'ing	785 Km. (491 Mi.)
Kunming-Hok'ou Line	Kunming-Hok'ou	297 Km. (186 Mi.)
	TOTAL............................	9761 Km. (5862 Mi.)

[*] Fei-ch'ü Ti Kung-lu Chiao-t'ung /The Highway Transportation of Communist Area7, Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party, 1953, pp. 22-23.

(Table 3 faces p. 865)

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499 Before the war of resistance against Japan, the highways in Southwest China (including country roads) amounted to 11,818 kilometers (7,386 miles) of which 6,812 kilometers (4,258 mi.) were paved with concrete or surfaced with tar.[44] During the war, the Nationalist Government built many new highways in the Southwest to meet military needs.[45] Since 1950, the Communists have built a number of new highways, including a network of roads in the minority areas. During the three-year period 1952-54, thirgy-four new highways (over 5,000 kilometers or 3,125 miles) were constructed.[46] Of these highways, the Sikang-Tibet Highway, the Chengtu-A-pa Highway, and the Kunming-Talo Highway are most important. The Sikang-Tibet Highway runs from Lhasa to Ya-an, a distance of 2,240 kilometers (1,400 mi.)[47] It climbs over mountains 16,000 feet above sea level. This was the first road to be built at such an altitude. In the past, traders with pack-trains

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[44] Mao Shou-chin Kung-lu Ch'ang-shih [Common Knowledge about Highways], Shanghai, 1951, p. 3.

[45] Ibid., p. 8.

[46] Ching-chi Nien-pao [Economic Year Book], Hong Kong, Economic Bulletin Publishing Co., 1954, pp. 50-51.

[47] China Reconstructs, Peking, The China Welfare Institute, May 1955, p. 2.

491 of yaks journeyed for months to bring their
499 goods to "the roof of the world," toiling over the ranges and deep valleys of the Tibetan plateau. But today trucks make the trip to Lhasa from Shanghai or Peking in as little time as 15 days.[48] When the Communists decided in 1950 to build this highway, teams were sent out to make a complete survey of the terrain. Soviet experts were consulted before the final choice of the route through Ch'ang-tu and T'ai-chao was made.[49]

Construction of the Sikang-Tibet Highway was extraordinarily difficult. The line was divided into 100-kilometers (60 mi.) sections, and workers were equipped with rock-drills and power-driven saws.[50] The snow-line on the Tibetan plateau was 15,000 feet above sea-level, and in certain area the earth was frozen so hard that workers had to use dynamite to blast it.[51]

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[48] Ibid.

[49] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, June 23, 1955, p. 786.

[50] Ibid.

[51] China Reconstructs, May 1955, p. 3.

491/ The bridging of the Nu River was another
499 difficult project in the building of the highway. Both banks of the river rose to a height of 3,000 feet. The river's current ran at a rate of 20 feet per second.[52] Another section of the highway cut across an immense tract of virgin forest, and it took the workers a long time to fell all the huge trees.[53] The Lhasa River Bridge, the last bridge of the highway, was completed in the latter part of December 1954 and the highway was open to motor traffic.[54]

491 The Chengtu-A-pa highway is another principal highway built by the Communists through one of the national minorities areas in Southwest China. Its construction was begun in March 1951 and was completed in November 1955.[55] It runs from Chengtu, the capital of Szechwan Province to A-pa, the commercial center of the Tibetan Autonomous District in Szechwan, a distance of 509 kilometers (318 mi.)[56] During a three-year period prior to November 1955, grains and building and industrial materials shipped to

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid., p. 4.

[55] People's Handbook, Tientsin, Ta-kung Pao, 1955, p. 532; Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, March 21, 1955, p. 12.

[56] Ibid.

491 this district amounted to 25,000 tons, while the native products shipped out of it amounted to 13,000 tons.[57] In Kweichow Province four short highways leading to the national minority district of the province were completed in 1954.[58] The Kweichow-Kiangsi Highway from Kweiyang to Chin-ch'eng-chiang was also opened to traffic in the same year.[59] Road improvement work on the Kweichow-Yunnan Highway was begun in 1955.[60]

Because of the limited number of railways in operation in Southwest China, highway transportation plays a very important role in this region, in spite of the comparatively high cost of motor fuel and a shortage of motor vehicles.

III. INLAND WATER ROUTES

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487 Inland water shipping is a major means of transportation in Southwest China. The two most important navigable rivers are Yangtze and the Chia-ling rivers. There are

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[57] China Daily News, New York, Nov. 23, 1955.

[58] Ibid., Aug. 16, 1955.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

505 numerous minor streams in this region, but
487 most of them are only navigable by junk. Some of the region's rivers are listed in Table 4.

Table 4. The Inland Water Routes of Southwest China*

(Unit: Km. = kilometer.)

RIVER	TERMINALS	DISTANCE (kilometers)	GRADE
Yangtse	Ich'ang-Ipin	1082 (676 Mi.)	3
Chinsha	Ipin-Chinchiangchieh	1000 (625 Mi.)	5
Heng	Hengchiang-Yenchin	80 (50 Mi.)	6
Min	Ipin-Loshan	160 (100 Mi.)	4
Chingshui	Loshan-Chengtu	168 (105 Mi.)	5
Tatu	Yaokut'o-Mapien	110 (69 Mi.)	6
	Loshan-Chink'ouho	100 (63 Mi.)	6
Ch'ingi	Loshan-T'iench'üan	190 (119 Mi.)	6
	Yaan-Yungching	30 (19 Mi.)	6
Kei	Chengtu-Kuanhsien	70 (44 Mi.)	6
Wai	Kuanhsien-P'engshan	110 (69 Mi.)	6
T'o	Luhsien-Neichiang	150 (94 Mi.)	5
	Neichiang-Chu'ngning	408 (255 Mi.)	6
Ching	Fushun-Weiyüan	160 (100 Mi.)	6
Yungning	Nach'i-Hsüyung	120 (75 Mi.)	6
Ch'ihshui	Hochiang-Ch'ihshui	80 (50 Mi.)	5
	Ch'ihshui-Maot'ai	164 (103 Mi.)	6
Ch'i	Chiangk'ou-Tungch'i	102 (64 Mi.)	5
Chialing	Chungking-Kuangyüan	740 (463 Mi.)	4
	Kuangyüan-Lüehyang	200 (125 Mi.)	5
Paishui	Ch'aot'ieni-Mienhsien	140 (88 Mi.)	5
	Chaohua-Pik'ou	150 (94 Mi.)	6
Fu	Hoch'uan-Shehung	379 (237 Mi.)	5
	Shehung-P'ingwu	406 (254 Mi.)	6
Ch'ü	Hoch'uan-Kuangan	125 (78 Mi.)	5
	Kuangan-T'ungchiang	332 (208 Mi.)	6
Nan	Chiangk'ou-Nanchiang	138 (86 Mi.)	6
T'ung	Sanhui-Hsüanhan	110 (69 Mi.)	6
Chung	Hsüanhan-Shuangchok'ou	92 (58 Mi.)	6
Hou	Hsüanhan-Wanyüan	120 (75 Mi.)	6
Wu	Fuling-Liukuang	585 (366 Mi.)	5-6
Ch'ing	Itu-Chuhopa	210 (131 Mi.)	5
	TOTAL...........	8031 (5019 Mi.)	

* Hang-tao Wang [Navigation Route Network], Nanking, Hsing-cheng-yuan Hsin-wen-chü, [Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan], 1947, pp. 26-29.

The different grades of waterways as determined by navigability, are shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Navigability of Rivers*

Rating	Depth	Navigability by Tonnage
Grade 1	5 to 8 meters (16-26')	10,000
Grade 2	3.8 meters (12')	2,000
Grade 3	3.2 meters (11')	1,000
Grade 4	2.8 meters (9')	6,000
Grade 5	2.5 meters (8')	300
Grade 6	1.5 meters (5')	60

* The Navigation Route Network, Nanking, Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan, 1947, pp. 3-5.

505 487 The section between I-chang and I-pin of the Yangtze River has a navigability rating of Grade 3, i.e., navigable for boats up to 1,000 tons. The section between I-pin and Lo-shan on the Min River and the section between Chungking and Kuang-yüan on the Chia-ling River have a navigability rating of Grade 4, navigable by steamers of 600 tons. All the other rivers have a lower rating than Grade 4 are navigable only by junk.

A. Inland Shipping

501 Before the resistance against Japan, China's total shipping tonnage was about 576,000 tons, including 124 ocean steamers totaling 367,383 tons and 3,333 river steamers totaling 208,617 tons. During the war, it was estimated that about 495,329 tons of both types of steamers were lost.[61] After the war, 2,751 Japanese ships of various types, with a total of 251,288 tons, were confiscated, including 507 river boats (62,375 tons) in the Yangtze River area.[62]

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[61] Hang-yün [Navigation], Nanking, Hsing-cheng-yuan, Hsin-wen-chü [Bureau of Information,Executive Yuan], 1949, p. 24.

[62] Ibid., p. 23.

Table 6. Shipping Tonnage of the Yangtze River Area in 1947*

Shipping Classification	Number of Ships	Gross Tonnage
By size		
60 tons--200 tons	460	25,964
201 tons--8,000 tons	47	36,411
Total	507	62,375
By Ownership		
National	160	28,959
Private	347	33,416
Total	507	62,375

* Hang Yün [Navigation], Nanking, Hsing-cheng-yuan, Hsing-wen-chü, [Bureau of Information, Executive Yuan], 1947, pp. 24-28.

B. Recent Developments

501 The Nationalist Government moved a great many government-owned ships from the China Mainland to Taiwan in 1949. It was estimated that less than 20 per cent of the shipping tonnage of the government-owned China Merchant Steamship Company was left to the Communists.[63] But due to the Communists' vigorous efforts in ship-building and ship-repairing, the number of ships available increased substantially in the period 1951-55. The People's Refloating Company has salvaged over 100 steamers of different sizes(totaling over 100,000 gross tons.)[64] adn of these salvaged vessels, the largest is the steamship Chiang-hsin, which is now in operation on the Yangtze River between the port of Shanghai and ports in Szechwan.[65]

503 River-dredging in Szechwan Province progressed rapidly during the three-year period prior to 1955, and a great many rocks and sand bars have been removed, enabling large

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[63] Economic Weekly, Shanghai, Jan. 1950, pp. 7-8.

[64] Wen-hui Daily, Hong Kong, Oct. 12, 1955.

[65] Ibid.

503 junks and steamers to reach many places formerly inacessible.[66] As of September 1955, there were approximately 100,000 kilometers of navigable waterways in Southwest China.[67]
502 The use of river lights along the upper Yangtze between I-chang and Chungking facilitated night sailing and reduced the running time by as much as six days.[68]

505 The former Min-sheng Industrial Corporation, the largest privately owned shipping company in China, was founded in Szechwan. It was reorganized as a joint public-private firm in 1952, and its name was changed to the Min-sheng Shipping Corporation by the Communist regime.[69] The Ch'uan-chiang Steamship Company, a merger of three steamship companies -- the Ch'iang-hua, the Hsieh-hsiang, and the Hua-chung -- was recently converted into a joint public-private corporation.[70] Other, smaller shipping firms in Southwest China were reorganized as well.[71]

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[66] New China News Agency, Chungking, Oct. 12, 1955.

[67] Wen-hui Daily, Hong Kong, Oct. 12, 1955.

[68] Navigation in the Communist Area, Taipei, 1953, p. 16.

[69] The Economic Yearbook, Hong Kong, 1954, p. 52.

[70] Wen-hui Daily, Hong Kong, Sept. 6, 1955.

[71] Ibid.

505 [502] The adoption of the "single file towing" method was recommended by Soviet experts, and it has increased both the speed of shipping and the volume of cargo shipped. It was reported that the Min-sheng Shipping Corporation has made a considerable increase in annual volume of freight since reorganization in 1952. Its target set for 1955 was three and half times that of 1952.[72] The reported efficiency of Min-sheng's tug boats in 1954 was 318 per cent higher than that reported in 1953.[73]

The freight rates for 24 manufactured articles were reduced by an average of 40 per cent in 1955, according to the Ministry of Communication.[74] The reduction of freight rates was made possible by the lowering of transportation costs as the result of improvements in towing methods and other techniques.

000 In Southwest China, Chungking is the most

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[72] Ibid.

[73] Ibid.

[74] New China News Agency, Peking, Oct. 20, 1955.

504 In Southwest China, Chungking is the most important river port. It is at the junction of the Yangtze and Chia-ling Rivers and is a terminus of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway. Loading equipment was installed on the Chiu-lung-po wharf at the port of Chungking after the completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway in 1952. Its loading and unloading capacity in 1955 was approximately 120 tons an hour.[75]

IV. AIR TRANSPORTATION

509 When the Nationalists evacuated to Taiwan in 1949, the two aviation companies, the China National Aviation Corporation, and the Central Aviation Corporation left no airplanes on the Mainland. Most of the planes were flown to Hong Kong. But in November 1949, because of the sudden defection of Liu Ching-i and Ch'en Cho-lin, managers of the two companies, a dozen planes were flown back to the Mainland.[76] Approximately 4,000 company employees in Hong Kong supported Liu and Ch'en, but only a small number of them went back to Mainland China.[77]

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[75] China Daily News, New York, Nov. 4, 1955.

[76] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, Dec. 1, 1940, p. 673.

[77] Ibid.

509 Because of shortage of civil airplanes, the Communists did not make much progress in civil air transportation during the first three years of their regime. Since 1954, however, there has been a considerable increase in the number of commercial airplanes, some of which were supplied by Soviet Russia.[78] Some planes are manufactured in Communist China, but most of the essential parts are imported from the Soviet Union, according to reports from Hong Kong.[79]

The two civil air routes in Southwest China in 1955 were the Peking-Hankou-Chungking line and the Peking-Sian-Chungking Line.[80] The international air routes which are in preparation include the China-Burma, the China-India, and the China-Vietminh lines.[81] The China-Burma civil aviation agreement, signed in Peking on November 21, 1955, provides that China's Civil Aviation Administration will operate the Kunming-Mandalay-Rangoon line and the

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[78] People's Daily, Peking, Sept. 29, 1954.

[79] China Weekly, Hong Kong, Jan. 10, 1955, p. 23.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Ibid.

509 Burma Civil Aviation Corporation will operate the Rangoon-Mandalay-Kunming-Canton line.[82] The national civil aviation targets for the first half of 1955 were surpassed. The number of passengers was 13 per cent above that reported in 1955; freight and mail increased 5.9 per cent and 76 per cent, respectively over the figures for the preceding year.[83]

V. DOMESTIC TRADE

438 Southwest China in general and Szechwan in particular is one of the grain-surplus regions of China. A large part of the surplus grain is shipped to Northwest China through the Chengtu-Chungking and Chengtu-Pao-chi railways and to Tibet by river junks and motor trucks. A small part of the surplus grain is usually shipped to Central-South China by water transport on the Yangtze River.

Part of the raw cotton produced in Szechwan is shipped to Yunnan and Kweichow. Szechwan also receives some raw cotton from Hopei

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[82] Economic Bulletin, Hong Kong, Nov. 21, 1955, p. 12

[83] New China News Agency, Peking, July 20, 1955.

438 Province either for re-shipment to other Southwestern provinces or for local use. The cotton from Hopeh is usually shipped by steamer on the Yangtze River.

Generally speaking, Southwest China is self-sufficient in coal. However, as a safety measure, the region imports some coal from Central-South China.

"State Socialism" is the guiding principle in Chinese Communist industry and trade. During the present transition, state-owned, co-operatives, state-capitalist and private industries co-exist.

A. State-owned Companies

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655 The six state-owned domestic trading companies established in 1950 were the China Food Company, the China Textile Company, the China Salt Company, the China General Merchandise Company, the China Coal and Building Material Company, and the China Native Products Company.[84] All

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[84] Newspaper Reading Handbook, Hankow, Yangtze Daily, 1950, pp. 422-23.

438 655 have branches and sub-branches in the major cities of Southwest China. Some companies, such as the China General Merchandise Company and the China Native Products Company, have branches in the rural areas of the region.[85] If the trade volume of the country as a whole in 1950 is given the index number 100, trade volume rose to 397 in 1952. It is reasonable to assume that the total trade volume of the Southwest Region made a proportionate gain in the same year.[86] The number of state owned and operated commercial firms in Communist China increased 45 per cent in a single year.[87] In 1954, wholesale and retail prices of staples in the eight major cities in the Southwest Region including Chungking and Kunming, increased only 4 per cent over those reported in the preceding year.[88]

B. Co-operative Companies

438 474 Supply and marketing co-operatives

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85. Yuan-li Wu, An Economic Survey of Communist China, New York, Bookman Associates, 1956, p. 380.

86. People's China, Peking, Jan. 16, 1954, p. 5.

87. Current Background, Hong Kong. U.S. Consulate General, Sept. 29, 1955, No. 360, p. 8.

88. Ibid.

438 474 supply farm implements, fertilizer, and a great number of other commodities for both production and consumption purposes to their members. The state trading companies usually draw up contracts in advance to supply products at fixed low prices to co-operatives. The exact number of supply and marketing co-operatives in Southwest China is unknown, but reports indicate that the number has increased rapidly since 1953. By the third quarter of 1955, there were co-operatives in cities in Southwest China and almost every hsiang (group of villages) had at least one co-operative.[89] Co-operatives accounted for one-quarter of the total national retail trade in 1953 -- 18 per cent of the total retail trade in the cities and 30 per cent of that in rural areas. About 75 per cent of all the purchases by co-operatives were made on behalf of the state.[90]

C. State-Capitalist Companies

475 The principal "State-Capitalist" corporations serve as distributors of the

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[89] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, May 12, 1955, p. 597.

[90] Ibid.

475 products of supply and marketing co-operatives on a commission basis. Private merchants purchase commodities from state trading companies at wholesale prices and resell them to consumers at retail prices fixed by the state. Joint state-private ownership has replaced private-capitalist ownership, and the state invests capital in trading firms under joint management. Throughout China approximately 200,000 private wholesale merchants and 2,000,000 retail traders had been forced to accept "socialist transformation" by the end of 1953. By early 1955, almost 100 per cent of the wholesale merchants dealing in grain, lumber, edible oil, and salt accepted the change to the "state-capitalism" arrangement.[91]

D. Private Companies

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656 Private traders and individual merchants, too, have been led on the road of state-capitalism. As a result of the growing monopoly of state-owned companies, private wholesale dealers have either been

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[91] Kung-shang-chieh [Industry and Commerce], Peking, Aug. 10, 1955, p. 17.

472 656 squeezed out of business or transformed into retail traders acting as agents of state trading companies. They are compelled to accept "socialist transformation."

After the "planned purchase and supply of grains" was introduced, nearly all of the retail dealers in grain were "transformed" into agents of the state grain markets. By the first half of 1955, over 33 per cent of the retail traders in China were acting as agents for state trading companies or co-operatives.[92] According to Communist plans, the total volume of private retail trade will be decreased from 65.9 per cent of the total retail trade in 1953 to 45.1 per cent in 1957.[93]

VI. FOOD RATIONING AND GRAIN TRADE

434 Rationing was first applied to food grain on November 19, 1953, in accordance with a government order for the enforcement of "planned purchase and planned supply of grains," designed to control the distribution of food during the period of reconstruction.

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[92] Industry and Commerce, Peking, Aug. 10, 1955, No. 8, pp. 17.

[93] Ibid., p. 18.

434 The stocks of all traders engaged in the sale of grain or other essential foodstuffs became the property of the state, which was to determine the ration and fix the official purchasing price and the retail selling price of various grains.[94]

In order to facilitate the work of rationing in cities, industrial and mining districts, and in rural areas where not enough grain was produced, state grain markets were established throughout the country. Upon the establishment of state grain markets, all private wholesale or retail grain shops in Southwest China were either forced out of business or were "transformed" under state guidance.[95]

Because of periods of flood and drought in 1953 and 1954, the production of grain in some regions of China was not sufficient to meet local demands. The system of rationing was unsatisfactory and caused discontent among the people. In rural districts, the implementation of the "San-ting" policy, i.e., the fixing of production, purchase, and supply quotas, resulted in great dissatisfaction among the farmers, who were unable to meet

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[94] Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong, May 12, 1955, No. 17, p. 604.

[95] China Weekly, Hong Kong, April 12, 1954, pp. 12-14.

434 the demands of the Communist cadres. In many cases farmers found it impossible to feed themselves and their families. In urban areas the per capita ration was too small for the maintenance of minimum subsistence standards.

VII. TRADE FAIRS

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438 In order to stimulate trade and facilitate the interflow of commodities between the urban and rural areas, the Chinese Communists have held a number of "Local Produce Fairs" in most of the principal cities throughout Southwest China. Some of the more notable fairs held in 1952 are shown in the following table:

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Table 7. Local Produce Fairs in Southwest China, 1952. *

Fair	Location	Trading Volume (Million)
Southwest Commodity Fair	Chungking	¥566,600 ($22.7)
Ch'wanfei Third Native Products Fair	Nanchung	¥205,900 ($ 8.2)
Ch'wannan Commodity Fair	Lu-hsien	¥107,600 ($ 4.3)
Ch'uansi Commodity Fair	Chengtu	¥ 73,000 ($ 2.9)
Yunnan Second Commodity Fair	Kunming	¥ 69,600 ($ 2.8)
Kweichow Native Products Fair	Kweiyang	¥ 34,900 ($1.4)
Kweiyang Municipality Native Products Fair	Kweiyang	¥ 74,000 ($2.9)

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Total	¥1,248,500 ($49.9)

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* Economic Weekly, Shanghai, May 28, 1953, No. 28, p. 7.

543 In 1952, the total trade volume of
443 these fairs amounted to US$49,900,000, of
438 which the fair in Chungking, the commercial center of the region, accounted for approximately 45 per cent.

CONCLUSION

000 The Communists plan intensive development of railway and highway transportation in Southwest China. The completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway was of considerable importance to the utilization of the industrial and agricultural resources of Szechwan Province. The completion of the Pao-chi--Chengtu Railway will link the Southwest with the Northwest and will be of great strategic value to the Communists in case of war.

At the time of the building of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway, a number of cases involving the corruption of Party cadres were brought to light. Many cadres accepted bribes from contractors who were anxious to sell the government inferior materials or who had economized by doing a shoddy job of construction. These practices, according to the Communists, accounted for the collapse of several bridges shortly after completion.

000 Workers were "conscripted" from forced labor camps, and many were inexperienced and too weak for so rigorous a job. Many of the cadres were neither properly trained nor adequately paid for the responsibilities they were required to assume.

Major highways built in "minority areas" in Southwest China will be used to facilitate the development of economic resources heretofore untapped, and they will also be used to tighten Communist controls over minority groups.

As a result of state monopoly of domestic trade, most private commercial firms have been forced out of business or have been compelled to accept "socialist transformation." Most of the retail dealers in the provinces of Southwest China are unemployed and in danger of starvation. Those who do not succumb to the propositions offered by the Communist regime will be eliminated in one way or another before they can join the ranks of rebellion.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3f,
Economic Background

SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE [*]

178 Prior to World War II, few modern industries had been developed in Southwest China. There were no spinning mills or cotton textile plants, for example. Power plants in the region produced only 17,000 kilowatts of electricity, an amount so low that it discouraged further industrial development. Only after the retreat of the Nationalist Government to Szechwan and the subsequent arrival of industrial equipment salvaged from East and Central China was it possible for a modern industrial society to develop. Factories were rapidly constructed, and some 10,000 skilled laborers migrated to Southwest China. Most of these factories were poorly built, had insufficient equipment, were inadequately financed, and encountered difficulty in maintaining operations under the impact of inflation during the war years. After the war, those industries which had survived were forced out of business by the press of competition from east coast cities and foreign markets.

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[*] Unless otherwise indicated, information in this chapter is supplied by Dr. K. N. Chang, consultant and author of chapter, from private sources.

Industries in Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan were financed in various ways. In Chungking, industries important to the war effort were built by the government itself; some textile plants were financed by government banks. Shipping, coal mining, power generating, and cement manufacturing were developed by local entrepreneurs with the help of funds from government banks. The Szechwan-Sikang Industrial Development Company was organized, with capital subscribed by the central and provincial governments, to promote industry in the two provinces; it succeeded in establishing a few enterprises. In Kweichow Province, officials organized the Kweichow Enterprise Corporation, a holding company financed by the Kweichow provincial government, the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Central Government, government banks, and local private interests. With its own capital or with the participation of private capital, it promoted 24 enterprises, including machine-manufacturing, chemical-manufacturing, tobacco-processing, flour-milling, the manufacture of electrical products and matches, and other light industries; it also controlled the provincial bank and a department store.

In Yunnan, the Yunnan Provincial Bank controlled the tin mining industry, the most important industry in the province, and a textile mill. The bank also promoted several other industries, with the participation of private capital. All of these industries were brought under the Yunnan People's Enterprise Corporation, a holding company, which was indirectly controlled by the Yunnan Provincial Bank. A few industries were built with the help of local "semi-public" banks. There was only one large private industry, the Yun Mow Cotton Textile Mill, established by a commercial firm of long standing with extensive holdings in Burma.

Government-financed industries were easy prey to the Communists when they took over control of this region. In Chungking, the Communists simply assumed command of all the industries operated by the Central Government and the government banks as well as those industries supplied with government credits. The three holding companies in the Southwest Region also came under Communist control. In one stroke, all the major industries in Southwest China fell into Communist hands.

In addition to extending control over the remaining private operated industries by confiscating the shares owned by "bureaucrats" and "reactionaries," the Communists sought to win the support of prominent businessmen by offering them various positions with the local government, commending them as "progressive elements" within the community, and offering other inducements of a similar nature. The intention was to force acceptance of government participation in business. In this way the number of joint state-private enterprises was increased. The following examples will illustrate the Communist program.

471 The Min Sheng Industrial Company in Chungking, a shipping enterprise with a large fleet of river boats, an ironworks, and shipbuilding and machine shops, was noted for its services to the government during the war. The founder and general manager of the company, Lu Tso-fu, was invited by the Communists to return to Mainland China from Hong Kong. He was assured that the Communist regime favored the continuation of his enterprises and would assist him whenever possible. Upon his return, he was appointed a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. When the Min Sheng Company was prassed for the payment of interest due on the credit extended by Canadians who had helped the company finance the construction of a number of vessels in Canada, the Communists facilitated the necessary payments. However, in 1952 the Min Sheng Company was transformed into a joint-state-private enterprise only a short time after the announcement of Lu's suicide. Why he chose to kill himself is not known, although it will be suspected that his relationship with the Communists was not as cordial as the Communists wished it to seem.

Hu Tzu-ang, an infuential local businessman and general manager of the Szechwan-Sikang Industrial Development Company, was appointed a member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and a member of the Finance and Economic Committee of the People's Government; he was also made deputy-mayor of Chungking Municipality. He has been used by the regime

471 to influence private factories to accept state orders for the processing and manufacturing of goods -- one step in the process of transforming private industry into joint state-private enterprise.

Wang Shao-yen, the brother of the general manager of the Yun Mow Cotton Mill in Kunming and its largest shareholder, was appointed deputy-chairman of the Yunnan Provincial Government while living in Hong Kong. A native of Yunnan, he has been used to win for the Communists the support of local businessmen as well as of community leaders. The Yun Mow Cotton Mill was transformed into a joint state-private enterprise in 1954.

The Min Sheng Company and the Yun Mow Cotton Mill were able to pay dividends to their shareholders after being transformed from private to joint ownership, but persons receiving payments were required to subscribe 90 per cent of their dividends for government bonds. Although Tung Shao-sheng, chief assistant to Lu Tso-fu, was appointed assistant general manager of the Min Sheng Company, actual direction of the company rests in the hands of a manager appointed by the Communists.

Among the few remaining industries under private ownership were some twenty cotton textile mills, with a total of 217,000 spindles, which had been built in Szechwan during the war. Two of these mills had been financed by the Bank of China. When the Communists reorganized the Bank of China, these two mills were taken over immediately by the Communists, and the remaining privately owned mills were in process of transformation during 1954. In all, there were 32 joint state-private enterprises in Chungking; their output in 1954 was reported to constitute over 43 per cent of the total value of all large-scale production by private industry and to account for more than 30 varieties of products.[1] About 130 enterprises were reported to have been transformed in Szechwan Province in 1954, not including those in Chungking.[2]

During 1953-54, about 30 enterprises in Yunnan Province were transformed.[3] With the exception of the Yun Mow Cotton Mill, they were all small factories producing cheap consumer goods.

In Kweichow Province, the Communist regime assumed control of all enterprises operated by the Kweichow Enterprise Corporation, but there were few other industries in the province worth the Communists' immediate attention.

The rapid transformation of private commerce in the Southwest Region can be illustrated by reports from Chungking. According to the mayor of Chungking, wholesale butchers and four classes of dealers in grain, cotton and silk piece goods, oil and wax goods, and firewood, coal, and charcoal were taken over by the state's commercial agencies.[4] Exporters of native products

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[1] Chungking Jih-pao [ChungkingDaily], Dec. 27, 1954. [2] Ibid.

[3] Jen-min Jih-pao [People's Daily], Peking, June 6, 1954.

[4] Chungking Daily, Jan. 13, 1955.

471 and dealers in hardware and electrical appliances, general goods, stationery, pharmaceuticals, dyestuffs, and Chinese medicines were temporarily allowed to carry on their businesses or were asked to do wholesale business on behalf of the state agencies. Some were persuaded to turn to retail trade or were given assistance in changing to other lines of business.

In the sphere of retail trade, the mayor's report stated that all private grain shops had been transformed into state agents in the course of carrying out the program for unified grain purchasing and marketing. In addition, 1,094 retail shops and 160 stall-keepers dealing in cotton cloth, sugar, edible vegetable oils, and dyestuffs were drawn into the orbit of "state capitalism." They were forced to stock goods furnished by state agencies on a consignment basis.

In order to accelerate the transformation of private industry and commerce, a conference of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce was held in November 1955.[5] A message addressed to industrial and commercial circles asking for the acceptance of "socialist transformation" reported that more than 80 per cent of private industry, figured in terms of total value of production, was then in process of becoming joint state-private enterprise, and more than 50 per cent of the private retail merchants had become agents of "state capitalist" commerce by November 1955. This statement on national conditions is the

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[5] New China News Agency, Nov. 21, 1955.

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471 best indication we have on the extent of present over-all "socialist transformation" in Southwest China.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3g,
Economic Background

LABOR

I. LABOR ORGANIZATION

467 Southwest China was more economically backward than any other region of China proper when the Communists established their regime in October 1949. Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Chinese industry had been concentrated on the east coast of such cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, and Canton. In the inland, Southwest provinces of Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan, and Sikang (now a part of Szechwan), industry had remained almost wholly in the handicraft stage. This situation was somewhat changed during the war when industrial plants removed from the coastal area and new factories were located in the Southwest, particularly at Chungking, Kunming, and Kweiyang. Many of the plants were discontinued after the war or removed to their original sites in the eastern cities.

The low stage of industrial development in the Southwest Region explains why the Communists' promotion of labor organization and the labor movement in the region has lagged behind similar efforts elsewhere in China. According to a Communist report of June 1950, there were only 177,670 industrial workers, including staff members, in the entire region. This number

467 constituted about 0.05 per cent of the total number of industrial workers in all China, although the population of the region accounts for 16.9 per cent of the population of the whole country. Of the 177,670 industrial workers, only 25,538 (14.37%) were unionized at the time the report was published.[1]

After three years' work on labor organization and the development of industry, the new regime announced in June 1952 that 35,259 basic trade unions (unions formed in individual factories, mines, and other enterprises) had been formed in the region.[2] The number of unionized industrial workers was reported to have increased from 25,538 to 640,846, and the total of all unionized wage earners was set at 1,405,706.

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466 However, in mid-1952, about 80 per cent of the industrial output of Southwest China was still turned out by handcraft methods in small shops throughout the region.[3] Old fashioned workshops and some of the semi-modern factories continued to rely heavily on apprentices for labor. The

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1. Chung-kuo Kung-jen [Chinese Worker Monthly] , Peking, June 15, 1950, p. 69.
2. Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily] , Chungking, Sept. 30, 1952, p. 1.
3. Chung-kuo Ch'ing-kung-yeh [China's Light Industry] , Peking, May 1952, pp. 21-24.

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438 466 treatment of apprentices under the new regime still largely followed the old customs in Southwest China. The working hours of the apprentice were almost unrestricted; his earnings seldom amounted to more than 35 lbs. of rice per month. Since the trade union and labor insurance laws promulgated by the Communist government did not cover the apprentices, they had neither organization nor security. After a three year apprenticeship, they[4] entered the labor market as unskilled labor.

467 Chungking is the industrial and commercial center of Southwest China. As a result, almost all regional reports concerning organized labor refer solely to this city. Chungking was occupied by the Communists on November 30, 1949, and the Preparatory Committee of the Chungking General Trade Union was established on December 27. The committee consisted of 87 members, including representatives of miners, textile workers, telecommunication workers, and workers in other industrial enterprises. The initial tasks of the committee were the restoration of production and the organization of labor in the city. By September 1951, about 90 per cent of the city's 200,000 working population were reported to have joined trade unions.[5] A large part of the Chungking industrial force was working in arsenals in the suburbs of the city. These workers were more tightly controlled by the regime but better paid than

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[4] New China Daily, Oct. 9, 1951, p. 2.

[5] Ibid., Oct. 1, 1951, p. 5.

467 the average worker. By mid-1953, 6,700 of the politically advanced industrial workers in Chungking were party members.[6]

II. LABOR DISPUTES AND LABOR BUREAU

468 According to Chinese Communist theory, labor and capital (or management in the case of publicly owned enterprises) perform different functions in striving for the identical goal of increased production; therefore, labor disputes should not be allowed to develop into strikes, sabotage, or lockouts which would interrupt production. To prevent crippling disputes, the regime has established a compulsory process of arbitration. The first step in settling labor differences consists of consultation between the owner and the trade union representatives of the workers in the case of privately owned enterprises, and between the trade union and the management in the case of publicly owned enterprises. If consultation fails, the dispute is taken to the labor bureau for settlement. Labor bureaus are maintained at all levels of the Communist government.[7] During the first half-year of Chungking's "liberation," some workers of privately-owned enterprises were reported to have submitted, under the guidance of trade unions

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[6] Kung-jen Jih-pao [Workers' Daily], July 1,1953, p. 1.

[7] "Measures Concerning Procedure of Settling Labor Disputes" issued by Ministry of Labor on Nov. 26, 1950. See Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-t'se Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compendium of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies, Vol. II, Peking, pp.1111-13.

and the labor bureau, to a cut in wages of from 40 to 60 per cent to help tide the capitalists over a difficult period.[8] 468

On the basis of experience in settling labor disputes, the Ministry of Labor in April 1950 issued a "Directive Concerning the Establishment of Labor-Capital Consultative Councils in Privately Owned Enterprises." In accordance with the directive, 34 different groups of private enterprises in Chungking formed their labor-capital consultative councils between mid-1950 and mid-1951. Labor and capital were equally represented on the council. During the period, consultations between labor and capital in various Chungking enterprises resulted in 2,224 agreements which were submitted to the labor bureau for ratification. Almost without exception, matters brought up in the councils for consultation were concerned with wages and the discharges of workers.[9]

III. POLITICIAL INDOCTRINATION

The Communists insist that the strength and class consciousness of the workers can only grow out of political indoctrination. In the guise of implementing this dogma, the Communists initiated the "Democratic Reform" Movement among the working class in May 1951, followed by the Resist-America-Aid Korea Movement, the Suppression-of-Counterrevolutionaries Movement as well as the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. Through 467 668

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[8] Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao [Compendium of Government Reports], Peking, 1951, p. 1013; Workers' Daily, June 21, 1950, p.1.

[9] New China Daily, Oct.10, 1951, p.2.

467 these drives, the Communists claim that trade
668 union organization was greatly expanded throughout the nation and the unity of the working class increased.

The "Democratic Reform" Movement was aimed specifically at the elimination of reactionary elements from labor organizations. Launched in Central-South China in May 1951, the movement was extended to the whole country in the following months. Its centers of action were the public and private factories, mind, and transportation systems.

To initiate "Democratic Reform" in any enterprise, the trade union leaders called meetings, at which everyone was free to make complaints or accusations against workers, union cadres, or managers. Once initiated, the campaign continued for days or weeks. In subsequent meetings, criticism and self-criticism were encouraged. The Communists claimed that many reactionary elements were disclosed this way. Within the transportation industry alone, 15,616 gang labor chiefs were said to have been eliminated throughout the country a few months after the movement started.[10]

The Communists claim that the conditions of construction workers at Ta-tu-k'ou and coal miners at the T'ien-fu mine, both in Chungking, were improved after the "Democratic Reform"

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[10] Current Background, Hong Kong, U.S. Consulate General, Oct. 15, 1951, No. 128.

467 Movement was initiated there in mid-1951. Prior
668 to the Communist regime, the system of recruitment in contruction work and in the mining industry was known as the gang master system. The gang master made a contract with the head engineer or manager of a company to supply labor for certain jobs at a stipulated price. He employed villagers for low wages and pocketed the difference between his payroll and the contract price. According to the Communist press, when the Red Army took Chungking at the end of 1949, the gang labor chiefs infiltrated the labor organization and some of them even pretended to be activists. The Communists assert that in the criticism and self-criticism meetings these gang labor chiefs were discovered and eliminated from the labor organization in Chungking.[11]

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

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461 Labor emulation is a Communist method for increasing labor productivity without raising production costs. It was practiced in Communist China during the early 1940's in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region.[12] Extended to all China in 1950, the labor emulation drive was stepped up in 1951 after the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War. According to the

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[11] New China Daily, Oct.10,12,14,1951; and Oct. 2,1952, p. 2.

[12] Abundant Clothing; Sufficient Food, Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, May 1944.

466 461 Communist tenet, labor emulation is a natural and spontaneous expression of the working class when it becomes the leading element in the country and begins to work for its own and national interests.

The responsibility for initiating labor emulation drives rests with the trade union leaders. They develop the campaign by the following stages: (1) the workers are brought together to discuss state production plans; (2) the trade unions, acting on behalf of the workers, then sign collective contracts with the managements of individual factories, mines, or other enterprises; (3) meetings are called to discuss production problems; and (4) the workers are urged to originate and submit "rationalization proposals"[13] and to popularize "advanced methods of work."[14]

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[13] 13. In Communist China, the term "rationalization proposals" means proposals submitted by workers to management for increasing production through improved techniques, reducing the cost of production, introducing methods to lengthen the life of machines, and using manpower more efficiently. The submission of rationalization proposals emerged as a campaign in Northeast China in 1947 and spread to all China in 1950. Cf. Kuo-min Ching-chi Shih-yung Ts'u-tien [Popular Dictionary of Practical Economics], Shanghai, 1952, pp. 9016-17.

[14] 14. The campaign to popularize "advanced methods of work" is a movement corresponding to Stakhanovism in Russia, a means of increasing the output of workers through publicized competition and the widespread adoption of faster or improved techniques developed by model workers. See Ibid., p. 9057.

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Since Southwest China was the last region to be occupied by the Communists, the labor emulation drive began there in 1952, two years after the movement's appearance in the other regions. In the later stage of the drive, emphasis was placed on raising the tehcnical skill of workers instead of lengthening working hours as had been done earlier in the movement. Throughout the region, Communist trade union cadres urged workers to improve working processes and devise more efficient working methods. In September and October 1952, the workers in the iron and steel and cotton textile industries of the whole region were said to have submitted 11,700 rationalization proposals.[15]

There were some reports of increased labor productivity in Southwest China following the inception of the labor emulation drive. They were accompanied by other accounts of an increase in sub-standard and unacceptable products. For instance, in a measuring instruments factory in Chungking, a production contract was signed by the union and management stipulating that if the workers could not fulfill 80 per cent of a fixed quota, there would be a wage cut. As a result, the workers raised their output, and the number of seconds and rejects increased accordingly.[16]

During an emulation drive, workers who showed special initiative and ingenuity in improving their work were accorded the title of "model workers" and given wide publicity. In addition, they received honors and rewards, prior rights to better housing, jobs as teachers of "backward"

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[15] Workers'Daily, Oct.22,1952, p. 1.

[16] New China Daily, Sept. 13, 1952, p. 2.

466 workers, invitations to talk to visitors about
461 their accomplishments, and, occasionally, even tours of foreign countries for propaganda purposes.

V. WAGES AND PURCHASING POWER

465 In order to insure a stable income for the people at a time of wide fluctuation in commodity prices, the Chinese Communists introduced a system whereby workers were paid in wage-units. One wage unit was worth the sum of the retail prices of the following daily necessities,[17] over which the government had control:

Food grain.	0.80 catty*/
White cotton cloth	0.20 ch'ih#/
Edible oil	0.05 catty
Salt	0.02 catty
Coal.	2.00 catties

*/ One catty = 1.1 lb.
#/ One ch'ih = 1.09 ft.

Southwest China was the last region to adopt the wage-unit system. In October 1952, the money value of the wage-unit in the Southwest region was quoted at 2,158 yuan (old currecy), the lowest quotation in the country. Before the wage-unit system was adopted in this region, workers were paid in "commodity-equivalent" units,[18] which had been used previously in Communist China to compute and stabilize savings deposits. One "commodity-equivalent" unit was quoted in October 1951 at 5,492 yuan (old currency).[19] The average miner in the T'ien-fu coal mine in Chungking was reported to be earning 120 "commodity-equivalent" units per month in mid-1950, which amounted to 659,000 yuan (about US$22),[20] while the average monthly pay for the construction worker was said to be 89 "commodity-equivalent" units (about US 19.50). The lowest pay was received by the apprentices who averaged 4.5 "commodity-equivalent" units per month[21] (about US$1.00).

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[17] Yangtze Daily, March 11, 1951, p. 2.

[18] Commodity-equivalent units were also based on the prices of essential commodities.

At the end of 1951, state-operated enterprises in the Southwest Region began to pay their workers in wage-units instead of "commodity-equivalent" units. The average gross earnings of a highly skilled worker in a Chungking steel factory was reported to be 300 wage units a month, amounting to 647,400 yuan (about US $25.90). An unskilled worker earned about 60 wage-units per month (about US $ 5.20).[22]

The Chinese Communists claim that the wages of Chinese workers have been rising as production increased, but the Communists' own figures do not support the claim. According to

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[19] New China Daily, Oct.4,1951.p.6.

[20] There are no direct quotations on the exchange rate of the yuan in terms of the U.S. dollar at this period. The figure is worked out from Hong Kong money to be about 25,000 yuan for one U.S. dollar.

[21] Chinese Worker Monthly, Sept.1950, p.70.

[22] New China Daily, Sept. 25, 1952, p.2; and Sept. 30, 1952, p. 1.

465 Communists statistics,[23] the average annual increase from 1951 to 1953 in the total value of industrial products of the Southwest Region was about 32 per cent. The 1953 average wage of workers in publicly owned enterprises in the region exceeded the 1952 average by only 13 per cent.

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511 The Chinese Communists boast that the increase of wages in China does not merely keep pace with the rise of living coats as is supposed to happen in a capitalist society, but represents a real elevation of the workers' living standard. In the Southwest Region, people's purchasing power[24] in 1952 was said to be 30 per cent higher than in 1950. The New China News Agency reported that three times the amount of cotton textiles were being supplied to the people of Szechwan Province in 1954, compared with 1951.[25] In Chungking, the consumption of meat in Nov. 1952 was reported to be 160 per cent higher than that in the pre-Communist period.[26]

An examination of the budget of a skilled worker in a Chungking steel factory, reported by the New China Daily on September 25, 1952, offers evidence for doubting the validity of the Communist

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[23] People's China, Peking, Sept. 1, 1954, p. 18.

[24] Ching-chi Tao-pao [Economic Bulletin] Feb. 24, 1953, p. 10.

[25] NCNA, Chengtu, Sept. 9, 1954.

[26] Economic Bulletin, Sept. 8, 1953, p. 1.

[redacted]

465 claims:
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Income (Wages and bonuses)	Yuan
	600,000

Expenditure	Yuan
Rice	90,000
Fuel (coal and wood)	68,000
Edible oil	10,800
Fat	8,000
Salt	510
Supplementary food	80,000
Rent	25,890
Total	283,200

465 511 651 The expenditures in the above budget are all for food and rent, which consumes about 47 per cent of the average worker's earnings. Besides clothing and other miscellaneous expenses, the remaining 53 per cent of his gross income is subject to various deductions in the form of union fees, "voluntary" contributions, and purchases of government bonds. When the Communist government issued the 1950 Victory Bond series, the Southwest Region was allocated 700,000 points; people[27] were urged to buy as many points as they could afford. The purchase of even one point was a big deduction from the workers' small income. After the Chinese Communists entered

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[27] One Victory Bond point was equal to the total value of six catties of rice, one catty of flour, four ch'ih of cotton cloth, sixteen catties of coal. One unit was quoted at 14,005 yuan (old currency) at the beginning of 1950.

the Korean war, the Chinese workers were urged 465
to make "voluntary" contributions to finance the 571
war. Within three months of 1951, workers in the 651
city of Chungking contributed 13,200,000,000 yuan (old currency).[28]

The Communists have reported an increase 511
in bank savings throughout the whole country. By 466
early May 1954, total savings deposits in cities nationwide were stated to be ten times larger in May 1954 than at the end of 1950. By the end of 1953, savings deposits in the Southwest Region had increased by 7.5 times as compared with 1950. But the increased savings do not necessarily indicate surplus spending power in the hands of the people. Beginning in 1952, the Chinese Communists forced each worker to put 25 to 30 per cent of his income in the People's Bank as compulsory savings to prevent possible inflation and to accumulate capital for national construction.[29] After deducting the "voluntary" contributions and compulsory savings, there is not likely to be money for the workers to spend for other than daily living needs.

VI. LABOR WELFARE

A. Insurance and Health

Under the Labor Insurance Law promulgated 745
by the Communist government in March 1951, 5,380,000 workers throughout China received insurance coverage for death, old age, illness and disability. In the Southwest China Region, there were 163,824 workers, other than railway

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[28] New China Daily, Oct. 25,1951,p.2.

[29] Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an[China Weekly], Hong Kong, Jan.4, 1954, p. 41.

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745 and telecommunication employees covered by the insurance law in mid-1952. In the whole region, there were only three large sanitoria, nine rest homes, and 53 crêches established under the provisions of the Labor Insurance Law. The largest sanitoria for workers is located in Nan-wen-ch'üan (Southern Warm Spring), a famous health resort and scenic beauty spot ten miles south of Chungking.

B. Labor Safety and Industrial Accidents

466 The Chinese Communists claim that from 1949 to 1953 the People's Government enacted 119 decrees, rules, and regulations concerning labor safety and sanitation. But there are no indications that any of them has been enforced to any extent. Since the intensification of the labor emulation drive in 1951, the incidence of industrial accidents in Southwest China has been increasing. A report covering the first half of 1952 showed a serious situation. According to the deputy director of the Department of Industry of the Southwest Region,[30] during the first six months of 1952, 3,245 industrial accidents occurred in the region and the accident death rate increased 56.25 per cent over the corresponding period of 1951. From June to August 1952, there were 273 serious industrial accidents reported in Chungking alone. As a result of these disclosures, the municipal government of Chungking issued a directive in September 1952 calling on all responsible parties in the factories and mines of Chungking to follow carefully the labor safety measures and to establish special agencies in each

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[30] *Ibid.*, January 19, 1953, p. 7.

466 enterprise to supervise the enforcement of safety rules and make detailed reports on industrial accidents. Working conditions were reported to have been improved since the issuance of the directive.[31]

C. Labor Education and Recreation

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466 At the time the Communists took over Mainland China in 1949, from 60 to 80 per cent of Chinese workers were illiterate (i.e., they could read less than 1,000 Chinese characters). In June 1950, the Government Administration Council issued the "Instructions for Developing Spare-time Education of Workers," a measure aimed at teaching all workers at least 1,000 characters within a period of three to five years and the ability to read simple books and newspapers. The Communist Trade Union Law stipulates that the management or owner of every enterprises must allocate a certain sum for the education of workers. By mid-1952, besides night classes opened in individual factories and mines, there were 652 spare-time schools in the region. "The Quick Method of Learning Chinese Characters" devised by cultural instructor Chi Chien-hua of the People's Liberation Army is lauded as a great help in accelerating the learning process among workers. Workers having a high degree of intelligence are reportedly being sent to universities and technical institutions for advanced study. The

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[31] New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 16, 22, 1952, p. 3.

873 Party, unions, and management decide who is qualified for additional technical training. The workers entering schools receive financial support equal to their former wages. The stated intention of the Chinese Communists is to build a new intelligentsia within the working class.

466 In the interest of worker recreation, the Communists reported that 11,929 clubs had been set up in factories, mines and other enterprises throughout the country by the end of 1954. From 1949 to 1952, 348 workers' clubs and 712 libraries were reported to have been established in Southwest China.[32] Workers were encouraged to enjoy their leisure time in these clubs and libraries. But in Communist China, even the "leisure" of the masses is controlled by the Party. After an 8- to 10-hour working day, workers have to participate in political studies, criticism or self-criticism meetings, or various campaigns, movements and drives initiated by the Party. It is doubtful that the Chinese workers have any real leisure time at all.

D. Housing Conditions

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466 According to a Communist report, People's Government spent more than 286,000,000 yuan (new currency) on housing projects for workers throughout China in 1952. In 1953, the government allocated 130,000,000 square feet of floor space for building workers' living quarters.

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[32] New China Daily, Sept. 29 and 30,1953.

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362 466 The housing projects for workers of Southwest China have been concentrated in Chungking and Chengtu; the number of units built was far less than in other regions. By March 1953, nine apartment houses with 577 rooms for workers and their families had been built in Chungking. There are no private baths and no private kitchens in these apartments. Only workers in construction and public utilities are eligible to live in these apartments. They rented for 12 wage-units per month (25,890 yuan, about US 1.00).[33] The municipal government of Chengtu completed a housing project for 512 families in April 1953. The whole project consisted of 14,896 square meters of floor space (about 152,534 square feet). Each family occupied about 250 square feet of floor space.[34] Compared with the living standard in pre-Communist China, this is a great improvement, but it benefitted only a small part of the working force.

VII. UNEMPLOYMENT

464 Since the Constitution of Communist China guarantees the right to work to everyone, the Communists maintain that "unemployment" under the new regime is a temporary holdover from the old

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[33] New China Daily, April 29, 1953, p. 2.

[34] Ibid., April 30, 1953, p. 2.

economy and will eventually disappear after the transformation from the capitalist economy to the socialist economy is completed in the future. 464

During the period from 1952 to 1952, 354,297 unemployed workers registered with the local governments in the Southwest Region. By October 1952, about 76 per cent of the registrants had found work through their own efforts or through government agencies. The Communist methods of unemployment relief included "substitution of work for relief," "increased production and self-help," and a "back-to-the-village" drive. Most of the unemployed urban workers in the Southwest Region were recruited to build railways, highways, and other public works in large cities such as Chungking, Chengtu, and Kungming. Only 15 per cent of the unemployed workers received direct relief in the region.[35]

VIII. THE FIVE YEAR PLAN AND THE WORKERS OF SOUTHWEST CHINA

The industry of Southwest China is still largely in the handicraft stage. The first Five-Year Plan initiated by the Communists in 1953 contained no major projects for the region. None of the small-scale factories and mines play any significant parts in the plan. Despite these facts, 185

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[35] New China Daily, Chungking, Sept. 29, p. 2 and Sept. 30, p. 2, 1952.

185 in 1953 and 1954 the workers in the Southwest had to respond to the demand of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions for renewed labor emulation drives and increased efforts to raise production. Reports of increased production in the region during the first three years of the plan were scattered, indicating that the workers in the Southwest have not been carrying a major load in Communist reconstruction under the plan.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3h,
Economic Background

FORCED LABOR IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

697 When the Chinese Communists seized control of Mainland China, they declared that they were going to use forced labor as a means of punishment for political offenders. The "landlord class, bureaucratic capitalists, and the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang" would be compelled to "Reform through labor" in order to qualify as "new men under the new regime."

687 In Southwest China the Communists instituted the Land Reform Movement and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries as they had done in other regions of the country. Chou Hsing, Chief of the Public Security Bureau of the Military and Political Committee in Southwest China, reported on November 17, 1951, that, according to incomplete statistics, there had been 5,181 cases in 1950 involving spies, bandits, "local despots," and other types of counterrevolutionaries in the Southwest Region. 697 Up to June 1950, of the population of that region, 80 per cent were said to have joined with local governments in suppressing counterrevolutionary elements, and thousands of arrests had been made. Beginning in May 1951 public security

497 agencies in the whole region began to clear the accumulated cases and organized the convicts for Reform through labor.[1] A report from Formosa estimated the number of prisoners sentenced to death or to Reform-through-labor for political reasons in this area at 1,484,000 up to the end of 1953, and those who had been put under public surveillance[2] at 743,154. The latter also were forced to perform manual labor.

But in some cases of forced labor, the political aspect has been overshadowed by the economic significance. Men were sent to forced-labor camps not only because they held different political views from the ruling class, but also because they were needed to fulfill huge economic plans such as the Hwai River project in East China and the Ching River harnessing project in the Central-South Region. In the Southwest similar examples may be found in the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway and of the Sikang-Tibet Highway.

II. MASS LABOR IN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION (CHENGTU-CHUNGKING LINE)

499 The Chengtu-Chungking Line is 505

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[1] Hsin-hua Jih-pao [New China Daily], Chungking, Nov. 21, 1950.

[2] Pei-kuan-chih T'ieh-mu Hou Ti Hsi-nan [Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, 1954, No. 5, p. 3.

499 kilometers (about 314 miles) in length and connects the provincial capital of Szechwan Province and the commercial center of the Southwest Region. In addition to the building of roadbeds, which had been partly finished by the Nationalists, the entire work consisted of building 45 tunnels, 327 bridges, 701 culverts, and 26,530,000 cubic feet of earthwork.[3] It was begun in June 1950 and was completed by the end of June 1952, six months in advance of the scheduled time. It was opened to traffic on July 1 of that year.

A. Recruitment of Labor

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464 In June 1950, the Southwest Railway Engineering Committee was created by the Southwest Military and Political Committee. Because of the urgent need for construction, the authorities first used the regular army. At the same time, the Southwest Railway Engineering Committee, in co-operation with the hsien governments, worked on the recruitment of civilian labor. In addition to patriotic appeals such as they had used in other mass-labor projects, the authorities promised the peasants

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[3] Wang Chih-fen, Chengtu-Chungking Railway, Shanghai, 1954, pp. 18-19.

499 464 reduction of land rent, the return of rental deposits on their land, and a cheap supply of daily necessities to the workers along the construction sites. The methods of recruitment seemed to be effective. Some 38,000 persons answered the call from the eastern part of that province; 30,000 from the southern part, 10,000 from Chengtu and the western part; 6,000 from the northern part; and 22,000 unemployed workers from Chengtun and Chungking also took part in the construction. The total labor force amounted to 104,000 men.[4] After the recruited civilians were organized, they took over the construction job from the army, some members of which were kept to act as office personnel and as an engineering corps.

B. Organization and Living Conditions of the Labor Force

499 466 The units of the labor organization were formed according to the plan of the projected line, which was divided into 180 sections. Each section was allocated 579 workers. Each group of workers was divided into two shifts. They were formed into small teams according to the character of the work assigned to them. Their

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[4] Cheng Chu-yüan, Chung-kung ti Nu-kung Chin-tu [Slavery System of the Chinese Communist] Hong Kong, Tzu ch'u-pan-she, 1952, p. 89.

499 sphere of movement was restricted to within
466 2 *li* (about 545 yards) on each side of the construction line.

499 The recruits were paid according to piece
465 rates, calculated on the basis of the work-day unit. One work-day unit is what an average worker could accomplish in one day. In the case of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway construction, one work-day unit is 2.5 cubic meters (about 81.75 cubic feet) of earthwork. For this amount of work, one worker received seven and one-half catties (about 8.25 lbs.) of rice.[5] In Southwest China, one catty of medium-grade rice was sold for 740 *yuan* (old currency); one U.S. dollar was worth about 20,000 *yuan* at the time. Therefore, 7.5 catties of rice would be worth about 27 cents in the United States. With this amount of money per day, the worker had to provide for his food, clothing, and other necessities, not to mention the support of his family.

499 The recruits were required to bring their own tools such as pickaxes and bamboo poles, for railway construction in China depended upon physical labor rather than upon mechanical equipment. Machinery for the laying of tracks was not introduced until the spring of 1954 in building the Pao-chi-Chengtu Line. The workers

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[5] *The World Today,* Hong Kong, Oct. 15, 1952, p. 2.

499 on the Chengtu--Chungking Line came to depend upon the primitive tools they brought, or used their bare hands. In their spare time, they were urged to make tools such as bamboo baskets for removing stones and mud. In their letter to Mao Tse-tung from the workers on the Chengtu-Chungking Line, they boasted that they had made and invented several hundred kinds of tools during the period of its construction.[6]

C. Methods Used to Increase the Productivity of Labor

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466 The Communists used all sorts of emotional appeals to increase productivity. After some activists among the workers had vowed not to go back home until they saw the train running between Chengtu and Chungking, 90 per cent of the builders gave up their New Year's vacation during the first year, and many young workers postponed their wedding dates. Early in 1951, the Communists organized the Three-Systematization and Five-Comparison campaigns among the working teams.[7] Within a period of four months (January to May), in consequence of these

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[6] New China Daily, Jan. 18, 1952, p. 4.

[7] The Three-Systematization Campaign included systematization of thought, of organization, and of rules. The Five-Comparison Campaign included comparison of work, of efficiency, of progress, of safety, and of economy. For details about these movements, see New China Daily, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 2.

499 466 campaigns, 130,000 "model workers" were elected and labor productivity increased. Taking the standard accomplishment for one work-day as 100 per cent, an average worker at first could fulfill only 25 per cent, but by the end of 1951, this had increased to 150 per cent.[8]

After the Communists entered Korea in November 1950, the Resist-America Aid-Korea Movement was instituted in the labor camps along the Chengtu-Chungking Line. The Communists aroused "hate-America" feelings among the workers and kept on telling the workers that the speeding of the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking Line was one way to defeat "American imperialism." The railway workers worked longer hours after being exposed to this propaganda. By the end of 1951, nearly 70 per cent of the entire undertaking had been completed.[9]

In addition to patriotic appeals, the Communists mobilized the workers to organize a Red Flag Campaign. To win the red flag, some members of one labor team worked steadily and slept only 30 hours in a period of 18 days[10] in order to fulfill the assigned task within the time required, One report from a Formosan

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[8] Wang Chih-fen, op. cit., p. 24.
[9] New China Daily, Dec. 8, 1951, p. 2.
[10] Ibid., June 22, 26, 1952.

499 466 source stated that the mortality rate among the workers was as highly as 10 per cent at the beginning of construction[11] in 1950, although the Communist press insisted that the workers seemed to think that the harshness of their life was nothing in comparison with what they had achieved. The Communists made the workers believe that they had built a road leading to paradise.[12]

D. Other Railway Construction in Southwest China

499 Since the sites of these railways are the same as the sites of the forced-labor camps, it would be helpful to list those lines under construction or in contemplation in Southwest China.[13]

1. Pao-chi--Chengtu Line connects Pao-chi in Shensi Province and Chengtu in Szechwan Province. The southern section was begun after the completion of the Chengtu-Chungking Line in 1952. As of May 1955 the track-laying

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[11] Kung-fei K'ung-chih-hsia Ti Szechwan [Szechwan Under the Communist Control], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, the Nationalist Party, Jan. 24, 1955, p. 24.

[12] New China Daily, Jan. 18, 1952, p. 4.

[13] Southwest China Behind the Iron Curtain, pp. 25-26.

499 work had already passed the Wei River. Originally it was scheduled to be finished in 1957, but the Communists have now scheduled its completion for 1956.

2. The Chengtu-Kunming Line runs from Chengtu in Szechwan Province to Kunming in Yunnan Province. Work on the line was begun in 1954 and scheduled for completion within the period of the first Five-Year Plan, which ends in 1957.

3. The Lung-ch'ang --Kweiyang Line is still being planned.

4. The Szechwan-Sikang Line will run from Chengtu to Ya-an in former Sikang Province. It is in the planning stage.

5. The Hunan-Kweichow Line will run from Chu-chou in Hunan Province to Kweiyang in Kweichow Province. It is under contemplation.

6. The Yunnan-Burma Line will run from Kunming in Yunnan to Nanta in Burma. It is under contemplation.

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III. MASS LABOR IN HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION (SIKANG-TIBET HIGHWAY)

The Government Administration Council

499 issued one directive concerning the conscription
464 of peasants to build and repair the highways in 1951,[14] which authorized all levels of local governments (administrative district, hsien, chu, and hsiang) to recruit and organize civilian labor for highway construction. It is stipulated in the directive that one recruit is limited to 10 standard work-days each year. One standard work-day is the average amount of work accomplished per day per person in that locality. The recruits receive no daily allowance for their food and are required to bring their own tools. In Southwest China, during five years of Communist control, about 5,000 kilometers (about 3,105 miles) of highways had been constructed with recruited laborers.[15] The most important one -- the Sikang-Tibet Highway -- was completed by the end of 1954.

A. Difficulties of the Job

491 The Sikang-Tibet Highway, 2,240 kilometers (about 1,400 miles) long, today links Lhasa with the rest of China. It is the first highway built in China at such a high altitude and in the face of so many difficulties. It climbs the

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[14] Compendium of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies of the Central Government, Peking, March 1952, Vol. III, pp. 713-15.

[15] People's Daily, Jan. 13, 1955.

491 snow-clad mountains that tower 16,000 feet above sea level, with bridges across the tremendous ravines where mountain torrents plunge through twisting gorges. The area along the route is rocky, precipitous, and subject to earthquakes, landslides, avalanches, and shifting sands.

499 Although the Communists had no topographical
464 maps of this region, no geological, seismological, or weather records, and no engineers with experience in highway construction over such a terrain as the Plateau of Tibet, they mobilized a tremendous amount of manpower.

B. Labor Force and Working Conditions of the Laborers

By the end of 1951, the local governments of K'ang-ting, Ya-an, Ch'ang-tu and T'ien-chüan had recruited about 8,000 civilian laborers. They began to work with the man-power of the People's Liberation Army. In that winter they worked on the terrain 16,000 feet above sea level under severe weather, 25 degrees below zero (C). By March 1952, out of the original 8,000 builders, 3,500 had died as the result of hardships and the climate.[16] At the same time, a fresh

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[16] Cheng Chu-yüan, op. cit., p. 98.

499 supply of 50,000 recruits continued to pour
464 into the construction sites, including thousands of Tibetans who worked from the western end of the line.

499 The builders were equipped with rock drills and power-driven saws which they moved in first to get rid of the most stubborn obstacles. It seems that on the Sikang-Tibet Highway road-building machinery was used more than on other highway construction. In one report the Communists said that snowplows and bulldozers cleared millions of cubic feet of snow and earth, replacing hand labor even on mountain tops and in deep forests.[17]

The Sikang-Tibet Highway has been the most-talked-about highway construction in Mainland China. Almost all the newspapers in different parts of China sent the reporters to the construction sites. This resulted in thousands of detailed press reports which disclosed the "heroic and tragic life of the masses who toiled on the roof of the world."[18]

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[17] China Reconstructs, Peking, May 1955, pp. 2-5.

[18] People's Daily, June 9, 1954, and Dec. 17, 1954, Ta-kung Pao [Ta-kung Daily], Aug. 7, and Sept. 26, 1954.

499 Workers and soldiers scaled vertical rock-walls, fought their way across rapids, and crept inch by inch across glaciers, disregarding wind, rain, and snow. Where the laborers worked in Ch'iao-erh-shan Mountain, the altitude was 17,000 feet above sea level, there was snow all year round, and the earth was frozen to a depth of over three feet. The workers built their tents on this hard-frozen floor and made their beds of dry leaves and tree branches. Sometimes they were buried by snow, their tents swept away by avalanches; in one place an avalanche fell every afternoon for five months. One section of the road cut across an immense tract of virgin forest which was cleared by manual labor, although each tree required several days' work by a team of three or four men.

The bridging of the Nu River was said to be the most "heroic" act accomplished by the builders. Both banks rose in sheer precipices about 3,00 feet high, and the current ran 20 feet per second. The point they had chosen for bridging had never been crossed. A group working on the Nu River bridge was completely cut off from its supply line, and the laborers were forced to live on rice gruel for two months before they were rescued.

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466 The Communists gave better treatment to the workers on the Sikang-Tibet Highway than to

499 workers elsewhere, for they did not use such
466 methods as "emulation drives" and "model workers' elections" to speed up work as they did on other projects. On the contrary, the authorities on the Sikang-Tibet Highway prohibited overtime work. The fact that the labor supply was not so abundant in this region and that they could not afford to transport workers from other parts of the country made them more lenient to the laborers on this project.

The Sikang-Tibet highway was opened to traffic by the end of 1954. To travel from Peking to Lhasa once took several months; today the trip can be made in fifteen days.

IV. REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR IN SOUTHWEST CHINA

697 A Communist report admitted that, in the Southwest Region, of the prisoners convicted through suppression of counterrevolutionaries, through land-reform laws, and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, 65 per cent had been organized by the end of 1951 into Reform-through-labor corps. They were employed in such heavy work as road-building, house construction, coal mining, collective farming, brick- and tile-manufacturing, and in handicraft industries such as weaving and shoe-making.[19] The size

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[19] New China Daily, Nov. 8, 1951, p. 2.

697 of the labor corps varied in accordance with the actual needs of the locality and was under the jurisdiction of the local public security offices. The following are some of the labor camps in the Southwest Region.

A. Reform-through-labor Camps in Chungking

Chungking was the headquarters for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries in the Southwest Region in 1951. In that year there were 100,000 arrests in Chungking alone. There were four Reform-through-labor camps in Chungking suburbs: (1) the Shih-pan-p'o, with 4,000 prisoners; (2) Tz'u-ch'i-k'ou, with 1,000 prisoners; (3) Wang-shan camp, with 2,000 prisoners; and (4) Sun-chia-hua-yüan camp, with 1,300 prisoners. The prisoners were organized according to physical condition and production techniques into groups engaging in different trades such as tile- and brick-making, wood, stone, earth, and lime works, and sewing, weaving, and other handicraft industries.

In addition to these permanent setups, there were temporary labor camps in Ts'ai-yüan-pa, Shan-hu-pa, and Ch'ao-t'ien-men. These temporary labor camps had been established to relieve the overcrowded prisons before

697 the labor corps were sent away to construction sites.[20]

B. Reform-through-labor Camp in Ch'i-chiang Hsien (East Szechwan)

Most of the prisoners here were employed in railway construction and coal mining. The corps who were engaged in coal digging netted 13,000,000 *yuan* (old currency) per month, while the women prisoners in the shoe factories netted 3,000,000 *yuan* per month.[21]

C. Labor Camp in O-mei Hsien (South Szechwan)

This camp was organized in March 1951, and laborers began work with one worn-out cart; later the camp developed into a large organization, including carpentry, lime kiln, brick and tile shops, paper-making works, and a duck farm. It accumulated a fund of 60,000,000 *yuan* (old currency) in 1952.[22]

These two cases of Reform-through-labor corps indicate that the Communists carried out the policy of combining punishment with labor

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[20] *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1951, p. 2; also Cheng Ch'u-yuan, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

[21] *New China Daily*, Nov. 8, 1951.

[22] *Ibid.*

697 production as defined in the forced-labor code, "Regulations Governing Reform-through-labor," promulgated in August 1954. Article 74 of that measure stated that the funds for the agencies enforcing Reform-through-labor are derived from (1) appropriations from the state budget and (2) income from production under Reform-through-labor.[23] In the case of O-mei Hsien Labor Camp, the state had supplied one "worn-out cart." The prisoners produced surplus value for the state at the start.

D. Labor Camps in Fu-ling Administrative District in Szechwan

The local government of Fu-ling Administrative District chose about 90 "intellectuals" and cadres from different hsien for training in the techniques of Reform-through-labor and then sent them back to their native places to join Reform-through-labor camps. They strengthened the rules in the labor camps and enforced among the prisoners a system of awards and punishment. Those prisoners who were found idle during labor service or who violated control measures were severely punished. Others, who had obeyed the law, exerted effort to study, and engage actively in production

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[23] People's Daily, Sept. 7, 1954.

697 were awarded with praise, material reward, or a reduction of their sentences. After these changes the productivity of the labor corps in this district doubled.[24]

What happened to prisoners who refused to "reform" may be judged from the case of Chiang-chin (Szechwan), where six labor-camp inmates were executed because they resisted control regulations and joined counterrevolutionary groups during the period of Reform-through-labor.[25]

E. Reform-through-labor Corps in Kweichow and Yunnan

According to a report by Ch'en Tseng-ku, vice-chairman of Kweichow Province, 70 per cent of the population of the province had joined the drive for the suppression of counterrevolutionaries. There were about 25,000 prisoners undergoing Reform-through-labor in Kweichow Province in 1951, half of whom became self-supporting when they began work.[26] Most of the prisoners were officials of the Nationalist regime or officers of the Nationalist Army. They were organized into teams according to their knowledge and ability. Those

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[24] New China Daily, Oct. 20, 1951, p. 2.
[25] Ibid., Dec. 12, 1951.
[26] Ibid., Nov. 23, 1951.

697 who had no professional training were formed into groups to reclaim waste land, repair or build municipal warehouses, and work on the highways.[27]

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731 In Li-chiang hsien, Yunnan Province, a Reform-through-labor corps of 30,000 prisoners was employed to repair the damages of an earthquake in December 1952. With the help of the peasants in the area, they dredged 6 rivers, rebuilt more than 100 villages, dug 78 ditches, and constructed 87 water basins to irrigate 110,000 mou (about 16,610 acres) of rice field, which was returned to production by the prisoners.[28]

There are several Reform-through-labor camps in the suburbs of Kunming, capital of Yunnan Province. One is in T'an-hua-ssu, and contained 3,000 prisoners in 1954.[29]

V. COMMENTS

464 It is doubtful that the use of patriotic appeals in recruiting peasants to work on the construction of such projects as the Chengtu-Chungking Railway and the Sikang-Tibet Highway would be successful again and again. The

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27. Sung Wei-ta, Hung-chieh Yü-sheng [Life After Red Terror], Taipei, 1955, p. 104.

28. Yün-nan Tung-nan-ya Ti Huo-san [Yunan--the Volcano of Southeast Asia], Taipei, Sixth Section, Central Committee, The Nationalist Party, May 1954, p. 31.

29. World Today, Aug. 1, 1954, p. 12.

464 Chinese peasants are both individualistic and conservative. After they have acquired land, they wish to be left alone. If the Communists want to employ men on mass-labor projects in the future, they may have to rely increasingly on material offers rather than on emotional appeal.

In their press reports, the Communists have always boasted of their ability to mobilize millions of peasants to work for the "Motherland"; they seemed to care little for the results of mobilization. In many cases, because of lack of planning, the use of patriotic appeals to arouse the masses resulted in a waste of manpower, causing frustration among those who remained idle or worked needlessly. For instance, one Communist report from Mien-chu Hsien in Szechwan Province admitted that the local government wasted 16,000 mandays in digging a well which did not yield one drop of water. Another report from Ying-shan, also in Szechwan Province, stated that the local dams were swept away by the torrent before the recruited peasants had finished them. In both cases, the local governments spend 30,000 catties (33,000 lbs.) of rice to feed the otherwise unpaid laborers.[30]

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[30] New China Daily, Nov. 24, 1951, p. 2.

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464 The easy mobilization of the masses in the Southwest Region discloses also the existence of a large group of unemployed in that region. Projects such as the construction of the Chengtu-Chungking Railway and the Sikang-Tibet Highway provide a means of coping with the unemployment problem and the population pressure which is typical in an overpopulated and underdeveloped country such as China is today.

Annex "A," Subparagraph 3i, Economic Background

FOREIGN TRADE

I. INTRODUCTION

439 A comprehensive survey of trade between Southwest China and foreign countries is not feasible because pertinent data is lacking. Much of the import and export trade of the inland region has been routed through seaports, and statistics on China's international trade have been compiled on the basis of reports submitted to the customs at the point of entry or embarkation.

In the case of imports, it is almost impossible to differentiate goods destined for the Southwest Region from those bound for other parts of the country until they reach their final destination. But to trace the flow of imports in the domestic market beyond their point of entry would require detailed trade statistics at wholesale and retail levels which are unobtainable. Nor is it feasible to make even crude estimates on the basis of regional consumption because relevant data is again lacking.

In the case of exports, the situation is somewhat different. We know what commodities are exported abroad from the Southwest Region and have available national export figures on these

439 products and statistics on their production in the Southwest and China as a whole. From these and other relevant data, we can obtain some idea of the Southwest's share in the export of tin, bristles, and tung oil. Because of the practical problems involved in an overall survey of the Southwest's foreign trade, this chapter will be confined to a discussion of the specific products, which are of special significance in the region's export trade.

II. TIN

439 328 China's tin production was badly crippled during World War II. Reduced from a high of more than 13,000 metric tons or 7.8 per cent of the world supply outside the Soviet Union in 1938 to a low of 2,000 metric tons in the last years of the war, the nation's output had recovered to only about one-third the 1938 rate at the time of the Communist takeover in 1949. Under the Communists, the production of tin was reported to have reached 6,400 tons in 1953 or about 3.6 per cent of total world production with the exception of the Soviet Union. Most of the increased output was the result of mining expansion in the Ko-chiu area of Yunnan, the major source of China's tin supply.

Tin constitutes a large part of Yunnan's total contribution to the nation's export trade. Under the Nationalist Government, much of China's tin went to the United States to pay the principal and interest on loans granted before and during World War II. However, China was only a minor source of supply for the United States' total tin requirements.

(See Table.1.)

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328 Details about the tin trade of Communist China are not now available. China's own needs for tin have undoubtedly increased under the Communist industrialization program, and any exportable surplus easily could have been absorbed by the Communist bloc of nations. Either or both suppositions would account for the complete discontinuance of Chinese tin shipments to Hong Kong after the Communist domination of the Mainland.[1]

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[1] See the statistics covering trade between China and Hong Kong published regularly in the Far Eastern Economic Review, Hong Kong.

Table 1. China's Tin Exports in Relation to the United States' Tin Requirements */

[In 1,000 tons]

Year	U.S. Imports from China	U.S. Tin Consumption in Manufacturing	Percent of U. S. Requirements Met by Chinese Imports
1935-39 (aver.)	2.7	77.3	3.43
1940-44 (aver.)	2.7	97.6	2.81
1945	1.9	83.6	2.06
1946	1.0	80.9	1.22
1947	2.6	88.1	3.00
1948	1.6	90.8	1.78
1949	3.7	72.4	5.09
1950	1.7	104.5	1.59
1951	.1	88.2	.62
1952	n. a.	78.4	-
1953	n. a.	85.6	-
1954	n. a.	82.6	-

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*/ Commodity Research Bureau, Commodity Yearbook 1955, New York, 1955, p. 335.

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III. BRISTLES

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237 Before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, China's total export of bristles ranged from 8 to more than 10 million pounds a year. (See Table 2.) From 1937 to 1941, the volume was reduced to between 6 and 8 million pounds a year due to the curtailment of bristles supplies from North China and partial disruption of normal distribution channels inside China. In the following two years, the bristles trade between Free China and the outside world was drastically reduced by Japan's total blockade of the China coast. Improvements in air transportation and the Chinese Government's efforts in increasing the collection of bristles from producers in Southwest China, particularly in Szechwan, permitted the nation to more nearly meet the continuing demand abroad for the product by exporting 4 million pounds in 1944, as against only 600 thousands pounds the previous year. The dislocations arising from the war-to-peace transition and the unrealistic official foreign exchange rate of the Chinese yuan reduced the export of bristles in 1945 to 1.3 million pounds. From 1946 to 1948, exports of the product regained their prewar rate of about 10 million pounds a year.

Between 1930 and 1950, the United States and the United Kingdom were the chief importers of Chinese bristles. (See Table 2.) From 1931 to 1938, the United States directly imported between 35 and 45 per cent of China's total bristles export, and in the next ten years between 55 and 95 per

Table 2. China's Bristles Export in Relation to the United States' Bristles Import a/

Year	Total Export from China	Total Import of U.S.A.	China's Export to U.S.A.	China's Export to U.S. as Percentage of: China's Total Export	U.S.A Total Import
	(in thousands of pounds)				
1931	8,484	4,245	3,061	36.1%	72%
1932	8,001	3,486	2,847	35.6%	82
1933	9,100	5,186	4,168	45.8	80
1934	9,273	4,143	3,341	36.0	81
1935	10,199	4,854	3,887	38.1	80
1936	11,607	-	4,693	40.4	90
1937	8,917	4,825	3,734	41.9	77
1938	8,011	3,209	2,859	35.7	89
1939	7,347	5,163	4,632	63.0	90
1940	7,840	5,640	5,078	64.8	90
1941	6,039	5,789	5,229	86.6	90
1942	141	1,458	968	686.5	66
1943	599	1,384	533	89.0	39
1944	4,282	2,871	1,659	38.7	58
1945	1,329	2,840	1,251	94.1	44
1946	10,493	6,454	5,785	55.1	90
1947	9,778	7,042	5,689	58.2	81
1948	10,125	7,307	6,842	67.6	94
1949	-	4,828	-	-	-
1950	-	7,357	-	-	-
1951	-	3,654	-	-	-
1952	-	5,368	-	-	-

a/ Based on Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China, 1948, Nanking, 1948; and on the following publications of the United States Department of Commerce, Washington, D. C.: Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1948, 1949, 1950; Monthly Summary of Foreign Trade of the United States.

(Table 2 faces p. 945.)

[redacted]

439 cent. These percentages are even higher if ship-
237 ments of Chinese bristles to the United States via Hong Kong are included. Statistics on the United States' importation of bristles show that from 80 to 90 per cent of the American foreign supply was normally derived from China.

After the Communists gained control of the Chinese Mainland in 1949, trade between the United States and China generally declined. However, the trade in bristles seems to have been an exception.

According to private information from a bristles merchant in New York, the commodity is of such strategic importance to the United States and so unavailable elsewhere than China that American government trade restrictions have been overlooked in regard to bristles imports, usually via Hong Kong. This policy would explain the steadiness of bristles imports into this country during 1950-52 (See Table 2.) despite the political changes occuring in China before that time.

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439 It is difficult to estimate with precision the
237 part of the Southwest provinces in Chinese bristles production, and export, although the importance of the region's contribution is generally known. Before 1937, according to one authoritative study, about 15 per cent of the bristles exported from China came from the Southwest provinces.[2] During the war, the collection and export of bristles in these provinces were administered by the Foreig Trade Commission, a Chinese government agency specially organized to foster the export trade of Free China. According to Nationalist Government statistics, the quantity of bristles collected in the Southwest provinces, mainly from Szechwan, during 1941-45, was as follows:[3]

Year	Thousands of Pounds
1940	1,638
1941	2,772
1942	3,520
1943	2,596
1944	2,728

On the basis of an average annual export of 10 million pounds for all China, the above figures

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[2] Chung-kuo Ching-chi Nien-chien [Economic Yearbook of China], Hong Kong, T'ai-p'ing-yang ching-chi yen-chiu she, 1947, pp. 55-58.

[3] Chinese Ministry of Information, China Handbook, 1937-1945, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1947, p. 419.

[redacted]

439 237 and other relevant statistics indicate that between 15 and 20 per cent of the nation's bristles exports normally originated in Southwest China.

I V. TUNG OIL

439 245 During the last two decades, several important developments have occurred in the tung oil trade between the United States and China. First, from 1939 to 1953, the United States' domestic production of tung oil increased by more than tenfold, whereas the quantity imported was reduced by about two-thirds. In 1953, domestic production for the first time surpassed imports of the commodity. (See Table 3.)

A second important development was the decreasing importance of China as a source of supply for tung oil imports into the United States. Before World War II, more than 90 per cent of American tung oil imports usually came from China. During 1943-45, the Chinese supply disappeared almost entirely from the American market because of the wartime disruption of major transportation arteries between China and the outside world. A temporary recovery in the oil trade between the two countries occurred in 1946, but in the years following, the relative importance of the Chinese supply of tung oil to the United States was greatly reduced because of the increased production of tung oil in South American and the curtailment of Chinese trade as a result of civil war in the country.

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Yet another development in the Sino-American tung oil trade after World War II was the decline in the relative importance of the American market as an outlet for Chinese tung oil exports. From 1932 to 1937, Chinese tung oil shipments to the United States constituted from 62 to 72 per cent of China's total tung oil export. During 1946-48, the ratio dropped to between 31 and 52 per cent.

Like other statistics cited in this chapter, those pertaining to tung oil include only the quantity involved in direct trade between China and the United States; they do not account for shipments from China to America via Hong Kong, or other intermediate ports. The practice of indirect shipment was commonly used during the war because of the Japanese occupation of China's maritime provinces and was frequently resorted to in the postwar era to evade trade and foreign exchange restrictions enforced by the Nationalist Government. Despite the absence of figures on Sino-American indirect trade, the decreasing importance of Chinese tung oil to the United States market because of expanding production of the commodity in North and South America is quite evident.

Normally, about one-third of China's tung oil export comes from Szechwan; Kweichow, another Southwestern province, also produced tung oil but on a much smaller scale. Before the Communist Government came to power in Mainland China, the tung oil from Szechwan was usually shipped lighter in barrels or in bulk via the Yangtze River to Shanghai, where it was transhipped to foreign countries.

[facing p. 949]

Table 3. China's Tung Oil Export in Relation to the
United States' Import and Production of Tung Oil a/

Year	U. S. Domestic Production	U. S. Import for Consumption	U.S. Import From China	Total Export From China (in millions of lbs.)	U. S. Import From China As Percentage of: Total U.S. Import for Consumption	U. S. Import From China As Percentage of: Total Export from China
	(- - - - in thousands of pounds		- - -)			
1931	-	74,668	--	109.2	95.4%	*
1932	-	72,594	66,106	107.0	93.4	61.8%
1933	-	114,544	117,213	166.2	94.5	70.5
1934	-	110,007	90,476	143.9	84.4	62.8
1935	-	120,069	108,467	162.9	91.2	66.6
1936	-	134,830	137,319	191.2	94.8	71.8
1937	-	174,885	141,343	227.0	91.1	62.3
1938	-	107,456	12,538	153.4	-	8.2
1939	3,000	78,718	1,536	73.9	-	2.1
1940	62	97,049	-	51.2	-	-
1941	3,533	43,800	-	46.3	-	-
1942	2,290	8,269	-	2.0	-	-
1943	5,310	68	-	.2	-	-
1944	2,568	1,771	-	.2	-	- -
1945	10, 353	1,370	-	.2	-	-
1946	11,046	34,919	35,892	77.7	96.5	46.2
1947	12,680	114,327	54,755	177.6	45.00	30.9
1948	16,837	122,853	86,695	167.8	65.0	51.7
1949	22,449	154,687	-	-	-	-
1950	23,467	104,041	-	-	-	-
1951	12,667	24,847	-	-	-	-
1952	23,151	28,500	-	-	-	-
1953	43,155	-	-	-	-	-

a/ U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Statistics, 1954; U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Yearbook, 1948, 1949 and 1950; and Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1947.

(Table 3 faces p. 949.)

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439 245 After 1949, the pattern of the trade was drastically changed. Partly because of the trade policy of Communist China and partly because of American government restrictions on trade with Red China and the use of Chinese Communist assets in the United States, the continuance of Chinese tung oil exports on the old scale to the United States became impossible. Although during the last few years a considerable amount of tung oil has been shipped to the United States from Communist China, the volume has been relatively small compared to that of the pre-Communist era. Apparently, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and countries in the Soviet bloc have replaced the United States as the leading outlets for Chinese tung oil exports.

Annex "A"

APPENDIX A

CONSTITUTION OF COMMUNIST CHINA

I. INTRODUCTION

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The general character of the Chinese Communist Constitution -- and its relation to the 1936 Soviet Constitution -- may be indicated by an account of the way in which it was produced. In January 1953, a constitutional-drafting committee was formed, consisting of thirty-two members, of which a majority of seventeen were from the Communist Party. The drafting committee then sat idle for a year without a meeting. The Communist members made necessary revisions and decided on a draft without consulting the other members of the committee. According to a leading party theoretician, Liu Shao-ch'i,

> "While drafting the Constitution, the committee for drafting the Constitution referred to all the constitutions, past and present, of the Soviet Union as well as to the constitutions of the People's Democracies. It is obvious that the experience of the advanced

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> socialist states, headed by the Soviet Union, has been of great help to us. Our draft constitution embodies the experience of our own country and that of other countries. It is not only the product of the People's Revolutionary Movement in China, but also a product of the international socialist movement."[1]

This draft was presented as a finished product to the Constitutional Drafting Committee at its first meeting in March 1954. The Central Government announced that the Draft Constitution would be discussed by the Political Consultative Conference, the governments of the regions, the provinces, the municipalities, the democratic parties, the local branches of the People's organizations, and the military forces. This was little more than a gesture to enlist popular support. When the National People's Congress was convened, nineteen days were devoted to organizing the work of the congress, and then the Constitution was

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[1] Liu Shao-ch'i, Report on the Draft Constitution; see Current Background, No. 294, Hong Kong, American Consulate-General, Sept. 20, 1954, p. 8.

000 unanimously passed within one hour. The only changes made were minor changes in wording.

The Chinese Communist Constitution contains a few features which are reminiscent of the highly authoritarian and centralized imperial Chinese state and a number which are reminiscent of the structure of the Kuomintang after 1924. But in the present context the resemblance to Chinese precedent is of less significance than the resemblance to the Stalin Constitution of 1936. This is scarcely surprising in view of the manner in which the document was written. In analyzing either constitution, it is essential to remember that to the Communists a constitution is not a statement of abstract and enduring principles but one of many instruments forged to speed the struggle toward a socialist, and ultimately Communist, society. Therefore, every article must be examined in the context of what seem to be the ultimate goals of the international Communist movement.

The Chinese and Russian Constitutions are generally similar not only in basic principles, but also in wording and style, as the following juxtaposed passages will show:

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USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.	Art. 1. The People's Republic of China is a democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
Art. 2. The political foundation of the USSR is the Soviet of Working People's deputies which grew and became strong as a result of the overthrew of the power of the landlords and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat.	Art. 2. All power in the People's Republic of China belongs to the people. The organs through which the people exercise power are the National People's Congress and the local People's Congress. The preamble of the Chinese Constitution says: The Chinese people led by the Communist Party finally achieved their great victory in the People's revolution against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat-capitalism.
Art. 4. The economic foundation of the USSR	Art. 5. At present the following basic forms of ownership of means of

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is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production... **Art. 5.** Socialist property in the USSR exists either in the form of state property (belonging to the whole people) or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property.	production exist in the People's Republic of China: state ownership, that is, ownership by the whole people; co-operative ownerships, that is, collective ownership by the working-masses; ownership by the individual working people; and capitalist ownership.
Art. 6. The land, its mineral wealth, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water, and air transport, banks, communication... are state property,	**Art. 6.** Socialist Ownership: All mineral resources and water, as well as forest, undeveloped land, and other resources which are state-owned by law, are the property of the

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that is, belong to the whole people.[2]	people.[3]

II. THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME SOVIET

While the USSR and the Supreme Soviet is composed of two chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the Chinese People's National Congress is a unicameral system. The Chinese State has been unitary for two millennia and the Communist Constitution contains no provision parallel to those concerning the Federal Republics of the Soviet Union.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 30. The highest organ of state power in the USSR is the	Art. 21. The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state authority in the

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[2] J. H. Meisel and E. S. Kozera, Material for the Study of the Soviet System, Ann Arbor, The George Wahr Publishing Company, 1950, p. 243.

[3] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Language Press, 1954.

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Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	People's Republic of China.
Art. 32. The legislative power of the USSR is exercised by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Art. 22. The National People's Congress is the only legislative authority in the country.

As the power of a national congress in a unitary state is unlimited, it can make laws on any subject. The drafters of the Chinese Communist Constitution failed to understand the distinction between the Soviet federal state and the Chinese unitary state and have quite unnecessarily specified the powers of their national congress as if China were a federal union.

The Chinese National People's Congress is indirectly elected. According to Article 23 of the Constitution: The National People's Congress is composed of deputies elected by the provinces, autonomous municipalities directly under central authority, the armed forces, and the Chinese residents abroad. There are several electoral levels within each province. The hsiang is the lowest unit of local government, and the congress of a hsiang

000 is elected by the population. Above it, the county congress is composed of deputies elected by the hsiang congresses, and the provincial congress is then composed of deputies elected by the county congresses. Members of the National People's Congress are elected by the provincial congresses. Under this system of election, the intermediate layers -- the hsiang congress, the county congress, and the provincial congress -- make it difficult for the public to see the true relation between promises made by members of congresses and their fulfillment to their ultimate constituencies. The Chinese Communist Party can easily manipulate the small number of deputies involved on each level.

After the military conquest of the Mainland, Communist prestige reached a new high. When the election of people's congresses was instituted, the Communists generally won a majority of at least 60 per cent on all levels of government. The Chinese Communist Party is confident of its powerful influence over the people and over all other political groups.

This one-party rule is somewhat obscured because other democratic groups are allowed to exist and to sit in the National People's Congress. Their leaders have been elected as deputy-chairmen under Liu Shao-ch'i. The

000 preamble of the Constitution explicitly states: "In the course of the great struggle to establish the People's Republic of China, the people of our country forged a broad people's democratic united front, composed of all democratic classes, democratic parties, and groups, and popular organizations, and led by the Communist Party of China."[4] In reality, these non-Communist leaders have no power and are used by the Communists as a facade.

III. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE STATE COUNCIL

The position of Mao Tse-tung as the Chairman of the People's Republic of China is unique in the Communist world. This position is found neither in the Soviet government nor the "People's democracies." Stalin said, "The USSR should not have an individual president elected by the entire population on an equal basis with the Supreme Soviet, who might essay to stand out against the Supreme

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[4] *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

000 Soviet."[5] It was explained by Soviet jurists that Stalin was referring to men like Napoleon and Hindenburg who rose above the state they were to serve. This consideration does not appear to have concerned the Chinese Communists. While the president of the Presidium of the USSR is a titular head, Mao Tse-tung represents the People's Republic in its relations with foreign states, commands the armed forces of the country, promulgates laws and decrees, and appoints or removes the Premier, Vice-Premier, and ministers. It is clear that Mao is an individual president, deviating from the collective presidency system of Soviet Russia, regardless of Liu Shao-ch'i's statement that "Ours is a collective head of state."[6]

Another divergence from the Soviet Constitutional pattern is the Chinese State Council. In the USSR the Council of Ministers, including its chairman or premier, is appointed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, but in China the premier is recommended first by the Chairman of the People's Republic

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5. Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR, Oxford Press, New York, 1948, p. 263.
6. Liu Shao-ch'i, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

000 and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress. Again, the ministers of the State Council are not, like the Council of Ministers in the USSR, appointed by the Presidium, but are recommended first by the premier and then accepted or rejected by the National People's Congress, or by the Standing Committee when the Congress is in recess. The Chinese Standing Committees' inability to appoint the premier means that it is less powerful than its counterpart, the Presidium of the USSR. The division of powers to appoint the premier and ministers in China may in part result from concern over the personal relations of the three top leaders. Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Republic, may wish to have a share in the choice of Premier; Chou En-lai may be reluctant to have his premiership decided by Liu Shao-ch'i, who, as Chairman of the National Congress and the Standing Committee, would then appear superior to Chou.

In both China and the Soviet Union the ministers are directly subordinate to the State Council. In the Constitution of the Soviet Union, thirty all-union ministries are enumerated. Communist China has the following, similar list: Internal Affairs; Foreign Affairs; National Defense; Public Security; Justice; Control; State Planning;

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000 State Construction; Finance; Food; Commerce; Foreign Trade; First Ministry of Machine Building; Second Ministry of Machine Building; Fuel Industry; Geology; Building-Industry; Textile Industry; Local Industry; Railways; Communication; Post and Telecommunication; Agriculture; Forestry and Reclamation; Water Conservation; Labor; Cultural Affairs; Higher Education; Education; Public Health; Physical Education; Nationalities Affairs; and Overseas Chinese Affairs. Eight administrative offices attached to the State Council co-ordinate the elaborately subdivided work of the ministries.

IV. THE STANDING COMMITTEE AND THE PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

The functions of the Standing Committee in China are the same as those of the Presidium of the USSR, except that the Standing Committee's power of appointment is limited to vice-premiers and ministers.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 49. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet	Art. 31. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

000 of the USSR: (a) convenes the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (b) issues decrees; (c) gives interpretations of the laws of the USSR in operation; (d) dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in conformity with Article 57 of the constitution of the USSR, and orders new elections; (e) conducts nationwide polls (referendum) on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics; (f) annuls decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and of the council of ministers

exercises the following functions and powers: (1) to conduct the election of deputies to the National People's Congress; (2) to convene the National People's Congress; (3) to interpret the laws; (4) to adopt decrees; (5) to supervise the work of the State Council, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (6) to annul decisions and orders of the State Council which contravene the Constitution, laws, and decrees; (7) to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by the government authorities of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central authority; (8) to decide on the appointment or removal of any Vice-Premier, Minister, head of commission, or secretary-general of the

000 of the Union Republics if they do not conform to law; (g) in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, releases and appoints ministers of the USSR on the recommendation of the Chairman of the council of ministers of the USSR subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (h) institutes decorations (orders and medals) and titles of honor of the USSR; (i) awards orders and medals and confers titles of honor of the USSR; (j) exercises the right of pardon; (k) institutes military titles,

State Council when the National People's Congress is not in session; (9) to appoint or remove the vice-presidents, judges, and other members of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court; (10) to appoint or remove the deputy chief procurators, procurators, and other members of the Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme People's Procuratorate; (11) to decide on the appointment or recall of plenipotentiary representatives to foreign state; (12) to decide on the ratification or abrogation of treaties concluded with foreign states; (13) to institute military, diplomatic and other special titles and ranks; (14) to institute and decide on the award of state orders, medals, and titles of honor; (15) to decide on the granting of pardons; (16)

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OVO diplomatic ranks, and other special titles; (l) appoints and removes the high command of the Armed Forces of the USSR; (m) in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, proclaims a state of war in the event of military attack on the USSR or when necessary to fulfill international treaty obligations concerning mutual defense against aggression; (n) orders general or partial mobilization; (o) ratifies and denounces international treaties of the USSR; (p) appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the USSR to foreign states; (q) receives the letters

to decide, when the National People's Congress is not in session, on the proclamation of a state of war in the event of armed attack on the country or in fulfillment of international treaty obligations concerning common defense against aggression; (17) to decide on general or partial mobilization; (18) to decide on the enforcement of martial law throughout the country or in certain areas; and (19) to exercise such other functions and powers as are vested in it by the National People's Congress.

000 of credence and recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states; and (r) proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the USSR in the interest of the defense of the USSR or of the maintenance of public order and the security of the state.	
Art. 48. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for all its activities.[7]	Art. 33. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is responsible to the National People's Congress and reports to it.[8]

V. THE JUDICIARY

Article 78 of the Chinese Communist

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[7] The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[8] Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

ovv Constitution states that in administering justice the People's Court is independent, subject only to the law. And, according to Article 85, "citizens of the People's Republic are equal before the law." However, the first article of the constitution says that the People's Republic is based on the alliance of the workers and peasants. This wording clearly shows that capitalists and landlords are much less privileged than workers and peasants.

The president of a People's Court is not a judge appointed for life. He is elected by the People's Congress on the corresponding level. In addition to the judge, there are assessors, according to Article 25 of the organic law of People's Courts and People's Procuratorates. With the exception of those deprived of political rights, citizens who have reached the age of twenty-three, and have the right to elect, may be elected as assessors.

Cases of the first instance in the People's Courts are heard in full court composed of judges and People's assessors. The People's Court is responsible to the People's Congress on the corresponding level; it is not independent. The Six Codes instituted during the Kuomintang period have been declared null and void; the newly issued Communist laws and ordinances are instruments of Communist political policy.

000 The judicial systems of Soviet Russia and Communist China are similar in spirit and letter, as the following comparisons will show.

USSR	COMMUNIST CHINA
Art. 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.	Art. 78. In administering justice, the people's courts are independent, subject only to the law.
Art. 103. In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.	Art. 75. The system of people's assessers applies, in accordance with law, to judicial proceeding in the People's Courts.
Art. 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, autonomous republic, or autonomous region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed the	Art. 77. Citizens of all nationalities have the right to use their own spoken and written languages in court proceedings. The People's Court are to provide interpretations for any party unacquainted with the spoken and written languages commonly

000 opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and, likewise, the right to use their own language in court.[9]

used in the locality.[10]

VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

An examination of the powers of annulment in local government from the province down to the hsiang will show how the power of governing the localities is centralized according to an hierarchical principle. The fourth paragraph of Article 40 of the Constitution reads, "The People's Congresses at county level and above have power to revise or annul inappropriate decisions issued by People's Congresses at the lower level as well as inappropriate decisions issued by People's Councils at the next lower level."[11]

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[9] *The Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, Peking, The Foreign Languages Press, 1954.

[10] Meisel and Kozera, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

[11] *Ibid.*

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VII. CITIZENS RIGHTS

000 Communists believe that class determines the rights of the individual in society. They disavow the theory of natural rights, and argue that the rights of landlords and capitalists should be eliminated. When the proletarian dictatorship was established in Soviet Russia, the property of the landlords and the capitalists was confiscated. The same thing happened to Chinese landlords and capitalists throughout the country after 1949. Under the Chinese Communist Constitution, the right to property is not guaranteed.

With regard to other rights, the language of the Chinese Constitution is generous only on the surface. According to Article 87: "Citizens . . . have freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of procession, and freedom of demonstration. By providing the necessary material facilities, the state guarantees to citizens enjoyment of these freedoms." However, "freedom of association" in Communist China does not apply to groups which are deemed subversive, and anything which challenges orthodox Communist teaching is deemed subversive. The great majority of the newspapers are government-owned or Party-owned, and the news to be published is

000 under the control of the New China News Agency; the newspapers of the other democratic groups can only publish or write as they are instructed.

Article 89 says that "freedom of the person of citizens. . . is inviolable." In reality, each person is a member of the urban street office, or urban inhabitants' committee, with the result that he is under the watch of Party members. Each must deposit his cash in a bank, which is situated at the corner of a street, and his bank account can be examined, so there is little freedom to dispose of one's own money. A Party member or a policeman may question anyone about his neighbors, and visitors must be reported.

The Russian Communists call the modern Western European and American views of civil rights "formal." By this, they insinuate that, while according to the letter of the Western European and American constitutions each citizen supposedly enjoys the same rights, in fact, however, a workman or a peasant never enjoys the same rights as a landlord or a capitalist. The Russians claim to reject this Western interpretation and to look at the question in the light of the common practice. Stalin says in his article, "The Principal Specific Features of the Draft Constitution,"

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> "Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights . . . . What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantees of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but insures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation."[12]

VIII. CONCLUSION

Because the Chinese Communist Constitution is only a legal document, one must seek the reality behind it.

The Chinese Communist Party has always

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12. Meisel and Kozera, op. cit., p. 236.

000 aimed at seizing and maintaining power; its war machine, its organizations, its propaganda, and its discipline are directed to this end.

In order to attain a monopoly of power, the Chinese Communists have worked to remove all obstacles. From Lenin, they have learned that civil rights are an obstacle, that separation of powers is an obstacle, that direct elections are an obstacle. Since there had been little knowledge of these democratic ideas among the people of China, their elimination has proved relatively easy. The Chinese Communists have been able to use new and effective techniques of control to consolidate a dictatorial power beyond the dreams of earlier Chinese autocrats.

1: Stanford University AF16 Southwest China AF16

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/For information on the influence of Communist propaganda over Chinese literary and humanistic activity, see category 116, pp. 227-241/

1: Stanford University AF16 Southwest China AF16

668

/For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day Southwest China, see the entire text in category 116./

113, 427, 56 Lolo AE4

/For a short description of the social organization of the Yi (Lolo) of Sikang, including their relationship to the Miao, see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 83-85/

113, 177, 563

Shan-Thai AL3
Chung-chia

/For a short description of the cultural position of the Chung-chia (Pu-yi) of Kweichow and the effects of Communist control on that position, see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 86-87/

113, 177, 563

Pai-i AE7
Chung-chia

/For a short description of the cultural position of the Chung-chia (Pu-yi) of Kweichow and the effects of Communist control on that position, see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 86-87./

113, 621, 648 Pai-i AE7

/For a short discussion of the social organization and cultural position of the Pai-i of Yunnan - with special reference to Communist control of the area - see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 87-89/

113, 427, 563 Miao AE5

/For a short description of the relationship of the Miao and the Lolo (Yi), and the effects of Communist rule on this relationship, see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 83-84/

105, 113 Miao AE5

/For a cultural summary of the Miao of Kweichow, see 1: Stanford University, AF16 Southwest China, category 116, pp. 82-84/